diff --git a/Client/tauri-client/src/components/solid/PluginContainer.tsx b/Client/tauri-client/src/components/solid/PluginContainer.tsx
index afe1c640..0901d433 100644
--- a/Client/tauri-client/src/components/solid/PluginContainer.tsx
+++ b/Client/tauri-client/src/components/solid/PluginContainer.tsx
@@ -25,7 +25,5 @@ export function PluginContainer(props: PluginContainerProps): JSX.Element {
     dispose?.();
   });
 
-  return (
-    <div class="plugin-container" data-plugin-id={props.binding.pluginId} ref={host} />
-  );
+  return <div class="plugin-container" data-plugin-id={props.binding.pluginId} ref={host} />;
 }
diff --git a/Client/tauri-client/src/components/solid/README.md b/Client/tauri-client/src/components/solid/README.md
index ed0b86af..4bf52631 100644
--- a/Client/tauri-client/src/components/solid/README.md
+++ b/Client/tauri-client/src/components/solid/README.md
@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ directory, and existing leaf components are ported one PR at a time.
    handle has the same `{ destroy }` shape that the rest of the codebase uses.
 4. **Test the pipeline.** New components get a `*.test.tsx` next to them
    using `@solidjs/testing-library`. The tests run under the existing Vitest
-   configuration without any extra setup.
+   configuration without any extra setup. Do **not** call `cleanup()` manually
+   in test files — `tests/setup-solid.ts` registers `afterEach(cleanup)` globally
+   via Vitest's `setupFiles` (added in T-500).
 5. **Delete vanilla DOM code.** Once a component is fully migrated, remove
    the old factory function and update its callers to import from
    `@components/solid/...`.
@@ -38,6 +40,14 @@ directory, and existing leaf components are ported one PR at a time.
   custom store via `fromStore` instead.
 - Touching framework-agnostic code (`lib/ws.ts`, `lib/dispatcher.ts`,
   `lib/livekitSession.ts`, `lib/api.ts`). These never need to know about Solid.
+- Using `innerHTML`, `insertAdjacentHTML`, or `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` in any
+  Solid component. JSX interpolation (`{value}`) auto-escapes user content and
+  is the correct approach. Components rendering user-supplied text (e.g. message
+  attachments, toast messages) must never bypass this escaping.
+- Placing `.tsx` files outside `src/components/solid/`. The `vite-plugin-solid`
+  transform is scoped to this directory in both `vite.config.ts` and
+  `vitest.config.ts`. A `.tsx` file elsewhere will fail with cryptic JSX parse
+  errors at build time.
 
 ## Existing components
 
diff --git a/Client/tauri-client/tests/setup-solid.test.tsx b/Client/tauri-client/tests/setup-solid.test.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ea365fb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Client/tauri-client/tests/setup-solid.test.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/**
+ * Phase B Step 6 — mountSolid adapter lifecycle smoke tests (T-500).
+ *
+ * Verifies that the mountSolid adapter in @lib/solidMount correctly inserts a
+ * Solid reactive root into the DOM and that destroy() disposes the root and
+ * removes the host element, preventing memory leaks across test suites.
+ *
+ * These tests complement Badge.test.tsx (which validates the Solid rendering
+ * pipeline end-to-end) by proving the *adapter* contract used by vanilla-DOM
+ * container components.
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
+import { mountSolid } from "@lib/solidMount";
+
+describe("mountSolid adapter", () => {
+  it("appends a data-solid-root host element to the parent on mount", () => {
+    const parent = document.createElement("div");
+    document.body.appendChild(parent);
+
+    const handle = mountSolid(() => <span>test</span>, parent);
+
+    expect(parent.querySelector("[data-solid-root]")).not.toBeNull();
+    expect(handle.el.dataset.solidRoot).toBe("true");
+    expect(handle.el.parentElement).toBe(parent);
+
+    handle.destroy();
+    parent.remove();
+  });
+
+  it("removes the host element from the DOM after destroy()", () => {
+    const parent = document.createElement("div");
+    document.body.appendChild(parent);
+
+    const handle = mountSolid(() => <span>cleanup-check</span>, parent);
+    expect(parent.children).toHaveLength(1);
+
+    handle.destroy();
+
+    expect(parent.querySelector("[data-solid-root]")).toBeNull();
+    expect(parent.children).toHaveLength(0);
+
+    parent.remove();
+  });
+
+  it("supports multiple independent mounts under the same parent", () => {
+    const parent = document.createElement("div");
+    document.body.appendChild(parent);
+
+    const a = mountSolid(() => <span>a</span>, parent);
+    const b = mountSolid(() => <span>b</span>, parent);
+
+    expect(parent.querySelectorAll("[data-solid-root]")).toHaveLength(2);
+
+    a.destroy();
+    expect(parent.querySelectorAll("[data-solid-root]")).toHaveLength(1);
+
+    b.destroy();
+    expect(parent.querySelectorAll("[data-solid-root]")).toHaveLength(0);
+
+    parent.remove();
+  });
+
+  it("exposes the host element via handle.el", () => {
+    const parent = document.createElement("div");
+    document.body.appendChild(parent);
+
+    const handle = mountSolid(() => <span>el-check</span>, parent);
+
+    expect(handle.el).toBeInstanceOf(HTMLElement);
+    expect(handle.el).toBe(parent.firstElementChild);
+
+    handle.destroy();
+    parent.remove();
+  });
+});
diff --git a/Client/tauri-client/tests/setup-solid.ts b/Client/tauri-client/tests/setup-solid.ts
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e78791f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Client/tauri-client/tests/setup-solid.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/**
+ * Vitest global setup for Solid.js component tests (T-500).
+ *
+ * Loaded via `test.setupFiles` in vitest.config.ts so every test suite
+ * automatically gets Solid's afterEach cleanup without having to import
+ * or call it manually.
+ *
+ * Add future Solid testing helpers here (custom matchers, query extensions,
+ * aria-query configuration, etc.). Do NOT import application code here —
+ * this file executes once before every test suite, including non-Solid suites.
+ *
+ * Security note: Solid JSX auto-escapes interpolated values ({expr}), so
+ * user-controlled strings passed through JSX are safe. Never use innerHTML,
+ * insertAdjacentHTML, or dangerouslySetInnerHTML in Solid components.
+ */
+import { cleanup } from "@solidjs/testing-library";
+import { afterEach } from "vitest";
+
+// Register cleanup after every test so Solid reactive roots are disposed
+// and host DOM nodes are removed. Without this, roots accumulate across tests
+// and can cause state leakage between test cases.
+afterEach(cleanup);
diff --git a/Client/tauri-client/vitest.config.ts b/Client/tauri-client/vitest.config.ts
index 949c5b09..fbc987c4 100644
--- a/Client/tauri-client/vitest.config.ts
+++ b/Client/tauri-client/vitest.config.ts
@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ export default defineConfig({
   // the angle brackets.
   plugins: [
     solidPlugin({
-      include: ["src/components/solid/**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"],
+      // Phase B Step 6: cover both the component directory and test files
+      // under tests/ that use JSX (e.g. setup-solid.test.tsx, T-500).
+      include: ["src/components/solid/**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}", "tests/**/*.tsx"],
     }),
   ],
   resolve: {
@@ -27,11 +29,11 @@ export default defineConfig({
     // `src/**/*.test.{ts,tsx}` files are picked up. The latter is required
     // for Phase B Step 6 Solid components, whose tests live alongside the
     // component file (see src/components/solid/README.md).
-    include: [
-      "tests/**/*.test.ts",
-      "src/**/*.test.ts",
-      "src/**/*.test.tsx",
-    ],
+    // T-500: also pick up .tsx test files under tests/ (e.g. setup-solid.test.tsx).
+    include: ["tests/**/*.test.ts", "tests/**/*.test.tsx", "src/**/*.test.ts", "src/**/*.test.tsx"],
+    // T-500: global Solid.js test setup — registers afterEach(cleanup) so
+    // individual *.test.tsx files do not need to call cleanup() manually.
+    setupFiles: ["./tests/setup-solid.ts"],
     coverage: {
       provider: "v8",
       include: ["src/**/*.ts"],
diff --git a/Server/plugin/examples/hello/README.md b/Server/plugin/examples/hello/README.md
index 921c6df3..4769f792 100644
--- a/Server/plugin/examples/hello/README.md
+++ b/Server/plugin/examples/hello/README.md
@@ -10,17 +10,33 @@ the registry persists it into the plugins table without executing the .wasm.
 
 ## Building the WASM
 
-The .wasm binary is intentionally NOT checked in. Build it locally with TinyGo
-or any other WASM toolchain that emits a module exporting `command_dispatch`,
-`on_event`, and `_start`:
+`main.go` in this directory implements the full plugin ABI
+(`allocate`, `deallocate`, `list_commands`, `command_dispatch`, `on_event`).
+The pre-built `hello.wasm` (925 KiB) is checked in, but you can rebuild it:
 
-```sh
-# TinyGo example (writes hello.wasm into this directory)
-tinygo build -o hello.wasm -target wasi ./main.go
+### Prerequisites
+
+| Tool | Version | Notes |
+|------|---------|-------|
+| TinyGo | 0.40.1 | Supports Go 1.19–1.25 only |
+| Go | 1.25.x | TinyGo 0.40.1 rejects Go 1.26+ |
+| wasm-opt | Binaryen 129 | Required by TinyGo for the `wasi` target |
+
+On Windows, extract TinyGo to e.g. `D:\Local-Lab\Coding\Software\tinygo` and
+add `<tinygo>\bin` plus `<binaryen>\bin` to `PATH`. Then point TinyGo at the
+compatible Go SDK:
+
+```pwsh
+$env:GOROOT = "$env:USERPROFILE\sdk\go1.25.3"   # installed via: go install golang.org/dl/go1.25.3@latest
+$env:PATH   = "$env:GOROOT\bin;$env:PATH"
 ```
 
-A trivial main.go that satisfies the host API is sketched in
-`Server/plugin/sandbox_wazero.go`'s docstring.
+### Build command
+
+```sh
+# Run from this directory (Server/plugin/examples/hello/)
+tinygo build -o hello.wasm -target wasi ./main.go
+```
 
 ## Tests
 
diff --git a/docs/audit-2026-04-07.md b/docs/audit-2026-04-07.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..200cec7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit-2026-04-07.md
@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+# OwnCord — Comprehensive Project Audit
+**Date:** 2026-04-07  
+**Branch:** claude/plan-phases-b-c-bGpoS  
+**Audited by:** 6 parallel Claude agents across 8 dimensions
+
+---
+
+## Table of Contents
+1. [Architecture](#1-architecture)
+2. [Code Quality](#2-code-quality)
+3. [Security](#3-security)
+4. [Dependencies & Supply Chain](#4-dependencies--supply-chain)
+5. [Test Coverage & Quality](#5-test-coverage--quality)
+6. [CI/CD & DevEx](#6-cicd--devex)
+7. [Observability](#7-observability)
+8. [Plugin System Governance](#8-plugin-system-governance)
+9. [Prioritized Top-10 Action List](#9-prioritized-top-10-action-list)
+
+---
+
+## 1. Architecture
+
+### Layer Map
+
+| Layer | Location | Responsibility |
+|-------|----------|---------------|
+| **Client UI** | `Client/tauri-client/src/components/` | SolidJS UI components, settings, voice |
+| **Client Pages** | `Client/tauri-client/src/pages/` | MainPage, ConnectPage entry points |
+| **Client Stores** | `Client/tauri-client/src/stores/` | Reactive state (auth, channels, messages, voice, dm, ui, roles) |
+| **Client Lib** | `Client/tauri-client/src/lib/` | API client, WebSocket client, dispatcher, LiveKit session, theme |
+| **Tauri Rust** | `Client/tauri-client/src-tauri/` | WS proxy, credential manager, PTT, update notifications |
+| **Server API** | `Server/api/` | REST handlers (auth, channels, messages, DMs, invites, uploads) |
+| **Server WS** | `Server/ws/` | Real-time hub, event persistence, command dispatch, LiveKit integration |
+| **Server Service** | `Server/service/` | Domain business logic (Message, Channel, Permission, User, DM, Invite, Block, Voice) |
+| **Server Store** | `Server/store/` | Data access layer (SQLiteStore, PostgresStore stub, MemStore) |
+| **Server DB** | `Server/db/` | SQL schema, migrations, sqlc-generated queries |
+| **Server Plugin** | `Server/plugin/` | WASM runtime (Wazero), loader, manifest, registry, capability-scoped host APIs |
+| **Server Admin** | `Server/admin/` | Admin UI, backup management, log streaming |
+| **Server Auth** | `Server/auth/` | Authentication, session management, rate limiting, TOTP |
+
+### Communication Patterns
+
+| Channel | Usage |
+|---------|-------|
+| **REST API** | Auth, channel CRUD, file uploads, initial data fetch — uses Tauri HTTP plugin for self-signed cert support |
+| **WebSocket** | Real-time events (messages, presence, typing, voice) — single connection per client, envelope format `{type, id, payload}` |
+| **Tauri IPC** | `ws_connect/send/disconnect`, credential manager, PTT, update checks — desktop-only features |
+| **LiveKit** | HTTP voice token acquisition, reverse-proxy WebSocket signaling at `/livekit/*`, webhook for participant events |
+
+### Dependency Direction
+
+Layering is **healthy and mostly respected**:
+- ✅ `api/ → service/ → store/` holds
+- ✅ `ws/` does not import `api/` (no circular deps)
+- ✅ Plugin system imports service layer cleanly
+- ✅ Auth middleware isolated; not interspersed with handlers
+
+### Anti-patterns
+
+| SEVERITY | File | Finding |
+|----------|------|---------|
+| MEDIUM | `Server/api/auth_handler.go` | Auth handler queries DB directly, bypassing service layer — inconsistent with `channel_handler.go` pattern |
+| MEDIUM | `Client/tauri-client/src/lib/dispatcher.ts` | 84 registered listeners creates implicit coupling; hard to trace data flow |
+| MEDIUM | `Client/tauri-client/src/lib/livekitSession.ts` (1710 lines) | Monolith mixing LiveKit SDK, audio pipeline, diagnostics — should decompose |
+| MEDIUM | `Client/tauri-client/src/pages/MainPage.ts` (554 lines) | Mixes routing, layout, store subscriptions, cleanup — violates single responsibility |
+| MEDIUM | `Server/service/message.go` (715 lines) | Combines send/search/delete/edit/fetch — split into focused services |
+| LOW | `Client/tauri-client/src/main.ts` (538 lines) | Entry point handles init, error handlers, theme, health checks, connection orchestration |
+| LOW | `Server/api/router.go` (394 lines) | Mixes middleware setup, route registration, and business logic wiring |
+| LOW | `Server/admin/` | Admin package operates directly on DB; not using service layer — may diverge from REST/WS semantics |
+| LOW | PostgreSQL backend | Fully scaffolded but query methods stubbed; migration path undocumented |
+
+---
+
+## 2. Code Quality
+
+### Go — Error Handling
+
+| SEVERITY | File:Line | Finding |
+|----------|-----------|---------|
+| MEDIUM | `Server/admin/logstream.go:398-426` | SSE handler ignores write errors with `_, _ = fmt.Fprintf()` — client disconnections not detectable |
+| MEDIUM | `Server/admin/handlers_backup.go:55,139` | `database.LogAudit()` errors silently discarded with `_ =` — audit trail may silently fail |
+| MEDIUM | `Server/admin/handlers_users.go` (5 instances) | `LogAudit()` errors discarded — affects compliance/security audit trail |
+| LOW | `Server/updater/updater.go` (13 instances) | Excessive `_ =` error suppression; no logging fallback |
+| LOW | `Server/db/db.go` (9 instances) | Unchecked errors in setup/teardown paths |
+
+### Go — Interface Design
+
+- ✅ **Strong**: Store package has clear interface hierarchy (`Store → MessageStore, ChannelStore, UserStore, SessionStore, RoleStore`) with proper concrete implementations
+- ⚠️ **Concern**: Service layer handlers receive concrete `*db.DB` or `*Hub` rather than small interfaces — reduces testability
+
+### Go — Large Files (>800 lines)
+
+| File | Lines |
+|------|-------|
+| `Server/ws/hub.go` | 919 — mixes client management, event persistence, plugin integration, voice key-holding |
+| `Server/store/memstore.go` | 766 |
+| `Server/service/message.go` | 715 |
+| `Server/store/postgres.go` | 833 — largely stubbed scaffolding |
+
+### Go — Security-Relevant TODOs
+
+| File | TODO |
+|------|------|
+| `Server/ws/command.go` | Validate attachment URL scheme (require HTTPS) — security gap |
+| `Server/ws/registry.go` | Stack trace may contain sensitive function arguments |
+| `Server/ws/voice_leave.go` | Propagate context through `livekit.RemoveParticipant()` call |
+| `Server/ws/voice_e2ee.go` | Re-check key-holder status inside `sendToUserIfInVoiceChannel` |
+| `Server/store/sqlite.go` | Incomplete transaction-scoped store wrapper |
+
+### TypeScript — Type Safety
+
+| SEVERITY | File:Line | Finding |
+|----------|-----------|---------|
+| MEDIUM | Multiple components | ~43 event handlers with untyped `(e)` parameters — should be typed as `MouseEvent`, `DragEvent`, etc. |
+| LOW | `src/lib/audioPipeline.ts:75` | Single `as any` cast (justified by eslint-disable comment; acceptable) |
+
+### TypeScript — Large Components
+
+| File | Lines | Action |
+|------|-------|--------|
+| `src/components/settings/AccountTab.ts` | 845 | **Extract**: password-section.ts, totp-section.ts, status-selector.ts |
+| `src/components/EmojiPicker.ts` | 665 | Extract emoji data file |
+| `src/components/MessageList.ts` | 662 | Extract height-calc module |
+| `src/components/MessageInput.ts` | 599 | Reasonable given feature density |
+
+### TypeScript — Error Handling Gaps
+
+| SEVERITY | File | Finding |
+|----------|------|---------|
+| MEDIUM | `src/components/InviteManager.ts:96,151` | `.then()` chains without `.catch()` — silent rejection |
+| MEDIUM | `src/components/message-input/file-upload.ts:57` | `.then()` without catch — corrupt file failures silent |
+| MEDIUM | `src/components/message-list/attachments.ts:341` | `void fetchImageAsDataUrl().then()` — image load failures not surfaced |
+
+---
+
+## 3. Security
+
+### Overall Posture: **GOOD** (no critical issues in core app security)
+
+### Secrets & Configuration
+- ✅ `.env.example` uses placeholder values; file gitignored
+- ✅ No hardcoded secrets found in source, Tauri config, or configs
+- ✅ LiveKit credentials require 32+ character minimum
+
+### Input Validation
+- ✅ Username validation with `auth.ValidateUsername()` + bluemonday HTML sanitization
+- ✅ File uploads use `filepath.Base()` to prevent path traversal
+- ✅ Plugin uploads: magic-byte ZIP validation, 16 MiB hard cap, decompression bomb protection, symlink rejection
+- MEDIUM | `Server/api/auth_handler.go:151` | Username validation doesn't explicitly check for Unicode control characters, RTL overrides, or zero-width chars — potential homograph attack vector
+
+### SQL Injection
+- ✅ All standard queries use parameterized statements
+- ✅ `SearchMessagesInChannels` uses `fmt.Sprintf` only for `?` placeholder structure (not user data) — **safe by design**
+- ✅ FTS query sanitization: whitelist-only (letters, digits, spaces, hyphens), max 200 runes
+
+### Authentication & Authorization
+- ✅ `AuthMiddleware`: Bearer token extraction → hash → session lookup → expiry → ban check → context injection
+- ✅ `RequirePermission`: Admin bit (0x40000000) bypasses; 403 on insufficient permissions
+- ✅ WebSocket in-band auth within 10-second deadline; re-validated every 10 messages
+- ✅ Fail-closed: nil role = zero access
+- ✅ Permission-filtered reconnect replay (prevents data leakage after permission changes)
+
+### Rate Limiting
+- ✅ Per-endpoint configurable rate limits with 429 + Retry-After
+- ✅ Login, register, TOTP verification all rate-limited
+- ✅ Sensitive endpoints (account deletion, TOTP management) rate-limited
+- ✅ IP extraction validates trusted CIDR proxies — prevents rate-limit bypass via spoofed headers
+
+### Tauri Security
+- ✅ CSP enforced; `withGlobalTauri: false` (Tauri API not exposed on `window`)
+- ✅ Capabilities-based permission model (Tauri v2)
+- ✅ No devtools in production build
+
+### WebSocket Security
+- ✅ Auth deadline prevents resource exhaustion from slow clients
+- ✅ Priority-based send channels (high/normal/low) prevent low-priority spam blocking critical messages
+- ✅ Read limit enforced (`wsReadLimitBytes = config.MaxMessageBytes`)
+
+### Observations (not blocking)
+
+| SEVERITY | Area | Finding |
+|----------|------|---------|
+| MEDIUM | Username validation | Add explicit Unicode control character / zero-width char rejection |
+| MEDIUM | TOTP secrets | Confirm AES-256 encryption of stored secrets with per-record salt |
+| MEDIUM | LiveKit webhook | Confirm webhook signature validation cannot be bypassed with malformed JWT |
+| LOW | Session tokens | Confirm cryptographically secure RNG and per-session salt for token hashing |
+
+---
+
+## 4. Dependencies & Supply Chain
+
+### Overall Posture: **MODERATE RISK** (Go excellent, npm floating)
+
+### Go Modules — 30 direct deps, ALL exact-pinned ✅
+Notable: `golang.org/x/crypto v0.49.0`, `github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 v3.6.0`, `github.com/tetratelabs/wazero v1.11.0`, `modernc.org/sqlite v1.48.0`
+
+### npm — 13 production deps, ALL floating (^) ⚠️
+
+| Risk | Package | Version |
+|------|---------|---------|
+| HIGH | `@tauri-apps/plugin-updater` | `^2.10.0` — update mechanism, should pin |
+| HIGH | `@tauri-apps/plugin-global-shortcut` | `^2` — any 2.x allowed |
+| HIGH | `@tauri-apps/plugin-notification` | `^2` — any 2.x allowed |
+| HIGH | `@tauri-apps/plugin-store` | `^2` — any 2.x allowed |
+| MEDIUM | `livekit-client` | `^2.18.0` |
+| MEDIUM | `solid-js` | `^1.9.3` |
+| LOW | `zod` | `^4.3.6` |
+
+**Mitigating factor:** `package-lock.json` (8,832 lines) is committed and locks transitive deps.
+
+### Lockfile Status
+
+| Ecosystem | Status |
+|-----------|--------|
+| Go | ✅ `go.sum` committed, 455 entries |
+| npm (client) | ✅ `package-lock.json` committed, 8,832 lines |
+| npm (root) | ✅ `package-lock.json` committed, 492 lines |
+
+### License Compliance
+- OwnCord: **AGPLv3**
+- All direct dependencies: Apache 2.0 or MIT — **no copyleft incompatibilities**
+
+### Known Vulnerabilities
+- No CRITICAL CVEs in direct dependencies as of Feb 2025
+- `golang.org/x/crypto v0.49.0` — verify no disclosed CVEs since mid-2024 release
+- Run `npm audit` and `govulncheck` periodically
+
+---
+
+## 5. Test Coverage & Quality
+
+### Go — Package Coverage
+
+| Package | Test Files | Status |
+|---------|-----------|--------|
+| `api/` | 23 | ✅ Heavy behavioral coverage |
+| `ws/` | 32 | ✅ Connect/disconnect, commands, auth, deadlock |
+| `auth/` | 8 | ✅ Core flows, TOTP, helpers |
+| `db/` | 18 | ✅ Operations and migrations |
+| `admin/` | 11 | ✅ Good coverage |
+| `plugin/` | 6 | ✅ Loading, sandbox, manifest |
+| `permissions/` | 3 | ✅ |
+| `service/` | 2 | ⚠️ Only message + permission |
+| `**store/**` | **0** | ❌ **CRITICAL GAP — data persistence untested** |
+| `syncutil/` | 0 | ⚠️ Concurrency utils untested |
+| `scripts/` | 0 | Low priority (CLI tool) |
+
+### Go — Test Quality: GOOD
+- Behavioral tests using in-memory SQLite (`:memory:`) with full schema
+- Table-driven patterns used throughout
+- `goleak.VerifyTestMain()` in `auth/` — goroutine leak detection
+- Deadlock detection tests via `go test -tags deadlock`
+
+### Go — Critical Coverage Gaps
+
+| SEVERITY | Gap |
+|----------|-----|
+| HIGH | `Server/store/` — data persistence layer has zero test coverage |
+| HIGH | No PostgreSQL integration tests — all use in-memory SQLite; schema drift not caught |
+| MEDIUM | `Server/syncutil/` — concurrency utilities untested |
+| MEDIUM | Migration safety not validated across versions |
+
+### TypeScript — Test Files
+- **1 component unit test**: `src/components/solid/Badge.test.tsx`
+- **44 E2E specs**: Playwright (20 browser-mode, 22 native-mode + helpers)
+- **1 jsdom smoke test**: `tests/browser/smoke.test.ts`
+
+### TypeScript — E2E Coverage: EXCELLENT
+Auth flow, channels, messages, DMs, health/reconnect, UI overlays, voice controls, theme persistence — all covered in 44 Playwright specs.
+
+### TypeScript — Unit Coverage: MINIMAL (<10%)
+
+| SEVERITY | Gap |
+|----------|-----|
+| HIGH | No tests for `src/lib/` utilities (api.ts, ws.ts, dispatcher.ts, livekitSession.ts) |
+| HIGH | No tests for `src/stores/` (messages, channels, voice, auth) |
+| MEDIUM | 7 files explicitly excluded from coverage thresholds: `main.ts`, `updater.ts`, `credentials.ts`, etc. |
+| MEDIUM | 70% coverage threshold configured in vitest but unit tests too sparse to enforce |
+
+---
+
+## 6. CI/CD & DevEx
+
+### Pipeline Gates
+
+| Job | OS | Gates |
+|-----|----|-------|
+| `server-build-test` | Windows + Ubuntu | ✅ Build (4 tag variants), Tests (race + deadlock), golangci-lint, govulncheck |
+| `client-check` | Windows | ✅ TypeScript check, ESLint, Oxlint, Prettier, Vitest, npm audit, Knip |
+| `server-docker-build` | Ubuntu | ✅ Docker build verification |
+| `tauri-build` | Windows + Ubuntu + Ubuntu-ARM | ✅ Rust lint, Rust audit, full Tauri build — PR to main only |
+
+### Linting Enforcement
+- **Go**: golangci-lint v2.11.3 — hard fail; rules: gocritic, gosec, errcheck, bodyclose, contextcheck, staticcheck
+- **TypeScript**: ESLint with `no-floating-promises: error`, `no-unused-vars: error`; Prettier format check; Oxlint
+- **Enforcement**: Hard fail for all linting/formatting in CI ✅
+
+### Gaps
+
+| SEVERITY | Finding |
+|----------|---------|
+| MEDIUM | E2E tests not in main CI — only run on PRs to main, not on merge. Code could merge without E2E gate |
+| MEDIUM | No branch protection rules visible in repo config |
+| LOW | No `.nvmrc` / `.node-version` file — Node 20 only enforced in CI, not locally |
+| LOW | Rust toolchain pinned to `stable` (not specific version) — builds can drift |
+| LOW | `Knip` runs with `|| true` (advisory only, not blocking) |
+
+### Build Reproducibility
+- ✅ Go: `go 1.25.0` pinned in `go.mod`; `go.sum` committed
+- ✅ Node: Version 20 pinned in CI; `npm ci` used (clean install)
+- ✅ 4 Go build tag variants tested: default, otel, wazero, otel+wazero
+- ✅ Lockfiles current (go.sum: Apr 6, package-lock: Apr 7)
+
+---
+
+## 7. Observability
+
+### Logging: STRONG ✅
+- **Library**: `log/slog` (stdlib, Go 1.21) with multi-handler — stdout (INFO+) + ring buffer (DEBUG+)
+- **Structured**: All logs use key-value pairs (`slog.Info("msg", "key", val)`)
+- **Context present**: actor_id, user_id, channel_id, operation names logged consistently
+- **Admin log viewer**: 2000-entry ring buffer in `Server/admin/logstream.go`
+- **Minor**: `Server/scripts/seed.go` uses `fmt.Printf` (non-production CLI, acceptable)
+
+### Metrics & Tracing: PRESENT (build-tag gated)
+- OpenTelemetry SDK with no-op default; full telemetry via `-tags otel`
+- Prometheus metrics export at `/metrics`
+- Request ID propagation via `X-Request-Id` header ✅
+- Health endpoints: `GET /health`, `GET /api/v1/health`, `GET /api/v1/livekit/health` ✅
+
+### Error Surfacing: GOOD ✅
+- Errors logged server-side with `slog.Error` before HTTP response
+- Consistent HTTP status codes (400 validation, 503 feature unavailable, 500 internal)
+- `writeErr()` / `writeJSON()` helper in admin ensure consistent error response shape
+
+### Client-Side: LIMITED ⚠️
+| SEVERITY | Finding |
+|----------|---------|
+| MEDIUM | No global error boundary component — unhandled promise rejections may fail silently |
+| LOW | No crash/error reporting integration (Sentry, etc.) |
+
+---
+
+## 8. Plugin System Governance
+
+### Plugin Architecture
+- WASM isolation via Wazero (behind `-tags wazero` build flag)
+- Manifest-declared capabilities: `commands`, `events`, `storage`, `http`, `ui`
+- Memory capped per runtime (default 64 MiB); CPU budget configurable
+
+### CRITICAL Issues
+
+| SEVERITY | File:Line | Finding |
+|----------|-----------|---------|
+| **CRITICAL** | `Server/plugin/sandbox_wazero.go:162,211` | `invokeCommand` has **no timeout** — a looping plugin hangs the goroutine indefinitely |
+| **CRITICAL** | `Server/plugin/host_storage.go` | Storage capability has **no key isolation** — plugin can read/write ANY key in the plugin store, not just its own |
+| **CRITICAL** | `Server/plugin/host_http.go:162-240` | HTTP capability allows plugins to **exfiltrate data** by POSTing captured payload to any allowlisted host |
+| **CRITICAL** | `Server/plugin/registry.go:129-133` | All commands auto-registered if manifest declares `commands` capability — **no per-command ACL** |
+| **CRITICAL** | `Server/plugin/host_events.go` | **No rate limit** on event delivery to plugins — malicious plugin could slow server by processing events slowly |
+| MEDIUM | `Server/plugin/host_http.go:64-96` | DNS rebinding TOCTOU between `rejectPrivateAddrs` check and TCP dial — not fully atomic |
+| LOW | `Server/plugin/registry.go` | Default (non-Wazero) stub build doesn't emit WARN if plugins are configured but stub is running |
+| LOW | `Server/plugin/loader.go` | Plugin discovery walks filesystem on every server start — no manifest caching |
+
+### Strengths
+- ✅ Per-plugin WASM module isolation (memory, execution)
+- ✅ Private IP SSRF protection via `rejectPrivateAddrs()`
+- ✅ Symlink rejection in ZIP extraction (zip-slip protection)
+- ✅ Decompression bomb protection on plugin upload
+- ✅ Graceful lifecycle (disable/uninstall/close) with module cleanup
+- ✅ Plugin registry tracks all loaded instances with mutex-protected map
+
+---
+
+## 9. Prioritized Top-10 Action List
+
+| Priority | SEVERITY | Area | Action | File |
+|----------|----------|------|--------|------|
+| 1 | CRITICAL | Plugin | Add `context.WithTimeout(ctx, cfg.CPUBudgetMs)` around `invokeCommand` to prevent infinite hangs | `Server/plugin/sandbox_wazero.go:162` |
+| 2 | CRITICAL | Plugin | Namespace storage keys by plugin ID: `fmt.Sprintf("%d/%s", pluginID, key)` in `PluginGet/Set/Delete` | `Server/plugin/host_storage.go` |
+| 3 | CRITICAL | Plugin | Add per-command ACL in registry — check `plugin.Manifest.AllowedCommands` or require explicit command declaration | `Server/plugin/registry.go:129` |
+| 4 | CRITICAL | Plugin | Rate-limit event delivery to plugins (token bucket per plugin) to prevent event flooding DoS | `Server/plugin/host_events.go` |
+| 5 | HIGH | Tests | Add `store/` package tests — data persistence is completely untested; cover SQLiteStore CRUD and query methods | `Server/store/` |
+| 6 | HIGH | Tests | Add TypeScript unit tests for `src/lib/` (api.ts, ws.ts, dispatcher.ts) and `src/stores/` — currently <10% unit coverage | `Client/tauri-client/src/lib/` |
+| 7 | HIGH | Deps | Pin critical npm packages to exact versions: `@tauri-apps/plugin-updater`, `vite`, `@tauri-apps/plugin-store` | `Client/tauri-client/package.json` |
+| 8 | MEDIUM | Architecture | Refactor `Server/api/auth_handler.go` to route through `AuthService` — currently bypasses service layer | `Server/api/auth_handler.go` |
+| 9 | MEDIUM | Code Quality | Silence audit trail loss — wrap `database.LogAudit()` calls with `slog.Error` on failure instead of `_ =` | `Server/admin/handlers_*.go` |
+| 10 | MEDIUM | CI/CD | Add E2E gate to `ci.yml` on push to main (not only on PR) + add `.nvmrc` for local Node version enforcement | `.github/workflows/ci.yml` |
+
+### Bonus (quick wins)
+
+- Add `.catch()` handlers to `.then()` chains in `InviteManager.ts`, `file-upload.ts`, `attachments.ts`
+- Add `context.WithTimeout` guard in `Server/ws/voice_leave.go` (`livekit.RemoveParticipant` has `//nolint:contextcheck`)
+- Add HTTPS-only URL validation in `Server/ws/command.go` (existing TODO)
+- Add frontend error boundary component wrapping `MainPage`
+- Add Unicode/invisible-character validation to username registration
+
+---
+
+*Report generated from 6 parallel audit agents. All findings are read-only analysis; no code was modified.*
diff --git a/docs/contributing.md b/docs/contributing.md
index c65d62b9..38abe1be 100644
--- a/docs/contributing.md
+++ b/docs/contributing.md
@@ -83,6 +83,24 @@ How to set up the development environment and contribute to OwnCord.
 | `npm run format:check` | Prettier check only (no writes) |
 | `npm run knip` | Dead code and unused export detection |
 
+## Plugin Development
+
+Plugins are WASM modules loaded at runtime when the server is built with `-tags wazero`.
+See `Server/plugin/examples/hello/README.md` for the full plugin ABI and build instructions.
+
+**Toolchain requirements for building `.wasm` plugins with TinyGo:**
+
+| Tool | Version | Notes |
+|------|---------|-------|
+| TinyGo | 0.40.1 | Supports Go 1.19–1.25 only |
+| Go SDK | 1.25.x | Install alongside the system Go via `go install golang.org/dl/go1.25.3@latest && go1.25.3 download` |
+| wasm-opt | Binaryen 129 | Required by TinyGo for the `wasi` target; download from Binaryen GitHub releases |
+
+Any WASM toolchain (Rust/`wasm32-wasi`, AssemblyScript, etc.) that exports the five ABI
+functions is equally valid — TinyGo is just the example toolchain used by `examples/hello/`.
+
+---
+
 ## Active Branches
 
 - `main` -- stable releases