Commit Graph
19 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
J3vbandClaude Opus 4.8 58005c9c6f feat(auth): revocable API tokens, introspect MCP server, and a Go 1.26 idiom pass (#1266)
* feat(auth): add revocable API tokens (bot/service auth)

Add long-lived, revocable API tokens so headless clients (the introspection
MCP tool, bots, CI) can authenticate without a password. Presented as
"Authorization: Bearer <token>", a token authenticates as a specific user,
inheriting that user's role and permissions.

- migration 018 + dedicated api_tokens table (kept separate from sessions so
  bulk logout and the per-user session cap never touch these); only the
  SHA-256 hash is stored, raw token shown once at creation
- auth.ResolveTokenHash: one shared bearer resolver that both AuthMiddleware
  and adminAuthMiddleware now call. Sessions are matched first so existing
  login behavior is unchanged; API tokens are a fallback only on session miss.
  A DB outage is returned wrapped, never mistaken for a bad token.
- `server token create|list|revoke` CLI: mints directly against the DB with no
  HTTP and no login — the password-free bootstrap path
- tests: resolver (8 cases incl. outage-not-fallthrough), db queries (6),
  api middleware integration (valid + revoked token)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(tools): add owncord-introspect MCP server

A local MCP dev tool that lets Claude Code introspect a running OwnCord
instance: read its logs, query any REST endpoint, and tail the desktop
client's log file. It is a thin wrapper over the existing API plus the
client log — no new product surface.

- tools/mcp-introspect/index.mjs (Node/ESM, one dep: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk)
  exposes api_request (full read-write passthrough), server_logs (admin SSE
  ring-buffer stream), client_logs (reads the desktop log file)
- authenticates with an API token (OWNCORD_API_TOKEN); pins the self-signed
  cert and skips hostname checks (the cert has no SAN)
- registered in .mcp.json (secret-free ${OWNCORD_API_TOKEN})
- un-ignore tools/mcp-introspect/ so this shared dev tool is committed, while
  tools/livekit-server.exe and node_modules stay ignored
- docs/mcp-introspect.md: how it works, tool reference, setup, troubleshooting

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(dependencies): update and add various crate versions in Cargo.lock

* feat(admin): manage API tokens from the admin panel

Add Owner-gated HTTP endpoints and a UI card to create, list, and revoke
API tokens from the web admin panel. Previously only the `server token`
CLI could manage them, which requires shell access to the host.

- POST|GET|DELETE /admin/api/tokens in admin/handlers_tokens.go, wired in
  admin/api.go. All three are Owner-only (ownerOnlyMiddleware, like
  backups/updates): an HTTP token-mint endpoint is a network-reachable
  credential-minting surface, and API tokens deliberately survive password
  change + bulk logout, so a hijacked admin session must not mint one.
- Reuses the same db.*APIToken calls as the CLI; create sources the actor
  from request context (audits who clicked, not the bound user); the raw
  token is returned once in the 201 body, never stored.
- Add json tags to db.APITokenListItem for snake_case wire consistency.
- Admin panel: "API Tokens" nav item + create modal, show-once reveal,
  revoke confirm in admin/static/index.html.
- Tests: 7 in admin/api_test.go (+api_tokens table in the in-memory schema).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: modernize to Go 1.26 idioms + enable modernize linter

Apply `golangci-lint modernize` autofixes across the server and enable the
linter in .golangci.yml so these stop re-accumulating (they built up only
because modernize was never in the config).

Production code: slices.Contains for hand-rolled membership loops (api
router, ws origin, db/account, plugin manifest); strings.SplitSeq for
allocation-free line/segment iteration (db/migrate, updater, livekit_proxy);
strings.Cut (config); fmt.Appendf (dm_handler); min() (event_pruner);
any (ws client). Tests: range-over-int, t.Context(), WaitGroup.Go,
slices.Sort, maps.Copy, new(expr), interface{}->any.

- plugin/manifest.go parent-traversal check applied by hand: modernize
  skipped it (two conflicting rewrites); used the slices.Contains form.
- Removed the now-dead ptr() test helper after newexpr inlined its callers.
- Dropped dangling sort imports left by the sort.Slice->slices.Sort rewrite.

No behavior change. All four tag variants build, full test suite is green,
and golangci-lint (with modernize enabled) reports 0 issues.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 13:25:46 +02:00
J3vbandClaude Opus 4.8 4fc21cb372 feat(server): logging & error-visibility hardening
Make server failures debuggable without leaking secrets:
- configurable stdout log level (config.yaml logging.level + OWNCORD_LOGGING_LEVEL)
- preserve the DB cause in ErrInternal wraps; log auth-DB failures distinctly
  from bad tokens; log the previously-silent expired-session cleanup goroutine
- route HTTP handler panics through slog (was chi stderr-only, invisible to
  the admin log stream)
- stackutil: argument-free panic stacks so key/token bytes never reach the
  admin ring buffer / SSE; slog.LogValuer redaction on VoiceConfig/GitHubConfig/
  GIFConfig/Config and db.User/db.Session
- logctx: req_id/trace_id correlation on ...Context log calls

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 11:07:12 +02:00
J3vbandClaude Opus 4.8 81a0b63e65 feat(e2ee): F3 identity/TOFU + W2-4/W3-3 hardening — checkpoint before F3 UI
WIP save point. Server + W2-4/W3-3 complete and gate-green; F3 voice E2EE
identity keys + TOFU implemented and MITM-verified-closed; the F3 voice-panel
UI (safety-number display, verified/mismatch badge, re-pin modal) is still TODO.

- W2-4 attachment link (coverage confirmed); W3-3a XFF CIDR pre-parse;
  W3-3b update-binary TOCTOU (single-handle verify + O_EXCL staging)
- F3 server: migration 017 identity_public_key, PATCH /users/me persist,
  ready/member_join/user_update carry key, signed voice_e2ee_announce
- F3 client: ECDSA identity keypair (keyring + pin store), publish wired into
  ready, verifyPeerAnnounce pin-before-legacy, rePinPeerIdentity recovery
- Gates: server full CI mirror green (-race/-deadlock/lint/4 build tags);
  client typecheck/lint/format + 3337 vitest green. Rust CI-verify only.

Next: build F3 voice-panel UI, then adversarial review, then finalize commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 21:07:09 +02:00
J3vbandClaude Fable 5 6afa9e974c refactor(server): thread context.Context through the db layer and all callers
Fixes all 109 golangci-lint findings (106 contextcheck, 1 gocritic,
2 gosec) that accumulated after D2 wired dbgen (whose queries take ctx)
under ctx-less db.DB wrappers while CI lint was quota-dead. No nolint
comments added; every finding fixed by genuinely threading context.

- db: all 138 hand-written db.DB methods take ctx first; the dbCtx()
  Background shim is deleted; raw Query/QueryRow/Exec/Begin use their
  Context variants; the four redundant ctx-less passthroughs removed.
  db.Auditor/WriteAudit gain ctx.
- Seams: permissions.Checker (DB iface, HasChannelPerm,
  RequireChannelAccess) and the service.Store interface mirror the new
  signatures (ws.EventStore and plugin.PluginStore already did).
- Callers: api/admin handlers use r.Context(); ws per-message paths use
  the connection ctx via DispatchV2; hub loops and startup wiring use
  context.Background(); service methods thread ctx where they have one
  and Background where no ctx exists. Public service surface reached by
  ctx-holding chains (PermissionService.HasChannelPerm/GetRoleForUser/
  RequireChannelAccess, message/dm/block/invite/profile methods) is now
  ctx-first.
- Detached (context.WithoutCancel) where cancellation would break an
  invariant, found by a 3-lens adversarial review of the diff:
  * voice-leave background retries (a dead webhook/connection ctx killed
    retry 2 before it ran, leaving ghost capacity-holding voice rows)
  * rollbackVoiceJoin's compensating delete (its trigger IS the cancel)
  * post-2FA-change DeleteOtherSessions and logout DeleteSession (the
    security tail of a committed change must not die with the request)
  * all api/ws audit writes (a banned user could suppress their own
    login_blocked_banned row by aborting the request mid-bcrypt)
  * admin backup VACUUM INTO (an interrupt left a truncated .db that
    the backup list presented as restorable)
  * post-commit message/edit refetches (a committed message must still
    fan out when the sender disconnects)
  * hub settings-cache refresh (one dead connection could pin stale
    values for the 30s TTL)
- gocritic rangeValCopy fixed (index iteration); gosec G306 excluded in
  config with justification (generated source must stay world-readable)
  instead of flipping genprotocol output to 0o600.

Verified: gofmt/vet, all four build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock
pass, full -race pass, golangci-lint 0 issues uncapped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 17:03:52 +02:00
J3vbandClaude Fable 5 f2966c2527 chore(server): delete production-dead code; move test helpers to export_test
Applied from a deadcode (RTA from mains, all build tags) sweep with
per-symbol adversarial verification:

Deleted (nothing but their own self-tests used them):
- admin.Handler (deprecated since Phase 6; production mounts NewHandler)
  plus its two self-tests
- ws.Hub.broadcastVoiceStateUpdate + wrapper + two self-tests (pre-V2
  leftover; the live voice_state path is the hub voice routines)
- ws.VoiceLeaveEvent + methods ('retained as scaffolding', never
  constructed in production; MsgTypeVoiceLeaveBC stays — live via the
  leave routine)
- ws.parseIdentity (production calls parseParticipantIdentity directly;
  ParseIdentityForTest now exercises the real parser)
- telemetry.Float64 (String/Int64 are used; the float case is covered by
  the otel-tagged internal test, re-addable when a caller appears)

Moved into export_test.go so they leave the production binary (all
callers are same-package tests): the eight ws test-client constructors
and voice/E2EE setters from ws/client.go, admin.SetBackupBaseDir
(new admin/export_test.go), api.SecurityHeaders (test-only wrapper;
production uses SecurityHeadersWithTLS — docs/api.md updated to the
real name). Client.getVoiceJoinToken/setVoiceChID inlined into their
existing ForTest wrappers; TestSetVoiceChID_* self-tests deleted.

Kept after verification: updater.SetBaseURL (11 cross-package test call
sites) and telemetry.resetAppMetricsForInit (live under -tags otel —
untagged deadcode false positive).

Full gate green: gofmt/vet, 4 build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock,
race.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 15:28:41 +02:00
J3vbandClaude Fable 5 a4eca1a55a fix(perms): own the server-scoped rule in HasServerPerm and fail closed on override-fetch errors (D13)
Closes audit finding A-2026-07-16, two defects in the same rule:

- permissions.HasServerPerm (admin bypass OR all-of bit test) replaces
  the hand-rolled copies in api.RequirePermission (whose raw test was
  any-of for multi-bit masks) and ModerationService.requireBanPermission.
  RequirePermission's doc comment now states the scope contract: role
  bitfield only, channel overrides deliberately not consulted.
- PermissionService.getOrPopulate and ChannelService.ListVisibleChannels
  no longer substitute an empty override map when
  GetAllChannelPermissionsForRole errors. That silently dropped every
  channel-level deny — and the permission cache then served the degraded
  snapshot for permCacheTTL (30s) across ~25 callers. Both fail closed
  now; admins skip the fetch entirely (they bypass channel checks).
- PermissionService.HasChannelPerm delegates to Checker.HasChannelPermBatch
  and MessageService.GetAccessibleChannelIDs to VisibleChannelIDs — the
  missed fifth D9 site, making that closure true rather than aspirational.
- AuthMiddleware rejects a dangling role_id (GetRoleByID returns nil,
  nil) with 401 instead of putting a nil role in the request context.

Locked by failing-first tests: override-fetch-error denies (cached and
uncached paths), admin-outage skip, multi-bit all-of, channel allow
override must not grant a server-wide route, 403 locks on both
RequirePermission routes, dangling-role 401.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 14:45:34 +02:00
J3vbandClaude Fable 5 a762dc712d fix(api): keep per-client keys distinct under broad trusted_proxies (W2-5)
With trusted_proxies covering client networks (e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 over LAN
clients), the right-to-left XFF walk skipped every entry, exhausted, and
fell back to the proxy's RemoteAddr — collapsing all clients into one
rate-limit/lockout bucket, so one user's failed logins locked out
everyone. On exhaustion the walk now returns the leftmost valid entry
(furthest-upstream hop), the best distinct per-client key such a config
allows. An untrusted RemoteAddr still never gets its headers honoured.

Also (W3-3): the CIDR list parses once per request instead of once per
XFF candidate, config load warns about invalid CIDR entries at startup
(a silently skipped entry silently un-trusts the proxy), and the sample
config documents that trusted_proxies must list only proxy hops.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 08:56:34 +02:00
J3vbandClaude Opus 4.8 7b178ff30b fix(security): harden server against verified code-review findings
Applies fixes for 20 adversarially-verified findings from a whole-codebase
security review (server side). All Go build-tag variants build, `go vet` is
clean, and the suite passes (the sole failing test, ws TestEmitEvents, is a
pre-existing nil-harness failure unrelated to these changes).

High severity:
- auth: close TOCTOU in TOTP verify rate-limit by recording each attempt
  atomically up-front (was Check-then-Allow), restoring the per-user
  brute-force cap.
- plugin: enforce the CPU/time budget on every WASM guest call via a
  WithTimeout context (WithCloseOnContextDone interrupts runaways); the
  configured budget was previously parsed but never applied.
- api/waf: inspect request bodies for chunked (ContentLength==-1) requests
  so the SQLi/XSS/RCE body rules can no longer be bypassed.
- ws: rate-limit voice_join/voice_leave and voice_e2ee announce/offer, which
  fan out to every participant and could force mass disconnects.

Medium severity:
- api: run bcrypt on the unknown-user login path (no || short-circuit) to
  remove the timing-based username-enumeration oracle.
- ws: verify LiveKit webhooks via the SDK receiver so the signature is bound
  to the body hash (kills forgery/replay).
- authz: require READ_MESSAGES for reactions and for plugin-command
  broadcasts; route the latter through RequireChannelAccess.
- api: cache the client-update signature fetch and rate-limit the endpoint.
- service: propagate DeleteOtherSessions failure from ChangePassword instead
  of silently reporting success.
- api: trust the rightmost non-proxy X-Forwarded-For entry, not the
  client-controllable leftmost one.
- plugin: route auto-registered commands through the conflict-checked
  RegisterCommand; pin the DNS-validated IP for host_http dials
  (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU).
- api: mark access-controlled downloads private/no-cache + Vary: Origin.

Low severity:
- auth: fail closed when a fully-shaped TOTP ciphertext fails GCM auth
  (was returning the ciphertext as plaintext).
- api: apply the livekit-proxy path allowlist to WebSocket upgrades too.
- service: verify attachment ownership before linking (IDOR).
- admin: bound the bootstrap setup invite (5 uses / 24h); re-verify the
  update binary hash immediately before rename+spawn (TOCTOU).
- service: require BanMembers + role hierarchy for moderation ban/unban.

chore: stop tracking the stray Server/owncord-server.exe build artifact.

Test infra: add uploader_id to the hand-rolled ws test attachment schemas and
make MemStore.GetAttachmentByID a no-op lookup, matching production/DB behavior.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 21:08:54 +02:00
J3vb d5ec7ca877 fix: validate proxy IP headers and force attachment for unsafe MIME types (BUG-112, BUG-118)
BUG-112: clientIPWithProxies now validates extracted X-Real-IP and
X-Forwarded-For values with net.ParseIP. Non-IP strings are rejected,
falling back to RemoteAddr. Prevents attackers from choosing arbitrary
rate-limit bucket keys via header injection.

BUG-118: Files with MIME types that could execute active content
(HTML, SVG, XML, PDF) are now served with Content-Disposition: attachment
instead of inline, preventing content hosting under the OwnCord origin.
2026-04-02 13:23:09 +02:00
J3vb d912a5a87d fix: AdminIPRestrict uses trusted_proxies for real client IP (BUG-116)
AdminIPRestrict now accepts trustedProxyCIDRs and resolves the real
client IP from X-Real-IP/X-Forwarded-For when connecting through a
trusted reverse proxy. Without trusted_proxies configured, behavior
is unchanged (RemoteAddr only). Prevents admin panel exposure when
OwnCord is deployed behind nginx/caddy/traefik.
2026-04-02 12:15:47 +02:00
jevb ecbffddf19 refactor: extract magic numbers to named constants
Create Server/api/constants.go (26 constants) and Server/auth/constants.go
(6 constants) for rate limits, timeouts, size limits, and token generation.
Replace all inline magic numbers with descriptive names across 9 source files.
No behavior changes — same values, just named for contributor readability.
2026-04-01 11:37:36 +02:00
jevb a0fd5e8fda security: fix 11 vulnerabilities from security review
Batch 1 — Immediate priority:
- C4: Atomic voice channel capacity (JoinVoiceChannelIfCapacity)
- H5: Sanitize emoji field with bluemonday (stored XSS)
- H8: Permission check before FTS search (timing oracle)
- M8: Filter ready payload channels by ReadMessages
- H10: Remove password/TOTP from admin ListAllUsers query

Batch 2 — Next sprint:
- C1: TOTP replay prevention (UsedTOTPCodeStore, 90s TTL)
- C2: Per-user TOTP brute-force rate limit (10/15min)
- C3: Delete requires SendMessages or ManageMessages
- H1: Expired sessions deleted on detection
- H3: Bearer token whitespace trimmed
- H6: Log warning when WS origin checking disabled
2026-03-31 19:10:42 +02:00
jevb 28f33644de fix: address remaining code review findings (C-3, H-5, H-6, M-1 through M-16)
- C-3: inject setupLimiter into NewAdminAPI instead of package-level global
- H-5: generateRandomKey returns error instead of panicking
- H-6: replace init() bcrypt with sync.Once lazy initialization
- M-2: remove unsafe-inline from admin CSP script-src and style-src
- M-3: sanitize upload filenames (strip control chars, truncate to 255)
- M-5: truncate User-Agent to 512 bytes before storing as device
- M-10: MaxBodySizeUnless uses prefix matching instead of exact path
- M-12: wrap seedExistingDatabase in a single transaction
- M-13: use errors.Is for EOF check in upload handler
- M-14: log writeJSON encoding errors instead of discarding
- M-16: standardize error codes to INTERNAL_ERROR across all handlers
2026-03-31 19:00:17 +02:00
jevb 90b4f268e2 feat: TOTP 2FA settings UI, server hardening, full validation pass
Client:
- Add TOTP enrollment/disable UI in Settings > Account (AccountTab.ts)
- Fix api.ts enableTotp/confirmTotp/disableTotp to require password param
- Add totp_enabled field to UserWithRole type
- Wire SettingsOverlay TOTP callbacks through MainPage and ConnectPage
- 27 new tests: totp-settings (18), api TOTP methods (6), auth store (3)

Server:
- Fix targetBoolSetting to default false on ErrNotFound (fresh DB compat)
- Fix admin settings test: boolean keys use valid values, not "testvalue"
- Add require_2fa validation to settings handler (normalizeSettingUpdates)
- Remove unused authenticateAdmin from logstream.go

Docs:
- Mark DOCUMENTATION_AUDIT Critical Finding #1 as RESOLVED
- Update CLAUDE.md Key Features with 2FA/TOTP bullet
- Update CLIENT-ARCHITECTURE.md with TOTP components
- Update CHATSERVER.md login flow and rate limiting table
- Create session log, update task tracking (T-192–T-201)
2026-03-29 21:31:18 +02:00
jevb 4c4526e539 fix: security hardening — 45 issues from full-project Copilot audit
Critical (6):
- C1: SQL injection in VACUUM INTO backup path — strict character allowlist
- C2: Unlimited binary download in updater — 500MB LimitReader
- C3: JSON injection in SSE log stream — json.Marshal instead of concat
- C4: CSS injection via custom themes — reject () and {} in values
- C5: Silent DM message loss — error response on participant lookup failure
- C6: LiveKit URL credential leak — strip creds from diagnostics endpoint

High (11):
- H1: DB errors no longer trigger login rate-limit lockout
- H2: Permission fetch failure returns 500, not empty channel list
- H3: TOCTOU race on duplicate WS — atomic check-and-register in hub
- H5: LiveKit webhook verifies voice channel match (already implemented)
- H7: Server host address validated before storage (hostname regex)
- H8: WS message deduplication on reconnect replay (1000-entry Set)
- H9: Admin setup endpoint rate limited (5/min/IP)
- H10: Backup responses return filename only, not full path
- H11: Update binary recovery failure now alerts admin

Medium (17):
- M1: MIME type from magic bytes, not client header
- M3: Nil guard on DM broadcast recipient
- M5: LiveKit process run-done channel race fixed
- M6: Backup restore calls fsync before close
- M7: Partial download file cleaned up on error
- M8: Admin CSP uses nonce instead of unsafe-inline
- M9: Client rate limiter enforced for presence_update
- M10: Voice joinedAt not reset on double-join
- M11: Unread count skips increment during reconnect replay
- M13: Category type uses exact match, not substring
- M14: Storage LimitReader off-by-one fixed
- M15: GitHub token only sent to GitHub hosts
- M16: Content-parser ReDoS regex replaced with split approach
- M17: Audio device switch error handling added

Low (11):
- L1: CORS uses configured origins instead of wildcard
- L2: HSTS header added when TLS enabled
- L3: Consistent JSON error responses across all endpoints
- L4: File modtime from stat, not time.Now()
- L5: Malformed invite JSON returns 400
- L6: TouchSession failure logged at warn
- L8: MessageInput timers cleared on destroy
- L9: Log persistence flush errors caught
- L10: Credential save failure surfaced to user
- L11: Case-insensitive asset name matching in updater

Found by GitHub Copilot full-project review (claude-sonnet-4.6 + claude-haiku-4.5).
2026-03-29 12:35:04 +02:00
jevb b2038cecdb feat: settings overhaul, GIF picker, notifications, PTT, scroll fixes
Client:
- Wire up all 4 notification toggles (desktop, taskbar flash, sounds, @everyone)
- Add compact mode CSS with visible layout differences
- Add GIF picker with Tenor API (trending + search)
- Render inline images/GIFs instead of link previews for direct URLs
- Add push-to-talk via Rust GetAsyncKeyState polling (non-consuming)
- Add key capture UI for PTT keybinds (supports mouse buttons)
- Add error/success feedback on account settings (password, username)
- Fix mic stream cleanup on tab switch (VoiceAudioTab factory pattern)
- Fix message timestamps using UTC with proper timezone conversion
- Fix emoji reaction picker (was returning early on empty emoji)
- Fix chat scroll jumpiness with Discord-style overflow-anchor + ResizeObserver
- Pre-measure all message heights on load to prevent first-scroll jump
- Improve scrollbar visibility with semi-transparent white thumb
- Show client version on Logs tab

Server:
- Add admin_allowed_cidrs config to restrict /admin to private networks
- Fix voice config defaults lost when YAML section has omitted fields
- Add negative caching to updater (5min error cache)
2026-03-19 12:23:24 +01:00
jevb 750a7af052 feat: native file downloads, upload size fix, native E2E tests
- Add file download with native save dialog (Tauri dialog + fs plugins)
- Make attachment filename clickable as additional download trigger
- Add download button with hover styling to file attachments
- Exempt /api/v1/uploads from global 1MB body size limit (MaxBodySizeUnless)
- Add native E2E test suite (8 specs) with Playwright CDP fixture
2026-03-18 17:10:16 +01:00
jevb 6eba999233 feat: add Let's Encrypt ACME support, fix security issues, improve server UX
Server:
- Add Let's Encrypt (ACME) TLS mode with autocert, HTTP-01 challenges on :80,
  and automatic certificate renewal (tls.mode: "acme" in config.yaml)
- Add ASCII art startup banner with server info and endpoint URLs
- Fix CSP blocking admin panel inline styles/scripts (per-route override)
- Suppress TLS handshake error noise in console output
- Fix TOCTOU race in invite consumption (atomic UPDATE with row-count check)
- Fix sendMsg mutex race condition (hold lock for entire send)
- Fix permission override formula (deny-first, allow-wins)
- Fix voice join parsing channelID before permission check
- Add session expiry check at WebSocket auth and periodic revalidation
- Add message length limit (4000 chars) and emoji length validation (32 bytes)
- Add file size enforcement in storage after io.Copy
- Add checksum URL validation in updater
- Add backup path traversal protection (BackupToSafe)
- Add self-modification guard in admin handlePatchUser
- Fix admin ownerOnlyMiddleware to use context user instead of re-auth
- Remove redundant startup log lines (banner shows same info)
- Add periodic expired session cleanup (15-min ticker)
- Add permissions package with bitfield constants and EffectivePerms
- Add rate limiter cleanup goroutine to prevent unbounded growth
- Add auth helpers (IsEffectivelyBanned, IsSessionExpired)
- Add WebSocket origin validation

Client:
- Add TOFU certificate trust service
- Add receive loop error handling
- Fix redundant else-if in OnChatMessage
2026-03-15 07:07:59 +01:00
jevb b7dd6eabe9 feat: implement Phase 2 auth & security with TDD
- auth/session: 256-bit crypto-random tokens, SHA-256 hashing for storage
- auth/password: bcrypt cost 12, strength validation (8-72 chars)
- auth/ratelimit: sliding-window RateLimiter with lockout, thread-safe
- db/models: User, Session, Invite, Role types
- db/auth_queries: full user/session/invite CRUD with in-memory test coverage
- api/middleware: AuthMiddleware (Bearer token), RequirePermission (bitfield),
  RateLimitMiddleware (X-Real-IP, Retry-After header)
- api/auth_handler: POST register/login, POST logout, GET me
  - Generic errors — username existence never revealed
  - Rate limits: 3/min register, 5/min login, lockout after 10 failures
- api/invite_handler: create/list/revoke behind MANAGE_INVITES permission
- bluemonday sanitization on all user-supplied string fields

Test coverage: auth 90.9%, db 84.4%, api 80.9%
2026-03-14 20:52:11 +01:00