mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
synced 2026-09-03 03:50:00 +03:00
a366160dc8f403adfa8759547fda70823aa601d2
17
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 J3vbandClaude Fable 5
|
8787b9066d |
fix: batch of 34 correctness fixes across server and client (#1372)
* fix(client): 3 defect(s) (OC-0037, OC-0063, OC-0116) Route the tray Status submenu through saveUserStatus() (mapping the legacy "offline" to "invisible") so notifications, autoIdle, and reconnect presence restore all agree with the tray's choice; build the connected overlay from the auth_ok payload instead of a pre-dispatch authStore snapshot; keep the TOTP overlay open across a rejected verify (totpPending latch) and retain the partial token for the retry instead of clearing it in finally. Hand-applied combined cluster preserved from the previous fix run's overlap-guard block (both clusters edit main.ts). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(voice): 2 defect(s) (OC-0010, OC-0011) * fix(ws): 1 defect(s) (OC-0050) * fix(db): 1 defect(s) (OC-0052) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0054) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0059) * fix(auth): 1 defect(s) (OC-0061) * fix(ws): 1 defect(s) (OC-0062) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0064) * fix(service): 1 defect(s) (OC-0070) * fix(ws): 1 defect(s) (OC-0073) * fix(service): 2 defect(s) (OC-0075, OC-0120) * fix(admin): 1 defect(s) (OC-0076) * fix(voice): 1 defect(s) (OC-0084) * fix(client): 2 defect(s) (OC-0085, OC-0094) Scope collapsed-category persistence to the connected host instead of the server display name, and stop the DM back button from jumping to the first text channel when DM mode was entered without recording channelBeforeDm. * fix(service): 1 defect(s) (OC-0087) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0089) * fix(ws): 1 defect(s) (OC-0091) * fix(api): 1 defect(s) (OC-0093) * fix(identity): 1 defect(s) (OC-0118) * fix(dm): 1 defect(s) (OC-0119) * fix(voice): 1 defect(s) (OC-0135) * fix(api): 1 defect(s) (OC-0137) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0142) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0144) * fix(admin): 1 defect(s) (OC-0145) * fix(updater): 1 defect(s) (OC-0146) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0150) * fix(mentions): 1 defect(s) (OC-0131) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
J3vbandClaude Fable 5
|
8579cb5d91 |
fix: batch of 25 correctness fixes across server and client (#1370)
* chore(workflows): raise subagent effort tiers (sonnet/haiku to xhigh, prove opus to high) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(voice): 6 defect(s) (OC-0098, OC-0004, OC-0005, OC-0006, OC-0007, OC-0020) * fix(db): 1 defect(s) (OC-0096) * fix(admin): 1 defect(s) (OC-0097) * fix(auth): 2 defect(s) (OC-0099, OC-0021) * fix(voice): 1 defect(s) (OC-0018) * fix(admin): 1 defect(s) (OC-0045) * fix(api): 1 defect(s) (OC-0103) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0105) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0107) * fix(api): 1 defect(s) (OC-0109) * fix(api): 1 defect(s) (OC-0112) * test(admin): compare restore bytes with bytes.Equal Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(voice): 2 defect(s) (OC-0095, OC-0014) OC-0095: createRoom never called setE2EEEnabled(true), so the full ECDH/HKDF/AES-GCM key exchange completed but frames still reached the SFU in plaintext. OC-0014: token refresh timer was 23h while the server mints LiveKit tokens with a 5-minute TTL, so any reconnect after minute 5 presented an expired token. * fix(profile): 2 defect(s) (OC-0100, OC-0102) * fix(service): 1 defect(s) (OC-0022) Archived channels were only read-only for SendMessage/DeleteMessage. Edit, reaction, pin and purge sinks bypassed the check. Route every write sink through a shared requireChannelWritable gate. * fix(api): 1 defect(s) (OC-0048) * chore(workflows): correct stale model labels in bughunt-fix phase details Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0015) * fix(voice): 1 defect(s) (OC-0002) * test: fix two CI-only failures in the batch-4 test suite The delete-account broadcast test now observes member_ban on a second client's socket: the hub broadcasts and then force-disconnects the target, so on a slow runner the close could beat the target's own copy of the frame. The observer is also the party the event exists for. The voice e2e mock now echoes the real joined channel id on voice_leave (it hardcoded channel_id 0, which the dispatcher's channel-matched self-leave teardown correctly ignores), and the rejoin test waits for the mock's delayed echoes to settle before clicking the row again — clicking inside the echo window toggled a leave instead of a join. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
J3vbandClaude Opus 4.8
|
58005c9c6f |
feat(auth): revocable API tokens, introspect MCP server, and a Go 1.26 idiom pass (#1266)
* feat(auth): add revocable API tokens (bot/service auth) Add long-lived, revocable API tokens so headless clients (the introspection MCP tool, bots, CI) can authenticate without a password. Presented as "Authorization: Bearer <token>", a token authenticates as a specific user, inheriting that user's role and permissions. - migration 018 + dedicated api_tokens table (kept separate from sessions so bulk logout and the per-user session cap never touch these); only the SHA-256 hash is stored, raw token shown once at creation - auth.ResolveTokenHash: one shared bearer resolver that both AuthMiddleware and adminAuthMiddleware now call. Sessions are matched first so existing login behavior is unchanged; API tokens are a fallback only on session miss. A DB outage is returned wrapped, never mistaken for a bad token. - `server token create|list|revoke` CLI: mints directly against the DB with no HTTP and no login — the password-free bootstrap path - tests: resolver (8 cases incl. outage-not-fallthrough), db queries (6), api middleware integration (valid + revoked token) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(tools): add owncord-introspect MCP server A local MCP dev tool that lets Claude Code introspect a running OwnCord instance: read its logs, query any REST endpoint, and tail the desktop client's log file. It is a thin wrapper over the existing API plus the client log — no new product surface. - tools/mcp-introspect/index.mjs (Node/ESM, one dep: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk) exposes api_request (full read-write passthrough), server_logs (admin SSE ring-buffer stream), client_logs (reads the desktop log file) - authenticates with an API token (OWNCORD_API_TOKEN); pins the self-signed cert and skips hostname checks (the cert has no SAN) - registered in .mcp.json (secret-free ${OWNCORD_API_TOKEN}) - un-ignore tools/mcp-introspect/ so this shared dev tool is committed, while tools/livekit-server.exe and node_modules stay ignored - docs/mcp-introspect.md: how it works, tool reference, setup, troubleshooting Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(dependencies): update and add various crate versions in Cargo.lock * feat(admin): manage API tokens from the admin panel Add Owner-gated HTTP endpoints and a UI card to create, list, and revoke API tokens from the web admin panel. Previously only the `server token` CLI could manage them, which requires shell access to the host. - POST|GET|DELETE /admin/api/tokens in admin/handlers_tokens.go, wired in admin/api.go. All three are Owner-only (ownerOnlyMiddleware, like backups/updates): an HTTP token-mint endpoint is a network-reachable credential-minting surface, and API tokens deliberately survive password change + bulk logout, so a hijacked admin session must not mint one. - Reuses the same db.*APIToken calls as the CLI; create sources the actor from request context (audits who clicked, not the bound user); the raw token is returned once in the 201 body, never stored. - Add json tags to db.APITokenListItem for snake_case wire consistency. - Admin panel: "API Tokens" nav item + create modal, show-once reveal, revoke confirm in admin/static/index.html. - Tests: 7 in admin/api_test.go (+api_tokens table in the in-memory schema). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: modernize to Go 1.26 idioms + enable modernize linter Apply `golangci-lint modernize` autofixes across the server and enable the linter in .golangci.yml so these stop re-accumulating (they built up only because modernize was never in the config). Production code: slices.Contains for hand-rolled membership loops (api router, ws origin, db/account, plugin manifest); strings.SplitSeq for allocation-free line/segment iteration (db/migrate, updater, livekit_proxy); strings.Cut (config); fmt.Appendf (dm_handler); min() (event_pruner); any (ws client). Tests: range-over-int, t.Context(), WaitGroup.Go, slices.Sort, maps.Copy, new(expr), interface{}->any. - plugin/manifest.go parent-traversal check applied by hand: modernize skipped it (two conflicting rewrites); used the slices.Contains form. - Removed the now-dead ptr() test helper after newexpr inlined its callers. - Dropped dangling sort imports left by the sort.Slice->slices.Sort rewrite. No behavior change. All four tag variants build, full test suite is green, and golangci-lint (with modernize enabled) reports 0 issues. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
J3vbandClaude Opus 5
|
17b17eb1b3 |
fix(security): close all 13 findings from the 2026-07-28 server scan, plus dependabot rollup (#1264)
* fix(admin): reject banned users in admin auth (F1) adminAuthMiddleware accepted a Bearer token on session validity plus the ADMINISTRATOR bit alone and never consulted ban state, so a ban never revoked admin-panel access. Adds the auth.IsEffectivelyBanned guard that api.AuthMiddleware already uses, at both admin credential-resolution points. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ws): gate the voice-channel text subscription on READ_MESSAGES (F2) registerNow subscribed any client with voice state to that channel's text-message topic regardless of READ_MESSAGES. The handshake's already-computed readable-channel set is now passed into registerNow and the subscription only happens when the voice channel is in it, preserving authorized reconnect delivery. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(service): require READ_MESSAGES to delete messages (F4) The non-DM delete gate checked MANAGE_MESSAGES without READ_MESSAGES, so a role locked out of a private channel could still delete every message in it. Requires ReadMessages alongside ManageMessages (and alongside SendMessages on the author path) and derives the mod flag from that same gate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(service): require READ_MESSAGES alongside MANAGE_MESSAGES in SetMessagePinned (F8) Pin/unpin checked only MANAGE_MESSAGES, so a role denied READ on a private channel could still pin and unpin its messages. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(service): enforce the DM block at every DM interaction sink (F5) The DM block was only checked on send, leaving edit, reactions, pins and typing as bypasses. One shared requireDMNotBlocked is now called from all of them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ws): re-check CONNECT_VOICE when minting a refreshed LiveKit token (F6) voice_token_refresh re-minted a LiveKit token without re-checking CONNECT_VOICE, so a revoked permission kept working for the life of the session. The permission is now re-checked where the token is minted, and a 60s sweep evicts participants whose permission was revoked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ws): rate-limit voice_e2ee_offer after validation, keyed on server state (F7) The limiter key was built from unvalidated client input, letting an attacker grow the limiter map without bound. The limiter now runs after validation and keys on (sender, voiceChannelID), never on client input. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ws): deliver voice_state/voice_leave only to roles that may read the channel (F9) Voice state of private channels was broadcast to every connected client, leaking channel membership. All 11 emit sites now route through one READ-filtered fan-out, channel-tagged so replay filters too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): redact the LiveKit access token from proxy dial-failure logs (F10) A dial failure wrote the LiveKit access-token JWT into the server log via the URL in the error. redactKey now runs on the error before it reaches slog. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): reserve the [deleted-N] username namespace (F11, F12) The tombstone username namespace used by account deletion was freely registrable, letting a user impersonate a deleted account. The namespace is now reserved at validation, and DeleteAccount retries with a random suffix on collision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): strip Unicode format characters from upload filenames (F13) The attachment filename sanitizer stripped control characters but not unicode.Cf, allowing bidi-override extension spoofing. Cf is now stripped alongside controls and foreign path separators are cut. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): reserve the login attempt before the bcrypt compare (F3) The per-username lockout was a read-only IsLockedOut check followed by a failure recorded only after the ~250ms bcrypt compare, so N concurrent requests all passed the stale check before any of them recorded a failure. The per-username cap is the only cross-IP brute-force defence (the middleware limits per IP), so a distributed burst landed N guesses per 15-minute window instead of 10. Both counters are now reserved atomically with limiter.Allow before the compare, and the lockout decision moves to the read-only limiter.Check so the reservation is not double-counted. The limits are sized at threshold+1, which leaves the sequential accepted-input set byte-identical to the previous behaviour: failures 1-10 still land, the 10th still trips the lockout, and the account owner's correct password on attempt 10 still returns 200. Sizing at threshold instead would make 9 cheap wrong guesses convert the victim's own correct password into a 15-minute lockout - the regression that got two earlier attempts at this fix rejected, now pinned by a boundary test. Deliberately scoped to handleLogin. The report also suggested widening to the password-confirmation endpoints, but those are authenticated, share a single pw_confirm_fail key across the TOTP endpoints, and widening there is what got the first attempt rejected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(deps): bump five Rust dependencies in /Client/tauri-client/src-tauri Rolls up dependabot #1259, #1260, #1261, #1262 and #1263: tauri-build 2.5.6 -> 2.6.3 tauri-plugin-fs 2.4.5 -> 2.5.1 tauri-plugin-http 2.5.7 -> 2.5.9 tauri-plugin-store 2.4.2 -> 2.4.4 webpki-roots 1.0.6 -> 1.0.9 All five are lockfile-only; the manifest constraints already permitted the new versions. The five PRs each rewrote overlapping regions of the same Cargo.lock and so could not be merged independently, so the lockfile was regenerated with cargo update --precise for each crate instead. The combined result is smaller than the sum of the five diffs because they share transitive updates. Verified with cargo check --locked --all-targets (exit 0). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(deps): bump typescript-eslint from 8.58.0 to 8.65.0 in /Client/tauri-client Dependabot #1258. 8.65.0 improves @typescript-eslint/no-unnecessary-type-assertion, which surfaces four assertions that were already redundant and now fail the lint gate. They are removed here rather than in a follow-up so no commit in this branch leaves `npm run lint` red: UserBar.ts / members.store.ts "online" as UserStatus -> "online" (the receiver already accepts the literal) media.ts drops `as RequestInit` on a literal that is already assignable LoginForm.ts drops `as { message: unknown }` made redundant by the `"message" in err` narrowing All four are the rule's own autofix. Verified: npm run typecheck, npm run lint, npm run format:check all clean, and the unit suite is 3572/3572 green across 129 files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
J3vbandClaude Fable 5
|
6afa9e974c |
refactor(server): thread context.Context through the db layer and all callers
Fixes all 109 golangci-lint findings (106 contextcheck, 1 gocritic,
2 gosec) that accumulated after D2 wired dbgen (whose queries take ctx)
under ctx-less db.DB wrappers while CI lint was quota-dead. No nolint
comments added; every finding fixed by genuinely threading context.
- db: all 138 hand-written db.DB methods take ctx first; the dbCtx()
Background shim is deleted; raw Query/QueryRow/Exec/Begin use their
Context variants; the four redundant ctx-less passthroughs removed.
db.Auditor/WriteAudit gain ctx.
- Seams: permissions.Checker (DB iface, HasChannelPerm,
RequireChannelAccess) and the service.Store interface mirror the new
signatures (ws.EventStore and plugin.PluginStore already did).
- Callers: api/admin handlers use r.Context(); ws per-message paths use
the connection ctx via DispatchV2; hub loops and startup wiring use
context.Background(); service methods thread ctx where they have one
and Background where no ctx exists. Public service surface reached by
ctx-holding chains (PermissionService.HasChannelPerm/GetRoleForUser/
RequireChannelAccess, message/dm/block/invite/profile methods) is now
ctx-first.
- Detached (context.WithoutCancel) where cancellation would break an
invariant, found by a 3-lens adversarial review of the diff:
* voice-leave background retries (a dead webhook/connection ctx killed
retry 2 before it ran, leaving ghost capacity-holding voice rows)
* rollbackVoiceJoin's compensating delete (its trigger IS the cancel)
* post-2FA-change DeleteOtherSessions and logout DeleteSession (the
security tail of a committed change must not die with the request)
* all api/ws audit writes (a banned user could suppress their own
login_blocked_banned row by aborting the request mid-bcrypt)
* admin backup VACUUM INTO (an interrupt left a truncated .db that
the backup list presented as restorable)
* post-commit message/edit refetches (a committed message must still
fan out when the sender disconnects)
* hub settings-cache refresh (one dead connection could pin stale
values for the 30s TTL)
- gocritic rangeValCopy fixed (index iteration); gosec G306 excluded in
config with justification (generated source must stay world-readable)
instead of flipping genprotocol output to 0o600.
Verified: gofmt/vet, all four build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock
pass, full -race pass, golangci-lint 0 issues uncapped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
J3vbandClaude Opus 4.8
|
6bc5938ddf |
fix(auth): canonicalize username for per-user login lockout keys
The per-username brute-force lockout keyed on the raw request username while GetUserByUsername matches COLLATE NOCASE, so case variants (admin/Admin/ADMIN) each got an independent 9-attempt bucket, multiplying allowed guesses per account. Lowercase the username before building the login_user_fail/login_user_lock keys so all casings share one bucket. (Security scan F1) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
J3vb
|
f962d59cd6 |
fix: update tests and fix pending-join drain regression for CI
Update LiveKitSession tests to use _state discriminated union instead of old flat field names (room, currentChannelId, latestToken, etc.) removed in the state machine refactor. Also fix renderers.test.ts URL resolution by setting a server host in beforeEach so isSafeUrl can parse relative attachment URLs in jsdom. Stage all four Go test files so the CI Go job runs them. Additionally fix a regression in connectAndSetup's finally block: when a pendingJoin is queued during a stale-join abort, preserve the connecting state so handleVoiceToken's drain loop can pick it up rather than losing it by resetting to idle. |
||
|
J3vb
|
e35e1b346c |
fix: encrypt TOTP secrets at rest and filter replay buffer by permissions
M1 — TOTP secrets are now AES-256-GCM encrypted before being stored in the database. Key is auto-generated on first run (data/totp.key) or set via OWNCORD_TOTP_KEY env var. Existing plaintext secrets are detected and returned as-is for backwards compatibility. M3 — Replay buffer events are now tagged with their channel ID. On reconnect, the server computes the user's current accessible channels and only replays events from those channels. Global broadcasts (presence, voice state, member updates) are always replayed. Falls back to full ready payload if permission computation fails. |
||
|
J3vb
|
50258457e4 |
fix: per-username login lockout and per-user password confirmation lockout (BUG-110, BUG-111)
BUG-110: Login handler now tracks failures per-username alongside per-IP. Distributed brute force from rotating IPs is blocked after 9 failures for the same username within 15 minutes. BUG-111: Password-change, TOTP enable/confirm/disable endpoints now have per-user escalating lockout (3 failures / 15min window / 15min lock), matching the existing delete-account pattern. Prevents password oracle attacks via stolen session tokens. |
||
|
jevb
|
9360d152dd |
test: improve auth handler coverage (deleteAccount, TOTP, logout, me)
Add 18 new tests covering low-coverage auth handler functions: - handleDeleteAccount: success, missing/wrong password, last admin guard, unauthenticated, and lockout after repeated failures - handleConfirmTOTP: invalid code, no pending secret, missing/wrong password, unauthenticated - handleDisableTOTP: wrong password, require_2fa blocks disable, unauthenticated - handleLogout: invalid token, double-logout session cleanup - handleMe: full field validation, invalid token Also extends the shared apiTestSchema with tables required by DeleteAccount (channels, messages, dm_participants, dm_open_state, reactions, read_states, audit_log). |
||
|
jevb
|
90b4f268e2 |
feat: TOTP 2FA settings UI, server hardening, full validation pass
Client: - Add TOTP enrollment/disable UI in Settings > Account (AccountTab.ts) - Fix api.ts enableTotp/confirmTotp/disableTotp to require password param - Add totp_enabled field to UserWithRole type - Wire SettingsOverlay TOTP callbacks through MainPage and ConnectPage - 27 new tests: totp-settings (18), api TOTP methods (6), auth store (3) Server: - Fix targetBoolSetting to default false on ErrNotFound (fresh DB compat) - Fix admin settings test: boolean keys use valid values, not "testvalue" - Add require_2fa validation to settings handler (normalizeSettingUpdates) - Remove unused authenticateAdmin from logstream.go Docs: - Mark DOCUMENTATION_AUDIT Critical Finding #1 as RESOLVED - Update CLAUDE.md Key Features with 2FA/TOTP bullet - Update CLIENT-ARCHITECTURE.md with TOTP components - Update CHATSERVER.md login flow and rate limiting table - Create session log, update task tracking (T-192–T-201) |
||
|
jevb
|
2976863ad0 |
fix: atomic invite registration, fail-closed search, proxy-aware rate limiting
- Atomic CreateUserWithInvite prevents invite burn on failed registration - Channel search fails closed on channel-type and override lookup errors - Malformed FTS input returns 400 instead of 500 - Search rate limiting uses own namespace, respects trusted proxy IPs - Login lockout keyed by forwarded client IP behind reverse proxy - Trusted same-server OG previews re-enabled with self-signed cert support - Normalized host matching for embeds/attachments - Regression tests for all changes (auth, channel, embeds) |
||
|
jevb
|
e0437d4d8d |
feat: LiveKit migration — permissions, auth hardening, voice improvements
Pre-review snapshot of LiveKit migration changes including: - Permission computation fix (allow-wins semantics) - Timing-safe password comparison with dummy hash - Rate limiter window fix - Dev credential clearing for LiveKit - Voice leave/join broadcast improvements - Migration transaction wrapping - Chat edit/delete permission guards - TOTP verification endpoint - Embed regex injection fix |
||
|
jevb
|
ce4326766a |
fix: resolve all golangci-lint issues blocking CI server build
Fix 70+ errcheck violations by adding explicit error discards (`_ =`) for unchecked return values across test helpers and deferred Close() calls. Remove unused `senderID` field from broadcastMsg and unused `defaultCleanupMaxWindow` const. Apply De Morgan's law, remove empty branch, and simplify redundant type declaration per staticcheck. |
||
|
jevb
|
9c1d99683c |
fix: address PR review findings (issues #9-#14)
- Fix capacity over-allocation and use strings.Builder in getReactionsBatch (#9) - Replace `any` types and cache Tauri invoke in window-state.ts (#10) - Remove custom `contains` helper, fix NilHub tests to pass nil (#11) - Add nil guards before hub method calls in admin handlers (#12) - Run golangci-lint v2: modernize interface{}/any, range-over-int loops, remove dead code, fix errcheck, add .golangci.yml config (#13) - Add 23 client unit test suites (694 tests), exclude Tauri-coupled files from coverage, achieve 80%+ threshold (#14) Closes #9, closes #10, closes #11, closes #12, closes #13, closes #14 |
||
|
jevb
|
6eba999233 |
feat: add Let's Encrypt ACME support, fix security issues, improve server UX
Server: - Add Let's Encrypt (ACME) TLS mode with autocert, HTTP-01 challenges on :80, and automatic certificate renewal (tls.mode: "acme" in config.yaml) - Add ASCII art startup banner with server info and endpoint URLs - Fix CSP blocking admin panel inline styles/scripts (per-route override) - Suppress TLS handshake error noise in console output - Fix TOCTOU race in invite consumption (atomic UPDATE with row-count check) - Fix sendMsg mutex race condition (hold lock for entire send) - Fix permission override formula (deny-first, allow-wins) - Fix voice join parsing channelID before permission check - Add session expiry check at WebSocket auth and periodic revalidation - Add message length limit (4000 chars) and emoji length validation (32 bytes) - Add file size enforcement in storage after io.Copy - Add checksum URL validation in updater - Add backup path traversal protection (BackupToSafe) - Add self-modification guard in admin handlePatchUser - Fix admin ownerOnlyMiddleware to use context user instead of re-auth - Remove redundant startup log lines (banner shows same info) - Add periodic expired session cleanup (15-min ticker) - Add permissions package with bitfield constants and EffectivePerms - Add rate limiter cleanup goroutine to prevent unbounded growth - Add auth helpers (IsEffectivelyBanned, IsSessionExpired) - Add WebSocket origin validation Client: - Add TOFU certificate trust service - Add receive loop error handling - Fix redundant else-if in OnChatMessage |
||
|
jevb
|
b7dd6eabe9 |
feat: implement Phase 2 auth & security with TDD
- auth/session: 256-bit crypto-random tokens, SHA-256 hashing for storage - auth/password: bcrypt cost 12, strength validation (8-72 chars) - auth/ratelimit: sliding-window RateLimiter with lockout, thread-safe - db/models: User, Session, Invite, Role types - db/auth_queries: full user/session/invite CRUD with in-memory test coverage - api/middleware: AuthMiddleware (Bearer token), RequirePermission (bitfield), RateLimitMiddleware (X-Real-IP, Retry-After header) - api/auth_handler: POST register/login, POST logout, GET me - Generic errors — username existence never revealed - Rate limits: 3/min register, 5/min login, lockout after 10 failures - api/invite_handler: create/list/revoke behind MANAGE_INVITES permission - bluemonday sanitization on all user-supplied string fields Test coverage: auth 90.9%, db 84.4%, api 80.9% |