* refactor(protocol): retire reserved voice_speakers and member_leave (S-15) Neither type was ever emitted by the server; B2-1 clears them from the schema before the epoch-1 wire fixtures are captured, so the frozen epoch does not carry two dead message types. Client: dropped the dead `ws.on(MEMBER_LEAVE)` / `ws.on(VOICE_SPEAKERS)` dispatcher handlers, the `MemberLeavePayload` type and both `ServerMessage` union members, and the tests that only exercised those WS paths. `removeMember` (member_ban) and `setSpeakers` (LiveKit ActiveSpeakers) stay live and keep their direct unit tests. * test(ws): capture the epoch-1 wire fixtures alpha.4 is the last client on the pre-epoch wire and B2-2 adds a protocol epoch to the auth handshake next, so record what epoch 1 actually looks like while it is still observable. TestEpoch1Fixtures drives eleven journeys through the ws package's in-process hub harness (full migrations, real hub, httptest WebSocket server) and compares each journey's per-connection frame sequence with a transcript under protocol/fixtures/epoch-1/: - fresh-connect, auth-failure, ping - chat-send-fanout, chat-edit-delete, reaction-add-remove - typing, mark-read, dm-send - resume-replay (last_seq + buffer-tier replay burst) - voice-join-e2ee-leave (join, both voice_state forms, announce and offer relay, leave) Volatile values are replaced by typed placeholders before both writing and comparison -- any key that is id/seq/last_seq, ends in _id (except channel_id and role_id) or _at, is timestamp/ts/last_seen, or contains token, becomes "<class:json-type>" so a field that changes type is still a diff, while everything else is compared verbatim. Regenerate with: go test ./ws -run TestEpoch1Fixtures -update Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(client): pin the epoch-1 auth frame contract Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(updater): pin the epoch-1 manifest and client-update shapes * test(ws): harden the epoch-1 fixtures against trailing frames and absent optionals Every journey now ends with the ping/pong barrier on each recorded connection, so a frame the server emits after the last read fails as `expected "pong", got "X"` instead of going unrecorded; auth-failure asserts the StatusPolicyViolation close instead, its socket being gone. alice carries a display name, avatar, about text, custom status, identity public key and an announce signature (bob carries none), so every optional field is frozen in its present form as well as its absent one — a rename or a retype of display_name or identity_public_key now moves a fixture. The typing journey focuses the channel on "a" before typing: without the subscription registerNow only makes for a focused client, its ping/pong proved nothing about excludeUserID. Comment fixes: the escaped placeholder form MarshalIndent would write, the real (headroom) reason for the raised read limit, a note that bare id and active_channel_id are normalised by design, and a .prettierignore line saying these fixtures are verified by the Go comparison, not by git diff. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(protocol): document the epoch-1 fixtures * docs(protocol): match the epoch-1 wire where the fixtures contradicted the doc - voice_state: note the unsequenced relay-to-joiner form (table row + section) - auth_error: correct the example message and list the real rejection messages - member_join/presence connect example: add the seq both frames actually carry - chat_message.user: document display_name - voice_join reply order: state that the joiner's own voice_state broadcast is not ordered against the other three frames * test(ws): freeze the null forms of auth_ok and member_join user fields buildAuthOK emits display_name/about/custom_status/avatar as always-present nulls, but only alice — who has all four set — ever authenticated on a recorded connection, so the fixtures froze those fields in their populated form alone. A rename, a retype or a dropped null would have moved nothing, on the very frame B2-2 edits. fresh-connect now records bob's handshake too, on a second connection: his auth_ok carries the four nulls, his member_join carries avatar null with display_name and identity_public_key omitted, and alice — idle by then, so her reads stay in hub order — records the same pair as an already-connected observer sees it. In voice-join-e2ee-leave bob answers alice's signed announce with a legacy unsigned one, which freezes the absent form of signature next to her present one. The auth frames the test writes now carry the correlation id the real client stamps on every frame (ws.ts send()); normalisation renders it <id:string>. expectClosed also asserts the close reason ("authentication failed"), not just code 1008 — HP-2 asks for both. Comment precision, no behaviour change: the barrier guarantee now states that pong may overtake a pending LOW-priority frame (writePump) and that no journey is affected because every barrier is sent on an idle connection; the ping-budget ceiling is six connections, not four; the typing journey cites handleChannelFocusV2 rather than registerNow as the subscribe site; resume-replay's b barrier explains why moving it past the resume would be a flake, not a fix; and the header notes that normalisation hides that chat_send_ok.id echoes the request id. The client contract test's cited range for ws.ts's send() call is 441-453, not 441-454. Regenerate with: go test ./ws -run TestEpoch1Fixtures -update Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(protocol): shape-not-value fixture rule, voice_max_video default, auth close code The fixture rule read "a fixture may only change with an epoch bump", which is false for the seeded values the transcripts record verbatim: role permission masks and colours, motd, server_name, voice_max_video, the voice_config preset. A migration that changes a default mask diffs fresh-connect.json, and the README told the author to revert a change that never touched the wire. Split the rule along shape versus value. A key set, a JSON type, a key appearing or disappearing, or per-connection frame order is a protocol change and earns fixtures/epoch-<n+1>/. A seeded default value is a seed change: regenerate in the same PR and read the diff frame by frame. Normalising those values is explicitly not the answer — a placeholder over a mask or over an enum such as voice_config.threshold_mode would hide the drift the fixtures exist to catch. Two wire facts corrected against the fixtures: - voice_max_video on an unconfigured channel is 25, not 0 (migration 004 is DEFAULT 25); the doc listed it among the zero values. - auth_error is followed by a close with code 1008 (policy violation) and reason "authentication failed" (serve.go:128), which the doc left as "closes the connection". Also: voice_speakers moves from discord-parity's "still dead" list to "came off the list" — it was retired earlier on this branch. And Kick says sessions are revoked and sockets drop on the next sweep, which is what ForceLogout does (moderation.go:236); it does not cut sockets. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(protocol): fixture rule covers enum vocabularies; header comment precision Re-check minors from the whole-branch review: a fixed-vocabulary value the client switches on is shape, not a seeded value; drop the false 'new default channel' clause (the seed asserts channel ids); the low-priority frame is presence_update, not connect presence. * docs(plans): record B2-1 evidence for HP-2 (PR #1435, fixture commit SHAs) * docs(protocol): additive changes stay within an epoch; bump only for what old clients cannot process Codex review on #1435: B2-2 keeps protocol_epoch = 1 while adding auth/ready/auth_error fields, which the previous wording would have called a break to revert. An epoch is a compatibility boundary, not a snapshot: additive keys regenerate in the same PR and are documented; removals, renames, retypes, dropped frames and reordering bump the epoch. The plan's B2-1 evidence records the refinement and hands B2-2/B2-4 the open questions (additive-tolerant replay of the epoch-1 transcript; epoch 0 vs 1 naming). * test(client): compare auth-frame key sets order-independently Codex review on #1435: Object.keys preserves insertion order, so a harmless property reorder in ws.ts would fail the pin. Key order has no wire meaning; the Go fixtures already compare with sorted keys. Sort both sides. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
16 KiB
Voice, Video & E2EE — target UX
Verified against: commit 5630aa1, 2026-08-04
Part of the Client UX Specification. The signaling/crypto mechanics
are mapped structurally in ../voice-e2ee.md; this document
specifies the user-facing states and reactions.
Covers: joining/leaving voice, mute/deafen/camera/screenshare, push-to-talk, the active-speaker display, and — the main gap — the E2EE "securing / secured" indicators.
1. Two state machines, one status
Internally there are two FSMs:
- The WS connection FSM (
ws.ts:disconnected…connected) — the socket. - The voice session FSM (
livekitSession.ts:idle | connecting | connected | reconnecting) — the LiveKit room.
Plus the user-facing booleans in voice.store (localMuted, localDeafened,
localCamera, localScreenshare, listenOnly, joinedAt) and the per-user
roster (voiceUsers with per-user speaking/muted/deafened/camera/screenshare).
Target: expose the voice session as one observable voiceStatus the widgets
read — idle | joining | securing | connected | reconnecting — rather than
inferring it from isVoiceConnected() alone.
✓ Implemented (2026-07).
voice.store.voiceStatus(idle | joining | securing | connected | reconnecting) is now the observable voice-session status.livekitSession.tsis the single writer:joiningat the start ofconnectAndSetup,securingwhen the ECDH key exchange begins,connectedon the atomicconnectedtransition (both the initial join and a successful auto-reconnect),reconnectingwhen the room drops and the reconnect loop forms its state, andidleonleaveVoice.joinVoiceChannelseedsjoiningoptimistically on click so the widget reacts before thevoice_tokenround-trip. The VoiceWidget reads it to distinguish "connecting to the room" from "securing the encryption" from "reconnecting".failedis not a persisted status: an E2EE-timeout / connection error auto-leaves toidleand surfaces a toast viaonErrorCallback(§2).
2. Join / leave
stateDiagram-v2
idle --> joining: click voice channel → voice_join → voice_token
joining --> securing: room.connect ok, E2EE key exchange begins
securing --> connected: room key ready (holder generates / member receives)
securing --> failed: e2ee_timeout (no key within ~15s)
joining --> reconnecting: transient connect failure (retry ≤3)
connected --> reconnecting: socket/room drop
reconnecting --> connected: re-announce key + rejoin (≤2 attempts)
reconnecting --> failed: attempts exhausted
connected --> idle: leave
failed --> idle: auto-leave + error
| Status | Presentation | Notes |
|---|---|---|
joining |
Voice widget shows "Connecting…"; channel roster shows self pending | handleVoiceToken → connectAndSetup |
securing |
"Securing connection…" indicator (lock, in-progress) | Non-key-holders block here until a room key arrives (10 s + 5 s retry, the "securing" key-exchange block in connectAndSetup (lib/livekitSession.ts) / E2EEManager.setupKeyExchange (lib/livekitE2EE.ts)) |
connected |
"Voice connected · secured 🔒" + elapsed timer (from joinedAt) |
E2EE active; per-user tiles live |
reconnecting |
"Reconnecting voice…"; controls frozen, not torn down | Keypair regenerated for forward secrecy (attemptAutoReconnect() → reannounceForReconnect(), lib/livekitSession.ts) |
failed |
Toast "Voice connection lost" / "Couldn't secure the call"; auto-leave | onErrorCallback fires |
Target rules:
- The "connecting" vs "securing" distinction is user-visible: while a non-key-holder waits for the room key, show securing, not a generic spinner — an E2EE call that's still exchanging keys is not yet private.
- Leaving is immediate and local (
leaveVoice): tear down tracks, clear E2EE state, reset camera/screenshare,idle.
✓ Implemented (2026-07). The VoiceWidget header now renders the E2EE phase from
voiceStatus: a "Securing…" label (amber) while the key exchange runs and a persistent "🔒 Secured" badge once the room key is ready and the room is connected — replacing the log-line-only feedback.joiningshows "Connecting…" andreconnectingshows "Reconnecting voice…", neither showing the secured badge. An E2EE-timeout still surfaces its"e2ee_timeout"toast and auto-leaves (livekitSession.tsconnectAndSetup). Code vs. diagram note: the client actually runs the ECDH key exchange beforeroom.connect(), sosecuringspans the key wait and the media connect; the state diagram below draws them in the reverse order for readability. The distinction users see is unchanged: non-key-holders sit insecuringuntil a room key arrives.
3. Local controls
All four are optimistic with rollback; each also emits a WS control message.
| Control | Local state | WS message | Rollback |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mute | localMuted (setLocalMuted) — fully unpublishes the mic track |
voice_mute{muted} |
n/a (local-authoritative) |
| Deafen | localDeafened + forces mute — unsubscribes remote voice audio only; screen-share/stream audio keeps playing (it has its own per-tile mute/volume) |
voice_deafen + voice_mute |
implies mute |
| Camera | localCamera set optimistically, rolled back on device failure (enableCamera() in lib/screenShare.ts) |
voice_camera{enabled} |
revert on failure + toast |
| Screenshare | localScreenshare optimistic, rollback on failure (enableScreenshare() in lib/screenShare.ts); rate-limited |
voice_screenshare{enabled} |
revert + toast |
| Control state | Presentation |
|---|---|
| mic muted | Mic-slash icon on self tile + control bar |
| deafened | Headphone-slash; implies muted styling |
| listen-only | Badge "Listen only — no microphone" with a Retry mic affordance (retryMicPermission) |
| camera on | Self video tile in the grid |
| screenshare on | Screen tile; a stop-share affordance always visible |
| speaking | Green ring on the speaking user's tile/avatar (from LiveKit's ActiveSpeakers) |
Mic-permission failure (restoreLocalVoiceState): on denied/absent mic, set
listenOnly and surface the specific reason ("Microphone permission denied" /
"No microphone found") as a toast with a retry — already wired to
onErrorCallback (the mic-unavailable branches of restoreLocalVoiceState(), lib/livekitSession.ts); the spec makes the Retry mic
control a permanent part of the listen-only badge.
4. Push-to-talk
PTT is a Rust key-poller (ptt.rs, 20 ms) emitting ptt-state{pressed} →
setMuted(!pressed) only while in a channel (the ptt-state listener inside initPtt(), lib/ptt.ts). Target UX:
| State | Presentation |
|---|---|
| PTT bound, released | Muted; hint "Hold {key} to talk" |
| PTT pressed | Unmuted + speaking ring |
| binding a key | Keybinds tab: "Press a key…" (10 s capture window, ptt_listen_for_key); reject text keys with "Pick a non-text key" |
| PTT thread error | Toast "Push-to-talk stopped unexpectedly" on ptt-error, offer re-enable |
5. Voice roster (per channel)
The channel's voice roster renders from voiceUsers. Each participant tile
reflects their speaking/muted/deafened/camera/screenshare. Target:
| Signal | Tile reaction |
|---|---|
voice_state |
Add/update the participant with their flags |
voice_leave |
Remove the tile; if it's us (kick/disconnect), clear local voice state (already the voice_leave handler in wireDispatcher(), lib/dispatcher.ts) |
| key-holder change | Invisible to users (re-election is automatic on leave); no UI churn |
Per-user volume is adjustable and persisted (userVolume_{id} in the Rust store).
6. Token refresh & reconnect (invisible)
Token refresh (23 h timer) and voice reconnect (≤2 attempts, 3 s apart) should be invisible on success. Only exhaustion surfaces: "Voice connection lost — failed to reconnect" + auto-leave. The 60 s token-refresh response guard and the forward-secrecy keypair rotation on reconnect are mechanics the user never sees.
7. E2EE identity verification surface
Peer identity state lives in voice.store (per-participant
status: verified | unverified | mismatch + safetyNumber), written by
lib/livekitE2EE.ts as announces are verified against the pinned identity
keys (lib/identity.ts).
| State | Roster badge (verifyPresentation(), components/ChannelSidebar.ts) |
Interaction |
|---|---|---|
verified |
Green shield; title "Identity verified · Safety number: {n}" | none needed |
unverified |
Neutral shield; no pinned key yet | none — pins on first verified announce |
mismatch |
Red shield-alert; title "Identity key changed — click to review and re-pin" | Click → blocking identity-mismatch modal |
The mismatch modal (createIdentityMismatchModal(), components/CertMismatchModal.ts;
opened from openIdentityMismatchModal() in components/ChannelSidebar.ts) shows the new key's fingerprint so
the user can verify it out-of-band before trusting. "Trust New Key" re-pins
via rePinPeerIdentity — deliberately pinning the exact key whose fingerprint
was displayed, not a fresh store read, so a malicious server cannot swap the
key during the human verification window (TOCTOU). Reject leaves the peer
blocked for E2EE media. A stripped or malformed published key disables the
trust action entirely (a blind accept is refused).
8. Media processing & devices
- Noise suppression: RNNoise WASM worklet (
lib/noise-suppression.ts, assetspublic/rnnoise.wasm+public/rnnoise-worklet.js), toggled in Settings → Voice & Audio; falls back to a ScriptProcessorNode pipeline when AudioWorklet is unavailable (createScriptProcessorPipeline()inlib/noise-suppression.ts). - Input volume & VAD:
lib/audioPipeline.tsapplies input gain and voice-activity gating ahead of publish. - Device hot-swap:
lib/deviceManager.tsfollows OS device plug/unplug and re-routes the active input/output without rejoining. - Stream preview:
lib/streamPreview.tsrenders the pre-share preview in the screen-share picker.
9. DM calls (ring)
DM voice is the same voice machinery on the DM's voice channel, plus a ring layer (no server-side call state — presence in the DM voice channel is the call):
| Event | Reaction |
|---|---|
| Outgoing: user clicks Call | call_ring sent (rate-limited 1/3 s server-side); caller joins the DM voice channel |
Incoming: call_incoming |
components/IncomingCallBanner.ts banner + ring chime (lib/notifications.ts), driven by the lib/call-ring.ts state machine (30 s auto-timeout) |
| Accept | Join the DM voice channel; banner clears |
| Decline | call_decline sent → other participants' ringing stops via call_declined |
| Timeout / caller leaves | Banner clears silently |
call_incoming / call_declined are page-scoped listeners in MainPage.ts,
not dispatcher handlers (see README §4).
Source of truth
src/lib/livekitSession.ts, src/lib/livekitE2EE.ts,
src/stores/voice.store.ts, src/lib/screenShare.ts,
src/lib/ptt.ts, src/lib/roomEventHandlers.ts, src/components/VoiceWidget.ts,
src/components/ChannelSidebar.ts (voice rows, join freeze on WS reconnect,
and the E2EE verification badge), src/components/VideoGrid.ts,
src-tauri/src/livekit_proxy.rs, src-tauri/src/ptt.rs,
src/lib/e2eeCrypto.ts, src/lib/identity.ts; and the structural map in
../voice-e2ee.md.