Commit Graph
12 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Claude 1673c37b9c fix: comprehensive security hardening from full codebase audit
Addresses 14 findings from the security audit across all severity levels:

CRITICAL:
- C-1: Add user blocking system (migration, DB queries, REST API, WS DM
  send check) to prevent harassment via unconsented DMs
- C-2: Remove server version from unauthenticated /health and /info endpoints
  to prevent fingerprinting

HIGH:
- H-1: Remove dangerous-settings feature from tauri-plugin-http
- H-3: Default allowSelfSigned to false in API client (was hardcoded true)
- H-4: Cap invite expiration to 30 days (720 hours)
- H-5: Add 256KB message size limit to LiveKit WS proxy (prevents OOM)
- H-6: Cap concurrent sessions to 25 per user (evicts oldest on overflow)
- H-8: Restrict /diagnostics/connectivity to ADMINISTRATOR role

MEDIUM:
- M-2: Deny access to legacy NULL-uploader unlinked attachments
- M-4: Log warnings on TOTP plaintext decryption fallback paths
- M-8: Remove acceptInvalidCerts from OG preview fetches
- M-10: Expand file upload blocklist (Java .class, OLE2, WASM, .lnk)
- M-12: Add LIMIT to ListInvites (200) and ListMembers (1000)
- M-14: Add CHECK constraint trigger on channels.type (text/voice/dm)

https://claude.ai/code/session_01KKo3RwjdmcNzkgXNfUkgNT
2026-04-04 16:48:57 +00:00
J3vb f40e6787a9 fix: resolve remaining LOW security findings (L2-L14)
- Document single-instance requirement for in-memory rate stores (L2)
- Add IsOwnerRole() helper for explicit owner guards (L4)
- WS auth deadline uses request context, not context.Background (L5)
- Double-check voice state before clearing in webhook handler (L8)
- Upload stores measured write size instead of client header.Size (L11)
- Startup warning when config upload size exceeds HTTP body limit (L12)
- Update check endpoint now requires owner role (L13)
- Backup paths resolved to absolute at init time (L14)
2026-04-02 15:22:03 +02:00
jevb a24dbd5d55 feat: add syncutil mutex, test scaffolding, and server hardening
- Add syncutil package with deadlock-detecting mutex (build-tag switchable)
- Add main_test.go TestMain scaffolding across all server packages
- Harden concurrency in ws, admin, auth, and updater packages
- Update CI workflow, go.mod/sum, Cargo.lock, and root changelogen tooling
2026-04-01 12:04:15 +02:00
jevb 447a4543e7 chore: remaining server changes (code quality, go mod tidy)
Go mod tidy, minor server-side adjustments from security verification
and code quality cleanup pass.
2026-04-01 11:38:33 +02:00
jevb 2a62f31c39 test: boost server coverage — auth 60→95%, db 69→81%, config 75→85%
Add comprehensive tests across all Go packages:
- auth: username validation, concurrent rate limiting, TOTP stores, timing
- config: env overrides, default credential detection, voice defaults
- db: search, message queries, special char handling
- api: handler edge cases, error paths, DM/invite/TOTP coverage
- ws: voice handler paths, integration scenarios
- updater: version comparison, timeout handling

6 of 8 packages now at 80%+ coverage.
2026-04-01 11:38:11 +02:00
jevb a40b42bbed fix: resolve 24 critical and high issues from full code & security review
CRITICAL (5):
- Hub panic recovery now calls h.Stop() after 3 panics (ws/hub.go)
- Ring buffer EventsSince returns non-nil empty slice for current seq (ws/ringbuffer.go)
- PTT event listener stores unsubscribe handle to prevent leak (ptt.ts)
- verifyTotp respects config.allowSelfSigned instead of hardcoding (api.ts)
- ptt_listen_for_key uses spawn_blocking to avoid thread pool starvation (ptt.rs)

HIGH - Server (13):
- TOTP rate-limit checked after body decode; counters reset on success
- TOTP enable returns 409 if already enabled (must disable first)
- Global search pre-computes accessible channel IDs for FTS WHERE clause
- DeleteAccount queries roles by name instead of hard-coded IDs
- BackupToSafe uses absClean in VACUUM INTO
- Voice camera slot uses atomic EnableCameraIfUnderLimit DB method
- readPump snapshots voiceChID before unregister for TOCTOU safety
- Voice join sets state after token send; rollback takes broadcast flag
- Updater download uses probe pattern instead of overflow write
- Webhook checks Authorization header before reading body
- Storage.Save adds fsync and fixes double-close
- Default WS origin denies cross-origin (was: accept all)

HIGH - Client (6):
- WS reconnect uses generation counter to discard stale events
- AudioPipeline uses generation counter against stale worklet callbacks
- Screenshare mute state preserved across reconnect (not full leave)
- handleVoiceToken uses iterative loop instead of unbounded recursion
- store.ts re-entrancy guard with pending update queue
- Notification AudioContext cleaned up on logout

Reviewed by 4 parallel agents across Server Core, Server Realtime,
Client & Tauri, and Security. 55 total findings; 24 CRITICAL+HIGH
fixed here, 31 MEDIUM+LOW tracked in vault backlog (T-265–T-295).
2026-04-01 09:23:17 +02:00
jevb 4c4526e539 fix: security hardening — 45 issues from full-project Copilot audit
Critical (6):
- C1: SQL injection in VACUUM INTO backup path — strict character allowlist
- C2: Unlimited binary download in updater — 500MB LimitReader
- C3: JSON injection in SSE log stream — json.Marshal instead of concat
- C4: CSS injection via custom themes — reject () and {} in values
- C5: Silent DM message loss — error response on participant lookup failure
- C6: LiveKit URL credential leak — strip creds from diagnostics endpoint

High (11):
- H1: DB errors no longer trigger login rate-limit lockout
- H2: Permission fetch failure returns 500, not empty channel list
- H3: TOCTOU race on duplicate WS — atomic check-and-register in hub
- H5: LiveKit webhook verifies voice channel match (already implemented)
- H7: Server host address validated before storage (hostname regex)
- H8: WS message deduplication on reconnect replay (1000-entry Set)
- H9: Admin setup endpoint rate limited (5/min/IP)
- H10: Backup responses return filename only, not full path
- H11: Update binary recovery failure now alerts admin

Medium (17):
- M1: MIME type from magic bytes, not client header
- M3: Nil guard on DM broadcast recipient
- M5: LiveKit process run-done channel race fixed
- M6: Backup restore calls fsync before close
- M7: Partial download file cleaned up on error
- M8: Admin CSP uses nonce instead of unsafe-inline
- M9: Client rate limiter enforced for presence_update
- M10: Voice joinedAt not reset on double-join
- M11: Unread count skips increment during reconnect replay
- M13: Category type uses exact match, not substring
- M14: Storage LimitReader off-by-one fixed
- M15: GitHub token only sent to GitHub hosts
- M16: Content-parser ReDoS regex replaced with split approach
- M17: Audio device switch error handling added

Low (11):
- L1: CORS uses configured origins instead of wildcard
- L2: HSTS header added when TLS enabled
- L3: Consistent JSON error responses across all endpoints
- L4: File modtime from stat, not time.Now()
- L5: Malformed invite JSON returns 400
- L6: TouchSession failure logged at warn
- L8: MessageInput timers cleared on destroy
- L9: Log persistence flush errors caught
- L10: Credential save failure surfaced to user
- L11: Case-insensitive asset name matching in updater

Found by GitHub Copilot full-project review (claude-sonnet-4.6 + claude-haiku-4.5).
2026-03-29 12:35:04 +02:00
jevb 3236918012 refactor: server hardening + client decomposition + protocol resilience
Server:
- Split monolithic voice_handlers.go into voice_join/leave/controls/broadcast
- Add metrics endpoint (admin-IP-restricted /api/v1/metrics)
- Add orphaned attachment cleanup in maintenance loop
- Add sentinel errors (db/errors.go, ws/errors.go)
- Add ring buffer for event replay on reconnect
- Add heartbeat monitoring with stale connection sweep
- Improve hub with panic recovery, graceful shutdown, seq tracking
- Typed message structs replace raw map[string]interface{}

Client:
- Decompose MainPage into ChatArea + SidebarArea controllers
- Add disposable.ts lifecycle management pattern
- Add member list right-click context menu (kick/ban/role)
- Tighten CSP (media-src, font-src, object-src, base-uri)
- Improve store with shallowEqual, 500-msg cap, batch updates
- Add search API endpoint wiring
- Fix LiveKit session cleanup and reconnection

Docs:
- Add CODEMAPS for architecture, backend, frontend, data, deps
- Add protocol-schema.json (machine-readable, 36 message types)
- Add platform research report
- Update PROTOCOL.md with seq/replay fields
2026-03-21 10:08:44 +01:00
jevb fca1b0cc0c test: boost server test coverage to 80%+ across all packages
Add comprehensive tests for db, storage, updater, and ws packages
covering edge cases, error paths, and voice handler functions.
New test files for attachment queries and WebSocket coverage boost.
2026-03-18 05:03:38 +01:00
jevb ce4326766a fix: resolve all golangci-lint issues blocking CI server build
Fix 70+ errcheck violations by adding explicit error discards (`_ =`)
for unchecked return values across test helpers and deferred Close()
calls. Remove unused `senderID` field from broadcastMsg and unused
`defaultCleanupMaxWindow` const. Apply De Morgan's law, remove empty
branch, and simplify redundant type declaration per staticcheck.
2026-03-17 08:09:52 +01:00
jevb 6eba999233 feat: add Let's Encrypt ACME support, fix security issues, improve server UX
Server:
- Add Let's Encrypt (ACME) TLS mode with autocert, HTTP-01 challenges on :80,
  and automatic certificate renewal (tls.mode: "acme" in config.yaml)
- Add ASCII art startup banner with server info and endpoint URLs
- Fix CSP blocking admin panel inline styles/scripts (per-route override)
- Suppress TLS handshake error noise in console output
- Fix TOCTOU race in invite consumption (atomic UPDATE with row-count check)
- Fix sendMsg mutex race condition (hold lock for entire send)
- Fix permission override formula (deny-first, allow-wins)
- Fix voice join parsing channelID before permission check
- Add session expiry check at WebSocket auth and periodic revalidation
- Add message length limit (4000 chars) and emoji length validation (32 bytes)
- Add file size enforcement in storage after io.Copy
- Add checksum URL validation in updater
- Add backup path traversal protection (BackupToSafe)
- Add self-modification guard in admin handlePatchUser
- Fix admin ownerOnlyMiddleware to use context user instead of re-auth
- Remove redundant startup log lines (banner shows same info)
- Add periodic expired session cleanup (15-min ticker)
- Add permissions package with bitfield constants and EffectivePerms
- Add rate limiter cleanup goroutine to prevent unbounded growth
- Add auth helpers (IsEffectivelyBanned, IsSessionExpired)
- Add WebSocket origin validation

Client:
- Add TOFU certificate trust service
- Add receive loop error handling
- Fix redundant else-if in OnChatMessage
2026-03-15 07:07:59 +01:00
jevb a1434ad07f feat: implement Phase 1 server skeleton with TDD
- Scaffold Go module (github.com/owncord/server) with all package dirs
- config: koanf-based YAML loader with env var overrides, default generation
- db: pure-Go SQLite (modernc, no CGO), WAL mode, FK enforcement, full
  15-table schema from SCHEMA.md including FTS5 and idempotent migrations
- auth/tls: ECDSA P-256 self-signed cert generation, LoadOrGenerate for
  all 4 TLS modes (self_signed, acme, manual, off)
- api: chi router with request ID middleware, /health and /api/v1/info
- main: graceful shutdown (30s timeout), structured slog JSON logging
- Stubs for ws, storage, admin packages ready for Phase 2+

Test coverage: api 100%, auth 85.7%, db 82.4%, config 80.6%
Binary: chatserver.exe 12MB, GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64
2026-03-14 20:34:37 +01:00