* refactor(protocol): retire reserved voice_speakers and member_leave (S-15) Neither type was ever emitted by the server; B2-1 clears them from the schema before the epoch-1 wire fixtures are captured, so the frozen epoch does not carry two dead message types. Client: dropped the dead `ws.on(MEMBER_LEAVE)` / `ws.on(VOICE_SPEAKERS)` dispatcher handlers, the `MemberLeavePayload` type and both `ServerMessage` union members, and the tests that only exercised those WS paths. `removeMember` (member_ban) and `setSpeakers` (LiveKit ActiveSpeakers) stay live and keep their direct unit tests. * test(ws): capture the epoch-1 wire fixtures alpha.4 is the last client on the pre-epoch wire and B2-2 adds a protocol epoch to the auth handshake next, so record what epoch 1 actually looks like while it is still observable. TestEpoch1Fixtures drives eleven journeys through the ws package's in-process hub harness (full migrations, real hub, httptest WebSocket server) and compares each journey's per-connection frame sequence with a transcript under protocol/fixtures/epoch-1/: - fresh-connect, auth-failure, ping - chat-send-fanout, chat-edit-delete, reaction-add-remove - typing, mark-read, dm-send - resume-replay (last_seq + buffer-tier replay burst) - voice-join-e2ee-leave (join, both voice_state forms, announce and offer relay, leave) Volatile values are replaced by typed placeholders before both writing and comparison -- any key that is id/seq/last_seq, ends in _id (except channel_id and role_id) or _at, is timestamp/ts/last_seen, or contains token, becomes "<class:json-type>" so a field that changes type is still a diff, while everything else is compared verbatim. Regenerate with: go test ./ws -run TestEpoch1Fixtures -update Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(client): pin the epoch-1 auth frame contract Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(updater): pin the epoch-1 manifest and client-update shapes * test(ws): harden the epoch-1 fixtures against trailing frames and absent optionals Every journey now ends with the ping/pong barrier on each recorded connection, so a frame the server emits after the last read fails as `expected "pong", got "X"` instead of going unrecorded; auth-failure asserts the StatusPolicyViolation close instead, its socket being gone. alice carries a display name, avatar, about text, custom status, identity public key and an announce signature (bob carries none), so every optional field is frozen in its present form as well as its absent one — a rename or a retype of display_name or identity_public_key now moves a fixture. The typing journey focuses the channel on "a" before typing: without the subscription registerNow only makes for a focused client, its ping/pong proved nothing about excludeUserID. Comment fixes: the escaped placeholder form MarshalIndent would write, the real (headroom) reason for the raised read limit, a note that bare id and active_channel_id are normalised by design, and a .prettierignore line saying these fixtures are verified by the Go comparison, not by git diff. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(protocol): document the epoch-1 fixtures * docs(protocol): match the epoch-1 wire where the fixtures contradicted the doc - voice_state: note the unsequenced relay-to-joiner form (table row + section) - auth_error: correct the example message and list the real rejection messages - member_join/presence connect example: add the seq both frames actually carry - chat_message.user: document display_name - voice_join reply order: state that the joiner's own voice_state broadcast is not ordered against the other three frames * test(ws): freeze the null forms of auth_ok and member_join user fields buildAuthOK emits display_name/about/custom_status/avatar as always-present nulls, but only alice — who has all four set — ever authenticated on a recorded connection, so the fixtures froze those fields in their populated form alone. A rename, a retype or a dropped null would have moved nothing, on the very frame B2-2 edits. fresh-connect now records bob's handshake too, on a second connection: his auth_ok carries the four nulls, his member_join carries avatar null with display_name and identity_public_key omitted, and alice — idle by then, so her reads stay in hub order — records the same pair as an already-connected observer sees it. In voice-join-e2ee-leave bob answers alice's signed announce with a legacy unsigned one, which freezes the absent form of signature next to her present one. The auth frames the test writes now carry the correlation id the real client stamps on every frame (ws.ts send()); normalisation renders it <id:string>. expectClosed also asserts the close reason ("authentication failed"), not just code 1008 — HP-2 asks for both. Comment precision, no behaviour change: the barrier guarantee now states that pong may overtake a pending LOW-priority frame (writePump) and that no journey is affected because every barrier is sent on an idle connection; the ping-budget ceiling is six connections, not four; the typing journey cites handleChannelFocusV2 rather than registerNow as the subscribe site; resume-replay's b barrier explains why moving it past the resume would be a flake, not a fix; and the header notes that normalisation hides that chat_send_ok.id echoes the request id. The client contract test's cited range for ws.ts's send() call is 441-453, not 441-454. Regenerate with: go test ./ws -run TestEpoch1Fixtures -update Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(protocol): shape-not-value fixture rule, voice_max_video default, auth close code The fixture rule read "a fixture may only change with an epoch bump", which is false for the seeded values the transcripts record verbatim: role permission masks and colours, motd, server_name, voice_max_video, the voice_config preset. A migration that changes a default mask diffs fresh-connect.json, and the README told the author to revert a change that never touched the wire. Split the rule along shape versus value. A key set, a JSON type, a key appearing or disappearing, or per-connection frame order is a protocol change and earns fixtures/epoch-<n+1>/. A seeded default value is a seed change: regenerate in the same PR and read the diff frame by frame. Normalising those values is explicitly not the answer — a placeholder over a mask or over an enum such as voice_config.threshold_mode would hide the drift the fixtures exist to catch. Two wire facts corrected against the fixtures: - voice_max_video on an unconfigured channel is 25, not 0 (migration 004 is DEFAULT 25); the doc listed it among the zero values. - auth_error is followed by a close with code 1008 (policy violation) and reason "authentication failed" (serve.go:128), which the doc left as "closes the connection". Also: voice_speakers moves from discord-parity's "still dead" list to "came off the list" — it was retired earlier on this branch. And Kick says sessions are revoked and sockets drop on the next sweep, which is what ForceLogout does (moderation.go:236); it does not cut sockets. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(protocol): fixture rule covers enum vocabularies; header comment precision Re-check minors from the whole-branch review: a fixed-vocabulary value the client switches on is shape, not a seeded value; drop the false 'new default channel' clause (the seed asserts channel ids); the low-priority frame is presence_update, not connect presence. * docs(plans): record B2-1 evidence for HP-2 (PR #1435, fixture commit SHAs) * docs(protocol): additive changes stay within an epoch; bump only for what old clients cannot process Codex review on #1435: B2-2 keeps protocol_epoch = 1 while adding auth/ready/auth_error fields, which the previous wording would have called a break to revert. An epoch is a compatibility boundary, not a snapshot: additive keys regenerate in the same PR and are documented; removals, renames, retypes, dropped frames and reordering bump the epoch. The plan's B2-1 evidence records the refinement and hands B2-2/B2-4 the open questions (additive-tolerant replay of the epoch-1 transcript; epoch 0 vs 1 naming). * test(client): compare auth-frame key sets order-independently Codex review on #1435: Object.keys preserves insertion order, so a harmless property reorder in ws.ts would fail the pin. Key order has no wire meaning; the Go fixtures already compare with sorted keys. Sort both sides. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
13 KiB
Settings & Admin — target UX
Verified against: commit 5630aa1, 2026-08-04
Part of the Client UX Specification.
Covers: the settings overlay and its tabs, account operations (profile, password, 2FA, delete), appearance/theming, the client's inline admin surface (ban/kick/ roles, channel CRUD, invites), and the updater. It also marks the boundary between what the desktop client does and what lives only on the server web panel.
1. Settings overlay
A tabbed overlay (SettingsOverlay) available both authenticated (in Main) and
unauthenticated (on Connect, for appearance/advanced). Tabs: Account,
Appearance, Notifications, Text & Images, Accessibility, Voice & Audio, Keybinds,
Advanced, Logs.
Target rules:
- Every save is confirmed: a toast on success, an inline error on failure. No silent saves.
- Preference writes are immediate and local (localStorage
owncord:settings:*), broadcast via theowncord:pref-changeevent so open views re-read live (e.g. theme, message density) without a restart. - Structural/durable data (server profiles, window geometry, per-user volumes)
persists through the Rust key-allowlisted store (
settings.json); lightweight UI prefs through localStorage. This split is intentional; the spec preserves it.
2. Account operations
The Account tab holds the identity-sensitive flows. All require the current password for sensitive changes and are rate-limited server-side.
2.1 Profile edit
| Step | Reaction |
|---|---|
| Edit username/avatar | PATCH /users/me; optimistic auth.updateUser; server broadcasts user_update so the member list + own bar update live |
| Failure | Inline field error + rollback |
2.2 Change password (with session revocation)
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant U as User
participant A as AccountTab
participant API as api.ts
U->>A: current + new + confirm (new min 8, new equals confirm)
A->>API: PUT /users/me/password
alt success
API-->>A: 204 — all other sessions revoked, this one kept
A->>U: "Password changed" toast, fields cleared
else revoke step failed
API-->>A: 200 warning, sessions_revoked
A->>U: success plus note — some sessions may still be active
else wrong current password
API-->>A: 403 — lockout counter server-side
A->>U: inline "Incorrect password"
else weak or same-as-old
API-->>A: 400
A->>U: inline validation error
end
Target rule (the W2-2 contract, surfaced to the user): once the password is
committed, the operation is a success even if the session-revocation step
fails — the UI must never present a committed change as an error (that would walk
the user into the confirm-lockout). The partial-success 200 {warning} maps to a
success message with a soft note, never a red error. (Server contract:
handleUpdateProfile() in Server/api/profile_handler.go; client already toasts success, the onUpdateProfile handler in pages/MainPage.ts.)
2.3 Two-factor (TOTP)
| Flow | Steps |
|---|---|
| Enable | Password prompt → POST /totp/enable → render QR URI + backup codes → 6-digit confirm → POST /totp/confirm → "Enabled" badge, auth user totp_enabled:true |
| Disable | Password confirm → DELETE /totp; a 403/"required" is rewritten to "2FA is required by this server and cannot be disabled" (already the 403 rewrite in buildTotpDisableView(), components/settings/AccountTab.ts) |
Target rule: backup codes are shown exactly once, with an explicit "Save these now — you won't see them again" and a copy affordance.
2.4 Sessions & delete account
| Action | Reaction |
|---|---|
| List sessions | GET /users/me/sessions; show device/IP/last-used; current session marked |
| Revoke a session | DELETE /users/me/sessions/{id}; optimistic removal + toast |
| Delete account | Modal with password confirm (irreversible — stronger than a two-click); DELETE /auth/account → clearAuth() → connect page |
3. Inline admin surface (client)
The desktop client exposes a subset of admin operations inline, gated by the actor's role. Everything here must (a) only appear for users who can perform it, and (b) confirm destructive actions.
| Operation | Affordance | REST | Reaction |
|---|---|---|---|
| Change role | Member context menu → submenu | PATCH /admin/api/users/{id} {role_id} |
Toast; member_update reflects live |
| Kick | Member menu, two-click confirm | DELETE /admin/api/users/{id}/sessions |
Toast "Kicked {user}"; sessions revoked, sockets drop on the next sweep → presence offline |
| Ban | Member menu, two-click confirm | PATCH /admin/api/users/{id} {banned, ban_reason} |
Toast; member_ban removes them |
| Create channel | Sidebar → modal | POST /admin/api/channels |
Modal closes on success; channel_create |
| Edit channel | Channel menu → modal | PATCH /admin/api/channels/{id} |
channel_update |
| Delete channel | Channel menu, two-click confirm | DELETE /admin/api/channels/{id} |
channel_delete; redirect if active |
| Reorder channels | Drag | PATCH …/{id} {position} per moved |
Optimistic; roll back on failure |
| Invites | Invite manager modal | GET/POST/DELETE /invites |
List with masked codes, copy, revoke; empty state "No active invites" |
Target rules:
- ✓ Destructive admin actions show an in-flight state (2026-08).
withConfirmation(AdminActions.ts) keeps the item in a pending label/class while the promise settles and ignores further clicks, so a slow ban no longer looks ignored; unblock, ban submit, purge, and the role-change submenu carry their own equivalent guards (a role change in flight also inerts the other role options —currentRoleonly updates when themember_updateechoes). - ✓ Ban collects a reason (2026-07/08). The ban flow renders an inline
reason input plus a duration choice (
appendBanFlow()incomponents/AdminActions.ts), and the menu passes both through (theonBanhandler increateSidebarMemberSection(),pages/main-page/SidebarMemberSection.ts→api.adminBanMember(userId, reason, durationHours)), so temporary bans and stored reasons work from the client.
3.1 What is not in the client (by design)
The full admin panel — user list, audit log, server settings, channel
permissions, plugin management, backups, updates, first-run setup — is the
server-rendered web panel under /admin, gated by IP restriction + admin
auth. The Tauri client has no REST methods for these (confirmed: no plugin/
audit/settings/permissions/setup calls in api.ts). The one bridge the client
does have is a deep-link: lib/admin-panel.ts opens
https://{host}/admin#{section} in the OS browser (wired from
the Audit Log button handler in createSidebarArea(), pages/main-page/SidebarArea.ts, gated by
lib/permissions.ts::canViewAuditLog).
Decision point. If the target is for admins to manage the server from the desktop app (audit log, settings, plugins) rather than the web panel, that is a new surface to build, not a gap in an existing flow. Flagged here so the boundary is explicit; the current split (inline moderation in the client, full administration on the web) may well be the intended design.
4. Appearance & theming
Themes are CSS custom properties (styles/tokens.css), 4 built-ins
(dark | neon-glow | midnight | light) plus custom overrides. Target: theme
changes apply live — ui.setTheme + the owncord:pref-change event re-skin
open views without reload. Appearance is editable pre-login (on the connect page)
so the app respects the user's theme before they authenticate.
5. Updater
Self-hosted: the update endpoint derives from the connected server URL, over TOFU-pinned (or system) TLS, minisign-verified inside the Tauri updater plugin.
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant N as UpdateNotifier
participant R as Rust updater
N->>N: 3s after mount → check_client_update(server_url)
alt update available
R-->>N: {available, version, body}
N->>U: banner "Update vX available" [Update Now] [Later]
U->>N: Update Now
N->>N: banner → "Downloading update…"
N->>R: download_and_install_update (minisign verify + apply)
R-->>N: (success → relaunch())
else up to date / check failed
N->>N: no banner (or "Update failed. Try again." + Dismiss)
end
| State | Presentation |
|---|---|
| checking | Silent (no UI until a result) |
| available | Non-modal banner with version + Update Now / Later (already createUpdateNotifier()/showBanner(), components/UpdateNotifier.ts) |
| downloading | Banner "Downloading update… N%" (or "… N.N MB" until Content-Length is known) |
| applied | App relaunches automatically |
| failed | "Update failed. Please try again later." + Dismiss |
✅ Wired — download progress. The Rust download callback (
download_and_install_updateinupdate_commands.rs) accumulates received bytes and emits anupdate-progressevent ({ received, total }) to the webview.downloadAndInstallUpdate(serverUrl, onProgress)(updater.ts) listens for it and forwards toUpdateNotifier, whoseformatDownloadProgressrenders a percentage whentotalis known and falls back to bytes (MB) otherwise, so the banner never looks hung. (Rust change is minimal and CI-gated only.)
6. System tray
The tray icon (src-tauri/src/tray.rs) is a parallel presence/window surface:
Show/Hide toggles the main window, a Status submenu
(Online / Idle / Do Not Disturb / Offline) emits a status-change event that
the TS side applies through the same presence path as the user-bar picker
(lib/userStatus.ts / components/StatusPicker.ts), and Quit exits the
app.
Source of truth
src/components/SettingsOverlay.ts (+ settings/*), src/components/AdminActions.ts,
src/components/InviteManager.ts, CreateChannelModal.ts, EditChannelModal.ts,
DeleteChannelModal.ts, src/components/UpdateNotifier.ts, src/lib/updater.ts,
src/lib/api.ts, src/lib/themes.ts, src/lib/preferences.ts,
src/pages/main-page/SidebarArea.ts, SidebarMemberSection.ts,
OverlayManagers.ts, src-tauri/src/commands.rs, src-tauri/src/update_commands.rs;
server Server/admin/api.go, Server/api/profile_handler.go, totp_handler.go.