test: audit 2026-08-19 — fix stale tests, close coverage gaps (#1397)

* test(server): admin/handlers/channels — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(server): api/constants — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(server): api/middleware — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(server): api/waf — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(server): auth/totp/encrypt — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(server): db/session/expiry/test — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(server): migrations/030/attachments/unlink/on/message/delete — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(server): updater/download — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(server): ws/handlers_command — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(server): ws/hub/broadcast — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(server): ws/hub/events — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(server): ws/livekit/webhook — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(server): ws/voice/controls — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(server): ws/voice/join — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(server): ws/voice/moderation — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(rust): src-tauri/src/commands.rs — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(rust): src-tauri/src/secret_store.rs — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(rust): src-tauri/src/update_commands.rs — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(client): src/components/ChannelSidebar.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(client): src/lib/ws.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(rust): src-tauri/src/credentials.rs — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(rust): src-tauri/src/tofu.rs — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(client): src/lib/hostValidation.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(client): src/lib/rate-limiter.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(client): src/pages/connect-page/LoginForm.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(client): src/pages/main-page/SidebarArea.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(client): src/stores/voice.store.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(client): tests/browser/smoke.test.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(client): tests/unit/media.test.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(client): tests/unit/renderers.test.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(client): src/components/UserProfilePopup.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(client): src/lib/e2eeCrypto.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(client): tests/unit/log-persistence.test.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 fixes

* test(client): keep tests/browser out of the jsdom suite and run it in CI

* test(server): ws/hub_broadcast_test.go — bytes.Equal payload compare (gocritic)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(client): src/lib/credentials.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 round 2 (Stryker)

* test(client): src/lib/dispatcher.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 round 2 (Stryker)

* test(client): src/lib/permissions.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 round 2 (Stryker)

* test(client): src/lib/rate-limiter.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 round 2 (Stryker)

* test(client): src/lib/hostValidation.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 round 2 (Stryker)

* test(client): src/stores/messages.store.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 round 2 (Stryker)

* test(client): src/lib/e2eeCrypto.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 round 2 (Stryker)

* test(client): src/lib/ws.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 round 2 (Stryker)

* test(client): src/lib/identity.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 round 2 (Stryker)

* test(client): src/lib/livekitE2EE.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 round 2 (Stryker)

* test(client): src/stores/auth.store.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 round 2 (Stryker)

* test(client): src/stores/voice.store.ts — test-audit 2026-08-19 round 2 (Stryker)

* docs: test audit 2026-08-19 — findings, fixes, measured baselines

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(graph): refresh the knowledge graph after the 2026-08-19 test audit

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
J3vb
2026-08-20 19:29:31 +02:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Claude Fable 5
parent 03fcb7d518
commit d880b64d64
61 changed files with 206893 additions and 181134 deletions
+252
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
package auth_test
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/hex"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
)
// testKey returns a deterministic 32-byte AES-256 key.
func testKey(fill byte) []byte {
key := make([]byte, 32)
for i := range key {
key[i] = fill
}
return key
}
// TestEncryptDecryptTOTPSecret_RoundTrip pins the real AES-GCM path: a secret
// encrypted with a key must decrypt back to itself byte-for-byte, and the
// stored form must not be the plaintext.
func TestEncryptDecryptTOTPSecret_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
key := testKey(0x2a)
secrets := []string{
"GEZDGNBVGY3TQOJQGEZDGNBVGY3TQOJQ", // 32-char base32 TOTP secret
"JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP", // 16-char legacy-length secret
"", // empty plaintext still round-trips
}
for _, secret := range secrets {
encrypted, err := auth.EncryptTOTPSecret(key, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EncryptTOTPSecret(%q): %v", secret, err)
}
if encrypted == secret {
t.Fatalf("EncryptTOTPSecret(%q) returned the plaintext", secret)
}
got, err := auth.DecryptTOTPSecret(key, encrypted)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DecryptTOTPSecret(%q): %v", secret, err)
}
if got != secret {
t.Fatalf("round-trip = %q, want %q", got, secret)
}
}
}
// TestEncryptTOTPSecret_NonceIsRandom pins that two encryptions of the same
// secret differ, so a stored ciphertext cannot be used as a secret fingerprint.
func TestEncryptTOTPSecret_NonceIsRandom(t *testing.T) {
key := testKey(0x11)
const secret = "GEZDGNBVGY3TQOJQGEZDGNBVGY3TQOJQ"
first, err := auth.EncryptTOTPSecret(key, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EncryptTOTPSecret: %v", err)
}
second, err := auth.EncryptTOTPSecret(key, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EncryptTOTPSecret: %v", err)
}
if first == second {
t.Fatal("two encryptions of the same secret produced identical ciphertext (nonce reuse)")
}
}
// TestDecryptTOTPSecret_FailsClosed pins the documented invariant at
// totp_encrypt.go: a value that has the full encrypted shape (valid hex, long
// enough for nonce+tag) but fails GCM authentication must return an error and
// an EMPTY string. Returning the ciphertext would silently mask a wrong
// TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY and hand the caller a bogus "secret".
func TestDecryptTOTPSecret_FailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
key := testKey(0x01)
const secret = "GEZDGNBVGY3TQOJQGEZDGNBVGY3TQOJQ"
encrypted, err := auth.EncryptTOTPSecret(key, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EncryptTOTPSecret: %v", err)
}
// Flip the last ciphertext byte to simulate tampering/corruption.
raw, err := hex.DecodeString(encrypted)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("hex.DecodeString: %v", err)
}
raw[len(raw)-1] ^= 0xff
tampered := hex.EncodeToString(raw)
tests := []struct {
name string
key []byte
ciphertext string
}{
{name: "wrong key", key: testKey(0x02), ciphertext: encrypted},
{name: "tampered ciphertext", key: key, ciphertext: tampered},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := auth.DecryptTOTPSecret(tc.key, tc.ciphertext)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("DecryptTOTPSecret returned nil error (got %q); must fail closed", got)
}
if got != "" {
t.Fatalf("DecryptTOTPSecret returned %q on auth failure; must return the empty string, never the ciphertext", got)
}
})
}
}
// TestDecryptTOTPSecret_LegacyPlaintextPassthrough pins the backwards-compat
// branches: values that cannot be encrypted data are handed back unchanged
// with no error, which is what makes the fail-closed branch above safe.
func TestDecryptTOTPSecret_LegacyPlaintextPassthrough(t *testing.T) {
key := testKey(0x03)
tests := []struct {
name string
value string
}{
{name: "short base32 secret", value: "JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP"},
// Long enough for the encrypted format but not valid hex.
{name: "long non-hex value", value: "GEZDGNBVGY3TQOJQGEZDGNBVGY3TQOJQGEZDGNBVGY3TQOJQGEZDGNBV"},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := auth.DecryptTOTPSecret(key, tc.value)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DecryptTOTPSecret(%q): %v", tc.value, err)
}
if got != tc.value {
t.Fatalf("DecryptTOTPSecret(%q) = %q, want the value unchanged", tc.value, got)
}
})
}
}
// TestLoadOrGenerateTOTPKey_StableAcrossRestarts pins that the second boot
// reads totp.key back off disk instead of generating a fresh key. A regression
// here makes every stored (encrypted) TOTP secret undecryptable after a
// restart, locking every 2FA account out.
func TestLoadOrGenerateTOTPKey_StableAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("OWNCORD_TOTP_KEY", "")
dataDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "data")
first, err := auth.LoadOrGenerateTOTPKey(dataDir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first LoadOrGenerateTOTPKey: %v", err)
}
if len(first) != 32 {
t.Fatalf("key length = %d, want 32", len(first))
}
second, err := auth.LoadOrGenerateTOTPKey(dataDir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second LoadOrGenerateTOTPKey: %v", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(first, second) {
t.Fatalf("key changed across restarts: %x then %x", first, second)
}
// The persisted key must be the one returned, so an operator copying
// totp.key to another host gets the same decryption key.
onDisk, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dataDir, "totp.key"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("reading totp.key: %v", err)
}
if string(onDisk) != hex.EncodeToString(first) {
t.Fatalf("totp.key = %q, want %q", onDisk, hex.EncodeToString(first))
}
}
// TestLoadOrGenerateTOTPKey_EnvVar pins that OWNCORD_TOTP_KEY wins over a
// totp.key on disk (so an operator can rotate without touching the file) and
// that a wrong-length env key is a hard error rather than a silent fallback to
// auto-generation.
func TestLoadOrGenerateTOTPKey_EnvVar(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("valid hex wins over the key file", func(t *testing.T) {
envKey := testKey(0x7e)
t.Setenv("OWNCORD_TOTP_KEY", hex.EncodeToString(envKey))
dataDir := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dataDir, "totp.key"),
[]byte(hex.EncodeToString(testKey(0x01))), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("writing totp.key: %v", err)
}
got, err := auth.LoadOrGenerateTOTPKey(dataDir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadOrGenerateTOTPKey: %v", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(got, envKey) {
t.Fatalf("key = %x, want the env key %x", got, envKey)
}
})
t.Run("wrong length is a hard error", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("OWNCORD_TOTP_KEY", hex.EncodeToString(make([]byte, 16)))
key, err := auth.LoadOrGenerateTOTPKey(t.TempDir())
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadOrGenerateTOTPKey accepted a 16-byte OWNCORD_TOTP_KEY (returned %x)", key)
}
if key != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadOrGenerateTOTPKey returned key %x alongside an error; want nil", key)
}
})
}
// TestLoadOrGenerateTOTPKey_RejectsBadKeyFile pins that a corrupt totp.key is a
// hard error rather than a silent regeneration (which would orphan every
// stored secret).
func TestLoadOrGenerateTOTPKey_RejectsBadKeyFile(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
contents string
}{
{name: "invalid hex", contents: "not-hex-at-all"},
{name: "wrong length", contents: hex.EncodeToString(make([]byte, 16))},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("OWNCORD_TOTP_KEY", "")
dataDir := t.TempDir()
keyPath := filepath.Join(dataDir, "totp.key")
if err := os.WriteFile(keyPath, []byte(tc.contents), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("writing totp.key: %v", err)
}
key, err := auth.LoadOrGenerateTOTPKey(dataDir)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadOrGenerateTOTPKey accepted a corrupt totp.key (returned %x)", key)
}
if key != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadOrGenerateTOTPKey returned key %x alongside an error; want nil", key)
}
// The corrupt file must be left alone, not overwritten with a
// freshly generated key.
after, readErr := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
if readErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("reading totp.key after failure: %v", readErr)
}
if string(after) != tc.contents {
t.Fatalf("totp.key was rewritten to %q, want %q", after, tc.contents)
}
})
}
}