Commit Graph
5 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Claude 5f1d6fc287 refactor(server): remove the store abstraction layer (D3)
Deletes Server/store (SQLiteStore, MemStore, the composed Store
interface) and collapses to a single sqlc-backed db package, executing
the prior audit's P4 "single data layer" direction (finding #6).

SQLiteStore was a pure pass-through to *db.DB, so consumers now depend
on narrow interfaces that *db.DB satisfies directly:

  - service.Store   (service/datastore.go, renamed from store/store.go)
  - ws.EventStore   (ws/eventstore.go)
  - plugin.PluginStore (plugin/pluginstore.go)

The event- and plugin-KV methods that lived in the store's SQLite
implementation move into the db package (db/event_queries.go,
db/plugin_queries.go), keeping their raw-SQL form.

Tests: the MemStore-based unit tests now run against a real in-memory
SQLite db opened per-test with migrations applied, via package-local
seed helpers. Fault-injection tests embed a real *db.DB and override the
single method under test, preserving error-path coverage. Full server
suite and sqlc-verify are green.

Docs: audit finding #6 and A-2026-07-06 marked resolved; decisions D3
updated; architecture server.md / data-model.md diagrams and prose
updated to the api -> service -> db layering.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UA17KPvqGBX3XbXYnMf1rA
2026-07-19 16:33:58 +00:00
J3vbandClaude Opus 4.8 7b178ff30b fix(security): harden server against verified code-review findings
Applies fixes for 20 adversarially-verified findings from a whole-codebase
security review (server side). All Go build-tag variants build, `go vet` is
clean, and the suite passes (the sole failing test, ws TestEmitEvents, is a
pre-existing nil-harness failure unrelated to these changes).

High severity:
- auth: close TOCTOU in TOTP verify rate-limit by recording each attempt
  atomically up-front (was Check-then-Allow), restoring the per-user
  brute-force cap.
- plugin: enforce the CPU/time budget on every WASM guest call via a
  WithTimeout context (WithCloseOnContextDone interrupts runaways); the
  configured budget was previously parsed but never applied.
- api/waf: inspect request bodies for chunked (ContentLength==-1) requests
  so the SQLi/XSS/RCE body rules can no longer be bypassed.
- ws: rate-limit voice_join/voice_leave and voice_e2ee announce/offer, which
  fan out to every participant and could force mass disconnects.

Medium severity:
- api: run bcrypt on the unknown-user login path (no || short-circuit) to
  remove the timing-based username-enumeration oracle.
- ws: verify LiveKit webhooks via the SDK receiver so the signature is bound
  to the body hash (kills forgery/replay).
- authz: require READ_MESSAGES for reactions and for plugin-command
  broadcasts; route the latter through RequireChannelAccess.
- api: cache the client-update signature fetch and rate-limit the endpoint.
- service: propagate DeleteOtherSessions failure from ChangePassword instead
  of silently reporting success.
- api: trust the rightmost non-proxy X-Forwarded-For entry, not the
  client-controllable leftmost one.
- plugin: route auto-registered commands through the conflict-checked
  RegisterCommand; pin the DNS-validated IP for host_http dials
  (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU).
- api: mark access-controlled downloads private/no-cache + Vary: Origin.

Low severity:
- auth: fail closed when a fully-shaped TOTP ciphertext fails GCM auth
  (was returning the ciphertext as plaintext).
- api: apply the livekit-proxy path allowlist to WebSocket upgrades too.
- service: verify attachment ownership before linking (IDOR).
- admin: bound the bootstrap setup invite (5 uses / 24h); re-verify the
  update binary hash immediately before rename+spawn (TOCTOU).
- service: require BanMembers + role hierarchy for moderation ban/unban.

chore: stop tracking the stray Server/owncord-server.exe build artifact.

Test infra: add uploader_id to the hand-rolled ws test attachment schemas and
make MemStore.GetAttachmentByID a no-op lookup, matching production/DB behavior.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 21:08:54 +02:00
Claude 0e2d101103 add ModerationService, VoiceService, MemStore, permission tests
- ModerationService: ban/unban with validation and audit logging
- VoiceService: join (with capacity check), leave, mute, deafen,
  camera (with video limit), screenshare (with permission check)
- MemStore: in-memory Store implementation for service unit tests
- Permission tests: cache hit/miss, invalidation, TTL behavior
- Add Moderation and Voice to Services struct

https://claude.ai/code/session_01CBFF3r84ywkJRWwuqw8zD8
2026-04-05 21:35:20 +00:00
Claude ccb80d8a83 complete service layer migration + store.Store integration
- Add UserService, DMService, InviteService, BlockService
- Migrate REST handlers (channel, DM, invite, block) to use services
- Remove block_handler.go (merged into dm_handler.go)
- Update all services to accept store.Store instead of *db.DB
- Router creates SQLiteStore and passes to service.New()

Handlers are now thin HTTP adapters: parse request → call service →
map error → write JSON. All business logic lives in the service layer.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01CBFF3r84ywkJRWwuqw8zD8
2026-04-05 21:01:29 +00:00
Claude 1c5fbbc246 add service layer foundation (Phase A, Step 1)
Introduce Server/service/ package with MessageService, ChannelService,
and PermissionService that encapsulate business logic previously
scattered across REST and WS handlers. The PermissionService adds
per-user in-memory caching with TTL-based expiry to eliminate
per-message DB round-trips at scale.

Services are wired into the WS hub via deps structs (strangler-fig
pattern) — existing handlers continue to work unchanged, with service
references available for incremental migration.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01CBFF3r84ywkJRWwuqw8zD8
2026-04-05 20:42:32 +00:00