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J3vbandClaude Fable 5
6afa9e974c
Fixes all 109 golangci-lint findings (106 contextcheck, 1 gocritic,
2 gosec) that accumulated after D2 wired dbgen (whose queries take ctx)
under ctx-less db.DB wrappers while CI lint was quota-dead. No nolint
comments added; every finding fixed by genuinely threading context.
- db: all 138 hand-written db.DB methods take ctx first; the dbCtx()
Background shim is deleted; raw Query/QueryRow/Exec/Begin use their
Context variants; the four redundant ctx-less passthroughs removed.
db.Auditor/WriteAudit gain ctx.
- Seams: permissions.Checker (DB iface, HasChannelPerm,
RequireChannelAccess) and the service.Store interface mirror the new
signatures (ws.EventStore and plugin.PluginStore already did).
- Callers: api/admin handlers use r.Context(); ws per-message paths use
the connection ctx via DispatchV2; hub loops and startup wiring use
context.Background(); service methods thread ctx where they have one
and Background where no ctx exists. Public service surface reached by
ctx-holding chains (PermissionService.HasChannelPerm/GetRoleForUser/
RequireChannelAccess, message/dm/block/invite/profile methods) is now
ctx-first.
- Detached (context.WithoutCancel) where cancellation would break an
invariant, found by a 3-lens adversarial review of the diff:
* voice-leave background retries (a dead webhook/connection ctx killed
retry 2 before it ran, leaving ghost capacity-holding voice rows)
* rollbackVoiceJoin's compensating delete (its trigger IS the cancel)
* post-2FA-change DeleteOtherSessions and logout DeleteSession (the
security tail of a committed change must not die with the request)
* all api/ws audit writes (a banned user could suppress their own
login_blocked_banned row by aborting the request mid-bcrypt)
* admin backup VACUUM INTO (an interrupt left a truncated .db that
the backup list presented as restorable)
* post-commit message/edit refetches (a committed message must still
fan out when the sender disconnects)
* hub settings-cache refresh (one dead connection could pin stale
values for the 30s TTL)
- gocritic rangeValCopy fixed (index iteration); gosec G306 excluded in
config with justification (generated source must stay world-readable)
instead of flipping genprotocol output to 0o600.
Verified: gofmt/vet, all four build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock
pass, full -race pass, golangci-lint 0 issues uncapped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
84 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
84 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"slices"
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"testing"
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"github.com/owncord/server/db"
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)
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// pwStore wraps a real *db.DB with controllable DeleteOtherSessions behavior
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// and audit capture, so the committed-password partial-success contract (W2-2)
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// is testable. Embedding *db.DB satisfies the service Store interface; the two
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// overridden methods intercept the calls the contract turns on while every
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// other call (UpdateUserPassword, GetUserByID) hits the real database.
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type pwStore struct {
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*db.DB
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failRevokes int // number of DeleteOtherSessions calls that fail before succeeding
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revokeCalls int
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audits []string
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}
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func (f *pwStore) DeleteOtherSessions(_ context.Context, _, _ int64) (int64, error) {
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f.revokeCalls++
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if f.revokeCalls <= f.failRevokes {
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return 0, errors.New("session table locked")
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}
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return 2, nil
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}
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func (f *pwStore) LogAudit(_ context.Context, _ int64, action, _ string, _ int64, _ string) error {
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f.audits = append(f.audits, action)
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return nil
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}
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// TestChangePassword_RevokeFailureIsPartialSuccess locks the W2-2 contract:
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// once the password is committed, revocation failure must never surface as an
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// error (the old password is dead; a "failed" report walks the user into the
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// confirm lockout), and the audit row must still be written.
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func TestChangePassword_RevokeFailureIsPartialSuccess(t *testing.T) {
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database := newTestDB(t)
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seedUser(t, database, &db.User{ID: 7, Username: "pat", PasswordHash: "oldhash"})
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fs := &pwStore{DB: database, failRevokes: 99}
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svc := NewUserService(fs)
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res, err := svc.ChangePassword(context.Background(), 7, "newhash", 1)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("committed password change must not return an error: %v", err)
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}
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if !res.RevokeFailed {
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t.Fatal("RevokeFailed should be set when revocation keeps failing")
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}
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if u, _ := database.GetUserByID(context.Background(), 7); u.PasswordHash != "newhash" {
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t.Fatal("password should be committed")
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}
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if !slices.Contains(fs.audits, "password_change") {
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t.Fatal("audit row must be written even when revocation fails")
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}
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}
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// TestChangePassword_RetryRecoversRevocation: a single transient revocation
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// failure is absorbed by the bounded compensating retry.
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func TestChangePassword_RetryRecoversRevocation(t *testing.T) {
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database := newTestDB(t)
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seedUser(t, database, &db.User{ID: 7, Username: "pat", PasswordHash: "oldhash"})
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fs := &pwStore{DB: database, failRevokes: 1}
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svc := NewUserService(fs)
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res, err := svc.ChangePassword(context.Background(), 7, "newhash", 1)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ChangePassword: %v", err)
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}
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if res.RevokeFailed {
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t.Fatal("retry should have recovered the revocation")
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}
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if res.SessionsRevoked != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("SessionsRevoked = %d, want 2", res.SessionsRevoked)
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}
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if fs.revokeCalls != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("expected exactly one retry (2 calls), got %d", fs.revokeCalls)
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}
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}
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