mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
synced 2026-09-03 03:50:00 +03:00
* fix(admin): reject banned users in admin auth (F1) adminAuthMiddleware accepted a Bearer token on session validity plus the ADMINISTRATOR bit alone and never consulted ban state, so a ban never revoked admin-panel access. Adds the auth.IsEffectivelyBanned guard that api.AuthMiddleware already uses, at both admin credential-resolution points. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ws): gate the voice-channel text subscription on READ_MESSAGES (F2) registerNow subscribed any client with voice state to that channel's text-message topic regardless of READ_MESSAGES. The handshake's already-computed readable-channel set is now passed into registerNow and the subscription only happens when the voice channel is in it, preserving authorized reconnect delivery. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(service): require READ_MESSAGES to delete messages (F4) The non-DM delete gate checked MANAGE_MESSAGES without READ_MESSAGES, so a role locked out of a private channel could still delete every message in it. Requires ReadMessages alongside ManageMessages (and alongside SendMessages on the author path) and derives the mod flag from that same gate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(service): require READ_MESSAGES alongside MANAGE_MESSAGES in SetMessagePinned (F8) Pin/unpin checked only MANAGE_MESSAGES, so a role denied READ on a private channel could still pin and unpin its messages. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(service): enforce the DM block at every DM interaction sink (F5) The DM block was only checked on send, leaving edit, reactions, pins and typing as bypasses. One shared requireDMNotBlocked is now called from all of them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ws): re-check CONNECT_VOICE when minting a refreshed LiveKit token (F6) voice_token_refresh re-minted a LiveKit token without re-checking CONNECT_VOICE, so a revoked permission kept working for the life of the session. The permission is now re-checked where the token is minted, and a 60s sweep evicts participants whose permission was revoked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ws): rate-limit voice_e2ee_offer after validation, keyed on server state (F7) The limiter key was built from unvalidated client input, letting an attacker grow the limiter map without bound. The limiter now runs after validation and keys on (sender, voiceChannelID), never on client input. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ws): deliver voice_state/voice_leave only to roles that may read the channel (F9) Voice state of private channels was broadcast to every connected client, leaking channel membership. All 11 emit sites now route through one READ-filtered fan-out, channel-tagged so replay filters too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): redact the LiveKit access token from proxy dial-failure logs (F10) A dial failure wrote the LiveKit access-token JWT into the server log via the URL in the error. redactKey now runs on the error before it reaches slog. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): reserve the [deleted-N] username namespace (F11, F12) The tombstone username namespace used by account deletion was freely registrable, letting a user impersonate a deleted account. The namespace is now reserved at validation, and DeleteAccount retries with a random suffix on collision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): strip Unicode format characters from upload filenames (F13) The attachment filename sanitizer stripped control characters but not unicode.Cf, allowing bidi-override extension spoofing. Cf is now stripped alongside controls and foreign path separators are cut. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): reserve the login attempt before the bcrypt compare (F3) The per-username lockout was a read-only IsLockedOut check followed by a failure recorded only after the ~250ms bcrypt compare, so N concurrent requests all passed the stale check before any of them recorded a failure. The per-username cap is the only cross-IP brute-force defence (the middleware limits per IP), so a distributed burst landed N guesses per 15-minute window instead of 10. Both counters are now reserved atomically with limiter.Allow before the compare, and the lockout decision moves to the read-only limiter.Check so the reservation is not double-counted. The limits are sized at threshold+1, which leaves the sequential accepted-input set byte-identical to the previous behaviour: failures 1-10 still land, the 10th still trips the lockout, and the account owner's correct password on attempt 10 still returns 200. Sizing at threshold instead would make 9 cheap wrong guesses convert the victim's own correct password into a 15-minute lockout - the regression that got two earlier attempts at this fix rejected, now pinned by a boundary test. Deliberately scoped to handleLogin. The report also suggested widening to the password-confirmation endpoints, but those are authenticated, share a single pw_confirm_fail key across the TOTP endpoints, and widening there is what got the first attempt rejected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(deps): bump five Rust dependencies in /Client/tauri-client/src-tauri Rolls up dependabot #1259, #1260, #1261, #1262 and #1263: tauri-build 2.5.6 -> 2.6.3 tauri-plugin-fs 2.4.5 -> 2.5.1 tauri-plugin-http 2.5.7 -> 2.5.9 tauri-plugin-store 2.4.2 -> 2.4.4 webpki-roots 1.0.6 -> 1.0.9 All five are lockfile-only; the manifest constraints already permitted the new versions. The five PRs each rewrote overlapping regions of the same Cargo.lock and so could not be merged independently, so the lockfile was regenerated with cargo update --precise for each crate instead. The combined result is smaller than the sum of the five diffs because they share transitive updates. Verified with cargo check --locked --all-targets (exit 0). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(deps): bump typescript-eslint from 8.58.0 to 8.65.0 in /Client/tauri-client Dependabot #1258. 8.65.0 improves @typescript-eslint/no-unnecessary-type-assertion, which surfaces four assertions that were already redundant and now fail the lint gate. They are removed here rather than in a follow-up so no commit in this branch leaves `npm run lint` red: UserBar.ts / members.store.ts "online" as UserStatus -> "online" (the receiver already accepts the literal) media.ts drops `as RequestInit` on a literal that is already assignable LoginForm.ts drops `as { message: unknown }` made redundant by the `"message" in err` narrowing All four are the rule's own autofix. Verified: npm run typecheck, npm run lint, npm run format:check all clean, and the unit suite is 3572/3572 green across 129 files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1381 lines
49 KiB
Go
1381 lines
49 KiB
Go
package api_test
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"image"
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"image/color"
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"image/png"
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"io"
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"mime/multipart"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"testing/fstest"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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"github.com/owncord/server/api"
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"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
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"github.com/owncord/server/db"
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"github.com/owncord/server/permissions"
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"github.com/owncord/server/service"
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"github.com/owncord/server/storage"
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)
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// testPermSvc wires a PermissionService around the test DB so
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// MountUploadRoutes can enforce its non-nil contract. The tests don't
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// exercise per-channel ACLs directly — they go through the live
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// permissions.Checker, which is the production path anyway.
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func testPermSvc(database *db.DB) *service.PermissionService {
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return service.NewPermissionService(database, permissions.NewChecker(database))
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}
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// ─── schema for upload tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
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var uploadTestSchema = []byte(`
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS roles (
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id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
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name TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
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color TEXT,
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permissions INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
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position INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
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is_default INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
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);
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INSERT OR IGNORE INTO roles (id, name, color, permissions, position, is_default) VALUES
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(1, 'Owner', '#E74C3C', 2147483647, 100, 0),
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(2, 'Admin', '#F39C12', 1073741823, 80, 0),
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(3, 'Moderator', '#3498DB', 1048575, 60, 0),
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(4, 'Member', NULL, 1635, 40, 1);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (
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id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
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username TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE COLLATE NOCASE,
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password TEXT NOT NULL,
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avatar TEXT,
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role_id INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 4 REFERENCES roles(id),
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totp_secret TEXT,
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status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'offline',
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created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
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last_seen TEXT,
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banned INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
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ban_reason TEXT,
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ban_expires TEXT,
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identity_public_key TEXT
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS sessions (
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id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
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user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
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token TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
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device TEXT,
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ip_address TEXT,
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created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
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last_used TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
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expires_at TEXT NOT NULL
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);
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CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_token ON sessions(token);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS channels (
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id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
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name TEXT NOT NULL,
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type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'text',
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category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
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topic TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
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position INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
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slow_mode INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
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archived INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
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created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
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voice_max_users INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS messages (
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id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
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channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id),
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user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id),
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content TEXT NOT NULL,
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created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
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edited_at TEXT,
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deleted INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS attachments (
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id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
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message_id INTEGER,
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filename TEXT NOT NULL,
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stored_as TEXT NOT NULL,
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mime_type TEXT NOT NULL,
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size INTEGER NOT NULL,
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uploaded_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
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width INTEGER,
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height INTEGER,
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uploader_id INTEGER REFERENCES users(id)
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS dm_participants (
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user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id),
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channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id),
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opened INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
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PRIMARY KEY (user_id, channel_id)
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS channel_overrides (
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channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id),
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role_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES roles(id),
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allow INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
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deny INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
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PRIMARY KEY (channel_id, role_id)
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS settings (
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key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
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value TEXT NOT NULL
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);
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INSERT OR IGNORE INTO settings (key, value) VALUES
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('server_name', 'OwnCord Server'),
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('motd', 'Welcome!');
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`)
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// ─── helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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func newUploadTestDB(t *testing.T) *db.DB {
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t.Helper()
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database, err := db.Open(":memory:")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("db.Open: %v", err)
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() { _ = database.Close() })
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migrFS := fstest.MapFS{"001_schema.sql": {Data: uploadTestSchema}}
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if err := db.MigrateFS(database, migrFS); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("MigrateFS: %v", err)
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}
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return database
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}
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func newUploadTestStorage(t *testing.T) *storage.Storage {
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t.Helper()
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dir := t.TempDir()
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store, err := storage.New(dir, 10) // 10 MB max
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("storage.New: %v", err)
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}
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return store
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}
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func buildUploadRouter(database *db.DB, store *storage.Storage, allowedOrigins []string) http.Handler {
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r := chi.NewRouter()
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limiter := auth.NewRateLimiter()
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api.MountUploadRoutes(r, database, store, limiter, allowedOrigins, testPermSvc(database))
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return r
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}
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func buildUploadRouterWithLimiter(database *db.DB, store *storage.Storage, limiter *auth.RateLimiter, allowedOrigins []string) http.Handler {
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r := chi.NewRouter()
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if limiter == nil {
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limiter = auth.NewRateLimiter()
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}
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api.MountUploadRoutes(r, database, store, limiter, allowedOrigins, testPermSvc(database))
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return r
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}
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// uploadCreateToken creates a user+session and returns the plaintext token.
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func uploadCreateToken(t *testing.T, database *db.DB, username string, roleID int) string {
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t.Helper()
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_, err := database.CreateUser(context.Background(), username, "$2a$12$fake", roleID)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("CreateUser %q: %v", username, err)
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}
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token := "upload-test-token-" + username
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hash := auth.HashToken(token)
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_, err = database.ExecContext(context.Background(),
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`INSERT INTO sessions (user_id, token, device, ip_address, expires_at)
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SELECT id, ?, 'test', '127.0.0.1', '2099-01-01T00:00:00Z' FROM users WHERE username = ?`,
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hash, username,
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("insert session for %q: %v", username, err)
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}
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return token
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}
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// makeMultipartFile builds a multipart form body with a single "file" field.
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func makeMultipartFile(t *testing.T, fieldName, filename string, content []byte) (*bytes.Buffer, string) {
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t.Helper()
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body := &bytes.Buffer{}
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writer := multipart.NewWriter(body)
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part, err := writer.CreateFormFile(fieldName, filename)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("CreateFormFile: %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := io.Copy(part, bytes.NewReader(content)); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("writing file part: %v", err)
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}
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if err := writer.Close(); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("closing multipart writer: %v", err)
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}
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return body, writer.FormDataContentType()
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}
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// makePNGBytes generates a small valid PNG image and returns its raw bytes.
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func makePNGBytes(t *testing.T, width, height int) []byte {
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t.Helper()
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img := image.NewRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, width, height))
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for y := range height {
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for x := range width {
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img.Set(x, y, color.RGBA{R: 255, G: 0, B: 0, A: 255})
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}
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}
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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if err := png.Encode(&buf, img); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("png.Encode: %v", err)
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}
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return buf.Bytes()
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}
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func doUpload(t *testing.T, router http.Handler, token, fieldName, filename string, content []byte) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
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t.Helper()
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body, contentType := makeMultipartFile(t, fieldName, filename, content)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/uploads", body)
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", contentType)
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if token != "" {
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
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}
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req.RemoteAddr = "127.0.0.1:9999"
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rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
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router.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
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return rr
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}
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func doServeFile(t *testing.T, router http.Handler, fileID, token string, headers map[string]string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
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t.Helper()
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/files/"+fileID, nil)
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if token != "" {
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
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}
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for k, v := range headers {
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req.Header.Set(k, v)
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}
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req.RemoteAddr = "127.0.0.1:9999"
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rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
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router.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
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return rr
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}
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// ─── MountUploadRoutes ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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func TestUpload_RoutesAreMounted(t *testing.T) {
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database := newUploadTestDB(t)
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store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
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router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
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token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "routeuser", 1)
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// POST /api/v1/uploads should not return 404/405.
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body, contentType := makeMultipartFile(t, "file", "test.txt", []byte("hello"))
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/uploads", body)
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", contentType)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
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req.RemoteAddr = "127.0.0.1:9999"
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rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
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router.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
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if rr.Code == http.StatusNotFound || rr.Code == http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
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t.Errorf("POST /api/v1/uploads returned %d, route not mounted", rr.Code)
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}
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// GET /api/v1/files/{id} should not return 405 (401 or 404 are valid).
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req2 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/files/some-id", nil)
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req2.RemoteAddr = "127.0.0.1:9999"
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rr2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
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router.ServeHTTP(rr2, req2)
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if rr2.Code == http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
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t.Errorf("GET /api/v1/files/{id} returned 405, route not mounted")
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}
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}
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// ─── handleUpload ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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func TestUpload_Success_TextFile(t *testing.T) {
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database := newUploadTestDB(t)
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store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
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router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
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token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "uploader1", 1)
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content := []byte("hello world this is a text file with enough bytes for detection")
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rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "notes.txt", content)
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if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
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t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 201; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
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}
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var resp map[string]any
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if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode response: %v", err)
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}
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if resp["filename"] != "notes.txt" {
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t.Errorf("filename = %v, want notes.txt", resp["filename"])
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}
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if resp["url"] == nil || resp["url"] == "" {
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t.Error("expected non-empty url in response")
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}
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if resp["id"] == nil || resp["id"] == "" {
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t.Error("expected non-empty id in response")
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}
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if resp["mime"] == nil || resp["mime"] == "" {
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t.Error("expected non-empty mime in response")
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}
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// Verify attachment record was created in DB.
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att, err := database.GetAttachmentByID(context.Background(), resp["id"].(string))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("GetAttachmentByID: %v", err)
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}
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if att == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected attachment record in DB, got nil")
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}
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if att.Filename != "notes.txt" {
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t.Errorf("DB filename = %q, want notes.txt", att.Filename)
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}
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}
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func TestUpload_Success_PNGImage(t *testing.T) {
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database := newUploadTestDB(t)
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store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
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router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
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token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "imguploader", 1)
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pngData := makePNGBytes(t, 16, 8)
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rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "image.png", pngData)
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if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
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t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 201; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
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}
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var resp map[string]any
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if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode response: %v", err)
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}
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if resp["mime"] != "image/png" {
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t.Errorf("mime = %v, want image/png", resp["mime"])
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}
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// Image upload should include dimensions.
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if resp["width"] == nil {
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t.Error("expected width for image upload")
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}
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if resp["height"] == nil {
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t.Error("expected height for image upload")
|
|
}
|
|
if int(resp["width"].(float64)) != 16 {
|
|
t.Errorf("width = %v, want 16", resp["width"])
|
|
}
|
|
if int(resp["height"].(float64)) != 8 {
|
|
t.Errorf("height = %v, want 8", resp["height"])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestUpload_Unauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, "", "file", "test.txt", []byte("hello"))
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 401", rr.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestUpload_InvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, "invalid-token-123", "file", "test.txt", []byte("hello"))
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 401", rr.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestUpload_MissingFileField(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "nofield", 1)
|
|
|
|
// Upload with wrong field name "attachment" instead of "file".
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "attachment", "test.txt", []byte("hello world"))
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 400; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("decode response: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if resp["message"] != "missing file field" {
|
|
t.Errorf("message = %v, want 'missing file field'", resp["message"])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestUpload_InvalidMultipartForm(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "badform", 1)
|
|
|
|
// Send a request with Content-Type claiming multipart but with a plain body.
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/uploads", bytes.NewReader([]byte("not multipart")))
|
|
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "multipart/form-data; boundary=nonexistent")
|
|
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
|
|
req.RemoteAddr = "127.0.0.1:9999"
|
|
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
router.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
|
|
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 400; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestUpload_BlockedFileType_Executable(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "exeuploader", 1)
|
|
|
|
// PE executable starts with "MZ".
|
|
exeContent := append([]byte("MZ"), make([]byte, 100)...)
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "malware.exe", exeContent)
|
|
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 400; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("decode response: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
msg, _ := resp["message"].(string)
|
|
if msg == "" {
|
|
t.Error("expected non-empty error message for blocked file type")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestUpload_BlockedFileType_ShellScript(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "shuploader", 1)
|
|
|
|
// Shell script starts with "#!".
|
|
shContent := []byte("#!/bin/bash\necho hello\n")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "script.sh", shContent)
|
|
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 400; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestUpload_BlockedFileType_ELF(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "elfuploader", 1)
|
|
|
|
// ELF binary starts with \x7fELF.
|
|
elfContent := append([]byte("\x7fELF"), make([]byte, 100)...)
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "binary", elfContent)
|
|
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 400; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestUpload_RateLimitedAfterBurst(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
limiter := auth.NewRateLimiter()
|
|
router := buildUploadRouterWithLimiter(database, store, limiter, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "burstuser", 1)
|
|
otherToken := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "otherburstuser", 1)
|
|
content := []byte("upload payload with enough bytes for content type detection")
|
|
|
|
for range 10 {
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "burst.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("pre-limit upload status = %d, want 201; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "burst.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
|
|
t.Fatalf("rate-limited upload status = %d, want 429; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("decode rate-limit response: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if resp["error"] != "RATE_LIMITED" {
|
|
t.Errorf("error = %v, want RATE_LIMITED", resp["error"])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rr = doUpload(t, router, otherToken, "file", "burst.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("other user upload status = %d, want 201; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestUpload_OversizedFileRejected(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
dir := t.TempDir()
|
|
store, err := storage.New(dir, 1)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("storage.New: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "largeupload", 1)
|
|
content := bytes.Repeat([]byte("a"), (1<<20)+1)
|
|
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "too-large.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
|
|
t.Fatalf("oversized upload status = %d, want 400; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("decode oversized response: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
message, _ := resp["message"].(string)
|
|
if !strings.Contains(message, "file exceeds maximum size") {
|
|
t.Fatalf("message = %q, want size rejection", message)
|
|
}
|
|
if resp["error"] != "BAD_REQUEST" {
|
|
t.Errorf("error = %v, want BAD_REQUEST", resp["error"])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestUpload_DBCreateAttachmentFailureDeletesStoredFile(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
dir := t.TempDir()
|
|
store, err := storage.New(dir, 10)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("storage.New: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "dbfailupload", 1)
|
|
|
|
if _, err := database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `DROP TABLE attachments`); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("drop attachments table: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
content := []byte("content that will save to disk before attachment insert fails")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "cleanup.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload status = %d, want 500; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("decode db failure response: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if resp["error"] != "INTERNAL_ERROR" {
|
|
t.Errorf("error = %v, want INTERNAL_ERROR", resp["error"])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ReadDir: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(entries) != 0 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected stored file cleanup on DB failure, found %d entries", len(entries))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestUpload_SanitizesReservedFilenameToUnnamed(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "sanitizeupload", 1)
|
|
content := []byte("content for reserved filename sanitization")
|
|
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", ".", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 201; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("decode response: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if resp["filename"] != "unnamed" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("filename = %v, want unnamed", resp["filename"])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
att, err := database.GetAttachmentByID(context.Background(), resp["id"].(string))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("GetAttachmentByID: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if att == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("expected attachment record in DB, got nil")
|
|
}
|
|
if att.Filename != "unnamed" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("DB filename = %q, want unnamed", att.Filename)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestUpload_StripsBidiOverrideAndForeignSeparator locks the two gaps in
|
|
// sanitizeUploadFilename. The sanitizer filtered ASCII control bytes only, so
|
|
// U+202E RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE survived into attachments.filename and was
|
|
// reflected to every other member of the channel — and into the native save
|
|
// dialog the client pre-fills — making a script display as though it ended in
|
|
// ".txt". Separately, filepath.Base only strips the server OS's separator, so a
|
|
// backslash survived on a Linux server and is a path separator on the victim's
|
|
// Windows client.
|
|
func TestUpload_StripsBidiOverrideAndForeignSeparator(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Escaped rather than embedded: a literal U+202E would reorder this source
|
|
// file in every editor and terminal that renders it — which is the whole
|
|
// primitive under test.
|
|
const rtlOverride = "\u202e"
|
|
|
|
cases := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
upload string
|
|
wantName string
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "bidi override removed",
|
|
upload: "Q3_Report" + rtlOverride + "txt.bat",
|
|
wantName: "Q3_Reporttxt.bat",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "other invisible formatting characters removed",
|
|
upload: "in\u200bvoice\u2066.pdf", // ZERO WIDTH SPACE, LEFT-TO-RIGHT ISOLATE
|
|
wantName: "invoice.pdf",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "backslash path stripped regardless of server OS",
|
|
upload: `..\..\Windows\evil.bat`,
|
|
wantName: "evil.bat",
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tc := range cases {
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "bidi"+strings.ReplaceAll(tc.name, " ", ""), 1)
|
|
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", tc.upload, []byte("@echo off\r\n"))
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 201; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("decode response: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
got, _ := resp["filename"].(string)
|
|
if got != tc.wantName {
|
|
t.Errorf("filename = %q, want %q", got, tc.wantName)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The stored record must match — it is what every other client renders.
|
|
att, err := database.GetAttachmentByID(context.Background(), resp["id"].(string))
|
|
if err != nil || att == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("GetAttachmentByID: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if att.Filename != tc.wantName {
|
|
t.Errorf("DB filename = %q, want %q", att.Filename, tc.wantName)
|
|
}
|
|
if strings.ContainsAny(att.Filename, "\\/") {
|
|
t.Errorf("stored filename %q still contains a path separator", att.Filename)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestUpload_SuccessfulUploadCreatesDBRecord(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "dbcheck", 1)
|
|
|
|
content := []byte("some file content for database record verification test")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "dbtest.txt", content)
|
|
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 201; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp)
|
|
|
|
fileID := resp["id"].(string)
|
|
att, err := database.GetAttachmentByID(context.Background(), fileID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("GetAttachmentByID: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if att == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("expected attachment record in DB")
|
|
}
|
|
if att.Filename != "dbtest.txt" {
|
|
t.Errorf("filename = %q, want dbtest.txt", att.Filename)
|
|
}
|
|
if att.Size != int64(len(content)) {
|
|
t.Errorf("size = %d, want %d", att.Size, len(content))
|
|
}
|
|
// message_id should be nil (unlinked upload).
|
|
if att.MessageID != nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("message_id = %v, want nil (unlinked)", att.MessageID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestUpload_ResponseFields(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "respfields", 1)
|
|
|
|
content := []byte("response field validation content data")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "fields.dat", content)
|
|
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 201; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// All required fields should be present.
|
|
requiredFields := []string{"id", "filename", "size", "mime", "url"}
|
|
for _, field := range requiredFields {
|
|
if resp[field] == nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("missing required field %q in response", field)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// URL should contain the file ID.
|
|
url, _ := resp["url"].(string)
|
|
id, _ := resp["id"].(string)
|
|
expectedURL := "/api/v1/files/" + id
|
|
if url != expectedURL {
|
|
t.Errorf("url = %q, want %q", url, expectedURL)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Non-image files should not have width/height.
|
|
if resp["width"] != nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected nil width for non-image, got %v", resp["width"])
|
|
}
|
|
if resp["height"] != nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected nil height for non-image, got %v", resp["height"])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ─── handleServeFile ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_Success(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "serve1", 1)
|
|
|
|
// Upload a file first.
|
|
content := []byte("served file content with enough bytes for mime detection")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "served.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload status = %d, want 201; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var uploadResp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&uploadResp)
|
|
fileID := uploadResp["id"].(string)
|
|
|
|
// Serve the file (uploader is also the requester — allowed for unlinked files).
|
|
rr2 := doServeFile(t, router, fileID, token, nil)
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Fatalf("serve status = %d, want 200; body: %s", rr2.Code, rr2.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify content type header is set.
|
|
ct := rr2.Header().Get("Content-Type")
|
|
if ct == "" {
|
|
t.Error("expected Content-Type header on served file")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify cache control header. Access-controlled downloads must be marked
|
|
// private + no-cache so shared/proxy caches never store them (info-leak).
|
|
cc := rr2.Header().Get("Cache-Control")
|
|
if cc != "private, no-cache" {
|
|
t.Errorf("Cache-Control = %q, want 'private, no-cache'", cc)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify Content-Disposition header.
|
|
cd := rr2.Header().Get("Content-Disposition")
|
|
if cd == "" {
|
|
t.Error("expected Content-Disposition header on served file")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_Success_PNG(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "servepng", 1)
|
|
|
|
pngData := makePNGBytes(t, 4, 4)
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "icon.png", pngData)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload status = %d, want 201; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var uploadResp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&uploadResp)
|
|
fileID := uploadResp["id"].(string)
|
|
|
|
rr2 := doServeFile(t, router, fileID, token, nil)
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Fatalf("serve status = %d, want 200", rr2.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ct := rr2.Header().Get("Content-Type")
|
|
if ct != "image/png" {
|
|
t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want image/png", ct)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "notfounduser", 1)
|
|
|
|
rr := doServeFile(t, router, "nonexistent-uuid-12345", token, nil)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 404", rr.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_EmptyID(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
|
|
// Request to /api/v1/files/ with no ID should 404 (chi won't match the route).
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/files/", nil)
|
|
req.RemoteAddr = "127.0.0.1:9999"
|
|
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
router.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
|
|
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 404", rr.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_CORS_MatchingOrigin(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, []string{"https://app.example.com"})
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "corsuser", 1)
|
|
|
|
// Upload a file.
|
|
content := []byte("cors test file content with sufficient length for detection")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "cors.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload: %d; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
var uploadResp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&uploadResp)
|
|
fileID := uploadResp["id"].(string)
|
|
|
|
// Serve with matching origin.
|
|
rr2 := doServeFile(t, router, fileID, token, map[string]string{
|
|
"Origin": "https://app.example.com",
|
|
})
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Fatalf("serve status = %d, want 200", rr2.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
acao := rr2.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")
|
|
if acao != "https://app.example.com" {
|
|
t.Errorf("ACAO = %q, want https://app.example.com", acao)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_CORS_NonMatchingOrigin(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, []string{"https://app.example.com"})
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "corsmismatch", 1)
|
|
|
|
content := []byte("cors non-matching test file content with sufficient length")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "cors2.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload: %d", rr.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
var uploadResp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&uploadResp)
|
|
fileID := uploadResp["id"].(string)
|
|
|
|
rr2 := doServeFile(t, router, fileID, token, map[string]string{
|
|
"Origin": "https://evil.example.com",
|
|
})
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Fatalf("serve status = %d, want 200", rr2.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
acao := rr2.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")
|
|
if acao != "" {
|
|
t.Errorf("ACAO should be empty for non-matching origin, got %q", acao)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_CORS_WildcardOrigin(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, []string{"*"})
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "corswildcard", 1)
|
|
|
|
content := []byte("wildcard cors test file content with sufficient length")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "wild.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload: %d", rr.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
var uploadResp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&uploadResp)
|
|
fileID := uploadResp["id"].(string)
|
|
|
|
rr2 := doServeFile(t, router, fileID, token, map[string]string{
|
|
"Origin": "https://anything.example.com",
|
|
})
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Fatalf("serve status = %d, want 200", rr2.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
acao := rr2.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")
|
|
if acao != "https://anything.example.com" {
|
|
t.Errorf("ACAO = %q, want https://anything.example.com for wildcard", acao)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_CORS_NoOriginHeader(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, []string{"*"})
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "corsnoorigin", 1)
|
|
|
|
content := []byte("no origin header test file content with sufficient length")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "noorigin.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload: %d", rr.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
var uploadResp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&uploadResp)
|
|
fileID := uploadResp["id"].(string)
|
|
|
|
// No Origin header — CORS headers should not be set.
|
|
rr2 := doServeFile(t, router, fileID, token, nil)
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Fatalf("serve status = %d, want 200", rr2.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
acao := rr2.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")
|
|
if acao != "" {
|
|
t.Errorf("ACAO should be empty when no Origin sent, got %q", acao)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_DBRecordMissing_ReturnsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "dbmissing", 1)
|
|
|
|
// No file uploaded — DB has no record.
|
|
rr := doServeFile(t, router, "aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee", token, nil)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 404", rr.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_StorageFileMissing_ReturnsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "storemissing", 1)
|
|
|
|
// Upload a file, then delete it from storage.
|
|
content := []byte("file that will be deleted from storage backend")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "vanish.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload: %d; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
var uploadResp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&uploadResp)
|
|
fileID := uploadResp["id"].(string)
|
|
|
|
// Delete the file from storage directly.
|
|
if err := store.Delete(fileID); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("store.Delete: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Serve should return 404 because the file is missing from disk.
|
|
rr2 := doServeFile(t, router, fileID, token, nil)
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 404 for missing storage file", rr2.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ─── Table-driven tests for blocked file types ──────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
func TestUpload_BlockedFileTypes(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
filename string
|
|
content []byte
|
|
}{
|
|
{"PE executable", "test.exe", append([]byte("MZ"), make([]byte, 50)...)},
|
|
{"ELF binary", "test.bin", append([]byte("\x7fELF"), make([]byte, 50)...)},
|
|
{"Mach-O 64-bit", "test.macho", append([]byte("\xcf\xfa\xed\xfe"), make([]byte, 50)...)},
|
|
{"Mach-O 32-bit", "test.macho32", append([]byte("\xce\xfa\xed\xfe"), make([]byte, 50)...)},
|
|
{"shell script", "test.sh", []byte("#!/bin/bash\necho hello\n")},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tc := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, fmt.Sprintf("blocked_%s", tc.name), 1)
|
|
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", tc.filename, tc.content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 400 for %s; body: %s", rr.Code, tc.name, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ─── End-to-end upload then serve round-trip ────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
func TestUpload_ThenServe_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "roundtrip", 1)
|
|
|
|
content := []byte("round trip test content for full upload and serve cycle")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "roundtrip.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload: %d; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var uploadResp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&uploadResp)
|
|
fileID := uploadResp["id"].(string)
|
|
url := uploadResp["url"].(string)
|
|
|
|
// Serve using the URL from the upload response.
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, url, nil)
|
|
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
|
|
req.RemoteAddr = "127.0.0.1:9999"
|
|
rr2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
router.ServeHTTP(rr2, req)
|
|
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Fatalf("serve status = %d, want 200", rr2.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify the served content matches what was uploaded.
|
|
servedBody := rr2.Body.Bytes()
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(servedBody, content) {
|
|
t.Errorf("served content length = %d, want %d", len(servedBody), len(content))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_ = fileID // used above
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestUpload_ThenServe_PNG_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "pngrt", 1)
|
|
|
|
pngData := makePNGBytes(t, 32, 32)
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "test.png", pngData)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload: %d; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var uploadResp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&uploadResp)
|
|
url := uploadResp["url"].(string)
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, url, nil)
|
|
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
|
|
req.RemoteAddr = "127.0.0.1:9999"
|
|
rr2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
router.ServeHTTP(rr2, req)
|
|
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Fatalf("serve: %d", rr2.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
if rr2.Header().Get("Content-Type") != "image/png" {
|
|
t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want image/png", rr2.Header().Get("Content-Type"))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify served bytes match original.
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(rr2.Body.Bytes(), pngData) {
|
|
t.Error("served PNG bytes differ from uploaded bytes")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ─── Access Control Tests (BUG-092) ────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_Unauthenticated_Returns401(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "acl401uploader", 1)
|
|
|
|
// Upload a file.
|
|
content := []byte("private file content for unauthenticated access test")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "private.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload: %d; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp)
|
|
fileID := resp["id"].(string)
|
|
|
|
// Request without auth token.
|
|
rr2 := doServeFile(t, router, fileID, "", nil)
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 401 for unauthenticated file request", rr2.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_UnlinkedFile_UploaderCanAccess(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "acluploader", 1)
|
|
|
|
content := []byte("file owned by uploader for ownership access test")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "mine.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload: %d; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp)
|
|
fileID := resp["id"].(string)
|
|
|
|
// Uploader can access their own unlinked file.
|
|
rr2 := doServeFile(t, router, fileID, token, nil)
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 200 for uploader accessing own file", rr2.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_UnlinkedFile_OtherUserForbidden(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
uploaderToken := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "aclowner", 4) // Member role
|
|
otherToken := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "aclother", 4) // Member role
|
|
|
|
content := []byte("private file content for other-user forbidden test")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, uploaderToken, "file", "secret.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload: %d; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp)
|
|
fileID := resp["id"].(string)
|
|
|
|
// Other user cannot access unlinked file.
|
|
rr2 := doServeFile(t, router, fileID, otherToken, nil)
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 403 for other user accessing unlinked file", rr2.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_AdminBypassesAllChecks(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
uploaderToken := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "acluploaderadmin", 4) // Member
|
|
adminToken := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "acladmin", 1) // Owner (admin)
|
|
|
|
content := []byte("file for admin bypass test content with sufficient bytes")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, uploaderToken, "file", "restricted.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload: %d; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp)
|
|
fileID := resp["id"].(string)
|
|
|
|
// Admin can access any file regardless of ownership.
|
|
rr2 := doServeFile(t, router, fileID, adminToken, nil)
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 200 for admin bypass", rr2.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_LinkedToGuildChannel_MemberWithPerm(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "guildmember", 4) // Member role (perms=1635, includes ReadMessages=0x0002)
|
|
|
|
// Upload a file.
|
|
content := []byte("guild channel attachment content for permission test")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token, "file", "guild.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload: %d; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp)
|
|
fileID := resp["id"].(string)
|
|
|
|
// Create a guild channel and link the attachment via a message.
|
|
_, err := database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO channels (id, name, type) VALUES (1, 'general', 'text')`)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("insert channel: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
// Get the uploader's user ID.
|
|
var userID int64
|
|
if err := database.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = 'guildmember'`).Scan(&userID); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("get user id: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO messages (id, channel_id, user_id, content) VALUES (1, 1, ?, 'test')`, userID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("insert message: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `UPDATE attachments SET message_id = 1 WHERE id = ?`, fileID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("link attachment: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Member with ReadMessages should be able to access.
|
|
rr2 := doServeFile(t, router, fileID, token, nil)
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 200 for guild member with READ_MESSAGES", rr2.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_LinkedToGuildChannel_MemberWithoutPerm(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
uploaderToken := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "guilduploader2", 1) // Owner (to upload)
|
|
memberToken := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "guildnoperm", 4) // Member
|
|
|
|
// Upload a file.
|
|
content := []byte("guild channel attachment content for denied permission test")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, uploaderToken, "file", "restricted.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload: %d; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp)
|
|
fileID := resp["id"].(string)
|
|
|
|
// Create channel and link.
|
|
_, err := database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO channels (id, name, type) VALUES (1, 'secret', 'text')`)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("insert channel: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
var uploaderID int64
|
|
if err := database.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = 'guilduploader2'`).Scan(&uploaderID); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("get user id: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO messages (id, channel_id, user_id, content) VALUES (1, 1, ?, 'test')`, uploaderID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("insert message: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `UPDATE attachments SET message_id = 1 WHERE id = ?`, fileID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("link attachment: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
// Deny ReadMessages (0x0002) for role 4 (Member) on channel 1.
|
|
_, err = database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO channel_overrides (channel_id, role_id, allow, deny) VALUES (1, 4, 0, 2)`)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("insert channel_override: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Member without ReadMessages should get 403.
|
|
rr2 := doServeFile(t, router, fileID, memberToken, nil)
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 403 for guild member without READ_MESSAGES", rr2.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_LinkedToDM_ParticipantAllowed(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token1 := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "dmalice", 4)
|
|
_ = uploadCreateToken(t, database, "dmbob", 4)
|
|
|
|
// Upload a file.
|
|
content := []byte("dm attachment content for participant access test")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token1, "file", "dm.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload: %d; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp)
|
|
fileID := resp["id"].(string)
|
|
|
|
// Create DM channel, add participants, link attachment.
|
|
_, err := database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO channels (id, name, type) VALUES (1, 'dm-1', 'dm')`)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("insert channel: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
var aliceID, bobID int64
|
|
_ = database.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = 'dmalice'`).Scan(&aliceID)
|
|
_ = database.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = 'dmbob'`).Scan(&bobID)
|
|
_, _ = database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO dm_participants (user_id, channel_id) VALUES (?, 1)`, aliceID)
|
|
_, _ = database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO dm_participants (user_id, channel_id) VALUES (?, 1)`, bobID)
|
|
_, _ = database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO messages (id, channel_id, user_id, content) VALUES (1, 1, ?, 'hi')`, aliceID)
|
|
_, _ = database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `UPDATE attachments SET message_id = 1 WHERE id = ?`, fileID)
|
|
|
|
// DM participant can access.
|
|
rr2 := doServeFile(t, router, fileID, token1, nil)
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 200 for DM participant", rr2.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestServeFile_LinkedToDM_NonParticipantForbidden(t *testing.T) {
|
|
database := newUploadTestDB(t)
|
|
store := newUploadTestStorage(t)
|
|
router := buildUploadRouter(database, store, nil)
|
|
token1 := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "dmowner", 4)
|
|
_ = uploadCreateToken(t, database, "dmpartner", 4)
|
|
outsiderToken := uploadCreateToken(t, database, "dmoutsider", 4)
|
|
|
|
// Upload a file.
|
|
content := []byte("dm attachment content for non-participant forbidden test")
|
|
rr := doUpload(t, router, token1, "file", "dmsecret.txt", content)
|
|
if rr.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("upload: %d; body: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp)
|
|
fileID := resp["id"].(string)
|
|
|
|
// Create DM channel with two participants (not the outsider).
|
|
_, err := database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO channels (id, name, type) VALUES (1, 'dm-1', 'dm')`)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("insert channel: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
var ownerID, partnerID int64
|
|
_ = database.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = 'dmowner'`).Scan(&ownerID)
|
|
_ = database.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = 'dmpartner'`).Scan(&partnerID)
|
|
_, _ = database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO dm_participants (user_id, channel_id) VALUES (?, 1)`, ownerID)
|
|
_, _ = database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO dm_participants (user_id, channel_id) VALUES (?, 1)`, partnerID)
|
|
_, _ = database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO messages (id, channel_id, user_id, content) VALUES (1, 1, ?, 'hi')`, ownerID)
|
|
_, _ = database.ExecContext(context.Background(), `UPDATE attachments SET message_id = 1 WHERE id = ?`, fileID)
|
|
|
|
// Non-participant gets 403.
|
|
rr2 := doServeFile(t, router, fileID, outsiderToken, nil)
|
|
if rr2.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 403 for DM non-participant", rr2.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|