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fix: address critical E2EE review findings — races, validation, reconnect

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Critical fixes:
- C1: Key holder election now uses lowest-user-ID from voiceStore instead
  of "am I first in peerPublicKeys" heuristic, preventing simultaneous
  join race where both participants generate conflicting room keys
- C2: TOCTOU race in handleVoiceE2EEOffer — target channel check now
  happens inside h.mu.RLock() section (atomically with client lookup)
- C3: Server now validates base64 encoding for public_key, encrypted_key,
  and iv before relaying, preventing client-side DoS via malformed payloads

High fixes:
- H1: ECDH keypair regenerated on reconnect with fresh announce, so
  stale keys don't persist and key rotation during disconnect is handled
- H2: E2EE epoch counter prevents stale offers from overwriting a
  rotated room key (handleE2EEOffer discards if epoch changed during unwrap)
- H3: After key rotation, re-check for peers that arrived during the async
  wrapping loop and send them the new key too
- H4: _ecdhKeyPair and _roomKey captured in local vars before async
  operations to prevent null dereference if clearE2EEState runs concurrently

Medium fixes:
- M1: User notified via onErrorCallback when E2EE key exchange times out
- M2: Timeout timer properly cleared to prevent leak and unhandled rejection
- M3: Duplicate announces deduplicated — same key ignored, changed key logged

https://claude.ai/code/session_01KKo3RwjdmcNzkgXNfUkgNT
This commit is contained in:
Claude
2026-04-04 19:35:41 +00:00
parent b89a7efa6a
commit 277c2d3e76
2 changed files with 128 additions and 30 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
Client/tauri-client/src/lib/livekitSession.ts
+108 -27
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import {
leaveVoiceChannel,
setListenOnly,
} from "@stores/voice.store";
import { authStore } from "@stores/auth.store";
import { loadPref } from "@components/settings/helpers";
import { createLogger } from "@lib/logger";
import { invoke } from "@tauri-apps/api/core";
@@ -150,6 +151,9 @@ export class LiveKitSession {
private _roomKeyRejector: ((err: Error) => void) | null = null;
/** Guard: true while a key rotation is in progress (prevents concurrent rotations). */
private _rotatingKey = false;
/** Monotonic counter incremented on every key rotation. handleE2EEOffer captures the
* epoch before async work and discards the result if epoch changed (stale offer). */
private _e2eeEpoch = 0;
/** Announces that arrived before our ECDH keypair was ready. Drained after keypair init. */
private _pendingAnnounces: Array<{ userId: number; publicKeyBase64: string }> = [];
@@ -435,12 +439,24 @@ export class LiveKitSession {
return;
}
// E2EE keys are exchanged client-side via ECDH. On reconnect, the
// room key is still in _roomKey from the previous session. Re-apply it.
// E2EE: Regenerate ECDH keypair for the new session (forward secrecy)
// and re-announce so other participants can re-wrap the room key for us.
// If we still have the room key from before disconnect, re-apply it now
// so audio works immediately; the key holder will send a fresh offer if
// the key was rotated during our absence.
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop -- must set up E2EE before connect
this._ecdhKeyPair = await generateECDHKeyPair();
this._peerPublicKeys.clear();
if (this._roomKey) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop -- must set key before connect
await this._e2eeKeyProvider.setKey(roomKeyToBase64(this._roomKey));
}
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop -- must export before connect
const reconnectPubKey = await exportPublicKey(this._ecdhKeyPair.publicKey);
this.ws?.send({
type: "voice_e2ee_announce",
payload: { public_key: reconnectPubKey },
});
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop -- sequential reconnect: must connect before restoring state
await newRoom.connect(resolvedUrl, token);
@@ -821,15 +837,22 @@ export class LiveKitSession {
log.info("E2EE: drained queued announce", { userId: qId });
}
// Determine if we are the key holder (first in channel = no existing
// voice_e2ee_announce messages received before this point).
// The server sends existing participants' public keys during voice_join
// sync — if we received none (including queued), we're first.
const existingPeerCount = this._peerPublicKeys.size;
this._isKeyHolder = existingPeerCount === 0;
// Determine key holder by lowest user ID in the channel (deterministic,
// avoids race when two users join simultaneously — both would otherwise
// see zero peers and elect themselves key holder).
const myId = authStore.getState().user?.id ?? 0;
const channelVoiceUsers = voiceStore.getState().voiceUsers.get(channelId);
let lowestInChannel = myId;
if (channelVoiceUsers) {
for (const uid of channelVoiceUsers.keys()) {
if (uid < lowestInChannel) lowestInChannel = uid;
}
}
this._isKeyHolder = myId !== 0 && lowestInChannel === myId;
if (this._isKeyHolder) {
// We're the first participant — generate the room key.
this._e2eeEpoch++;
this._roomKey = generateRoomKey();
await this._e2eeKeyProvider.setKey(roomKeyToBase64(this._roomKey));
log.info("E2EE: key holder — generated room key", { channelId });
@@ -842,13 +865,17 @@ export class LiveKitSession {
this._roomKeyRejector = reject;
});
// Don't block forever — timeout after 10 seconds.
const timeout = new Promise<void>((_, reject) =>
setTimeout(() => reject(new Error("E2EE key exchange timeout")), 10_000),
);
let timeoutId: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null = null;
const timeout = new Promise<void>((_, reject) => {
timeoutId = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error("E2EE key exchange timeout")), 10_000);
});
try {
await Promise.race([roomKeyPromise, timeout]);
} catch {
log.warn("E2EE: key exchange timed out, proceeding without E2EE", { channelId });
this.onErrorCallback?.("End-to-end encryption unavailable — key exchange timed out");
} finally {
if (timeoutId !== null) clearTimeout(timeoutId);
}
this._roomKeyResolver = null;
this._roomKeyRejector = null;
@@ -1106,16 +1133,32 @@ export class LiveKitSession {
return;
}
try {
// Deduplicate: if we already have a key for this user with the same base64,
// skip the import. If the key changed, log a warning (could be a reconnect
// or a protocol violation).
const existingKey = this._peerPublicKeys.get(userId);
const peerKey = await importPublicKey(publicKeyBase64);
if (existingKey) {
const existingB64 = await exportPublicKey(existingKey);
if (existingB64 === publicKeyBase64) {
log.debug("E2EE: duplicate announce from same key, ignoring", { userId });
return;
}
log.warn("E2EE: peer public key changed (reconnect or key rotation?)", { userId });
}
this._peerPublicKeys.set(userId, peerKey);
log.info("E2EE: received peer public key", { userId });
// If we're the key holder and have a room key, wrap it for the new peer.
if (this._isKeyHolder && this._roomKey && this._ecdhKeyPair) {
// Capture keypair + roomKey before async work to avoid null dereference if
// clearE2EEState() runs concurrently.
const keypair = this._ecdhKeyPair;
const currentRoomKey = this._roomKey;
if (this._isKeyHolder && currentRoomKey && keypair) {
const { encryptedKey, iv } = await wrapRoomKey(
this._ecdhKeyPair.privateKey,
keypair.privateKey,
peerKey,
this._roomKey,
currentRoomKey,
);
this.ws?.send({
type: "voice_e2ee_offer",
@@ -1143,17 +1186,33 @@ export class LiveKitSession {
log.warn("E2EE: received offer from unknown peer", { fromUserId });
return;
}
if (!this._ecdhKeyPair) {
const keypair = this._ecdhKeyPair;
if (!keypair) {
log.warn("E2EE: received offer but no ECDH keypair");
return;
}
this._roomKey = await unwrapRoomKey(
this._ecdhKeyPair.privateKey,
// Capture epoch before async work — if a key rotation occurs during
// unwrap, the epoch will have advanced and we discard this stale result.
const epochBefore = this._e2eeEpoch;
const unwrapped = await unwrapRoomKey(
keypair.privateKey,
peerKey,
encryptedKeyBase64,
ivBase64,
);
if (this._e2eeEpoch !== epochBefore) {
log.info("E2EE: discarding stale offer (epoch changed during unwrap)", {
fromUserId,
epochBefore,
epochNow: this._e2eeEpoch,
});
return;
}
this._roomKey = unwrapped;
await this._e2eeKeyProvider.setKey(roomKeyToBase64(this._roomKey));
log.info("E2EE: room key received and applied", { fromUserId });
@@ -1199,10 +1258,7 @@ export class LiveKitSession {
}
const wasKeyHolder = this._isKeyHolder;
// Use parseUserId for safe parsing of LiveKit identity strings.
const myUserId = this._room?.localParticipant?.identity
? parseUserId(this._room.localParticipant.identity)
: 0;
const myUserId = authStore.getState().user?.id ?? 0;
if (myUserId !== 0 && lowestUserId === myUserId && !wasKeyHolder) {
// Prevent concurrent rotations (e.g. two participants leave in rapid succession).
@@ -1216,15 +1272,20 @@ export class LiveKitSession {
// Rotate the room key — generate a new one and distribute to all remaining peers.
try {
this._e2eeEpoch++;
this._roomKey = generateRoomKey();
await this._e2eeKeyProvider.setKey(roomKeyToBase64(this._roomKey));
log.info("E2EE: rotated room key", { channelId });
log.info("E2EE: rotated room key", { channelId, epoch: this._e2eeEpoch });
// Wrap and send the new key to all remaining peers.
if (this._ecdhKeyPair) {
for (const [peerId, peerKey] of this._peerPublicKeys) {
// Snapshot peers before async loop — new peers that arrive during
// wrapping are handled by the post-rotation check below.
const keypair = this._ecdhKeyPair;
const peersSnapshot = new Map(this._peerPublicKeys);
if (keypair) {
for (const [peerId, peerKey] of peersSnapshot) {
const { encryptedKey, iv } = await wrapRoomKey(
this._ecdhKeyPair.privateKey,
keypair.privateKey,
peerKey,
this._roomKey,
);
@@ -1234,8 +1295,27 @@ export class LiveKitSession {
});
}
log.info("E2EE: distributed rotated key to peers", {
peerCount: this._peerPublicKeys.size,
peerCount: peersSnapshot.size,
});
// H3: Check for peers that arrived during the rotation loop and
// send them the new key too.
if (keypair === this._ecdhKeyPair && this._roomKey) {
for (const [peerId, peerKey] of this._peerPublicKeys) {
if (!peersSnapshot.has(peerId)) {
const { encryptedKey, iv } = await wrapRoomKey(
keypair.privateKey,
peerKey,
this._roomKey,
);
this.ws?.send({
type: "voice_e2ee_offer",
payload: { target_user_id: peerId, encrypted_key: encryptedKey, iv },
});
log.info("E2EE: sent rotated key to late-arriving peer", { peerId });
}
}
}
}
} catch (err) {
log.error("E2EE: failed to rotate room key", err);
@@ -1252,6 +1332,7 @@ export class LiveKitSession {
this._peerPublicKeys.clear();
this._isKeyHolder = false;
this._rotatingKey = false;
this._e2eeEpoch = 0;
this._pendingAnnounces.length = 0;
// Reject (not resolve) so waiting connectAndSetup sees a failure, not a
// silent success with no room key.
Server/ws/voice_e2ee.go
+20 -3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package ws
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"log/slog"
)
@@ -32,6 +33,10 @@ func (h *Hub) handleVoiceE2EEAnnounce(_ context.Context, c *Client, payload json
c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeBadPayload, "public_key too large"))
return
}
if _, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(p.PublicKey); err != nil {
c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeBadPayload, "public_key is not valid base64"))
return
}
// Store the public key on the client for later retrieval by new joiners.
c.setE2EEPubKey(p.PublicKey)
@@ -68,16 +73,28 @@ func (h *Hub) handleVoiceE2EEOffer(_ context.Context, c *Client, payload json.Ra
c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeBadPayload, "encrypted_key or iv too large"))
return
}
if _, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(p.EncryptedKey); err != nil {
c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeBadPayload, "encrypted_key is not valid base64"))
return
}
if _, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(p.IV); err != nil {
c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeBadPayload, "iv is not valid base64"))
return
}
// Verify the target is in the same voice channel.
// Verify the target is in the same voice channel — lookup and channel
// check must be atomic (under the same lock hold) to prevent TOCTOU races
// where the target leaves between lookup and the channel comparison.
h.mu.RLock()
target, ok := h.clients[p.TargetUserID]
h.mu.RUnlock()
if !ok {
h.mu.RUnlock()
c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeBadPayload, "target user not connected"))
return
}
if target.getVoiceChID() != voiceChID {
targetChID := target.getVoiceChID()
h.mu.RUnlock()
if targetChID != voiceChID {
c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeForbidden, "target user not in your voice channel"))
return
}