Claude
1673c37b9c
fix: comprehensive security hardening from full codebase audit
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Addresses 14 findings from the security audit across all severity levels:
CRITICAL:
- C-1: Add user blocking system (migration, DB queries, REST API, WS DM
send check) to prevent harassment via unconsented DMs
- C-2: Remove server version from unauthenticated /health and /info endpoints
to prevent fingerprinting
HIGH:
- H-1: Remove dangerous-settings feature from tauri-plugin-http
- H-3: Default allowSelfSigned to false in API client (was hardcoded true)
- H-4: Cap invite expiration to 30 days (720 hours)
- H-5: Add 256KB message size limit to LiveKit WS proxy (prevents OOM)
- H-6: Cap concurrent sessions to 25 per user (evicts oldest on overflow)
- H-8: Restrict /diagnostics/connectivity to ADMINISTRATOR role
MEDIUM:
- M-2: Deny access to legacy NULL-uploader unlinked attachments
- M-4: Log warnings on TOTP plaintext decryption fallback paths
- M-8: Remove acceptInvalidCerts from OG preview fetches
- M-10: Expand file upload blocklist (Java .class, OLE2, WASM, .lnk)
- M-12: Add LIMIT to ListInvites (200) and ListMembers (1000)
- M-14: Add CHECK constraint trigger on channels.type (text/voice/dm)
https://claude.ai/code/session_01KKo3RwjdmcNzkgXNfUkgNT
2026-04-04 16:48:57 +00:00
jevb
28f33644de
fix: address remaining code review findings (C-3, H-5, H-6, M-1 through M-16)
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- C-3: inject setupLimiter into NewAdminAPI instead of package-level global
- H-5: generateRandomKey returns error instead of panicking
- H-6: replace init() bcrypt with sync.Once lazy initialization
- M-2: remove unsafe-inline from admin CSP script-src and style-src
- M-3: sanitize upload filenames (strip control chars, truncate to 255)
- M-5: truncate User-Agent to 512 bytes before storing as device
- M-10: MaxBodySizeUnless uses prefix matching instead of exact path
- M-12: wrap seedExistingDatabase in a single transaction
- M-13: use errors.Is for EOF check in upload handler
- M-14: log writeJSON encoding errors instead of discarding
- M-16: standardize error codes to INTERNAL_ERROR across all handlers
2026-03-31 19:00:17 +02:00
jevb
4c4526e539
fix: security hardening — 45 issues from full-project Copilot audit
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Critical (6):
- C1: SQL injection in VACUUM INTO backup path — strict character allowlist
- C2: Unlimited binary download in updater — 500MB LimitReader
- C3: JSON injection in SSE log stream — json.Marshal instead of concat
- C4: CSS injection via custom themes — reject () and {} in values
- C5: Silent DM message loss — error response on participant lookup failure
- C6: LiveKit URL credential leak — strip creds from diagnostics endpoint
High (11):
- H1: DB errors no longer trigger login rate-limit lockout
- H2: Permission fetch failure returns 500, not empty channel list
- H3: TOCTOU race on duplicate WS — atomic check-and-register in hub
- H5: LiveKit webhook verifies voice channel match (already implemented)
- H7: Server host address validated before storage (hostname regex)
- H8: WS message deduplication on reconnect replay (1000-entry Set)
- H9: Admin setup endpoint rate limited (5/min/IP)
- H10: Backup responses return filename only, not full path
- H11: Update binary recovery failure now alerts admin
Medium (17):
- M1: MIME type from magic bytes, not client header
- M3: Nil guard on DM broadcast recipient
- M5: LiveKit process run-done channel race fixed
- M6: Backup restore calls fsync before close
- M7: Partial download file cleaned up on error
- M8: Admin CSP uses nonce instead of unsafe-inline
- M9: Client rate limiter enforced for presence_update
- M10: Voice joinedAt not reset on double-join
- M11: Unread count skips increment during reconnect replay
- M13: Category type uses exact match, not substring
- M14: Storage LimitReader off-by-one fixed
- M15: GitHub token only sent to GitHub hosts
- M16: Content-parser ReDoS regex replaced with split approach
- M17: Audio device switch error handling added
Low (11):
- L1: CORS uses configured origins instead of wildcard
- L2: HSTS header added when TLS enabled
- L3: Consistent JSON error responses across all endpoints
- L4: File modtime from stat, not time.Now()
- L5: Malformed invite JSON returns 400
- L6: TouchSession failure logged at warn
- L8: MessageInput timers cleared on destroy
- L9: Log persistence flush errors caught
- L10: Credential save failure surfaced to user
- L11: Case-insensitive asset name matching in updater
Found by GitHub Copilot full-project review (claude-sonnet-4.6 + claude-haiku-4.5).
2026-03-29 12:35:04 +02:00
jevb
4d1a1676c7
feat: TOFU cert pinning, settings cache refactor, ban enforcement, and 80%+ test coverage
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- Implement TOFU certificate pinning in Rust WS proxy with accept_cert_fingerprint command
- Refactor settings cache from package-level globals to Hub methods (eliminates global state)
- Add runtime ban check on WS message handling (kicks banned users mid-session)
- Sanitize reaction error messages to prevent IDOR information leaks
- Add slog error logging to REST handlers (channel, invite, search)
- Handle channel_delete for active channel in client dispatcher
- Add certMismatchBlock to prevent auto-reconnect on TOFU mismatch
- Consolidate root-level spec docs into docs/brain/06-Specs/ vault
- Add 80%+ test coverage for ws (80.9%) and admin (81.7%) packages
- Delete completed TODOS.md (all items resolved)
2026-03-17 11:05:52 +01:00
jevb
6eba999233
feat: add Let's Encrypt ACME support, fix security issues, improve server UX
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Server:
- Add Let's Encrypt (ACME) TLS mode with autocert, HTTP-01 challenges on :80,
and automatic certificate renewal (tls.mode: "acme" in config.yaml)
- Add ASCII art startup banner with server info and endpoint URLs
- Fix CSP blocking admin panel inline styles/scripts (per-route override)
- Suppress TLS handshake error noise in console output
- Fix TOCTOU race in invite consumption (atomic UPDATE with row-count check)
- Fix sendMsg mutex race condition (hold lock for entire send)
- Fix permission override formula (deny-first, allow-wins)
- Fix voice join parsing channelID before permission check
- Add session expiry check at WebSocket auth and periodic revalidation
- Add message length limit (4000 chars) and emoji length validation (32 bytes)
- Add file size enforcement in storage after io.Copy
- Add checksum URL validation in updater
- Add backup path traversal protection (BackupToSafe)
- Add self-modification guard in admin handlePatchUser
- Fix admin ownerOnlyMiddleware to use context user instead of re-auth
- Remove redundant startup log lines (banner shows same info)
- Add periodic expired session cleanup (15-min ticker)
- Add permissions package with bitfield constants and EffectivePerms
- Add rate limiter cleanup goroutine to prevent unbounded growth
- Add auth helpers (IsEffectivelyBanned, IsSessionExpired)
- Add WebSocket origin validation
Client:
- Add TOFU certificate trust service
- Add receive loop error handling
- Fix redundant else-if in OnChatMessage
2026-03-15 07:07:59 +01:00
jevb
b7dd6eabe9
feat: implement Phase 2 auth & security with TDD
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- auth/session: 256-bit crypto-random tokens, SHA-256 hashing for storage
- auth/password: bcrypt cost 12, strength validation (8-72 chars)
- auth/ratelimit: sliding-window RateLimiter with lockout, thread-safe
- db/models: User, Session, Invite, Role types
- db/auth_queries: full user/session/invite CRUD with in-memory test coverage
- api/middleware: AuthMiddleware (Bearer token), RequirePermission (bitfield),
RateLimitMiddleware (X-Real-IP, Retry-After header)
- api/auth_handler: POST register/login, POST logout, GET me
- Generic errors — username existence never revealed
- Rate limits: 3/min register, 5/min login, lockout after 10 failures
- api/invite_handler: create/list/revoke behind MANAGE_INVITES permission
- bluemonday sanitization on all user-supplied string fields
Test coverage: auth 90.9%, db 84.4%, api 80.9%
2026-03-14 20:52:11 +01:00