Files
OwnCord/Server/api/plugins_handler.go
T
J3vbandClaude Fable 5 2b2d58abc1 feat(b2-6): safe audit coverage (S-02) (#1441)
* docs(b2-6): enumerate the security-sensitive mutations and their audit coverage

Step 1 of B2-6: the mutation inventory crossed with the 43 non-test
Audit( call sites at 67fdd18d, recorded in the plan's evidence block.
Invite create/revoke (S-02) and plugin install/uninstall have no audit
row; no timeout mutation exists (kick is force_logout / voice_mod_kick).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu

* added new doc

* docs(audit): update changelog and security documentation to include admin panel actions in audit log

* feat(b2-6): audit every security-sensitive mutation, invite and plugin rows first (S-02)

Step 2 of B2-6. TestAuditCoverage_* in service, api and admin drive each
mutation from the plan's inventory against a fake db.AuditStore
(Server/db/audittest) and assert the expected action arrives. Red before
this commit on exactly four rows: invite_create, invite_revoke,
plugin_install, plugin_uninstall.

- InviteService writes invite_create / invite_revoke naming the invite by
  id, never by code; RevokeInvite now takes the actor, threaded from the
  handler. A failed revoke writes nothing (test).
- The plugin admin handler takes a db.Auditor and writes plugin_install /
  plugin_uninstall against the RequireAdminAuth principal
  (admin.ActorIDFromContext, exported for that).
- docs/security.md lists the four new actions; CHANGELOG under Unreleased.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu

* test(b2-6): denylist over the recorded audit detail corpus

Step 3 of B2-6. Each TestAuditCoverage_* table now ends with a subtest
that runs audittest.AssertSafeDetails over every entry its rows recorded:
a shape denylist (bcrypt/argon2 hashes, password=/token=/secret=/
recovery-code key-value leaks, otpauth URIs, Bearer credentials) plus the
fixture's own secrets (raw tokens, passwords and hashes, TOTP secrets and
codes, invite codes, message bodies). audittest_test.go proves each class
bites and that ordinary details pass. Zero hits on the corpus at HEAD, so
no call site needed changing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu

* docs(b2-6): record pre-squash SHAs, red/green and denylist evidence

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu

* fix(b2-6): audit committed invites on a canceled request; 404 unknown plugin uninstall

Codex P2s on #1441, both test-first:
- CreateInvite read the invite back on the request context, so a cancel
  after the insert committed returned an error and skipped invite_create.
  The read-back and audit now run on context.WithoutCancel, like the
  password-change tail. TestCreateInvite_AuditSurvivesCanceledLookup.
- Registry.UninstallPlugin is idempotent on an unknown id, so the handler
  wrote plugin_uninstall for plugins that never existed. It now checks the
  row first: 404 and no audit. TestPluginsHandlerUninstallUnknownID.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu

* docs(b2-6): record the Codex review outcome on #1441

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 11:11:37 +02:00

277 lines
9.4 KiB
Go

// Phase C Step 9 — Plugin admin REST surface.
//
// All endpoints are mounted under the existing AdminIPRestrict group so they
// inherit the same network ACL as the rest of the admin panel. Authentication
// is handled by the admin handler's middleware before this handler runs.
package api
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"errors"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/admin"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/db"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/plugin"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
)
// maxPluginUploadBytes caps the multipart upload at 16 MiB to match the
// plugin.maxZipBytes ceiling. The handler enforces both layers because the
// outer MaxBytesReader gives a clean 413 instead of a partial extract.
const maxPluginUploadBytes = 16 * 1024 * 1024
// PluginAdminHandler exposes plugin lifecycle operations to the admin panel.
type PluginAdminHandler struct {
registry *plugin.Registry
store plugin.PluginStore
audit db.Auditor // nil disables audit writes (unit tests)
}
// NewPluginAdminHandler builds an http.Handler that the router can mount.
// Pass a nil registry when plugin support is disabled — the handler then
// reports an empty list and 503 on lifecycle calls.
func NewPluginAdminHandler(registry *plugin.Registry, st plugin.PluginStore, audit db.Auditor) http.Handler {
h := &PluginAdminHandler{registry: registry, store: st, audit: audit}
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Get("/", h.list)
r.Post("/install", h.install)
r.Post("/{id}/enable", h.enable)
r.Post("/{id}/disable", h.disable)
r.Delete("/{id}", h.uninstall)
return r
}
// install accepts a multipart upload with a single "plugin" file part
// containing a .zip. The zip is validated (zip-slip safe, no symlinks,
// uncompressed total capped, manifest required at root) and installed via
// Registry.InstallFromZip. Returns 201 with the new plugin name on success.
func (h *PluginAdminHandler) install(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if h.registry == nil {
http.Error(w, "plugin runtime disabled", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
// Hard cap on the request body before parsing multipart so a hostile
// client can't tie up parsing memory.
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxPluginUploadBytes+1024)
if err := r.ParseMultipartForm(maxPluginUploadBytes); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "invalid multipart upload", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
file, header, err := r.FormFile("plugin")
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "missing 'plugin' file part", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
defer file.Close() //nolint:errcheck
// Reject obviously-wrong uploads early. The real defence is the zip
// reader inside InstallFromZip (content-type is client-supplied and must
// never be trusted for authorisation), but rejecting non-zip MIME types
// here returns a cleaner 400 than a "not a valid zip" error from deep
// inside the registry.
if header != nil {
if ct := header.Header.Get("Content-Type"); ct != "" && !isZipContentType(ct) {
http.Error(w, "plugin upload must be a .zip archive", http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType)
return
}
}
// Read the entire zip into memory — InstallFromZip needs an io.ReaderAt
// for archive/zip and the cap is small enough to be safe.
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(file, maxPluginUploadBytes+1))
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "failed to read upload", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if int64(len(body)) > maxPluginUploadBytes {
http.Error(w, "plugin upload too large", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
return
}
// Magic-byte check: a real .zip starts with "PK\x03\x04" (local file
// header) or "PK\x05\x06" (empty archive). Anything else is definitively
// not a zip regardless of what the client labelled it.
if !hasZipMagic(body) {
http.Error(w, "plugin upload is not a valid zip archive", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
name, err := h.registry.InstallFromZip(r.Context(), body)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("plugin install failed", "error", err)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "INSTALL_FAILED",
Message: "plugin installation failed",
})
return
}
h.writeAudit(r, "plugin_install", h.installedID(r.Context(), name), name)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, map[string]any{"name": name})
}
func (h *PluginAdminHandler) list(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
// An empty list means "nothing installed" on a server with the runtime on,
// and "you can't install anything" on a server with it off. The caller
// can't tell those apart from the body, so say which it is — otherwise the
// admin panel's empty state has to guess.
w.Header().Set("X-Plugin-Runtime", pluginRuntimeState(h.registry))
if h.store == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, []any{})
return
}
rows, err := h.store.ListPlugins(ctx)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("plugin list failed", "error", err)
http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, rows)
}
func (h *PluginAdminHandler) enable(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
id, ok := parsePluginID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
if h.registry == nil {
http.Error(w, "plugin runtime disabled", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
if err := h.registry.EnablePlugin(r.Context(), id); err != nil {
slog.Error("plugin enable failed", "id", id, "error", err)
http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
func (h *PluginAdminHandler) disable(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
id, ok := parsePluginID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
if h.registry == nil {
http.Error(w, "plugin runtime disabled", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
if err := h.registry.DisablePlugin(r.Context(), id); err != nil {
slog.Error("plugin disable failed", "id", id, "error", err)
http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
func (h *PluginAdminHandler) uninstall(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
id, ok := parsePluginID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
if h.registry == nil {
http.Error(w, "plugin runtime disabled", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
// Registry.UninstallPlugin is idempotent on an unknown id, so check the
// row here: a stale or repeated delete must answer 404 and must not
// record a plugin_uninstall that never happened.
if h.store != nil {
if _, err := h.store.GetPlugin(r.Context(), id); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
http.Error(w, "plugin not found", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
slog.Error("plugin lookup failed", "id", id, "error", err)
http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
}
if err := h.registry.UninstallPlugin(r.Context(), id); err != nil {
slog.Error("plugin uninstall failed", "id", id, "error", err)
http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
h.writeAudit(r, "plugin_uninstall", id, "")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// writeAudit records a plugin lifecycle mutation (B2-6) against the admin
// principal RequireAdminAuth put on the request. A nil auditor (unit tests
// that only exercise the HTTP surface) records nothing.
func (h *PluginAdminHandler) writeAudit(r *http.Request, action string, pluginID int64, detail string) {
if h.audit == nil {
return
}
db.WriteAudit(context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()), h.audit, admin.ActorIDFromContext(r.Context()),
action, "plugin", pluginID, detail)
}
// installedID resolves a freshly installed plugin's row id for its audit
// entry; 0 when the store cannot answer (the name in detail still identifies it).
func (h *PluginAdminHandler) installedID(ctx context.Context, name string) int64 {
if h.store == nil {
return 0
}
row, err := h.store.GetPluginByName(ctx, name)
if err != nil || row == nil {
return 0
}
return row.ID
}
// pluginRuntimeState reports whether lifecycle calls will work, for the
// X-Plugin-Runtime response header. A nil registry means plugin support is
// compiled/configured off and every lifecycle endpoint answers 503.
func pluginRuntimeState(registry *plugin.Registry) string {
if registry == nil {
return "disabled"
}
return "enabled"
}
// isZipContentType reports whether ct looks like a zip MIME type. Both the
// IANA-registered application/zip and the legacy application/x-zip-compressed
// (used by some Windows clients) are accepted. The comparison is case-
// insensitive and strips any parameters after a semicolon.
func isZipContentType(ct string) bool {
for i := 0; i < len(ct); i++ {
if ct[i] == ';' {
ct = ct[:i]
break
}
}
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(ct)) {
case "application/zip", "application/x-zip-compressed", "application/octet-stream":
return true
}
return false
}
// hasZipMagic reports whether b begins with the PK signature used by every
// .zip archive. Empty archives use 0x50,0x4b,0x05,0x06; non-empty archives
// start with a local file header 0x50,0x4b,0x03,0x04. Both are accepted.
func hasZipMagic(b []byte) bool {
if len(b) < 4 {
return false
}
if b[0] != 'P' || b[1] != 'K' {
return false
}
return (b[2] == 0x03 && b[3] == 0x04) || (b[2] == 0x05 && b[3] == 0x06)
}
func parsePluginID(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (int64, bool) {
idStr := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(idStr, 10, 64)
if err != nil || id <= 0 {
http.Error(w, "invalid plugin id", http.StatusBadRequest)
return 0, false
}
return id, true
}