Files
OwnCord/Server/ws/can_send_ready_test.go
J3vbandClaude Fable 5 6afa9e974c refactor(server): thread context.Context through the db layer and all callers
Fixes all 109 golangci-lint findings (106 contextcheck, 1 gocritic,
2 gosec) that accumulated after D2 wired dbgen (whose queries take ctx)
under ctx-less db.DB wrappers while CI lint was quota-dead. No nolint
comments added; every finding fixed by genuinely threading context.

- db: all 138 hand-written db.DB methods take ctx first; the dbCtx()
  Background shim is deleted; raw Query/QueryRow/Exec/Begin use their
  Context variants; the four redundant ctx-less passthroughs removed.
  db.Auditor/WriteAudit gain ctx.
- Seams: permissions.Checker (DB iface, HasChannelPerm,
  RequireChannelAccess) and the service.Store interface mirror the new
  signatures (ws.EventStore and plugin.PluginStore already did).
- Callers: api/admin handlers use r.Context(); ws per-message paths use
  the connection ctx via DispatchV2; hub loops and startup wiring use
  context.Background(); service methods thread ctx where they have one
  and Background where no ctx exists. Public service surface reached by
  ctx-holding chains (PermissionService.HasChannelPerm/GetRoleForUser/
  RequireChannelAccess, message/dm/block/invite/profile methods) is now
  ctx-first.
- Detached (context.WithoutCancel) where cancellation would break an
  invariant, found by a 3-lens adversarial review of the diff:
  * voice-leave background retries (a dead webhook/connection ctx killed
    retry 2 before it ran, leaving ghost capacity-holding voice rows)
  * rollbackVoiceJoin's compensating delete (its trigger IS the cancel)
  * post-2FA-change DeleteOtherSessions and logout DeleteSession (the
    security tail of a committed change must not die with the request)
  * all api/ws audit writes (a banned user could suppress their own
    login_blocked_banned row by aborting the request mid-bcrypt)
  * admin backup VACUUM INTO (an interrupt left a truncated .db that
    the backup list presented as restorable)
  * post-commit message/edit refetches (a committed message must still
    fan out when the sender disconnects)
  * hub settings-cache refresh (one dead connection could pin stale
    values for the 30s TTL)
- gocritic rangeValCopy fixed (index iteration); gosec G306 excluded in
  config with justification (generated source must stay world-readable)
  instead of flipping genprotocol output to 0o600.

Verified: gofmt/vet, all four build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock
pass, full -race pass, golangci-lint 0 issues uncapped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 17:03:52 +02:00

48 lines
1.3 KiB
Go

package ws_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"testing"
)
// TestBuildReady_IncludesCanSend confirms every ready channel carries the
// can_send affordance flag the client composer keys off.
func TestBuildReady_IncludesCanSend(t *testing.T) {
hub, database := newCoverageHub(t)
user := seedCoverageOwner(t, database, "cansend-user")
role, err := database.GetRoleByID(context.Background(), 1)
if err != nil || role == nil {
t.Fatalf("GetRoleByID: %v", err)
}
if _, err := database.CreateChannel(context.Background(), "general", "text", "", "", 0); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateChannel: %v", err)
}
msg, err := hub.BuildReadyWithRoleForTest(database, user.ID, role)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("BuildReadyWithRoleForTest: %v", err)
}
var env struct {
Payload struct {
Channels []map[string]any `json:"channels"`
} `json:"payload"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(msg, &env); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal: %v", err)
}
if len(env.Payload.Channels) == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected at least one channel")
}
for _, ch := range env.Payload.Channels {
canSend, ok := ch["can_send"]
if !ok {
t.Errorf("channel %v missing can_send", ch["name"])
continue
}
// Owner role → can_send true everywhere.
if canSend != true {
t.Errorf("channel %v can_send = %v, want true for owner", ch["name"], canSend)
}
}
}