fix: 11 defects from bughunt sweep across server, db and client (#1382)

* fix(ws): 1 defect(s) (OC-0001) * fix(db): 1 defect(s) (OC-0002) sanitizeFTSQuery filtered only characters, so FTS5's bareword boolean keywords (AND, OR, NOT) reached MATCH as operators; a query in an invalid operator position raised "fts5: syntax error" instead of returning results. Drop those bareword tokens after sanitizing. * fix(dm): 1 defect(s) (OC-0004) * fix(ws): 1 defect(s) (OC-0005) * fix(voice): 1 defect(s) (OC-0006) Count the shared voice_max_video budget in streams rather than rows: a single user publishing both camera and screenshare consumed one slot while producing two live streams, letting a channel over-admit up to 2N streams against an N-stream cap. * fix(client): 2 defect(s) (OC-0007, OC-0009) OC-0007: mark the active channel loading before invalidating its message window on a full-ready resync, so MessageList shows the spinner instead of the empty-channel state for the duration of the refetch. OC-0009: fan USER_UPDATE renames out to voiceStore.voiceUsers, which keeps its own frozen username copy, so the voice roster no longer shows a stale name for the rest of the call. * fix(admin): 1 defect(s) (OC-0010) * fix(identity): 1 defect(s) (OC-0011) * fix(ws): 1 defect(s) (OC-0003) The public half of an invisible user's presence (PresenceOthersEvent, and BroadcastPresence's own mapped payload) went out via broadcastExcludeLow on the low-priority queue - the ephemeral, unsequenced, drop-on-overflow transport built for typing indicators - while every other source of the same user's presence shares the normal-priority queue. That split one user's presence across two per-client FIFOs with different durability and different drain order (writePump drains normal strictly before low), so a frame could land out of order against a later connect/disconnect presence frame, or be silently dropped with no replay recovery. Adds Hub.BroadcastToAllExcept, which routes through the same h.broadcast channel and seqMu-serialized deliverBroadcast as BroadcastToAll, carrying an excludeUserID that deliverBroadcast applies via pubsub.Publish(TopicGlobal, msg, excludeUserID). * fix(ws): 1 defect(s) (OC-0008) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 03:50:00 +03:00 · 2026-08-16 17:06:11 +02:00
parent d6c768cb90
commit 36be31db43
25 changed files with 1346 additions and 62 deletions
@@ -1436,6 +1436,60 @@ func TestAdminAPI_DeleteChannel_NilHubDoesNotPanic(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

+// OC-0010: handleDeleteChannel commits archived=1 as its own transaction and
+// evicts voice participants BEFORE calling AdminDeleteChannel — all on
+// r.Context(). If the admin's browser aborts the request in that window (tab
+// close, navigation, network blip), r.Context() is canceled and the final
+// AdminDeleteChannel call fails with context.Canceled: the handler 500s, but
+// the archive and the voice eviction already committed. Nothing reverts the
+// archive, nothing broadcasts it, and no audit row is written — the channel
+// is left silently archived (writes refused, channel_focus 403s) while every
+// connected client still shows it live in the sidebar.
+//
+// This reproduces the race deterministically by canceling the request
+// context from inside CleanupVoiceForChannel — exactly the call the repro
+// says the real-world cancellation lands during — instead of relying on
+// timing. The fix must make the delete tolerate a caller cancellation that
+// arrives after the archive has already committed.
+func TestAdminAPI_DeleteChannel_SurvivesContextCancelAfterArchiveCommits(t *testing.T) {
+	database := openAdminTestDB(t)
+	hub := &mockHub{}
+	handler := admin.NewAdminAPI(database, "1.0.0", hub, nil, nil, nil, nil, newTestModService(database), newTestRoleService(database))
+	token := createAdminUser(t, database)
+
+	chID, _ := database.AdminCreateChannel(context.Background(), "del-cancel-race", "text", "", "", 0)
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	// Fires synchronously inside handleDeleteChannel, after the archive
+	// commit but before the final AdminDeleteChannel call — the same window
+	// the repro describes a browser abort landing in.
+	hub.onVoiceCleanup = func(int64) {
+		cancel()
+	}
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/channels/"+itoa(chID), nil)
+	req = req.WithContext(ctx)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	if w.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 204 (delete must survive a caller cancellation that arrives after the archive already committed); body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+
+	ch, err := database.GetChannel(context.Background(), chID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GetChannel: %v", err)
+	}
+	if ch != nil {
+		t.Errorf("channel %d still exists after a reported-successful delete: %+v", chID, ch)
+	}
+
+	if len(hub.channelDeleteIDs) != 1 || hub.channelDeleteIDs[0] != chID {
+		t.Errorf("BroadcastChannelDelete calls = %v, want exactly [%d]", hub.channelDeleteIDs, chID)
+	}
+}
+
 // ─── API tokens: /admin/api/tokens ───────────────────────────────────────────

 func TestAdminAPI_CreateAPIToken_OK(t *testing.T) {
@@ -317,13 +317,33 @@ func handleDeleteChannel(database *db.DB, hub HubBroadcaster) http.HandlerFunc {
 			hub.CleanupVoiceForChannel(id)
 		}

-		if err := database.AdminDeleteChannel(r.Context(), id); err != nil {
+		// From here on the archive (and, if it ran, the voice eviction)
+		// already committed. If the admin's browser goes away in this window
+		// (tab close, navigation, network blip), r.Context() cancels, and an
+		// AdminDeleteChannel that still used it would fail with
+		// context.Canceled — 500ing while leaving the channel silently
+		// archived, unbroadcast and unaudited (OC-0010). Run the rest of the
+		// delete on an uncancellable tail, matching the repo's convention
+		// for other durable side effects (totp_handler.go, service/user.go).
+		delCtx := context.WithoutCancel(r.Context())
+		if err := database.AdminDeleteChannel(delCtx, id); err != nil {
+			// A genuine failure here (not caller cancellation, which delCtx
+			// already absorbs) still leaves the archive committed — tell
+			// connected clients about the state that did change instead of
+			// leaving them stuck seeing a live channel that now 403s on
+			// every read and write.
+			if hub != nil && !existing.Archived {
+				if archived, gErr := database.GetChannel(delCtx, id); gErr == nil && archived != nil {
+					hub.BroadcastChannelUpdate(archived)
+					hub.RefreshChannelVisibility(archived)
+				}
+			}
 			writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to delete channel")
 			return
 		}
 		actor := actorFromContext(r)
 		slog.Warn("channel deleted", "actor_id", actor, "channel_id", id, "name", existing.Name)
-		db.WriteAudit(context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()), database, actor, "channel_delete", "channel", id,
+		db.WriteAudit(delCtx, database, actor, "channel_delete", "channel", id,
 			fmt.Sprintf("deleted #%s", existing.Name))
 		if hub != nil {
 			hub.BroadcastChannelDelete(id)
@@ -225,6 +225,30 @@ func handleEnableTOTP(pendingStore *auth.PendingTOTPStore, limiter *auth.RateLim
 	}
 }

+// revokeOtherSessionsAfterAuthChange revokes every session for userID except
+// keepSessionID as the security tail of a committed 2FA state change. It
+// mirrors UserService.ChangePassword (service/user.go:262-274): a failure is
+// logged and retried once (bounded compensating retry for transient write
+// contention); if the retry also fails, revoked reports what did succeed and
+// failed is true so the caller can report a partial success instead of
+// silently claiming the other sessions were revoked when they were not.
+func revokeOtherSessionsAfterAuthChange(ctx context.Context, database *db.DB, userID, keepSessionID int64, action string) (revoked int64, failed bool) {
+	revoked, err := database.DeleteOtherSessions(ctx, userID, keepSessionID)
+	if err != nil {
+		slog.Error("DeleteOtherSessions after "+action, "err", err, "user_id", userID)
+		revokedRetry, retryErr := database.DeleteOtherSessions(ctx, userID, keepSessionID)
+		if retryErr != nil {
+			slog.Error("DeleteOtherSessions retry after "+action, "err", retryErr, "user_id", userID)
+			return revoked, true
+		}
+		revoked += revokedRetry
+	}
+	if revoked > 0 {
+		slog.Info("revoked other sessions after "+action, "user_id", userID, "revoked", revoked)
+	}
+	return revoked, false
+}
+
 func handleConfirmTOTP(database *db.DB, pendingStore *auth.PendingTOTPStore, usedTOTPCodes *auth.UsedTOTPCodeStore, limiter *auth.RateLimiter, totpKey []byte) http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
@@ -313,15 +337,26 @@ func handleConfirmTOTP(database *db.DB, pendingStore *auth.PendingTOTPStore, use
 		}
 		// Security tail of the 2FA change: once the secret update committed,
 		// revoking the other sessions must not be aborted by a dead request.
-		n, _ := database.DeleteOtherSessions(context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()), user.ID, keepSessionID)
-		if n > 0 {
-			slog.Info("revoked other sessions after totp enable", "user_id", user.ID, "revoked", n)
-		}
+		tailCtx := context.WithoutCancel(r.Context())
+		revoked, revokeFailed := revokeOtherSessionsAfterAuthChange(tailCtx, database, user.ID, keepSessionID, "totp enable")

 		slog.Info("totp enabled", "user_id", user.ID)
-		db.WriteAudit(context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()), database, user.ID, "totp_enabled", "user", user.ID,
+		db.WriteAudit(tailCtx, database, user.ID, "totp_enabled", "user", user.ID,
 			"two-factor authentication enrolled")

+		if revokeFailed {
+			// Partial success: 2FA IS enabled; only revoking the other
+			// sessions failed. A 5xx here would be a lie — the state change
+			// already committed — so mirror the ChangePassword contract
+			// (api/profile_handler.go) and report 200 with an explicit warning
+			// instead of a silent, unqualified 204.
+			writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
+				"warning":          "two-factor authentication enabled, but other sessions could not be revoked; revoke them from the sessions list",
+				"sessions_revoked": revoked,
+			})
+			return
+		}
+
 		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
 	}
 }
@@ -403,15 +438,26 @@ func handleDisableTOTP(database *db.DB, pendingStore *auth.PendingTOTPStore, lim
 		}
 		// Security tail of the 2FA change: once the secret update committed,
 		// revoking the other sessions must not be aborted by a dead request.
-		n, _ := database.DeleteOtherSessions(context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()), user.ID, keepSessionID)
-		if n > 0 {
-			slog.Info("revoked other sessions after totp disable", "user_id", user.ID, "revoked", n)
-		}
+		tailCtx := context.WithoutCancel(r.Context())
+		revoked, revokeFailed := revokeOtherSessionsAfterAuthChange(tailCtx, database, user.ID, keepSessionID, "totp disable")

 		slog.Info("totp disabled", "user_id", user.ID)
-		db.WriteAudit(context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()), database, user.ID, "totp_disabled", "user", user.ID,
+		db.WriteAudit(tailCtx, database, user.ID, "totp_disabled", "user", user.ID,
 			"two-factor authentication disabled")

+		if revokeFailed {
+			// Partial success: 2FA IS disabled; only revoking the other
+			// sessions failed. A 5xx here would be a lie — the state change
+			// already committed — so mirror the ChangePassword contract
+			// (api/profile_handler.go) and report 200 with an explicit warning
+			// instead of a silent, unqualified 204.
+			writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
+				"warning":          "two-factor authentication disabled, but other sessions could not be revoked; revoke them from the sessions list",
+				"sessions_revoked": revoked,
+			})
+			return
+		}
+
 		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
 	}
 }
@@ -528,6 +528,150 @@ func TestDisableTOTP_APITokenPrincipal_RevokesAllSessions(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

+// ─── OC-0011: DeleteOtherSessions failures must not be silent successes ──────
+
+// TestConfirmTOTP_RevokeFailureSurfacesWarning locks down that when
+// DeleteOtherSessions fails after a 2FA enable commits, the handler must not
+// report unqualified success: it should mirror the ChangePassword contract
+// (service/user.go:262-274 / api/profile_handler.go:377) and report a 200
+// with an explicit warning, not a silent 204.
+func TestConfirmTOTP_RevokeFailureSurfacesWarning(t *testing.T) {
+	database := newAuthTestDB(t)
+	limiter := auth.NewRateLimiter()
+	router := buildAuthRouter(database, limiter)
+
+	token := loginAndGetToken(t, router, database, "confirmrevokefail", 4)
+	user, _ := database.GetUserByUsername(context.Background(), "confirmrevokefail")
+	if user == nil {
+		t.Fatal("user not found")
+	}
+
+	// A second, unrelated session so DeleteOtherSessions has a row to delete
+	// (a DELETE that matches zero rows never fires a BEFORE DELETE trigger).
+	otherToken, _ := auth.GenerateToken()
+	if _, err := database.CreateSession(context.Background(), user.ID, auth.HashToken(otherToken), "other-device", "127.0.0.1"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateSession: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Step 1: enable to get a pending secret (before the trigger exists).
+	rr := postJSONWithToken(t, router, "/api/v1/users/me/totp/enable", token,
+		map[string]string{"password": "Password1!"})
+	if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("enable: status = %d; body = %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
+	}
+	var enableResp map[string]any
+	_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&enableResp)
+	secret := extractSecretFromURI(t, enableResp["qr_uri"].(string))
+	code, _ := auth.GenerateTOTPCode(secret, time.Now().UTC())
+
+	// Make every DELETE against sessions fail from here on, simulating a
+	// genuine DB-level failure (disk error, "database is closed" during
+	// shutdown) rather than a cancel race — the confirm call below already
+	// uses context.WithoutCancel, so a dead request cannot trigger this.
+	if _, err := database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `
+		CREATE TRIGGER block_delete_sessions
+		BEFORE DELETE ON sessions
+		BEGIN
+			SELECT RAISE(FAIL, 'delete blocked');
+		END;
+	`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create trigger: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Step 2: confirm. The secret update must still commit even though the
+	// session-revocation tail fails.
+	rr = postJSONWithToken(t, router, "/api/v1/users/me/totp/confirm", token,
+		map[string]string{"password": "Password1!", "code": code})
+
+	updated, _ := database.GetUserByUsername(context.Background(), "confirmrevokefail")
+	if updated == nil || updated.TOTPSecret == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected TOTPSecret to be committed even though revocation failed")
+	}
+
+	if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("confirm-totp with revoke failure: status = %d, want 200; body = %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
+	}
+	var resp map[string]any
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode confirm response: %v", err)
+	}
+	if resp["warning"] == nil {
+		t.Error("expected a warning field when session revocation failed after totp enable")
+	}
+
+	// The other session must still be present — revocation genuinely failed,
+	// it was not silently skipped or falsely reported as revoked.
+	if s, _ := database.GetSessionByTokenHash(context.Background(), auth.HashToken(otherToken)); s == nil {
+		t.Error("other session should still exist: DeleteOtherSessions was blocked by the trigger")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDisableTOTP_RevokeFailureSurfacesWarning is the handleDisableTOTP
+// sibling of TestConfirmTOTP_RevokeFailureSurfacesWarning.
+func TestDisableTOTP_RevokeFailureSurfacesWarning(t *testing.T) {
+	database := newAuthTestDB(t)
+	limiter := auth.NewRateLimiter()
+	router := buildAuthRouter(database, limiter)
+
+	token := loginAndGetToken(t, router, database, "disablerevokefail", 4)
+	user, _ := database.GetUserByUsername(context.Background(), "disablerevokefail")
+	if user == nil {
+		t.Fatal("user not found")
+	}
+
+	// Enable and confirm TOTP first (before the trigger exists).
+	rr := postJSONWithToken(t, router, "/api/v1/users/me/totp/enable", token,
+		map[string]string{"password": "Password1!"})
+	var enableResp map[string]any
+	_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&enableResp)
+	secret := extractSecretFromURI(t, enableResp["qr_uri"].(string))
+	code, _ := auth.GenerateTOTPCode(secret, time.Now().UTC())
+	rr = postJSONWithToken(t, router, "/api/v1/users/me/totp/confirm", token,
+		map[string]string{"password": "Password1!", "code": code})
+	if rr.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
+		t.Fatalf("setup confirm: status = %d; body = %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
+	}
+
+	// A second, unrelated session so DeleteOtherSessions has a row to delete.
+	otherToken, _ := auth.GenerateToken()
+	if _, err := database.CreateSession(context.Background(), user.ID, auth.HashToken(otherToken), "other-device", "127.0.0.1"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateSession: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if _, err := database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `
+		CREATE TRIGGER block_delete_sessions
+		BEFORE DELETE ON sessions
+		BEGIN
+			SELECT RAISE(FAIL, 'delete blocked');
+		END;
+	`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create trigger: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	rr = deleteWithToken(t, router, "/api/v1/users/me/totp", token,
+		map[string]string{"password": "Password1!"})
+
+	updated, _ := database.GetUserByUsername(context.Background(), "disablerevokefail")
+	if updated == nil || updated.TOTPSecret != nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected TOTPSecret to be cleared even though revocation failed")
+	}
+
+	if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("disable-totp with revoke failure: status = %d, want 200; body = %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
+	}
+	var resp map[string]any
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode disable response: %v", err)
+	}
+	if resp["warning"] == nil {
+		t.Error("expected a warning field when session revocation failed after totp disable")
+	}
+
+	if s, _ := database.GetSessionByTokenHash(context.Background(), auth.HashToken(otherToken)); s == nil {
+		t.Error("other session should still exist: DeleteOtherSessions was blocked by the trigger")
+	}
+}
+
 // ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

 // deleteWithToken sends a DELETE request with a JSON body and auth token.
@@ -70,10 +70,14 @@ type Querier interface {
 	DeleteSessionByToken(ctx context.Context, token string) error
 	DisablePlugin(ctx context.Context, id int64) error
 	EditMessageContent(ctx context.Context, arg EditMessageContentParams) (Message, error)
-	// Camera and screenshare share one voice_max_video budget: a channel capped
-	// at N simultaneous video streams must not let a camera publish ignore
-	// screenshare occupants (or vice versa), so both gates count the same
-	// `camera = 1 OR screenshare = 1` slot usage (OC-0023).
+	// Camera and screenshare share one voice_max_video budget, counted in
+	// STREAMS, not rows: a channel capped at N simultaneous video streams must
+	// not let a camera publish ignore screenshare occupants (or vice versa,
+	// OC-0023), and a single user with both flags set must consume two of the N
+	// slots, not one (OC-0006) -- so both gates sum `vs2.camera + vs2.screenshare`
+	// across the channel's rows rather than counting rows where either is set.
+	// The enabling user's own bit is still 0 at gate time, so no self-exclusion
+	// term is needed.
 	EnableCameraIfUnderLimit(ctx context.Context, arg EnableCameraIfUnderLimitParams) (sql.Result, error)
 	EnablePlugin(ctx context.Context, id int64) error
 	EnableScreenshareIfUnderLimit(ctx context.Context, arg EnableScreenshareIfUnderLimitParams) (sql.Result, error)
@@ -102,40 +102,44 @@ const enableCameraIfUnderLimit = `-- name: EnableCameraIfUnderLimit :execresult

 UPDATE voice_states SET camera = 1
 WHERE voice_states.user_id = ? AND voice_states.channel_id = ?
-  AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM voice_states AS vs2 WHERE vs2.channel_id = ? AND (vs2.camera = 1 OR vs2.screenshare = 1)) < ?
+  AND (SELECT COALESCE(SUM(vs2.camera), 0) + COALESCE(SUM(vs2.screenshare), 0) FROM voice_states AS vs2 WHERE vs2.channel_id = ?) < ?4
 `

 type EnableCameraIfUnderLimitParams struct {
 	UserID      int64 `json:"userId"`
 	ChannelID   int64 `json:"channelId"`
 	ChannelID_2 int64 `json:"channelId2"`
-	ChannelID_3 int64 `json:"channelId3"`
+	MaxVideo    int64 `json:"maxVideo"`
 }

-// Camera and screenshare share one voice_max_video budget: a channel capped
-// at N simultaneous video streams must not let a camera publish ignore
-// screenshare occupants (or vice versa), so both gates count the same
-// `camera = 1 OR screenshare = 1` slot usage (OC-0023).
+// Camera and screenshare share one voice_max_video budget, counted in
+// STREAMS, not rows: a channel capped at N simultaneous video streams must
+// not let a camera publish ignore screenshare occupants (or vice versa,
+// OC-0023), and a single user with both flags set must consume two of the N
+// slots, not one (OC-0006) -- so both gates sum `vs2.camera + vs2.screenshare`
+// across the channel's rows rather than counting rows where either is set.
+// The enabling user's own bit is still 0 at gate time, so no self-exclusion
+// term is needed.
 func (q *Queries) EnableCameraIfUnderLimit(ctx context.Context, arg EnableCameraIfUnderLimitParams) (sql.Result, error) {
 	return q.db.ExecContext(ctx, enableCameraIfUnderLimit,
 		arg.UserID,
 		arg.ChannelID,
 		arg.ChannelID_2,
-		arg.ChannelID_3,
+		arg.MaxVideo,
 	)
 }

 const enableScreenshareIfUnderLimit = `-- name: EnableScreenshareIfUnderLimit :execresult
 UPDATE voice_states SET screenshare = 1
 WHERE voice_states.user_id = ? AND voice_states.channel_id = ?
-  AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM voice_states AS vs2 WHERE vs2.channel_id = ? AND (vs2.camera = 1 OR vs2.screenshare = 1)) < ?
+  AND (SELECT COALESCE(SUM(vs2.camera), 0) + COALESCE(SUM(vs2.screenshare), 0) FROM voice_states AS vs2 WHERE vs2.channel_id = ?) < ?4
 `

 type EnableScreenshareIfUnderLimitParams struct {
 	UserID      int64 `json:"userId"`
 	ChannelID   int64 `json:"channelId"`
 	ChannelID_2 int64 `json:"channelId2"`
-	ChannelID_3 int64 `json:"channelId3"`
+	MaxVideo    int64 `json:"maxVideo"`
 }

 func (q *Queries) EnableScreenshareIfUnderLimit(ctx context.Context, arg EnableScreenshareIfUnderLimitParams) (sql.Result, error) {
@@ -143,7 +147,7 @@ func (q *Queries) EnableScreenshareIfUnderLimit(ctx context.Context, arg EnableS
 		arg.UserID,
 		arg.ChannelID,
 		arg.ChannelID_2,
-		arg.ChannelID_3,
+		arg.MaxVideo,
 	)
 }

@@ -34,6 +34,15 @@ func messageFromGen(m dbgen.Message) *Message {
 // ("-col: expr"), so keeping it turns "well-known" into a filter on a
 // nonexistent column "known" and SQLite errors instead of matching. Folding
 // to a space (rather than dropping it) still matches the indexed tokens.
+//
+// Filtering characters alone is not enough: FTS5's MATCH grammar also
+// recognizes bareword keywords -- AND, OR, NOT (uppercase only) -- as
+// boolean operators rather than search terms. Those are ordinary letters, so
+// the character filter lets them through unchanged, and a query that places
+// one in an invalid position (e.g. the whole query is "AND", or it starts or
+// ends with one) makes SQLite raise "fts5: syntax error" instead of running
+// the search. Any such token is dropped below so the result is always a
+// plain sequence of bareword terms.
 func sanitizeFTSQuery(q string) string {
 	var sb strings.Builder
 	sb.Grow(len(q))
@@ -51,7 +60,16 @@ func sanitizeFTSQuery(q string) string {
 	if runes := []rune(result); len(runes) > 200 {
 		result = string(runes[:200])
 	}
-	return result
+
+	fields := strings.Fields(result)
+	kept := fields[:0]
+	for _, f := range fields {
+		if f == "AND" || f == "OR" || f == "NOT" {
+			continue
+		}
+		kept = append(kept, f)
+	}
+	return strings.Join(kept, " ")
 }

 // CreateMessage inserts a new message and returns the assigned ID.
@@ -720,6 +720,42 @@ func TestSearchMessages_HyphenatedQuery(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

+// OC-0002: sanitizeFTSQuery only filters characters, not FTS5's bareword
+// boolean keywords (AND, OR, NOT). A query consisting of (or containing) one
+// of those keywords in an operator position makes SQLite raise an
+// "fts5: syntax error", which SearchMessages surfaces as an error (mapped by
+// the service layer to a 500) instead of returning zero results.
+func TestSearchMessages_BooleanKeywordQuery(t *testing.T) {
+	database := openMigratedMemory(t)
+	userID := seedUser(t, database, "booleanuser")
+	chID := seedChannel(t, database, "booleanch")
+
+	_, _ = database.CreateMessage(context.Background(), chID, userID, "hello world", nil)
+
+	for _, q := range []string{"AND", "OR", "NOT", "AND world", "hello AND"} {
+		if _, err := database.SearchMessages(context.Background(), q, nil, 10); err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("SearchMessages(%q): unexpected error: %v", q, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Same root cause as TestSearchMessages_BooleanKeywordQuery, but through the
+// SearchMessagesInChannels caller, which sanitizes with the same
+// sanitizeFTSQuery helper.
+func TestSearchMessagesInChannels_BooleanKeywordQuery(t *testing.T) {
+	database := openMigratedMemory(t)
+	userID := seedUser(t, database, "boolchanuser")
+	chID := seedChannel(t, database, "boolchanch")
+
+	_, _ = database.CreateMessage(context.Background(), chID, userID, "hello world", nil)
+
+	for _, q := range []string{"AND", "OR", "NOT", "AND world", "hello AND"} {
+		if _, err := database.SearchMessagesInChannels(context.Background(), q, []int64{chID}, 10); err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("SearchMessagesInChannels(%q): unexpected error: %v", q, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 // ─── UpdateReadState ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

 func TestUpdateReadState_Upsert(t *testing.T) {
@@ -93,20 +93,24 @@ UPDATE voice_states SET server_deafened = 1, deafened = 1 WHERE user_id = ? AND
 -- name: ClearVoiceServerDeafen :execresult
 UPDATE voice_states SET server_deafened = 0 WHERE user_id = ? AND channel_id = ?;

-- Camera and screenshare share one voice_max_video budget: a channel capped
-- at N simultaneous video streams must not let a camera publish ignore
-- screenshare occupants (or vice versa), so both gates count the same
-- `camera = 1 OR screenshare = 1` slot usage (OC-0023).
+-- Camera and screenshare share one voice_max_video budget, counted in
+-- STREAMS, not rows: a channel capped at N simultaneous video streams must
+-- not let a camera publish ignore screenshare occupants (or vice versa,
+-- OC-0023), and a single user with both flags set must consume two of the N
+-- slots, not one (OC-0006) -- so both gates sum `vs2.camera + vs2.screenshare`
+-- across the channel's rows rather than counting rows where either is set.
+-- The enabling user's own bit is still 0 at gate time, so no self-exclusion
+-- term is needed.

 -- name: EnableCameraIfUnderLimit :execresult
 UPDATE voice_states SET camera = 1
 WHERE voice_states.user_id = ? AND voice_states.channel_id = ?
-  AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM voice_states AS vs2 WHERE vs2.channel_id = ? AND (vs2.camera = 1 OR vs2.screenshare = 1)) < ?;
+  AND (SELECT COALESCE(SUM(vs2.camera), 0) + COALESCE(SUM(vs2.screenshare), 0) FROM voice_states AS vs2 WHERE vs2.channel_id = ?) < sqlc.arg(max_video);

 -- name: EnableScreenshareIfUnderLimit :execresult
 UPDATE voice_states SET screenshare = 1
 WHERE voice_states.user_id = ? AND voice_states.channel_id = ?
-  AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM voice_states AS vs2 WHERE vs2.channel_id = ? AND (vs2.camera = 1 OR vs2.screenshare = 1)) < ?;
+  AND (SELECT COALESCE(SUM(vs2.camera), 0) + COALESCE(SUM(vs2.screenshare), 0) FROM voice_states AS vs2 WHERE vs2.channel_id = ?) < sqlc.arg(max_video);

 -- name: ClearVoiceState :exec
 DELETE FROM voice_states WHERE user_id = ?;
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ func (d *DB) EnableCameraIfUnderLimit(ctx context.Context, userID, channelID int
 		UserID:      userID,
 		ChannelID:   channelID,
 		ChannelID_2: channelID,
-		ChannelID_3: int64(maxVideo),
+		MaxVideo:    int64(maxVideo),
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return false, fmt.Errorf("EnableCameraIfUnderLimit: %w", err)
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ func (d *DB) EnableScreenshareIfUnderLimit(ctx context.Context, userID, channelI
 		UserID:      userID,
 		ChannelID:   channelID,
 		ChannelID_2: channelID,
-		ChannelID_3: int64(maxVideo),
+		MaxVideo:    int64(maxVideo),
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return false, fmt.Errorf("EnableScreenshareIfUnderLimit: %w", err)
@@ -273,9 +273,20 @@ func (s *DMService) CreateGroupDM(ctx context.Context, userID int64, recipientID
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: failed to create group DM", ErrInternal)
 	}

-	participants, err := s.st.GetDMParticipants(ctx, ch.ID, userID)
+	// The channel, all dm_participants rows and all dm_open_state rows are
+	// already committed at this point, so this read must not turn a fully-
+	// persisted group DM into a reported failure (OC-0004): it runs
+	// uncancellable (context.WithoutCancel) so a client disconnect landing
+	// right after the commit can't fail it via ctx.Err(), and any other
+	// failure is logged rather than propagated so the caller still gets a
+	// usable result to fan dm_channel_open out from. Group DMs are
+	// duplicate-by-design — there is no "the group for these users" to find —
+	// so telling the caller creation failed when it actually committed only
+	// invites a retry that creates a second, indistinguishable group.
+	participants, err := s.st.GetDMParticipants(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), ch.ID, userID)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: failed to read group DM participants: %v", ErrInternal, err)
+		slog.Error("DMService.CreateGroupDM: failed to read participants after commit", "err", err, "channel_id", ch.ID)
+		participants = nil
 	}

 	return &CreateGroupDMResult{
@@ -61,3 +61,63 @@ func TestDMService_CreateGroupDM_RefusesBannedRecipient(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("CreateGroupDM with a banned recipient = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
 	}
 }
+
+// cancelAfterCreateGroupDMStore wraps a real *db.DB and cancels a context the
+// instant CreateGroupDMChannel returns successfully — simulating a client
+// disconnect that lands exactly in the gap between the channel's commit and
+// the service's post-commit GetDMParticipants read.
+type cancelAfterCreateGroupDMStore struct {
+	*db.DB
+	cancel context.CancelFunc
+}
+
+func (s *cancelAfterCreateGroupDMStore) CreateGroupDMChannel(ctx context.Context, name string, participantIDs []int64) (*db.Channel, error) {
+	ch, err := s.DB.CreateGroupDMChannel(ctx, name, participantIDs)
+	if err == nil {
+		s.cancel()
+	}
+	return ch, err
+}
+
+// OC-0004: CreateGroupDMChannel commits the channel, all dm_participants rows
+// and all dm_open_state rows in one transaction. The subsequent
+// GetDMParticipants read used to run on the same cancellable request context,
+// so a client disconnect landing right after the commit (context cancelled
+// in the gap) turned a fully-persisted group DM into a reported failure —
+// inviting a client retry that, because group DMs are duplicate-by-design
+// (db/dm_queries.go CreateGroupDMChannel doc), creates a second identical
+// group.
+func TestDMService_CreateGroupDM_SurvivesCancelledPostCommitRead(t *testing.T) {
+	database := newTestDB(t)
+	seedUser(t, database, &db.User{ID: 1, Username: "alice"})
+	seedUser(t, database, &db.User{ID: 2, Username: "bob"})
+	seedUser(t, database, &db.User{ID: 3, Username: "carol"})
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	st := &cancelAfterCreateGroupDMStore{DB: database}
+	st.cancel = cancel
+
+	svc := NewDMService(st)
+	result, err := svc.CreateGroupDM(ctx, 1, []int64{2, 3}, "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateGroupDM with context cancelled right after commit: %v (the channel is already persisted at this point — this must not fail the request)", err)
+	}
+	if result.Channel == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected a created channel even though the post-commit context was cancelled")
+	}
+	if len(result.ParticipantIDs) != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("ParticipantIDs = %v, want 3 entries so the caller can still broadcast dm_channel_open", result.ParticipantIDs)
+	}
+
+	// The channel must actually be persisted — a retry after this "failure"
+	// would otherwise be indistinguishable from creating a brand new group.
+	var count int
+	if err := database.QueryRowContext(context.Background(),
+		`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM dm_participants WHERE channel_id = ?`, result.Channel.ID,
+	).Scan(&count); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("count participants: %v", err)
+	}
+	if count != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("persisted participant rows = %d, want 3", count)
+	}
+}
@@ -32,12 +32,33 @@ func (h *Hub) EmitEvents(ctx context.Context, events []Event) {
 			// An invisible user's public presence half rides this branch;
 			// like the visible case below, it must invalidate any queued
 			// coalescer entry so a stale connect-time presence can't flush
-			// after (and overwrite) this fresher user-chosen status.
+			// after (and overwrite) this fresher user-chosen status. The
+			// drop and the broadcast run atomically under presenceMu (see
+			// dropQueuedPresenceAndBroadcast, OC-0005) so a flush racing in
+			// at the same moment can never enqueue its stale frame after
+			// this fresher one.
 			if po, isPresence := ev.(PresenceOthersEvent); isPresence {
-				h.dropQueuedPresence(po.excludeUserID)
+				h.dropQueuedPresenceAndBroadcast(po.excludeUserID, func() {
+					// Normal priority, excluding the owner — NOT
+					// broadcastExcludeLow. Every other source of this same
+					// user's presence (connect/disconnect via BroadcastToAll,
+					// and the visible presence_update path below) already
+					// shares the normal-priority queue; putting this one on
+					// the low-priority queue instead split one user's
+					// presence across two per-client FIFOs with different
+					// durability (low silently drops on overflow instead of
+					// disconnecting, so no replay ever repairs the loss) and
+					// different drain order (writePump always drains normal
+					// strictly before low, so a newer frame on one queue can
+					// be delivered before an older frame still sitting on the
+					// other) — exactly the hazard OC-0214 fixed for the
+					// visible case below (OC-0003).
+					h.BroadcastToAllExcept(po.excludeUserID, e.Payload())
+				})
+			} else {
+				// Low priority: typing indicators are ephemeral.
+				h.broadcastExcludeLow(e.ChannelID(), e.ExcludeUserID(), e.Payload())
 			}
-			// Low priority: typing indicators are ephemeral.
-			h.broadcastExcludeLow(e.ChannelID(), e.ExcludeUserID(), e.Payload())
 		case UserTargetedEvent:
 			// High priority: targeted events (DM opens, mentions).
 			// dm_channel_open is unsequenced and targeted, so replay can never
@@ -75,12 +96,18 @@ func (h *Hub) EmitEvents(ctx context.Context, events []Event) {
 			// single ordered, seq-stamped, replayable stream (OC-0214).
 			if pe, isPresence := ev.(PresenceEvent); isPresence {
 				// A user-chosen presence also bypasses the connect/disconnect
-				// coalescer; drop any entry still queued for this user or the
-				// pending flush (up to 300ms later) would overwrite this
-				// fresher status with the stale connect-time one.
-				h.dropQueuedPresence(pe.userID)
+				// coalescer; drop any entry still queued for this user and
+				// broadcast atomically under presenceMu (see
+				// dropQueuedPresenceAndBroadcast, OC-0005), or the pending
+				// flush (up to 300ms later) could race in between the drop
+				// and the broadcast and overwrite this fresher status with
+				// the stale connect-time one.
+				h.dropQueuedPresenceAndBroadcast(pe.userID, func() {
+					h.BroadcastToAll(e.Payload())
+				})
+			} else {
+				h.BroadcastToAll(e.Payload())
 			}
-			h.BroadcastToAll(e.Payload())
 		default:
 			slog.Warn("EmitEvents: unknown event type", "type", fmt.Sprintf("%T", ev))
 		}
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+package ws
+
+// emit_presence_others_priority_test.go — regression test for OC-0003: the
+// public half of an invisible user's presence (PresenceOthersEvent) went out
+// via h.broadcastExcludeLow onto the low-priority queue — the same ephemeral,
+// drop-on-overflow, unsequenced transport used for typing indicators — while
+// every other source of the same user's presence (connect/disconnect via
+// BroadcastToAll, and the visible presence_update path OC-0214 already fixed)
+// shares the normal-priority queue. That split one user's presence across two
+// per-client FIFOs with different durability and different drain order:
+// writePump always drains normal strictly before low, so an observer with an
+// older frame on low and a newer one on normal (or vice versa) can end up
+// with the wrong one landing last, and a full low-priority queue silently
+// drops the frame with no seq bump and no replay recovery — unlike the
+// normal-priority queue, which disconnects on overflow and lets replay (or a
+// fresh ready) repair the gap.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// TestEmitEvents_PresenceOthersEvent_UsesNormalPriorityQueue pins the fix: a
+// PresenceOthersEvent (the public half of an invisible presence change),
+// routed through the ExcludeSenderEvent case in EmitEvents, must land on an
+// observer's normal-priority queue — the same FIFO every other presence
+// source for that user uses — never the low-priority queue, while still never
+// reaching the excluded user (the invisible owner) themselves.
+//
+// Before the fix, emit.go special-cased this case onto h.broadcastExcludeLow,
+// so this test observes the frame on the observer's c.sendLow instead of
+// c.send, and fails.
+func TestEmitEvents_PresenceOthersEvent_UsesNormalPriorityQueue(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newEmitTestHub()
+
+	// Built directly (not via the emit_test.go helpers) so send and sendLow
+	// are DISTINCT channels — the shared-channel helpers in export_test.go
+	// unify them "for test observability" and would mask exactly the
+	// queue-split this test needs to detect.
+	observer := &Client{
+		hub:      h,
+		ctx:      context.Background(),
+		userID:   1,
+		send:     make(chan []byte, 8),
+		sendHigh: make(chan []byte, 8),
+		sendLow:  make(chan []byte, 8),
+	}
+	owner := &Client{
+		hub:      h,
+		ctx:      context.Background(),
+		userID:   2,
+		send:     make(chan []byte, 8),
+		sendHigh: make(chan []byte, 8),
+		sendLow:  make(chan []byte, 8),
+	}
+	h.clients[1] = observer
+	h.clients[2] = owner
+	h.pubsub.Subscribe(observer, TopicGlobal)
+	h.pubsub.Subscribe(owner, TopicGlobal)
+
+	// The normal-priority path goes through the async hub.broadcast channel,
+	// so the hub loop must be running to deliver it.
+	go h.Run()
+	defer h.Stop()
+
+	payload := []byte(`{"type":"presence","user_id":2,"status":"offline"}`)
+	h.EmitEvents(context.Background(), []Event{
+		PresenceOthersEvent{excludeUserID: 2, payload: payload},
+	})
+
+	observerNormal := drainChan(observer.send, 200*time.Millisecond)
+	observerLow := drainChan(observer.sendLow, 50*time.Millisecond)
+	ownerNormal := drainChan(owner.send, 50*time.Millisecond)
+	ownerLow := drainChan(owner.sendLow, 50*time.Millisecond)
+
+	if len(observerNormal) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("expected the public half of an invisible presence change on the "+
+			"observer's normal-priority queue (same FIFO as connect/disconnect "+
+			"presence), got %d normal messages, %d low messages",
+			len(observerNormal), len(observerLow))
+	}
+	if len(observerLow) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("invisible presence's public half must not go out on the "+
+			"low-priority queue: writePump drains normal strictly before low, so "+
+			"a frame queued there can be delivered after a later connect/"+
+			"disconnect presence frame on the normal queue, leaving the "+
+			"observer's final view stale, and is silently dropped (no replay "+
+			"recovery) on overflow; got %d low messages", len(observerLow))
+	}
+	if len(ownerNormal) != 0 || len(ownerLow) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("the excluded owner must never receive the public half of "+
+			"their own invisible presence change: got %d normal, %d low messages",
+			len(ownerNormal), len(ownerLow))
+	}
+}
@@ -247,8 +247,12 @@ func (e PresenceEvent) Payload() []byte   { return e.payload }

 // PresenceOthersEvent is the public half of an invisible user's presence: the
 // mapped ("offline") payload, broadcast to everyone except the user it
-// describes. Satisfies ExcludeSenderEvent with a channel id of 0, which
-// broadcastExcludeLow routes as a global publish minus one subscriber.
+// describes. Satisfies ExcludeSenderEvent with a channel id of 0; EmitEvents
+// special-cases it onto h.BroadcastToAllExcept (normal priority, sequenced,
+// replayable) rather than the ExcludeSenderEvent default of
+// broadcastExcludeLow, so this frame shares the same durable per-client FIFO
+// as every other source of the same user's presence instead of the
+// ephemeral, drop-on-overflow one built for typing indicators (OC-0003).
 type PresenceOthersEvent struct {
 	excludeUserID int64
 	payload       []byte
@@ -20,6 +20,13 @@ type broadcastMsg struct {
 	// recipient's role may not READ, and the audience is resolved off the hub
 	// goroutine so deliverBroadcast stays free of permission queries.
 	recipients []int64
+	// excludeUserID, when non-zero, is omitted from a global (channelID == 0)
+	// broadcast's live delivery. Used for the public half of an invisible
+	// user's presence (see BroadcastToAllExcept): everyone else must see it,
+	// but the owner's own view comes from a separate, synchronous, targeted
+	// send, and the two racing would let the async global broadcast overwrite
+	// it. Ignored outside the channelID == 0 branch of deliverBroadcast.
+	excludeUserID int64
 	// enqueuedAt stamps the enqueue site so deliverBroadcast can record
 	// enqueue→fanout latency. Zero on test-constructed messages; skipped then.
 	enqueuedAt time.Time
@@ -50,6 +57,29 @@ func (h *Hub) BroadcastToAll(msg []byte) {
 	}
 }

+// BroadcastToAllExcept enqueues msg for delivery to every connected client
+// except excludeUserID. Non-blocking, like BroadcastToAll: if the broadcast
+// channel is full the message is dropped with a warning.
+//
+// Routes through the SAME h.broadcast channel — and so the same single-
+// goroutine hub dispatch loop and seqMu-serialized deliverBroadcast — as
+// BroadcastToAll and every other normal-priority global broadcast. That
+// shared serialization is what gives two broadcasts about the same user (say,
+// a connect/disconnect presence frame and this one) their correct relative
+// order at each observer: whichever enqueues onto h.broadcast first is also
+// delivered to c.send first. A caller that instead published straight to
+// pub/sub, bypassing this queue, would reintroduce exactly that kind of
+// reordering from the other direction (OC-0003).
+func (h *Hub) BroadcastToAllExcept(excludeUserID int64, msg []byte) {
+	select {
+	case h.broadcast <- broadcastMsg{channelID: 0, excludeUserID: excludeUserID, msg: msg, enqueuedAt: time.Now()}:
+	default:
+		h.broadcastDrops.Add(1)
+		slog.Warn("hub: broadcast channel full, dropping global message",
+			"msg_len", len(msg))
+	}
+}
+
 // broadcastVoiceEvent enqueues a voice_state / voice_leave message for the
 // connected clients whose current role may READ channelID.
 //
@@ -599,27 +629,71 @@ func (h *Hub) QueuePresence(userID int64, status string, customStatus *string) {
 	}
 }

-// dropQueuedPresence removes a user's pending coalesced presence, if any.
-// Called when a fresher presence for that user is broadcast directly (the
-// presence_update handler path), so the coalescer's later flush cannot
-// resurrect the stale connect-time state over it. Ordering holds because a
-// user's connect (which queues) and their presence_update (which drops) run
-// serially on the same connection's readPump.
-func (h *Hub) dropQueuedPresence(userID int64) {
+// dropQueuedPresenceAndBroadcast atomically removes any coalesced presence
+// still queued for userID and runs broadcast, both under presenceMu. Called
+// when a fresher presence for that user is delivered directly (the
+// presence_update handler path, via EmitEvents), so the delete and the send
+// of the fresher frame can never straddle flushPresenceQueue's own
+// snapshot-and-broadcast critical section (OC-0005).
+//
+// Holding presenceMu across the delete AND the broadcast — rather than just
+// the delete — is what actually closes the race: whichever of this call and
+// flushPresenceQueue acquires presenceMu second also enqueues its broadcast
+// second.
+//   - If this call goes first, it deletes the entry before flush can ever
+//     snapshot it, so flush never broadcasts the stale state at all.
+//   - If flush goes first, this call's delete is a no-op against the
+//     already-cleared queue, but its broadcast still cannot run until flush's
+//     own broadcast has already been enqueued — so the fresher frame is
+//     stamped with the higher seq by deliverBroadcast's single FIFO consumer
+//     and every client's final view converges on it, not the stale one.
+//
+// broadcast runs with presenceMu held: every current caller (BroadcastToAll,
+// BroadcastToAllExcept) only enqueues onto h.broadcast's non-blocking
+// channel send, so this cannot block and introduces no new lock-order edge.
+// Both callers sharing that same channel also means the "enqueues second"
+// ordering guarantee above translates directly into delivery order: both
+// broadcasts are drained by the same single-consumer hub dispatch loop
+// (deliverBroadcast), in the order they were enqueued.
+func (h *Hub) dropQueuedPresenceAndBroadcast(userID int64, broadcast func()) {
 	h.presenceMu.Lock()
+	defer h.presenceMu.Unlock()
 	delete(h.presenceQueue, userID)
-	h.presenceMu.Unlock()
+	broadcast()
 }

+// presenceFlushRaceHook, when non-nil, runs once per flushPresenceQueue call
+// immediately after the coalesced queue has been snapshotted and cleared,
+// while presenceMu is still held. Test-only (always nil in production): the
+// snapshot-to-broadcast window is too narrow to land a real concurrent
+// dropQueuedPresenceAndBroadcast reliably, so tests use this hook to
+// reproduce that interleaving deterministically. Mirrors the established
+// refreshChannelVisibilityRaceHook / voiceJoinPostTokenRaceHook pattern.
+var presenceFlushRaceHook func()
+
 // flushPresenceQueue drains the coalescer and broadcasts each user's latest
-// presence. Runs on the AfterFunc timer goroutine, never under presenceMu
-// during the fan-out.
+// presence, all under presenceMu (OC-0005). Runs on the AfterFunc timer
+// goroutine.
+//
+// presenceMu is held across the broadcast loop, not just the snapshot: it
+// used to be released beforehand, which let a concurrent
+// dropQueuedPresenceAndBroadcast (nee dropQueuedPresence) call race in after
+// the snapshot had already escaped the lock. The drop was then a guaranteed
+// no-op against the live (already-nilled) map, AND nothing constrained
+// whether that call's own fresher broadcast landed on h.broadcast before or
+// after this loop's stale one — so the stale connect-time presence could win
+// the seq race and permanently overwrite a user-chosen status. Holding the
+// lock here forces the two critical sections to serialize, which is what
+// dropQueuedPresenceAndBroadcast's ordering guarantee depends on.
 func (h *Hub) flushPresenceQueue() {
 	h.presenceMu.Lock()
+	defer h.presenceMu.Unlock()
 	queued := h.presenceQueue
 	h.presenceQueue = nil
 	h.presenceFlushArmed = false
-	h.presenceMu.Unlock()
+	if presenceFlushRaceHook != nil {
+		presenceFlushRaceHook()
+	}
 	for uid, p := range queued {
 		h.BroadcastPresence(uid, p.status, p.customStatus)
 	}
@@ -643,7 +717,15 @@ func (h *Hub) BroadcastPresence(userID int64, status string, customStatus *strin
 	// presencePayload.CustomStatus has no omitempty) so the client clears any
 	// cached text, matching what db.MemberSummary.ForViewer already does for
 	// the ready payload's member list.
-	h.broadcastExcludeLow(0, userID, buildPresenceMsg(userID, public, nil))
+	//
+	// Normal priority, excluding the owner (BroadcastToAllExcept), not
+	// broadcastExcludeLow: the low-priority queue is unsequenced and dropped
+	// (not disconnected) on overflow, so it could silently lose this frame
+	// with no replay recovery, and — since writePump always drains normal
+	// strictly before low — deliver it out of order against the very
+	// connect/disconnect presence frames this same coalescer flush also
+	// produces for other users via BroadcastToAll (OC-0003).
+	h.BroadcastToAllExcept(userID, buildPresenceMsg(userID, public, nil))
 	h.SendToUser(userID, buildPresenceMsg(userID, status, customStatus))
 }

@@ -858,8 +940,12 @@ func (h *Hub) deliverBroadcast(bm broadcastMsg) {
 				h.SendToUser(userID, msg)
 			}
 		case bm.channelID == 0:
-			// Global broadcast — deliver to every connected client.
-			h.pubsub.PublishGlobal(msg)
+			// Global broadcast — deliver to every connected client, minus
+			// excludeUserID when the caller set one (see BroadcastToAllExcept).
+			// Publish(TopicGlobal, msg, 0) is exactly PublishGlobal(msg) when
+			// excludeUserID is the zero value, so ordinary BroadcastToAll
+			// callers are unaffected.
+			h.pubsub.Publish(TopicGlobal, msg, bm.excludeUserID)
 		default:
 			// Channel-scoped broadcast — deliver to subscribers of the channel
 			// topic. The rate limiter already passed above, before the seq
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+package ws
+
+// OC-0006: EnableCameraIfUnderLimit / EnableScreenshareIfUnderLimit gate on
+// COUNT(*) FROM voice_states WHERE ... (camera = 1 OR screenshare = 1) < N —
+// one row per *user*, not one unit per *stream*. camera and screenshare are
+// independent columns on the same row, so a single user with both flags set
+// consumes only one slot in the count while actually publishing two streams.
+// A channel capped at N simultaneous video streams can therefore over-admit
+// to 2N live streams while still refusing the next publisher, claiming the
+// N-stream cap is reached when more than N streams are already live.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/owncord/server/db"
+	"github.com/owncord/server/permissions"
+)
+
+const oc0006VideoStreamRoleID = int64(211)
+
+func newOC0006VideoStreamDB(t *testing.T) *db.DB {
+	t.Helper()
+	database, err := db.Open(":memory:")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("db.Open: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := db.Migrate(database); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Migrate: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = database.Close() })
+	if _, err := database.ExecContext(context.Background(),
+		`INSERT INTO roles (id, name, color, permissions, position, is_default)
+		 VALUES (?, 'oc-0006-video', NULL, ?, 5, 0)`,
+		oc0006VideoStreamRoleID,
+		permissions.ReadMessages|permissions.ConnectVoice|permissions.SpeakVoice|permissions.UseVideo|permissions.ShareScreen,
+	); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed oc-0006-video role: %v", err)
+	}
+	return database
+}
+
+func seedOC0006VideoStreamUser(t *testing.T, database *db.DB, username string) int64 {
+	t.Helper()
+	uid, err := database.CreateUser(context.Background(), username, "hash", int(oc0006VideoStreamRoleID))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateUser %s: %v", username, err)
+	}
+	return uid
+}
+
+// mustCreateVideoCappedChannel2 mirrors mustCreateVideoCappedChannel from
+// oc_0023_screenshare_video_limit_test.go (kept file-local to avoid a
+// cross-file test helper dependency).
+func mustCreateVideoCappedChannel2(t *testing.T, database *db.DB, name string, maxVideo int) int64 {
+	t.Helper()
+	chID, err := database.CreateChannel(context.Background(), name, "voice", "", "", 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateChannel %s: %v", name, err)
+	}
+	if err := database.AdminUpdateChannel(context.Background(), chID, db.ChannelUpdate{
+		Name:          name,
+		VoiceMaxVideo: maxVideo,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("AdminUpdateChannel %s: %v", name, err)
+	}
+	return chID
+}
+
+// A channel capped at 2 simultaneous video streams. Alice alone publishes
+// both her camera and her screenshare -- that is 2 streams from one row.
+// Bob's camera enable must then be refused: the cap is already saturated by
+// Alice's two streams. Today the gate counts Alice's row once (camera=1 OR
+// screenshare=1 matches her single row), so it reads slot usage as 1, not 2,
+// and wrongly admits Bob's third stream.
+func TestEnableVideoSlot_SameUserDoubleStreamCountsTwoSlots(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	database := newOC0006VideoStreamDB(t)
+	chID := mustCreateVideoCappedChannel2(t, database, "capped-room-samerow", 2)
+
+	alice := seedOC0006VideoStreamUser(t, database, "alice-double")
+	bob := seedOC0006VideoStreamUser(t, database, "bob-third")
+	if err := database.JoinVoiceChannel(ctx, alice, chID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("JoinVoiceChannel alice: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := database.JoinVoiceChannel(ctx, bob, chID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("JoinVoiceChannel bob: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	d := VoiceDeps{DB: database, Permissions: permissions.NewChecker(database)}
+
+	ssRes := handleVoiceScreenshareV2(ctx, VoiceScreenshareCmd{userID: alice, enabled: true}, ClientInfo{UserID: alice, VoiceChannelID: chID}, d)
+	if ssRes.Error != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("alice screenshare enable (1st stream, cap 2) should succeed, got error: %+v", ssRes.Error)
+	}
+
+	camRes := handleVoiceCameraV2(ctx, VoiceCameraCmd{userID: alice, enabled: true}, ClientInfo{UserID: alice, VoiceChannelID: chID}, d)
+	if camRes.Error != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("alice camera enable (2nd stream, cap 2) should succeed, got error: %+v", camRes.Error)
+	}
+
+	// Cap is now saturated: Alice alone is publishing 2 of the 2 allowed
+	// streams. Bob's camera enable is a 3rd stream and must be refused.
+	bobCamRes := handleVoiceCameraV2(ctx, VoiceCameraCmd{userID: bob, enabled: true}, ClientInfo{UserID: bob, VoiceChannelID: chID}, d)
+	if bobCamRes.Error == nil {
+		t.Fatal("bob's camera enable succeeded as the channel's 3rd live video stream against a cap of 2 -- the same-user double-publish (camera+screenshare on one row) was undercounted as a single slot")
+	}
+	if ce, ok := bobCamRes.Error.(ClientError); !ok || ce.Code != ErrCodeVideoLimit {
+		t.Errorf("error = %+v, want ClientError{Code: %q}", bobCamRes.Error, ErrCodeVideoLimit)
+	}
+
+	vs, err := database.GetVoiceState(ctx, bob)
+	if err != nil || vs == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GetVoiceState bob: %v", err)
+	}
+	if vs.Camera {
+		t.Error("bob's camera flag was set to true despite the VIDEO_LIMIT refusal")
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+package ws
+
+// presence_coalesce_flush_race_test.go — regression test for OC-0005.
+//
+// flushPresenceQueue snapshots h.presenceQueue and releases presenceMu
+// BEFORE broadcasting the snapshotted entries. dropQueuedPresence (the guard
+// EmitEvents uses to stop a stale connect/disconnect presence from
+// clobbering a fresher user-chosen status) only deletes from the LIVE map,
+// so a drop that lands after the flush has already taken its snapshot is a
+// no-op — and, critically, nothing then constrains the relative order in
+// which the flush's stale broadcast and the fresher direct broadcast reach
+// h.broadcast. Both go through deliverBroadcast's single FIFO consumer,
+// which stamps seq in enqueue order, so whichever one is enqueued LAST wins
+// every client's final view. A stale connect-time presence enqueued after a
+// user's own fresher presence_update therefore permanently overwrites it.
+//
+// The snapshot-to-broadcast window is a few instructions wide and not
+// reliably landed by staggering real goroutines, so presenceFlushRaceHook
+// (test-only, nil in production) fires at exactly that point, mirroring the
+// established refreshChannelVisibilityRaceHook / voiceJoinPostTokenRaceHook
+// pattern used to pin analogous races elsewhere in this package.
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// TestFlushPresenceQueue_ConcurrentDirectPresenceOrdersLast pins OC-0005 for
+// the visible presence_update path (EmitEvents' BroadcastAllEvent branch).
+//
+// A stale connect-time "online" is queued for user 42. While
+// flushPresenceQueue is mid-flush (queue already snapshotted), a concurrent
+// presence_update to "dnd" races in via EmitEvents. The fresher "dnd" must
+// end up enqueued on h.broadcast AFTER the stale "online" — so the hub
+// stamps it with the higher seq and every other client's final view of user
+// 42 converges on "dnd", not the stale "online".
+func TestFlushPresenceQueue_ConcurrentDirectPresenceOrdersLast(t *testing.T) {
+	h := &Hub{
+		broadcast: make(chan broadcastMsg, 8),
+		pubsub:    NewPubSub(),
+	}
+	// Populate the queue directly rather than via QueuePresence: QueuePresence
+	// arms a real 300ms time.AfterFunc(h.flushPresenceQueue), and this test
+	// already drives flushPresenceQueue manually below. Leaving that timer
+	// armed would let it fire later — during a *later* run of this same test
+	// under -count=N, or during another test entirely — and invoke whatever
+	// presenceFlushRaceHook happens to be installed at that later moment,
+	// which is exactly the kind of cross-run interference this test must not
+	// introduce.
+	h.presenceMu.Lock()
+	h.presenceQueue = map[int64]pendingPresence{42: {status: "online"}}
+	h.presenceFlushArmed = true
+	h.presenceMu.Unlock()
+
+	raced := make(chan struct{})
+	var hookRan bool
+	presenceFlushRaceHook = func() {
+		hookRan = true
+		// Simulate EmitEvents' direct presence branch racing in exactly
+		// here: after flushPresenceQueue has snapshotted (and, currently,
+		// released presenceMu for) the queue, but before it has broadcast
+		// the stale entry.
+		go func() {
+			h.EmitEvents(context.Background(), presenceEvents(42, "dnd", nil))
+			close(raced)
+		}()
+		// Give the goroutine room to actually run: with the bug this lets
+		// it complete its (unsynchronized) broadcast well before flush's
+		// own loop runs; with the fix in place the goroutine instead blocks
+		// on presenceMu until this function returns and releases it, so the
+		// sleep costs nothing extra there either way.
+		time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	defer func() { presenceFlushRaceHook = nil }()
+
+	h.flushPresenceQueue()
+	<-raced
+
+	if !hookRan {
+		t.Fatal("presenceFlushRaceHook never fired — test setup is broken, not exercising the flush race window")
+	}
+
+	if len(h.broadcast) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 2 broadcast frames (stale flush + fresh update), got %d", len(h.broadcast))
+	}
+	first := <-h.broadcast
+	second := <-h.broadcast
+
+	if !bytes.Contains(first.msg, []byte(`"status":"online"`)) {
+		t.Errorf("expected the stale flush's 'online' frame enqueued FIRST; got first=%s", first.msg)
+	}
+	if !bytes.Contains(second.msg, []byte(`"status":"dnd"`)) {
+		t.Errorf("expected the fresh presence_update's 'dnd' frame enqueued LAST (so it gets the higher seq and wins); got second=%s", second.msg)
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+package ws
+
+// reconnect_fallback_channel_leak_test.go — regression test for OC-0001.
+//
+// handleReconnect promotes an attacker-supplied (but READ-gated at the time)
+// active_channel_id into c.channelID (serve.go ~349) before its own abort
+// paths run. When a permission revocation lands deep in the handshake and
+// trips the final mustFullResync re-check (serve.go ~401), handleReconnect
+// aborts with handled=false and ServeWS falls through to handleFreshConnect
+// — but nothing clears the already-set c.channelID. handleFreshConnect
+// recomputes allowedChannelIDs WITHOUT the revoked channel and its
+// buildReady payload correctly omits it, but registerNow (hub.go ~560)
+// subscribes c.channelID's ChannelTopic unconditionally, with no
+// readableChannelIDs check — unlike its two siblings in the same function.
+// Every subsequent broadcast to that channel is then delivered to a client
+// that was never granted READ_MESSAGES for it.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/coder/websocket"
+
+	"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
+	"github.com/owncord/server/permissions"
+)
+
+func TestReconnect_FullReadyFallbackDoesNotLeakRevokedChannelSubscription(t *testing.T) {
+	database := newHarvestVoiceDB(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	uid := seedHarvestVoiceUser(t, database, "fallback-leak-user")
+	chID := mustCreateVoiceChannel(t, database, "fallback-leak-channel")
+	ch, err := database.GetChannel(ctx, chID)
+	if err != nil || ch == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GetChannel: %v", err)
+	}
+	user, err := database.GetUserByID(ctx, uid)
+	if err != nil || user == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GetUserByID: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	token, err := auth.GenerateToken()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GenerateToken: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := database.CreateSession(ctx, uid, auth.HashToken(token), "test", "127.0.0.1"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateSession: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	hub := NewHub(database, auth.NewRateLimiter(), nil)
+	go hub.Run()
+	defer hub.Stop()
+
+	// Precondition: the channel is READ-visible at the moment the auth frame
+	// is evaluated, so the auth-frame active_channel_id is legitimately
+	// honoured by handleReconnect.
+	allowedBefore, err := hub.computeAllowedChannels(ctx, database, user)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("computeAllowedChannels: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !allowedBefore[chID] {
+		t.Fatalf("precondition: channel %d should start READ-visible", chID)
+	}
+
+	// Bracket last_seq=99 so the resume takes the buffer tier (not a
+	// mustFullResync-forced full ready from the very start).
+	rb := hub.ReplayBuffer()
+	rb.Push(98, chID, []byte(`{"seq":98,"type":"chat_message","payload":{}}`))
+	rb.Push(99, chID, []byte(`{"seq":99,"type":"chat_message","payload":{}}`))
+	rb.Push(100, chID, []byte(`{"seq":100,"type":"chat_message","payload":{}}`))
+	hub.SeedSeq(100)
+	const lastSeq = uint64(99)
+
+	if hub.mustFullResync(lastSeq) {
+		t.Fatalf("precondition: mustFullResync must be false before any visibility change")
+	}
+
+	// Fires once, deep inside handleReconnect — after c.channelID has already
+	// been promoted from active_channel_id (serve.go ~349) but before the
+	// final mustFullResync re-check (serve.go ~401). Revoke READ_MESSAGES on
+	// chID, mirroring an admin edit racing the resume, exactly like
+	// TestHandleReconnect_VisibilityChangeDuringHandshake_ForcesFullReady.
+	var hookRan bool
+	handleReconnectPreRegisterRaceHook = func() {
+		hookRan = true
+		if overrideErr := database.UpsertChannelOverride(ctx, chID, harvestVoiceRoleID, 0, permissions.ReadMessages); overrideErr != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("UpsertChannelOverride: %v", overrideErr)
+		}
+		//nolint:contextcheck // RefreshChannelVisibility takes no context by design.
+		hub.RefreshChannelVisibility(ch)
+	}
+	defer func() { handleReconnectPreRegisterRaceHook = nil }()
+
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(ServeWS(hub, database, []string{"*"}, 0))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	dialCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 10*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	conn, dialResp, dialErr := websocket.Dial(dialCtx, "ws"+strings.TrimPrefix(srv.URL, "http"), nil)
+	if dialResp != nil && dialResp.Body != nil {
+		_ = dialResp.Body.Close()
+	}
+	if dialErr != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("websocket.Dial: %v", dialErr)
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = conn.Close(websocket.StatusNormalClosure, "") }()
+
+	raw, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
+		"type": "auth",
+		"payload": map[string]any{
+			"token":             token,
+			"last_seq":          lastSeq,
+			"active_channel_id": chID,
+		},
+	})
+	if err := conn.Write(dialCtx, websocket.MessageText, raw); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write auth: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// The abort forces the fallback full-connect flow, which writes TWO
+	// frames — auth_ok, then ready — unlike the single auth_ok a successful
+	// buffer-tier resume would send.
+	readCtx, readCancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 5*time.Second)
+	defer readCancel()
+	_, authMsg, err := conn.Read(readCtx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read auth_ok: %v", err)
+	}
+	var authParsed map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(authMsg, &authParsed); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unmarshal auth_ok: %v", err)
+	}
+	if authParsed["type"] != MsgTypeAuthOK {
+		t.Fatalf("expected auth_ok, got %v", authParsed["type"])
+	}
+
+	_, readyMsg, err := conn.Read(readCtx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read ready: %v", err)
+	}
+	var readyParsed map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(readyMsg, &readyParsed); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unmarshal ready: %v", err)
+	}
+	if readyParsed["type"] != MsgTypeReady {
+		t.Fatalf("expected ready (handleReconnect aborted, fell through to handleFreshConnect), got %v", readyParsed["type"])
+	}
+
+	if !hookRan {
+		t.Fatal("handleReconnectPreRegisterRaceHook never fired — test setup is broken, not exercising the race window")
+	}
+
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
+	var c *Client
+	for {
+		hub.mu.Lock()
+		c = hub.clients[uid]
+		hub.mu.Unlock()
+		if c != nil {
+			break
+		}
+		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
+			t.Fatal("client was never registered")
+		}
+		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+
+	if got := c.getChannelID(); got == chID {
+		t.Errorf("resumed-then-fallback client kept focus on revoked channel %d after registerNow, want 0", got)
+	}
+
+	hub.pubsub.mu.RLock()
+	sub := hub.pubsub.topics[ChannelTopic(chID)][uid]
+	hub.pubsub.mu.RUnlock()
+	if sub != nil {
+		t.Errorf("client is subscribed to ChannelTopic(%d) despite READ_MESSAGES being revoked before registration — "+
+			"every subsequent broadcast to that channel will be delivered to this socket", chID)
+	}
+}
@@ -692,6 +692,20 @@ func (h *Hub) handleFreshConnect(
 			allowedChannelIDs = allowed
 		}
 	}
+	// handleReconnect may have promoted an auth-frame active_channel_id into
+	// c.channelID (serve.go, honoured only when it was READ-visible at that
+	// moment) and then aborted on one of its own re-checks — most notably the
+	// final mustFullResync check, tripped by a permission revocation that
+	// landed mid-handshake. None of those abort paths undo the c.channelID
+	// write. registerNow subscribes c.channelID's ChannelTopic
+	// unconditionally, so re-gate it here against the freshly recomputed
+	// permission set before registering. Fail closed: a nil allowedChannelIDs
+	// (lastSeq == 0, or the computeAllowedChannels error branch above) denies.
+	if chID := c.getChannelID(); chID != 0 && !allowedChannelIDs[chID] {
+		c.mu.Lock()
+		c.channelID = 0
+		c.mu.Unlock()
+	}
 	h.registerNow(c, allowedChannelIDs)

 	// Settle the session's status before buildReady reads the member list, so
@@ -75,6 +75,29 @@ func (h *Hub) presentableMembers(members []db.MemberSummary, viewerID int64) []d
 	return out
 }

+// presentableDMChannels applies presentableMembers' "no live connection means
+// offline" rule to a DM channel list's recipient statuses. GetUserDMChannels
+// already applies db.StatusForViewer (the invisible-to-others half); this
+// adds the missing "no live connection" half so dm_channels cannot disagree
+// with the members array about whether the same disconnected user is online.
+// Both Recipient (the legacy single-recipient field) and every entry of
+// Recipients (the group-aware field) are rewritten, since a 1:1 DM's
+// Recipient is a copy of Recipients[0], not a shared reference.
+func (h *Hub) presentableDMChannels(dmChannels []db.DMChannelInfo) []db.DMChannelInfo {
+	connected := h.connectedUserIDs()
+	for i := range dmChannels {
+		if dmChannels[i].Recipient.ID != 0 && !connected[dmChannels[i].Recipient.ID] {
+			dmChannels[i].Recipient.Status = db.StatusOffline
+		}
+		for j := range dmChannels[i].Recipients {
+			if !connected[dmChannels[i].Recipients[j].ID] {
+				dmChannels[i].Recipients[j].Status = db.StatusOffline
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return dmChannels
+}
+
 // connectedUserIDs snapshots the ids with a live WebSocket connection.
 func (h *Hub) connectedUserIDs() map[int64]bool {
 	h.mu.RLock()
@@ -249,6 +272,15 @@ func (h *Hub) buildReady(ctx context.Context, database *db.DB, userID int64, rol
 			dmChannels[i].MentionCount = u.MentionCount
 		}
 	}
+	// GetUserDMChannels only applies db.StatusForViewer, which collapses
+	// invisible to offline but passes a disconnected recipient's saved
+	// idle/dnd through verbatim (MarkUserDisconnected deliberately keeps a
+	// chosen idle/dnd across a disconnect so the next connect can honour it,
+	// relying on every read path to hide it in the meantime). members already
+	// gets the "no live connection means offline" half of that rule from
+	// presentableMembers above; apply the same half here so dm_channels
+	// cannot disagree with members about the same user within one payload.
+	dmChannels = h.presentableDMChannels(dmChannels)

 	// Collect voice states, filtered to visible channels (BUG-095) plus the
 	// user's own open DM channels — mirroring computeAllowedChannels, which
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+package ws_test
+
+// serve_ready_dm_status_test.go — regression test for OC-0008: buildReady's
+// dm_channels half came straight from database.GetUserDMChannels, which
+// applies only db.StatusForViewer — that collapses invisible to offline but
+// passes a disconnected user's saved idle/dnd through verbatim. members goes
+// through presentableMembers first, which additionally forces offline for
+// anyone with no live WebSocket connection (mirroring
+// TestReady_DisconnectedMemberWithChosenStatusRendersOffline in
+// presence_invisible_test.go, but for the dm_channels field). Before the fix
+// a signed-out user who last chose "dnd" or "idle" would show as offline in
+// members but still dnd/idle in dm_channels within the very same ready frame.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/owncord/server/db"
+)
+
+// dmChannelStatusFor pulls the recipient status for other.ID out of a ready
+// payload's dm_channels array, checking both the legacy `recipient` field and
+// the group-aware `recipients` array so a fix that only patches one leaks
+// through undetected.
+func dmChannelStatusFor(t *testing.T, raw []byte, otherID int64) (recipientStatus string, recipientsStatus string, found bool) {
+	t.Helper()
+	var env struct {
+		Payload struct {
+			DMChannels []struct {
+				Recipient struct {
+					ID     int64  `json:"id"`
+					Status string `json:"status"`
+				} `json:"recipient"`
+				Recipients []struct {
+					ID     int64  `json:"id"`
+					Status string `json:"status"`
+				} `json:"recipients"`
+			} `json:"dm_channels"`
+		} `json:"payload"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &env); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unmarshal ready: %v", err)
+	}
+	for _, dm := range env.Payload.DMChannels {
+		if dm.Recipient.ID == otherID {
+			recipientStatus = dm.Recipient.Status
+			found = true
+		}
+		for _, r := range dm.Recipients {
+			if r.ID == otherID {
+				recipientsStatus = r.Status
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return recipientStatus, recipientsStatus, found
+}
+
+// TestBuildReady_DMChannelsHidesDisconnectedRecipientStatus pins OC-0008: a DM
+// recipient with no live WebSocket connection must render offline in
+// dm_channels, exactly as presentableMembers already forces for the members
+// array. absent chooses "dnd", then MarkUserDisconnected-equivalent state is
+// simulated by simply never registering a client for absent (buildReady's
+// connectedUserIDs() only reflects live hub registrations, so an
+// unregistered user is indistinguishable from "signed out").
+func TestBuildReady_DMChannelsHidesDisconnectedRecipientStatus(t *testing.T) {
+	hub, database := newServeHub(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	viewer := seedServeUser(t, database, "dm-status-viewer")
+	absent := seedServeUser(t, database, "dm-status-absent")
+	viewerRole, err := database.GetRoleByID(ctx, viewer.RoleID)
+	if err != nil || viewerRole == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GetRoleByID: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// absent chose "dnd" before signing out; the column keeps it (this is
+	// exactly what MarkUserDisconnected leaves behind for a non-online status).
+	if err := database.UpdateUserStatus(ctx, absent.ID, db.StatusDND); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("UpdateUserStatus: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	seedDMChannel(t, database, viewer.ID, absent.ID)
+
+	// Only the viewer has a live connection; absent is never registered, so
+	// they must render offline everywhere in this ready payload.
+	msg, err := hub.BuildReadyWithRoleForTest(database, viewer.ID, viewerRole)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("BuildReadyWithRoleForTest: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	recipientStatus, recipientsStatus, found := dmChannelStatusFor(t, msg, absent.ID)
+	if !found {
+		t.Fatalf("ready payload's dm_channels is missing recipient %d", absent.ID)
+	}
+	if recipientStatus != db.StatusOffline {
+		t.Errorf("dm_channels[].recipient.status = %q, want %q (disconnected member must render offline, same rule presentableMembers applies to the members array)", recipientStatus, db.StatusOffline)
+	}
+	if recipientsStatus != db.StatusOffline {
+		t.Errorf("dm_channels[].recipients[].status = %q, want %q", recipientsStatus, db.StatusOffline)
+	}
+}