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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 J3vbandClaude Fable 5
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fb04a579c4 |
fix(docker): ship /app owned by the runtime uid; run the boot-smoke in CI too (#1378)
* fix(release): give the Docker boot-smoke a writable /app, and run it in CI The v1.2.0-alpha.3 release run died at "Boot-smoke Docker image": a bare `docker run` of the distroless image has nowhere the uid-65532 server can write — /app is root-owned, and the VOLUME /app/data anonymous volume is created root-owned too — so config.Load failed on "writing default config: open config.yaml: permission denied" and the container exited. Real deployments bind-mount config.yaml and data/, which is why the image itself is fine. Move the smoke into Server/scripts/docker-smoke.sh, run the container with `--tmpfs /app --tmpfs /app/data` (Docker's tmpfs default mode is 1777, so the non-root server can write both), and call the same script from ci.yml's docker-build job — loading the image it already builds — so the smoke is exercised on every PR to main instead of for the first time at tag time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(docker): ship /app and /app/data owned by the runtime uid so a bare run boots The tmpfs approach did not survive CI: runc re-applies the underlying directory's mode to a tmpfs mounted over an existing path, so /app stayed root:755 and the write still failed. Fix the image instead of the harness: stage /app/data in the builder, chown it to 65532, COPY --chown it into the distroless stage before WORKDIR. Docker seeds the VOLUME's anonymous volume from that image dir, ownership included, so `docker run <image>` with no mounts now boots and answers /health — which is also the contract the smoke should be testing, so it goes back to a bare `docker run`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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J3vbandClaude Fable 5
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f5faf82a60 |
infra: observability, backups, guardrails, and deployment hardening (#1376)
* docs: add infrastructure roadmap plan Records the verified recommendations from an infrastructure review in three tracks: raising the single-instance ceiling, cheap seams for a possible multi-instance future, and ops hygiene. Includes explicit anti-recommendations and sequencing. Security-sensitive detail is intentionally excluded per docs/security.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * feat(server): real health checks and saturation metrics /api/v1/metrics now exposes signals that were already computed in memory but never surfaced: reconnect replay tier hits, event-persister counters, SQLite writer-pool wait stats, aggregate per-client backpressure counters (including previously invisible low-priority drops), and permission-cache hit/miss. /health now returns a real verdict: hub dispatch-loop liveness, a bounded database ping, and a free-disk check, returning 503 with a subsystem reason when degraded. Checks are cached so the unauthenticated endpoint cannot amplify load. The hub's panic breaker now exits the process so a supervisor can restart it, instead of leaving broadcast delivery silently dead while clients still appear online. OTel instruments that were declared but never recorded are now wired (ws_active_connections, ws_broadcast_latency_seconds, ws_messages_total, ws_events_dropped_total, voice gauges) or removed (db_query_duration_seconds). Also corrects the docs/api.md description of broadcast_drops, which counts hub-queue overflow, not client send-queue overflow. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * feat(server): implement scheduled backups, retention, and backup verification The backup_schedule and backup_retention settings have existed in the admin panel and API since the initial schema but were never read by any code. The 15-minute maintenance loop now enforces them: a scheduled backup is taken when the newest backup on disk is older than the schedule interval (manual backups reset the clock), and retention prunes backups older than the configured days while always keeping the newest one. Backups are now verified with PRAGMA integrity_check immediately after VACUUM INTO (a failed backup is removed rather than listed as restorable) and again before a restore may overwrite the live database. A failed VACUUM INTO also cleans up its partial output file — but never a pre-existing one. The backup directory is configurable via a new backup.dir key (default data/backups) so operators can point backups at another disk or an off-host mount, mirroring the SetDatabasePath plumb. Restore-handler tests now use real SQLite fixtures (the integrity gate correctly refuses text files) with the mid-copy failure injected through a test-only copy hook. Also adds audited gosec suppressions to the Windows disk-free syscall added in the previous commit, which the Windows lint leg flagged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * feat(server): capacity and failure-mode guardrails - server.max_ws_connections: optional cap on concurrent WebSocket clients, checked before the upgrade with a 503 + Retry-After; rejections are counted and exposed as ws_conn_rejects in /api/v1/metrics. - Single-process database lock: an OS-level advisory lock (flock / exclusive handle) beside the SQLite file makes a second server process fail fast with a clear message instead of silently fighting the first over process-local state. A bounded retry covers the self-update/restore restart handoff, and the lock mechanism failing (e.g. network filesystems) only warns. - Disk-space awareness: boot-time warnings for the data and backup volumes, plus a disk_free_mb metrics field, via a small cross-platform diskutil package (already used by /health). - Upload storage failures: storage.Save now marks server-side filesystem failures with a sentinel (storage.ErrIO); handlers return 507 for those instead of blaming the client with a 400, and the emoji route stops echoing raw storage errors (which embed absolute paths) into responses. - Unknown config keys now warn at startup — a typo like admin_alowed_cidrs previously kept the default silently while the operator believed the setting changed. Never fatal: newer servers tolerate older configs. - Admin settings honesty: the three stored-but-inert settings (server_icon, max_upload_bytes, voice_quality) are shown read-only with a note pointing at the real config.yaml keys, instead of pretending to apply. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * perf(db): write-path efficiency and capacity knobs - channel_focus/mark_read now skip the read-state UPSERT when the stored row already matches (same last_message_id, no mentions) — refocus events fire at up to 10/s/user and every no-op write still occupied the single SQLite writer connection. The extra existence check runs on the reader pool, which doesn't serialize. Same shape as the session-touch throttle. - DeleteExpiredSessions is now sargable: migration 031 normalizes legacy expiry formats to the RFC3339-Z layout the server writes and indexes expires_at, replacing the strftime full-table scan that ran on the writer every 15 minutes. - Boot-time ANALYZE runs only when a migration actually applied; unchanged schemas get the cheap PRAGMA optimize instead (which also covers crash-restarts that never reached the shutdown optimize). - The read/write SQL router gets a table-driven test with explicit expected values (INSERT ... RETURNING must hit the writer despite being :one). - New knobs, all defaulting to current behavior: database.max_readers, security.auth_rate_limit_multiplier (for shared-NAT communities), event_persistence.replay_ring_size and replay_cold_limit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * fix(server): shutdown lifecycle ordering - The event pruner and maintenance loop are now joined (bounded) before the database closes: bgCtx cancellation used to run AFTER database.Close via LIFO defers, contradicting its own comment, and neither goroutine was ever waited on — a mid-tick scheduled backup or prune could still hold the writer while the pool tore down. StartEventPruner returns a done channel with the same join contract EventPersister.Stop already had. - srv.Shutdown now runs before hub.GracefulStop, so in-flight HTTP handlers' broadcasts still reach a live hub and the event persister instead of vanishing from the replay/event store across a restart. Shutdown does not wait on hijacked WebSocket connections, so the swap adds no delay. - GracefulStopContext threads the 30s shutdown budget into the hub: the 5s client-notice window (matching the countdown clients are shown) ends early when the budget expires, and is skipped entirely when nobody is connected — early-return startup paths and idle servers no longer sleep 5s for an audience of zero. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * build(deploy): systemd unit, compose hardening, boot-smoked releases, CI polish - deploy/owncord.service: hardened systemd unit template with the two verified caveats encoded (install dir stays writable for self-update under ProtectSystem=strict; CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE for ACME's :80), plus a 'Linux (systemd)' deployment docs section — the Linux service story was previously 'Docker or nothing'. - New 'Reverse Proxy Topology' docs section with a working nginx snippet and the correct signaling-vs-media distinction: /livekit/* is already proxied by the server, only WebRTC media ports must be directly reachable. - docker-compose: log rotation, commented resource limits, and a healthcheck backed by a new 'chatserver healthcheck' subcommand (the distroless image has no shell) that probes /health without config side effects. - release.yml: a concurrency group (queue, never cancel), and boot-smoke gates — the freshly built server binaries and the Docker image are cold booted and probed healthy BEFORE anything is signed or pushed. The release feed drives signed self-updates, so a binary that compiles but dies on boot previously would have shipped itself to every auto-updating instance. - ci.yml: client-check/client-tests move to ubuntu with the reasoning recorded (no win32 code paths, LF enforced repo-wide); admin-e2e gets a written graduation criterion instead of an open-ended non-blocking status. - docs: Tailscale guide notes the CGNAT range vs the default admin CIDRs; architecture overview records presence/voice state as the fifth single-instance blocker and the macOS client scope decision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * perf(server): measured load tooling, narrowed invalidation, presence coalescing, storage and CIDR seams - Fix scripts/k6/ws-load.js against the real wire protocol: envelope-wrapped frames, correct message types (typing_start, presence_update), the correct /api/v1/ws path, and thresholds that fail a run where nobody authenticated or went ready — the script had drifted to pre-envelope framing and reported 100% green while every auth failed on the first frame. A new workflow_dispatch-only load-baseline workflow boots a real server, seeds users through the setup/invite APIs, runs the script, and uploads the k6 summary plus a metrics snapshot for before/after comparison. - Role-scoped channel-override changes now evict only the affected role's members from the permission cache (fail-safe: unreadable member list still flushes everything). InvalidateAll here repopulated every connected user — two reads each — synchronously inside the admin request via RefreshChannelVisibility, a stampede that scaled with total population rather than the role's size. Same pattern the per-user override endpoints already used. - Connect/disconnect presence broadcasts now pass through a 300ms latest-wins coalescer (QueuePresence): each un-coalesced presence change is a sequenced global broadcast (an O(clients) fan-out under seqMu), so a reconnect storm fired O(users) of them from the connect critical path. A flap inside the window collapses to its final state; the wire format, seq ordering, and replay behaviour are unchanged, and the delivery path (BroadcastPresence) is untouched. - Storage seam: api handlers now consume a FileStore interface (consumer-side, same pattern as service.Store) with Open returning a seekable storage.File — writing down the contract (range-request seeks included) an alternative backend would have to meet, without building one. - The metrics surfaces and the LiveKit webhook/health endpoints get their own allowlist keys (metrics_allowed_cidrs, livekit_webhook_allowed_cidrs, both defaulting to admin_allowed_cidrs), so a central Prometheus scraper or an externally-hosted LiveKit no longer requires widening the admin panel's perimeter. Startup now also warns when admin_allowed_cidrs is customized while trusted_proxies is empty — behind a proxy or container network the check would otherwise compare the proxy's private address, not the client's. - The container healthcheck probe now PINS the server's own certificate from disk (VerifyConnection, exact-match) instead of skipping TLS verification, addressing the CodeQL finding on the previous commit; WebPKI verification is used when no local cert exists (ACME). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * fix(server): address self-review findings on the hardening branch Seven fixes from a high-effort review of the full branch diff: - healthcheck CLI now works under tls.mode acme: it overrides ServerName with the configured domain for WebPKI verification instead of pinning a cert that doesn't exist (or is stale) in that mode. Previously an ACME deployment's container healthcheck failed forever. - /health pings the READER pool (new db.PingRead): the writer ping queued behind a scheduled backup's VACUUM INTO and reported the server degraded for the whole backup — which an autoheal watchdog would turn into a nightly mid-backup restart. - /health runs its cached checks under context.WithoutCancel so a probe that disconnects mid-request cannot poison the shared cache with a false degraded verdict for the next 5 seconds. - The token CLI uses a new db.OpenShared that skips the single-process lock: minting a token against a running server is safe under WAL and was a documented workflow the lock had broken. - The per-user TOTP failure cap is no longer scaled by security.auth_rate_limit_multiplier — that knob exists for per-IP limits; scaling the only cross-IP brute-force defence multiplied an attacker's distributed guess budget. Mirrors the unscaled per-user login threshold. - A direct presence_update now drops the user's queued entry in the connect/disconnect coalescer, so a stale connect-time presence can no longer flush 300ms later over the user's fresher chosen status. - The scheduled-backup filename collision loop breaks on any stat error and bounds its suffix probing, instead of spinning the maintenance goroutine forever on a persistent EACCES. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * test(admin): real SQLite fixture for the merged Close-failure restore test TestHandleRestoreBackup_RestartsWhenCloseFails arrived from main (#1375) with a plain-text backup fixture; this branch's restore handler verifies backups with integrity_check before touching the live database, so the text fixture was (correctly) refused with 400 before the Close-failure branch under test was reached. Use a real backup via BackupToSafe, matching the other restore tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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J3vbandClaude Fable 5
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6afa9e974c |
refactor(server): thread context.Context through the db layer and all callers
Fixes all 109 golangci-lint findings (106 contextcheck, 1 gocritic,
2 gosec) that accumulated after D2 wired dbgen (whose queries take ctx)
under ctx-less db.DB wrappers while CI lint was quota-dead. No nolint
comments added; every finding fixed by genuinely threading context.
- db: all 138 hand-written db.DB methods take ctx first; the dbCtx()
Background shim is deleted; raw Query/QueryRow/Exec/Begin use their
Context variants; the four redundant ctx-less passthroughs removed.
db.Auditor/WriteAudit gain ctx.
- Seams: permissions.Checker (DB iface, HasChannelPerm,
RequireChannelAccess) and the service.Store interface mirror the new
signatures (ws.EventStore and plugin.PluginStore already did).
- Callers: api/admin handlers use r.Context(); ws per-message paths use
the connection ctx via DispatchV2; hub loops and startup wiring use
context.Background(); service methods thread ctx where they have one
and Background where no ctx exists. Public service surface reached by
ctx-holding chains (PermissionService.HasChannelPerm/GetRoleForUser/
RequireChannelAccess, message/dm/block/invite/profile methods) is now
ctx-first.
- Detached (context.WithoutCancel) where cancellation would break an
invariant, found by a 3-lens adversarial review of the diff:
* voice-leave background retries (a dead webhook/connection ctx killed
retry 2 before it ran, leaving ghost capacity-holding voice rows)
* rollbackVoiceJoin's compensating delete (its trigger IS the cancel)
* post-2FA-change DeleteOtherSessions and logout DeleteSession (the
security tail of a committed change must not die with the request)
* all api/ws audit writes (a banned user could suppress their own
login_blocked_banned row by aborting the request mid-bcrypt)
* admin backup VACUUM INTO (an interrupt left a truncated .db that
the backup list presented as restorable)
* post-commit message/edit refetches (a committed message must still
fan out when the sender disconnects)
* hub settings-cache refresh (one dead connection could pin stale
values for the 30s TTL)
- gocritic rangeValCopy fixed (index iteration); gosec G306 excluded in
config with justification (generated source must stay world-readable)
instead of flipping genprotocol output to 0o600.
Verified: gofmt/vet, all four build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock
pass, full -race pass, golangci-lint 0 issues uncapped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Claude
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2e7a80171b |
feat(server,client): protocol codegen + audit quick-wins batch
Protocol codegen (decision D4, audit A-2026-07-08): - Add docs/protocol-schema.json as the real single source of truth for WS message-type constants, making the long-standing 'generated from' comment in both constant files true. - Add Server/scripts/genprotocol, a generator emitting both Server/ws/message_types.go and Client .../lib/protocolTypes.ts (constants byte-for-byte value-identical to before; only headers, ordering alignment, and provenance comments changed). - Add make protocol-generate / protocol-verify and wire protocol-verify into CI next to sqlc-verify. Quick wins (decision D8): - admin: log LogAudit write failures in the backup handlers instead of discarding them (prior audit #10). - api: fix self-contradictory upload Cache-Control to 'private, no-cache' per remediation plan W3-4; drop the now-unused fileCacheMaxAgeSeconds constant; update test. - ws: route the hub settings cache through db.GetSetting instead of inline SQL. - ws: fix a latent data race — main.go wires SetEventPersister and SetEventStore after NewRouter has already started the hub Run loop, which reads those fields on the broadcast/replay paths. They (and pluginSink, which one test sets post-Run) are now atomic pointers; the remaining pre-Run-only setters reject late calls with an error log instead of racing silently. Update the audit closure table and decisions doc statuses accordingly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UA17KPvqGBX3XbXYnMf1rA |
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jevb
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5cec992c1f |
chore: add dev tooling — Stryker, gremlins, k6, toxiproxy, Coraza WAF, Zod
Install and configure mutation testing (Stryker for client, go-gremlins for server), load testing (k6), chaos testing (toxiproxy), WAF middleware (Coraza with OWASP rules, opt-in via waf_enabled config), and Zod for runtime schema validation. All tools verified building cleanly. |
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jevb
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447a4543e7 |
chore: remaining server changes (code quality, go mod tidy)
Go mod tidy, minor server-side adjustments from security verification and code quality cleanup pass. |
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jevb
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0e29d98d9d |
fix: resolve CI failures — eslint peer dep conflict and errcheck lint errors
Downgrade @eslint/js to ^9.39.4 to match eslint ^9 peer requirement. Fix 7 unchecked .Close() return values flagged by errcheck linter. |
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jevb
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39658e919b |
refactor: extensibility overhaul — handler registry, permission checker, sidebar decomposition, DX improvements
Server: - Unified permission checker (permissions/checker.go) replaces 3 duplicated implementations - WS handler registry pattern (ws/registry.go) replaces monolithic switch (747→184 lines) - Split handlers into domain files: handlers_chat.go, handlers_presence.go, handlers_reaction.go - Shared message type constants (ws/message_types.go) — no more string literals - Admin API split into helpers.go, types.go, middleware.go (api.go now 61 lines) - Dev seed script (scripts/seed.go) with -confirm-dev safety flag - Air hot reload config (.air.toml) - Fix: DM attachment permission now uses participant check, not role check - Fix: Typing broadcast now checks ReadMessages permission for non-DM channels Client: - Extract preferences to @lib/preferences.ts (fixes lib→component dependency) - Extract roles to dedicated roles.store.ts (was mixed into channels store) - Decompose SidebarArea (921→598 lines) into 4 sub-components - Shared modal factory (lib/modalFactory.ts) with tests - Global showToast() helper (lib/toast.ts) — 18 call sites migrated - Protocol type constants (lib/protocolTypes.ts) synced with server - Remove 38 unnecessary type casts across 17 files - Component test harness (tests/helpers/test-harness.ts) with 8 tests - Fix: DM section "View All" respects collapsed state - Fix: Modal onClose fires on external signal abort - Fix: savePref wrapped in try/catch for quota exceeded - Fix: loadPref null guard added Triple-reviewed: Claude code-review agent + OpenAI Codex CLI + GitHub Copilot |
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jevb
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3236918012 |
refactor: server hardening + client decomposition + protocol resilience
Server:
- Split monolithic voice_handlers.go into voice_join/leave/controls/broadcast
- Add metrics endpoint (admin-IP-restricted /api/v1/metrics)
- Add orphaned attachment cleanup in maintenance loop
- Add sentinel errors (db/errors.go, ws/errors.go)
- Add ring buffer for event replay on reconnect
- Add heartbeat monitoring with stale connection sweep
- Improve hub with panic recovery, graceful shutdown, seq tracking
- Typed message structs replace raw map[string]interface{}
Client:
- Decompose MainPage into ChatArea + SidebarArea controllers
- Add disposable.ts lifecycle management pattern
- Add member list right-click context menu (kick/ban/role)
- Tighten CSP (media-src, font-src, object-src, base-uri)
- Improve store with shallowEqual, 500-msg cap, batch updates
- Add search API endpoint wiring
- Fix LiveKit session cleanup and reconnection
Docs:
- Add CODEMAPS for architecture, backend, frontend, data, deps
- Add protocol-schema.json (machine-readable, 36 message types)
- Add platform research report
- Update PROTOCOL.md with seq/replay fields
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