Audit writes stay best-effort — a LogAudit failure must never fail or abort
the request — but a failed write must no longer be silently discarded. Add
db.WriteAudit(auditor, actor, action, targetType, targetID, detail), which
logs a failed write with actor/action/target context (never the detail
string, which may be sensitive) and never propagates the error.
The Auditor interface is satisfied structurally by both *db.DB and the
service-layer Store, so api/admin/ws/service all reach the helper without an
import cycle. Converts all ~26 call sites from `_ = LogAudit(...)` (and the
two backup handlers' inline `if err` blocks) to db.WriteAudit. Pinned by
db/audit_test.go: failure logged and not propagated, success logs nothing,
detail never leaks.
Resolves the repo-wide LogAudit policy question flagged by the D8 note.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Applies fixes for 20 adversarially-verified findings from a whole-codebase
security review (server side). All Go build-tag variants build, `go vet` is
clean, and the suite passes (the sole failing test, ws TestEmitEvents, is a
pre-existing nil-harness failure unrelated to these changes).
High severity:
- auth: close TOCTOU in TOTP verify rate-limit by recording each attempt
atomically up-front (was Check-then-Allow), restoring the per-user
brute-force cap.
- plugin: enforce the CPU/time budget on every WASM guest call via a
WithTimeout context (WithCloseOnContextDone interrupts runaways); the
configured budget was previously parsed but never applied.
- api/waf: inspect request bodies for chunked (ContentLength==-1) requests
so the SQLi/XSS/RCE body rules can no longer be bypassed.
- ws: rate-limit voice_join/voice_leave and voice_e2ee announce/offer, which
fan out to every participant and could force mass disconnects.
Medium severity:
- api: run bcrypt on the unknown-user login path (no || short-circuit) to
remove the timing-based username-enumeration oracle.
- ws: verify LiveKit webhooks via the SDK receiver so the signature is bound
to the body hash (kills forgery/replay).
- authz: require READ_MESSAGES for reactions and for plugin-command
broadcasts; route the latter through RequireChannelAccess.
- api: cache the client-update signature fetch and rate-limit the endpoint.
- service: propagate DeleteOtherSessions failure from ChangePassword instead
of silently reporting success.
- api: trust the rightmost non-proxy X-Forwarded-For entry, not the
client-controllable leftmost one.
- plugin: route auto-registered commands through the conflict-checked
RegisterCommand; pin the DNS-validated IP for host_http dials
(DNS-rebinding TOCTOU).
- api: mark access-controlled downloads private/no-cache + Vary: Origin.
Low severity:
- auth: fail closed when a fully-shaped TOTP ciphertext fails GCM auth
(was returning the ciphertext as plaintext).
- api: apply the livekit-proxy path allowlist to WebSocket upgrades too.
- service: verify attachment ownership before linking (IDOR).
- admin: bound the bootstrap setup invite (5 uses / 24h); re-verify the
update binary hash immediately before rename+spawn (TOCTOU).
- service: require BanMembers + role hierarchy for moderation ban/unban.
chore: stop tracking the stray Server/owncord-server.exe build artifact.
Test infra: add uploader_id to the hand-rolled ws test attachment schemas and
make MemStore.GetAttachmentByID a no-op lookup, matching production/DB behavior.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
M1 — TOTP secrets are now AES-256-GCM encrypted before being stored in
the database. Key is auto-generated on first run (data/totp.key) or set
via OWNCORD_TOTP_KEY env var. Existing plaintext secrets are detected
and returned as-is for backwards compatibility.
M3 — Replay buffer events are now tagged with their channel ID. On
reconnect, the server computes the user's current accessible channels
and only replays events from those channels. Global broadcasts (presence,
voice state, member updates) are always replayed. Falls back to full
ready payload if permission computation fails.
BUG-110: Login handler now tracks failures per-username alongside per-IP.
Distributed brute force from rotating IPs is blocked after 9 failures
for the same username within 15 minutes.
BUG-111: Password-change, TOTP enable/confirm/disable endpoints now have
per-user escalating lockout (3 failures / 15min window / 15min lock),
matching the existing delete-account pattern. Prevents password oracle
attacks via stolen session tokens.
BUG-122: Remove channelID==0 bypass in deliverBroadcast that leaked
all channel-scoped broadcasts to unfocused clients. Clients must now
send channel_focus to receive channel events.
BUG-126: Reject edits and reactions on soft-deleted messages in
handleChatEdit and handleReaction.
BUG-108: Revoke all other sessions when a user changes their password
or enables/disables TOTP 2FA. Adds DeleteOtherSessions DB function.
7 new test cases covering all three fixes.
Create Server/api/constants.go (26 constants) and Server/auth/constants.go
(6 constants) for rate limits, timeouts, size limits, and token generation.
Replace all inline magic numbers with descriptive names across 9 source files.
No behavior changes — same values, just named for contributor readability.
CRITICAL (5):
- Hub panic recovery now calls h.Stop() after 3 panics (ws/hub.go)
- Ring buffer EventsSince returns non-nil empty slice for current seq (ws/ringbuffer.go)
- PTT event listener stores unsubscribe handle to prevent leak (ptt.ts)
- verifyTotp respects config.allowSelfSigned instead of hardcoding (api.ts)
- ptt_listen_for_key uses spawn_blocking to avoid thread pool starvation (ptt.rs)
HIGH - Server (13):
- TOTP rate-limit checked after body decode; counters reset on success
- TOTP enable returns 409 if already enabled (must disable first)
- Global search pre-computes accessible channel IDs for FTS WHERE clause
- DeleteAccount queries roles by name instead of hard-coded IDs
- BackupToSafe uses absClean in VACUUM INTO
- Voice camera slot uses atomic EnableCameraIfUnderLimit DB method
- readPump snapshots voiceChID before unregister for TOCTOU safety
- Voice join sets state after token send; rollback takes broadcast flag
- Updater download uses probe pattern instead of overflow write
- Webhook checks Authorization header before reading body
- Storage.Save adds fsync and fixes double-close
- Default WS origin denies cross-origin (was: accept all)
HIGH - Client (6):
- WS reconnect uses generation counter to discard stale events
- AudioPipeline uses generation counter against stale worklet callbacks
- Screenshare mute state preserved across reconnect (not full leave)
- handleVoiceToken uses iterative loop instead of unbounded recursion
- store.ts re-entrancy guard with pending update queue
- Notification AudioContext cleaned up on logout
Reviewed by 4 parallel agents across Server Core, Server Realtime,
Client & Tauri, and Security. 55 total findings; 24 CRITICAL+HIGH
fixed here, 31 MEDIUM+LOW tracked in vault backlog (T-265–T-295).
- C-3: inject setupLimiter into NewAdminAPI instead of package-level global
- H-5: generateRandomKey returns error instead of panicking
- H-6: replace init() bcrypt with sync.Once lazy initialization
- M-2: remove unsafe-inline from admin CSP
- M-3: sanitize upload filenames (strip control chars, truncate to 255)
- M-5: truncate User-Agent to 512 bytes before storing as device
- M-10: MaxBodySizeUnless uses prefix matching instead of exact path
- M-12: wrap seedExistingDatabase in a single transaction
- M-13: use errors.Is for EOF check in upload handler
- M-14: log writeJSON encoding errors instead of discarding
- M-16: standardize error codes to INTERNAL_ERROR across all handlers
Move handleVerifyTOTP, handleEnableTOTP, handleConfirmTOTP, and
handleDisableTOTP along with their request/response types into a
dedicated totp_handler.go file, bringing auth_handler.go from 829
to 583 lines.
Add audit log calls for TOTP lifecycle events:
- totp_verified on successful 2FA login verification
- totp_enabled on successful TOTP enrollment confirmation
- totp_disabled on successful TOTP removal
