* fix(admin): reject banned users in admin auth (F1)
adminAuthMiddleware accepted a Bearer token on session validity plus the
ADMINISTRATOR bit alone and never consulted ban state, so a ban never
revoked admin-panel access. Adds the auth.IsEffectivelyBanned guard that
api.AuthMiddleware already uses, at both admin credential-resolution points.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ws): gate the voice-channel text subscription on READ_MESSAGES (F2)
registerNow subscribed any client with voice state to that channel's
text-message topic regardless of READ_MESSAGES. The handshake's
already-computed readable-channel set is now passed into registerNow and the
subscription only happens when the voice channel is in it, preserving
authorized reconnect delivery.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(service): require READ_MESSAGES to delete messages (F4)
The non-DM delete gate checked MANAGE_MESSAGES without READ_MESSAGES, so a
role locked out of a private channel could still delete every message in it.
Requires ReadMessages alongside ManageMessages (and alongside SendMessages on
the author path) and derives the mod flag from that same gate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(service): require READ_MESSAGES alongside MANAGE_MESSAGES in SetMessagePinned (F8)
Pin/unpin checked only MANAGE_MESSAGES, so a role denied READ on a private
channel could still pin and unpin its messages.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(service): enforce the DM block at every DM interaction sink (F5)
The DM block was only checked on send, leaving edit, reactions, pins and
typing as bypasses. One shared requireDMNotBlocked is now called from all of
them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ws): re-check CONNECT_VOICE when minting a refreshed LiveKit token (F6)
voice_token_refresh re-minted a LiveKit token without re-checking
CONNECT_VOICE, so a revoked permission kept working for the life of the
session. The permission is now re-checked where the token is minted, and a
60s sweep evicts participants whose permission was revoked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ws): rate-limit voice_e2ee_offer after validation, keyed on server state (F7)
The limiter key was built from unvalidated client input, letting an attacker
grow the limiter map without bound. The limiter now runs after validation and
keys on (sender, voiceChannelID), never on client input.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ws): deliver voice_state/voice_leave only to roles that may read the channel (F9)
Voice state of private channels was broadcast to every connected client,
leaking channel membership. All 11 emit sites now route through one
READ-filtered fan-out, channel-tagged so replay filters too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): redact the LiveKit access token from proxy dial-failure logs (F10)
A dial failure wrote the LiveKit access-token JWT into the server log via the
URL in the error. redactKey now runs on the error before it reaches slog.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): reserve the [deleted-N] username namespace (F11, F12)
The tombstone username namespace used by account deletion was freely
registrable, letting a user impersonate a deleted account. The namespace is
now reserved at validation, and DeleteAccount retries with a random suffix on
collision.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): strip Unicode format characters from upload filenames (F13)
The attachment filename sanitizer stripped control characters but not
unicode.Cf, allowing bidi-override extension spoofing. Cf is now stripped
alongside controls and foreign path separators are cut.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): reserve the login attempt before the bcrypt compare (F3)
The per-username lockout was a read-only IsLockedOut check followed by a
failure recorded only after the ~250ms bcrypt compare, so N concurrent
requests all passed the stale check before any of them recorded a failure.
The per-username cap is the only cross-IP brute-force defence (the middleware
limits per IP), so a distributed burst landed N guesses per 15-minute window
instead of 10.
Both counters are now reserved atomically with limiter.Allow before the
compare, and the lockout decision moves to the read-only limiter.Check so the
reservation is not double-counted. The limits are sized at threshold+1, which
leaves the sequential accepted-input set byte-identical to the previous
behaviour: failures 1-10 still land, the 10th still trips the lockout, and the
account owner's correct password on attempt 10 still returns 200. Sizing at
threshold instead would make 9 cheap wrong guesses convert the victim's own
correct password into a 15-minute lockout - the regression that got two
earlier attempts at this fix rejected, now pinned by a boundary test.
Deliberately scoped to handleLogin. The report also suggested widening to the
password-confirmation endpoints, but those are authenticated, share a single
pw_confirm_fail key across the TOTP endpoints, and widening there is what got
the first attempt rejected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(deps): bump five Rust dependencies in /Client/tauri-client/src-tauri
Rolls up dependabot #1259, #1260, #1261, #1262 and #1263:
tauri-build 2.5.6 -> 2.6.3
tauri-plugin-fs 2.4.5 -> 2.5.1
tauri-plugin-http 2.5.7 -> 2.5.9
tauri-plugin-store 2.4.2 -> 2.4.4
webpki-roots 1.0.6 -> 1.0.9
All five are lockfile-only; the manifest constraints already permitted the
new versions. The five PRs each rewrote overlapping regions of the same
Cargo.lock and so could not be merged independently, so the lockfile was
regenerated with cargo update --precise for each crate instead. The combined
result is smaller than the sum of the five diffs because they share
transitive updates.
Verified with cargo check --locked --all-targets (exit 0).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(deps): bump typescript-eslint from 8.58.0 to 8.65.0 in /Client/tauri-client
Dependabot #1258.
8.65.0 improves @typescript-eslint/no-unnecessary-type-assertion, which
surfaces four assertions that were already redundant and now fail the lint
gate. They are removed here rather than in a follow-up so no commit in this
branch leaves `npm run lint` red:
UserBar.ts / members.store.ts "online" as UserStatus -> "online"
(the receiver already accepts the literal)
media.ts drops `as RequestInit` on a literal that is
already assignable
LoginForm.ts drops `as { message: unknown }` made
redundant by the `"message" in err` narrowing
All four are the rule's own autofix. Verified: npm run typecheck, npm run
lint, npm run format:check all clean, and the unit suite is 3572/3572 green
across 129 files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes all 109 golangci-lint findings (106 contextcheck, 1 gocritic,
2 gosec) that accumulated after D2 wired dbgen (whose queries take ctx)
under ctx-less db.DB wrappers while CI lint was quota-dead. No nolint
comments added; every finding fixed by genuinely threading context.
- db: all 138 hand-written db.DB methods take ctx first; the dbCtx()
Background shim is deleted; raw Query/QueryRow/Exec/Begin use their
Context variants; the four redundant ctx-less passthroughs removed.
db.Auditor/WriteAudit gain ctx.
- Seams: permissions.Checker (DB iface, HasChannelPerm,
RequireChannelAccess) and the service.Store interface mirror the new
signatures (ws.EventStore and plugin.PluginStore already did).
- Callers: api/admin handlers use r.Context(); ws per-message paths use
the connection ctx via DispatchV2; hub loops and startup wiring use
context.Background(); service methods thread ctx where they have one
and Background where no ctx exists. Public service surface reached by
ctx-holding chains (PermissionService.HasChannelPerm/GetRoleForUser/
RequireChannelAccess, message/dm/block/invite/profile methods) is now
ctx-first.
- Detached (context.WithoutCancel) where cancellation would break an
invariant, found by a 3-lens adversarial review of the diff:
* voice-leave background retries (a dead webhook/connection ctx killed
retry 2 before it ran, leaving ghost capacity-holding voice rows)
* rollbackVoiceJoin's compensating delete (its trigger IS the cancel)
* post-2FA-change DeleteOtherSessions and logout DeleteSession (the
security tail of a committed change must not die with the request)
* all api/ws audit writes (a banned user could suppress their own
login_blocked_banned row by aborting the request mid-bcrypt)
* admin backup VACUUM INTO (an interrupt left a truncated .db that
the backup list presented as restorable)
* post-commit message/edit refetches (a committed message must still
fan out when the sender disconnects)
* hub settings-cache refresh (one dead connection could pin stale
values for the 30s TTL)
- gocritic rangeValCopy fixed (index iteration); gosec G306 excluded in
config with justification (generated source must stay world-readable)
instead of flipping genprotocol output to 0o600.
Verified: gofmt/vet, all four build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock
pass, full -race pass, golangci-lint 0 issues uncapped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The per-username brute-force lockout keyed on the raw request username while GetUserByUsername matches COLLATE NOCASE, so case variants (admin/Admin/ADMIN) each got an independent 9-attempt bucket, multiplying allowed guesses per account. Lowercase the username before building the login_user_fail/login_user_lock keys so all casings share one bucket. (Security scan F1)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Audit writes stay best-effort — a LogAudit failure must never fail or abort
the request — but a failed write must no longer be silently discarded. Add
db.WriteAudit(auditor, actor, action, targetType, targetID, detail), which
logs a failed write with actor/action/target context (never the detail
string, which may be sensitive) and never propagates the error.
The Auditor interface is satisfied structurally by both *db.DB and the
service-layer Store, so api/admin/ws/service all reach the helper without an
import cycle. Converts all ~26 call sites from `_ = LogAudit(...)` (and the
two backup handlers' inline `if err` blocks) to db.WriteAudit. Pinned by
db/audit_test.go: failure logged and not propagated, success logs nothing,
detail never leaks.
Resolves the repo-wide LogAudit policy question flagged by the D8 note.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Applies fixes for 20 adversarially-verified findings from a whole-codebase
security review (server side). All Go build-tag variants build, `go vet` is
clean, and the suite passes (the sole failing test, ws TestEmitEvents, is a
pre-existing nil-harness failure unrelated to these changes).
High severity:
- auth: close TOCTOU in TOTP verify rate-limit by recording each attempt
atomically up-front (was Check-then-Allow), restoring the per-user
brute-force cap.
- plugin: enforce the CPU/time budget on every WASM guest call via a
WithTimeout context (WithCloseOnContextDone interrupts runaways); the
configured budget was previously parsed but never applied.
- api/waf: inspect request bodies for chunked (ContentLength==-1) requests
so the SQLi/XSS/RCE body rules can no longer be bypassed.
- ws: rate-limit voice_join/voice_leave and voice_e2ee announce/offer, which
fan out to every participant and could force mass disconnects.
Medium severity:
- api: run bcrypt on the unknown-user login path (no || short-circuit) to
remove the timing-based username-enumeration oracle.
- ws: verify LiveKit webhooks via the SDK receiver so the signature is bound
to the body hash (kills forgery/replay).
- authz: require READ_MESSAGES for reactions and for plugin-command
broadcasts; route the latter through RequireChannelAccess.
- api: cache the client-update signature fetch and rate-limit the endpoint.
- service: propagate DeleteOtherSessions failure from ChangePassword instead
of silently reporting success.
- api: trust the rightmost non-proxy X-Forwarded-For entry, not the
client-controllable leftmost one.
- plugin: route auto-registered commands through the conflict-checked
RegisterCommand; pin the DNS-validated IP for host_http dials
(DNS-rebinding TOCTOU).
- api: mark access-controlled downloads private/no-cache + Vary: Origin.
Low severity:
- auth: fail closed when a fully-shaped TOTP ciphertext fails GCM auth
(was returning the ciphertext as plaintext).
- api: apply the livekit-proxy path allowlist to WebSocket upgrades too.
- service: verify attachment ownership before linking (IDOR).
- admin: bound the bootstrap setup invite (5 uses / 24h); re-verify the
update binary hash immediately before rename+spawn (TOCTOU).
- service: require BanMembers + role hierarchy for moderation ban/unban.
chore: stop tracking the stray Server/owncord-server.exe build artifact.
Test infra: add uploader_id to the hand-rolled ws test attachment schemas and
make MemStore.GetAttachmentByID a no-op lookup, matching production/DB behavior.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
M1 — TOTP secrets are now AES-256-GCM encrypted before being stored in
the database. Key is auto-generated on first run (data/totp.key) or set
via OWNCORD_TOTP_KEY env var. Existing plaintext secrets are detected
and returned as-is for backwards compatibility.
M3 — Replay buffer events are now tagged with their channel ID. On
reconnect, the server computes the user's current accessible channels
and only replays events from those channels. Global broadcasts (presence,
voice state, member updates) are always replayed. Falls back to full
ready payload if permission computation fails.
BUG-110: Login handler now tracks failures per-username alongside per-IP.
Distributed brute force from rotating IPs is blocked after 9 failures
for the same username within 15 minutes.
BUG-111: Password-change, TOTP enable/confirm/disable endpoints now have
per-user escalating lockout (3 failures / 15min window / 15min lock),
matching the existing delete-account pattern. Prevents password oracle
attacks via stolen session tokens.
Create Server/api/constants.go (26 constants) and Server/auth/constants.go
(6 constants) for rate limits, timeouts, size limits, and token generation.
Replace all inline magic numbers with descriptive names across 9 source files.
No behavior changes — same values, just named for contributor readability.
- C-3: inject setupLimiter into NewAdminAPI instead of package-level global
- H-5: generateRandomKey returns error instead of panicking
- H-6: replace init() bcrypt with sync.Once lazy initialization
- M-2: remove unsafe-inline from admin CSP
- M-3: sanitize upload filenames (strip control chars, truncate to 255)
- M-5: truncate User-Agent to 512 bytes before storing as device
- M-10: MaxBodySizeUnless uses prefix matching instead of exact path
- M-12: wrap seedExistingDatabase in a single transaction
- M-13: use errors.Is for EOF check in upload handler
- M-14: log writeJSON encoding errors instead of discarding
- M-16: standardize error codes to INTERNAL_ERROR across all handlers
- C-3: inject setupLimiter into NewAdminAPI instead of package-level global
- H-5: generateRandomKey returns error instead of panicking
- H-6: replace init() bcrypt with sync.Once lazy initialization
- M-2: remove unsafe-inline from admin CSP script-src and style-src
- M-3: sanitize upload filenames (strip control chars, truncate to 255)
- M-5: truncate User-Agent to 512 bytes before storing as device
- M-10: MaxBodySizeUnless uses prefix matching instead of exact path
- M-12: wrap seedExistingDatabase in a single transaction
- M-13: use errors.Is for EOF check in upload handler
- M-14: log writeJSON encoding errors instead of discarding
- M-16: standardize error codes to INTERNAL_ERROR across all handlers
Move handleVerifyTOTP, handleEnableTOTP, handleConfirmTOTP, and
handleDisableTOTP along with their request/response types into a
dedicated totp_handler.go file, bringing auth_handler.go from 829
to 583 lines.
Add audit log calls for TOTP lifecycle events:
- totp_verified on successful 2FA login verification
- totp_enabled on successful TOTP enrollment confirmation
- totp_disabled on successful TOTP removal
Server fixes:
- voice_leave: broadcast voice_leave even on DB error so peers don't see ghost users (H1)
- migrate: record migration inside transaction for atomicity (H2)
- password: use init() with panic for dummyHash to catch bcrypt init failures (M1)
- password: replace //nolint:errcheck with explicit _ = discard (M2)
- handlers: clarify edit permission comment, fix error message wording (M3)
- auth_handler: distinguish duplicate username (400) from DB error (500) (M4)
Client fixes:
- media: revert YouTube oEmbed to browser fetch — no need to disable cert verification (C1)
- messages.store: fix prependMessages cap to keep newest messages, not oldest (H5)
- ChannelSidebar: ref-count globalDragAc to prevent multi-instance teardown race (H6)
- attachments: replace console.error with project logger (M6)
- ws: clarify lastSeq reset comment to match actual behavior (M5)
- CRIT-2: Prevent HTTP header injection in Content-Disposition via mime.FormatMediaType
- HIGH-1: Call hub.GracefulStop() on server shutdown to clean up WebSocket/voice state
- HIGH-2: Remove double send on serveErr channel that caused goroutine leak
- HIGH-3: Handle GetUserByID error after registration to prevent nil panic
- HIGH-4: Return nil,nil on sql.ErrNoRows in GetAttachmentByID (matching codebase convention)
- HIGH-5: Add voiceDone channel to bound RTP goroutine lifetime on voice teardown
- Fix handleVoiceICE to return VOICE_ERROR when no PC (consistent with other voice handlers)
- Update tests to match corrected behavior
- Remove premature UpdateUserStatus("online") from REST login handler;
the WebSocket serve.go already sets "online" on actual WS connect
- Add ResetAllUserStatuses() called at server startup to clear stale
statuses from previous runs or crashes (alongside ClearAllVoiceStates)
- Redesign ConnectPage with modern dark theme, profile cards with delete buttons, login/register toggle
- Add DPAPI-encrypted password saving with "Remember my password" checkbox
- Fix permission bit constants to match SCHEMA.md (Member role 0x663)
- Add migration 004 to fix existing Member role permissions
- Add comprehensive audit logging across all server packages (auth, admin, ws, setup)
- Add member_join WebSocket broadcast so new users appear in members list in real-time
- Add host URL normalization (strip scheme prefix) for reverse proxy compatibility
- Add REST API client, ChatService orchestrator, WebSocket service with reconnection
- Add model types (WsEnvelope payloads, API responses), converters, tests
