mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
synced 2026-09-03 03:50:00 +03:00
* feat(auth): add revocable API tokens (bot/service auth) Add long-lived, revocable API tokens so headless clients (the introspection MCP tool, bots, CI) can authenticate without a password. Presented as "Authorization: Bearer <token>", a token authenticates as a specific user, inheriting that user's role and permissions. - migration 018 + dedicated api_tokens table (kept separate from sessions so bulk logout and the per-user session cap never touch these); only the SHA-256 hash is stored, raw token shown once at creation - auth.ResolveTokenHash: one shared bearer resolver that both AuthMiddleware and adminAuthMiddleware now call. Sessions are matched first so existing login behavior is unchanged; API tokens are a fallback only on session miss. A DB outage is returned wrapped, never mistaken for a bad token. - `server token create|list|revoke` CLI: mints directly against the DB with no HTTP and no login — the password-free bootstrap path - tests: resolver (8 cases incl. outage-not-fallthrough), db queries (6), api middleware integration (valid + revoked token) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(tools): add owncord-introspect MCP server A local MCP dev tool that lets Claude Code introspect a running OwnCord instance: read its logs, query any REST endpoint, and tail the desktop client's log file. It is a thin wrapper over the existing API plus the client log — no new product surface. - tools/mcp-introspect/index.mjs (Node/ESM, one dep: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk) exposes api_request (full read-write passthrough), server_logs (admin SSE ring-buffer stream), client_logs (reads the desktop log file) - authenticates with an API token (OWNCORD_API_TOKEN); pins the self-signed cert and skips hostname checks (the cert has no SAN) - registered in .mcp.json (secret-free ${OWNCORD_API_TOKEN}) - un-ignore tools/mcp-introspect/ so this shared dev tool is committed, while tools/livekit-server.exe and node_modules stay ignored - docs/mcp-introspect.md: how it works, tool reference, setup, troubleshooting Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(dependencies): update and add various crate versions in Cargo.lock * feat(admin): manage API tokens from the admin panel Add Owner-gated HTTP endpoints and a UI card to create, list, and revoke API tokens from the web admin panel. Previously only the `server token` CLI could manage them, which requires shell access to the host. - POST|GET|DELETE /admin/api/tokens in admin/handlers_tokens.go, wired in admin/api.go. All three are Owner-only (ownerOnlyMiddleware, like backups/updates): an HTTP token-mint endpoint is a network-reachable credential-minting surface, and API tokens deliberately survive password change + bulk logout, so a hijacked admin session must not mint one. - Reuses the same db.*APIToken calls as the CLI; create sources the actor from request context (audits who clicked, not the bound user); the raw token is returned once in the 201 body, never stored. - Add json tags to db.APITokenListItem for snake_case wire consistency. - Admin panel: "API Tokens" nav item + create modal, show-once reveal, revoke confirm in admin/static/index.html. - Tests: 7 in admin/api_test.go (+api_tokens table in the in-memory schema). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: modernize to Go 1.26 idioms + enable modernize linter Apply `golangci-lint modernize` autofixes across the server and enable the linter in .golangci.yml so these stop re-accumulating (they built up only because modernize was never in the config). Production code: slices.Contains for hand-rolled membership loops (api router, ws origin, db/account, plugin manifest); strings.SplitSeq for allocation-free line/segment iteration (db/migrate, updater, livekit_proxy); strings.Cut (config); fmt.Appendf (dm_handler); min() (event_pruner); any (ws client). Tests: range-over-int, t.Context(), WaitGroup.Go, slices.Sort, maps.Copy, new(expr), interface{}->any. - plugin/manifest.go parent-traversal check applied by hand: modernize skipped it (two conflicting rewrites); used the slices.Contains form. - Removed the now-dead ptr() test helper after newexpr inlined its callers. - Dropped dangling sort imports left by the sort.Slice->slices.Sort rewrite. No behavior change. All four tag variants build, full test suite is green, and golangci-lint (with modernize enabled) reports 0 issues. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
83 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
83 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
package auth
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"errors"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/owncord/server/db"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// tokenStore is the DB surface bearer-token resolution needs. *db.DB satisfies
|
|
// it directly; tests use a fake. Kept as a tiny interface (like db.Auditor) so
|
|
// the security-critical resolution logic is unit-testable without a real DB.
|
|
type tokenStore interface {
|
|
GetSessionByTokenHash(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) (*db.Session, error)
|
|
GetActiveAPIToken(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) (*db.APIToken, error)
|
|
GetUserByID(ctx context.Context, id int64) (*db.User, error)
|
|
GetRoleByID(ctx context.Context, id int64) (*db.Role, error)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Sentinel outcomes, so each caller can reproduce its existing 401/403 responses
|
|
// exactly. A DB outage is NOT one of these — it surfaces as a wrapped error.
|
|
var (
|
|
ErrTokenNotFound = errors.New("auth: no matching session or api token")
|
|
ErrTokenExpired = errors.New("auth: session expired")
|
|
ErrUserNotFound = errors.New("auth: user not found")
|
|
ErrRoleNotFound = errors.New("auth: role not found")
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// ResolveTokenHash resolves a hashed bearer token to its principal (user + role).
|
|
//
|
|
// It matches a login session FIRST — so every existing session code path is
|
|
// preserved byte-for-byte — and only falls through to an API token when no
|
|
// session row matches. The returned *db.Session is nil for an API-token
|
|
// principal (downstream consumers already guard a nil session).
|
|
//
|
|
// A DB error is returned WRAPPED (never a sentinel) so callers can distinguish
|
|
// an outage from a bad token and never fall through to API-token lookup on an
|
|
// outage. On ErrTokenExpired the matched (expired) session is returned so the
|
|
// caller can schedule its cleanup by hash, exactly as the api middleware does today.
|
|
func ResolveTokenHash(ctx context.Context, store tokenStore, hash string) (*db.User, *db.Role, *db.Session, error) {
|
|
sess, err := store.GetSessionByTokenHash(ctx, hash)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, err // DB outage — do not fall through to API tokens
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var userID int64
|
|
switch {
|
|
case sess != nil:
|
|
if IsSessionExpired(sess.ExpiresAt) {
|
|
return nil, nil, sess, ErrTokenExpired
|
|
}
|
|
userID = sess.UserID
|
|
default:
|
|
tok, err := store.GetActiveAPIToken(ctx, hash)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if tok == nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, ErrTokenNotFound
|
|
}
|
|
userID = tok.UserID
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
user, err := store.GetUserByID(ctx, userID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if user == nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, ErrUserNotFound
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A dangling role_id returns (nil, nil): the nil check is load-bearing so a
|
|
// nil role never reaches the context and every downstream permission check.
|
|
role, err := store.GetRoleByID(ctx, user.RoleID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if role == nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, ErrRoleNotFound
|
|
}
|
|
return user, role, sess, nil
|
|
}
|