Files
OwnCord/Server/admin/setup_handler.go
T
J3vbandClaude Fable 5 6afa9e974c refactor(server): thread context.Context through the db layer and all callers
Fixes all 109 golangci-lint findings (106 contextcheck, 1 gocritic,
2 gosec) that accumulated after D2 wired dbgen (whose queries take ctx)
under ctx-less db.DB wrappers while CI lint was quota-dead. No nolint
comments added; every finding fixed by genuinely threading context.

- db: all 138 hand-written db.DB methods take ctx first; the dbCtx()
  Background shim is deleted; raw Query/QueryRow/Exec/Begin use their
  Context variants; the four redundant ctx-less passthroughs removed.
  db.Auditor/WriteAudit gain ctx.
- Seams: permissions.Checker (DB iface, HasChannelPerm,
  RequireChannelAccess) and the service.Store interface mirror the new
  signatures (ws.EventStore and plugin.PluginStore already did).
- Callers: api/admin handlers use r.Context(); ws per-message paths use
  the connection ctx via DispatchV2; hub loops and startup wiring use
  context.Background(); service methods thread ctx where they have one
  and Background where no ctx exists. Public service surface reached by
  ctx-holding chains (PermissionService.HasChannelPerm/GetRoleForUser/
  RequireChannelAccess, message/dm/block/invite/profile methods) is now
  ctx-first.
- Detached (context.WithoutCancel) where cancellation would break an
  invariant, found by a 3-lens adversarial review of the diff:
  * voice-leave background retries (a dead webhook/connection ctx killed
    retry 2 before it ran, leaving ghost capacity-holding voice rows)
  * rollbackVoiceJoin's compensating delete (its trigger IS the cancel)
  * post-2FA-change DeleteOtherSessions and logout DeleteSession (the
    security tail of a committed change must not die with the request)
  * all api/ws audit writes (a banned user could suppress their own
    login_blocked_banned row by aborting the request mid-bcrypt)
  * admin backup VACUUM INTO (an interrupt left a truncated .db that
    the backup list presented as restorable)
  * post-commit message/edit refetches (a committed message must still
    fan out when the sender disconnects)
  * hub settings-cache refresh (one dead connection could pin stale
    values for the 30s TTL)
- gocritic rangeValCopy fixed (index iteration); gosec G306 excluded in
  config with justification (generated source must stay world-readable)
  instead of flipping genprotocol output to 0o600.

Verified: gofmt/vet, all four build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock
pass, full -race pass, golangci-lint 0 issues uncapped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 17:03:52 +02:00

179 lines
6.0 KiB
Go

package admin
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/microcosm-cc/bluemonday"
"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
"github.com/owncord/server/db"
)
// setupSanitizer strips all HTML from user input during setup.
var setupSanitizer = bluemonday.StrictPolicy()
// ownerRoleID is the role ID assigned to the first user (Owner).
const ownerRoleID = 1
// setupStatusResponse is the JSON shape returned by GET /api/setup/status.
type setupStatusResponse struct {
NeedsSetup bool `json:"needs_setup"`
}
// setupRequest is the JSON body for POST /api/setup.
type setupRequest struct {
Username string `json:"username"`
Password string `json:"password"`
}
// setupResponse is the JSON shape returned on successful setup.
type setupResponse struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
UserID int64 `json:"user_id"`
Username string `json:"username"`
InviteCode string `json:"invite_code"`
}
// handleSetupStatus returns whether initial setup is needed (no users exist).
func handleSetupStatus(database *db.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
count, err := database.UserCount(r.Context())
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to check user count")
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, setupStatusResponse{NeedsSetup: count == 0})
}
}
// handleSetup creates the first owner account. It only works when no users
// exist in the database, preventing abuse after initial setup.
func handleSetup(database *db.DB, limiter *auth.RateLimiter, allowedOrigins []string) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// CSRF protection: reject cross-origin requests (BUG-097).
// If Origin is present and doesn't match allowed origins, deny.
// No Origin header = same-origin or non-browser client (allow).
if origin := r.Header.Get("Origin"); origin != "" {
if !isSetupOriginAllowed(origin, allowedOrigins) {
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "cross-origin setup request blocked")
return
}
}
// Rate limit: 5 attempts per minute per IP.
// Strip the port so that different source ports from the same IP
// are correctly grouped under a single rate-limit bucket.
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
host = r.RemoteAddr
}
setupKey := "setup:" + host
if !limiter.Allow(setupKey, 5, time.Minute) {
writeErr(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "RATE_LIMITED", "too many setup attempts, try again later")
return
}
var req setupRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", "invalid request body")
return
}
req.Username = strings.TrimSpace(setupSanitizer.Sanitize(req.Username))
if req.Username == "" || req.Password == "" {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", "username and password are required")
return
}
// Validate username format (length, no control/invisible chars).
if err := auth.ValidateUsername(req.Username); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", err.Error())
return
}
if err := auth.ValidatePasswordStrength(req.Password); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", err.Error())
return
}
// Hash the password.
hash, err := auth.HashPassword(req.Password)
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to hash password")
return
}
// Atomically check no users exist and create the owner (BUG-119).
// This closes the TOCTOU race between UserCount() and CreateUser().
uid, err := database.CreateOwnerIfEmpty(r.Context(), req.Username, hash, ownerRoleID)
if errors.Is(err, db.ErrConflict) {
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "setup has already been completed")
return
}
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to create user")
return
}
// Issue a session token so the user is immediately logged in.
token, err := auth.GenerateToken()
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to generate session token")
return
}
device := r.Header.Get("User-Agent")
const maxDeviceLen = 512
if len(device) > maxDeviceLen {
device = device[:maxDeviceLen]
}
if _, err := database.CreateSession(r.Context(), uid, auth.HashToken(token), device, host); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to create session")
return
}
// Create default channels under canonical categories.
_, _ = database.CreateChannel(r.Context(), "general", "text", "Text Channels", "Welcome to the server!", 0)
_, _ = database.CreateChannel(r.Context(), "General", "voice", "Voice Channels", "", 0)
// Generate a bootstrap invite code so the owner can invite others.
// Bound it (5 uses / 24h) rather than minting an unlimited, non-expiring
// invite — the owner can create fresh invites once logged in.
bootstrapInviteExpiry := time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour)
inviteCode, err := database.CreateInvite(r.Context(), uid, 5, &bootstrapInviteExpiry)
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to generate invite code")
return
}
slog.Info("server setup completed", "owner", req.Username, "user_id", uid)
db.WriteAudit(context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()), database, uid, "server_setup", "server", 0,
"initial setup: owner account created, default channel and invite generated")
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, setupResponse{
Token: token,
UserID: uid,
Username: req.Username,
InviteCode: inviteCode,
})
}
}
// isSetupOriginAllowed checks if the given origin is permitted by the
// configured allowed_origins list. Wildcard "*" allows any origin.
// An empty list denies all cross-origin requests (safe default).
func isSetupOriginAllowed(origin string, allowed []string) bool {
for _, a := range allowed {
if a == "*" || strings.EqualFold(a, origin) {
return true
}
}
return false
}