Files
OwnCord/Server/main.go
T
J3vbandClaude Opus 5 39551de4a6 refactor(server): work off the complexity backlog — 62 findings to 0 (#1389)
* refactor(ws): split handleVoiceJoin into cohesive join-stage helpers

handleVoiceJoin was 130 statements / cyclomatic 59 / nestif 11, breaking all
three complexity budgets at once. Split along the stage boundaries the doc
comment already described: precheck, leave-current, persist, restore
moderator flags, grant token, complete. The publish-permission derivation
becomes its own helper because it is the one branch-heavy block inside the
token grant.

Pure move: every statement is preserved verbatim. The only edits are bare
`return`s becoming the typed returns of their new helper, `c.userID` becoming
the `userID` parameter inside voiceJoinPublishPerms, and voiceJoinComplete
re-reading `ch.VoiceMaxUsers` instead of receiving it — `ch` is never mutated,
so the value is identical.

Verified by normalising both revisions of the region to sorted, comment- and
whitespace-stripped statements and diffing: the only deltas are the ones
listed above.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: collapse the three duplicated sibling pairs

dupl flagged three pairs of adjacent near-identical functions. Each pair is
now one parameterised implementation plus two thin, still-greppable wrappers.

- ws/voice_controls.go: handleVoiceMuteV2 / handleVoiceDeafenV2 share
  voiceSelfToggleV2; handleVoiceCameraV2 / handleVoiceScreenshareV2 share
  voiceStreamToggleV2. Camera and screenshare drawing from one
  voice_max_video budget (OC-0023) was a bug caused by exactly this
  duplication drifting, so one body is the point, not a side effect.
- db/mention_queries.go: ListMentionTargetsByRoles / ListMentionTargetsByUserIDs
  share listMentionTargets. The matched column is a closed named type
  (mentionTargetColumn) rather than a bare string, so the value interpolated
  into the SELECT cannot become caller-supplied.

Behaviour is unchanged: every rate-limit key, error code, error string, slog
message and slog key is preserved verbatim, including the two "failed to
update <kind> state" messages, which are now assembled the same way
enableVideoSlot already assembled them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(api): extract readEmojiUpload from handleCreateEmoji

handleCreateEmoji was 101 lines against a 100-line budget. The upload-bytes
stage — pull the file out of the parsed form, cap its size, sniff its MIME
type and sniff its dimensions — is the one self-contained block in it, and it
already wrote its own refusals, so it moves out whole as readEmojiUpload.

The permission-before-parse ordering the doc comment calls out is unchanged;
so is every error string. file.Close() now runs when the helper returns
rather than when the handler does, which is strictly earlier and unobservable:
the bytes are already copied into raw and nothing else touches the handle.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: extract one cohesive block from three single-budget offenders

Each of these was over exactly one budget, so each gets exactly one extraction
rather than a restructure:

- api/totp_handler.go handleVerifyTOTP (102 lines / 100): the block that
  resolves the user behind the partial-auth challenge and decrypts their TOTP
  secret becomes totpChallengeSecret. The ban-inside-the-partial-window check
  moves with it.
- service/message_reactions.go handleReaction (cyclop 21 / 20): the whole
  authorisation chain — channel lookup, archived gate, DM participant and
  block checks, non-DM permission check — becomes reactionAudience, which
  also returns the DM fan-out audience it already resolved. Check order is
  unchanged and load-bearing.
- db/admin_queries.go BackupToSafe (cyclop 21 / 20): the character allowlist
  loop and the SQL-comment rejection become validateBackupPathChars. That
  loop alone was most of the branch count.

No error string, no check and no ordering changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(plugin): split InstallFromZip into staged install helpers

104 statements / cyclomatic 44 / nestif 12. Split along the stages the code
already had: installZipExtract (the per-entry write loop, with
installZipEntryDest holding the mode/symlink/zip-slip guard chain and
installZipWriteEntry the size-capped copy), installZipStagedManifest,
installZipPromote, and installZipReactivate for the :399 nested block.

Every zip-slip, symlink, entry-mode and uncompressed-size check is preserved
in the same order relative to the writes it guards. The 19 inline
`cleanup(); return` sites collapse to 4 in the orchestrator, one per stage,
because each helper now returns an error instead of unwinding itself — the
staging directory is still removed on exactly the same set of failures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(api): split newWAFMiddleware into engine build and per-phase helpers

184 lines / cyclomatic 38, and the request-body block at :382 was the worst
nested site in the tree at nestif 17.

Engine construction moves out of the closure (wafInlineEngine, wafCRSEngine —
the Coraza directive string is lifted verbatim), and each request phase
becomes its own helper: wafInlineRequestHeaders, wafCRSRequestHeaders
(including the Host/Transfer-Encoding re-add for CRS 920280), wafFeedCRSBody
and wafInspectRequestBody, which is the old :382 block.

The three `handleWAFInterruption(w, it); return` sites inside the body block
become one: the helper now returns the interruption and the orchestrator
handles it. No statement runs between the two points on either side, so the
verdict is honoured identically — in particular a CRS body interruption still
returns without replacing r.Body.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(service): split SendMessage and lift EditMessage's access check

SendMessage was 79 statements / cyclomatic 35 with an 11-deep nested
attachment block at :101; EditMessage was one point over cyclop.

SendMessage becomes sendMessagePrecheck (permission and DM-block gates,
content sanitisation), sendMessageLinkAttachments (the :101 block: attachment
ownership, claim and link) and sendMessageDMSideEffects. EditMessage gets
editMessageCheckAccess and nothing else — one budget over earns one
extraction.

The sanitizeContent fixpoint and the attachment ownership check are unchanged,
as is the order of every gate. The DM side effects run behind
`isDM && !s.sendMessageDMSideEffects(...)`, so a non-DM never enters them;
inside, only the GetDMParticipantIDs failure returns false, matching the one
error the original early-returned on.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(admin): split handlePatchUser into per-field apply helpers

106 lines / cyclomatic 29, with the ban block at :154 nested 9 deep.

Each optional field of the partial edit becomes its own helper —
patchUserPrecheck, patchUserAuthorizeRole, patchUserApplyBan (the :154 block,
including the session disconnect and the broadcast) and patchUserApplyRole.
Each returns a bool meaning "keep going"; none of them writes a success
response, so the single response site in the orchestrator is unchanged.

Field application order, the permission-cache invalidation on a role change
and the disconnect-and-broadcast on a ban are all preserved, as are the three
fail-closed `mod == nil` guards, which now sit at the top of their own helper
and still fire on exactly the same conditions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(admin): split handleSetup into first-run setup stages

143 lines / cyclomatic 30, with the optional-wizard block at :219 sitting
exactly on the nestif threshold.

Split into the stages the endpoint already had: request gating (rate limit and
origin check, which run before any auth exists on a fresh server), owner
account creation, and the wizard application that was the :219 block.

Every gate in front of the handler is a security control on an unauthenticated
endpoint; none moved relative to the work it protects. setup_wizard.go is
untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: split run() into named bootstrap and shutdown steps

131 statements / cyclomatic 57, with the executable-path fallback at :126
nested 9 deep.

The five anonymous `defer func(){...}()` blocks become named functions —
telemetryStop, runClosePlugins, runStopEventPersistence, runStopAuditWriter,
maintenanceStop — and the bootstrap stages move out likewise.

Every defer is still registered in run() itself, at the same point in the
sequence, so the LIFO teardown order is unchanged; that order is documented
in the surrounding comments and is load-bearing (the audit-writer stop must
follow database.Close's registration, the event-persistence stop must precede
it). runStopEventPersistence is now registered unconditionally with a nil
persister meaning "disabled", where the old code registered its defer inside
the enabled branch — a no-op occupying that slot cannot change the relative
order of the others.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(ws): split handleReconnect into resume stages

77 statements / cyclomatic 41, plus the replay block at :199 and, in
handleFreshConnect, the voice-state restore at :622.

handleReconnect becomes reconnectPrecheck, reconnectSelectReplay (with
reconnectVetColdTail for the cold-tier gap check), reconnectRegister and
reconnectWriteReplay. handleFreshConnect's stale-voice cleanup moves to its
own helper, where the `if h.livekit != nil` wrapper becomes a guard clause —
that block was the tail of its scope, so returning early and falling off the
end are the same.

The parts that carry the invariants are moved verbatim: reconnectRegister
still takes h.seqMu, still calls registerNow inside that same critical
section (BUG-123 / OC-0206), still unlocks on every exit, and still emits the
"full" tier counter and telemetry on each of its three re-check failures.
handleReconnect's two-boolean contract is unchanged — the collapsed
`return false, false` sites are all fall-through-to-full-ready, and the
single `return true, false` is still the handshake-write-failure path whose
teardown already ran (OC-0051).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(server): fold in the adversarial review of the complexity refactors

Eleven skeptic passes over the refactor commits on this branch found no
blocker and no major — behaviour is preserved throughout. They did find
comment and accuracy defects worth correcting:

- db/mention_queries.go: the mentionTargetColumn rationale claimed the named
  type made the interpolated column "only ever one of the two constants". A
  Go named type is not closed, so that is a convention the type makes visible,
  not one it enforces. Reworded, gosec justification included.
- ws/voice_controls.go: the dupl collapse generalised away three specifics —
  that a server deafen is the moderator's to lift (now on the serverDeafen
  field), the concrete voice_states.camera / voice_states.screenshare column
  names, and the half of the OC-0023 rationale about neither stream kind
  hiding from the other's count. All three restored.
- ws/voice_join.go: `maxUsers := ch.VoiceMaxUsers` had been hoisted to the top
  of voiceJoinComplete, moving a read across the tail supersession guard. The
  read is inert, but it was the one statement in that commit whose position
  relative to a security guard changed; it now sits at its use, as before.
- ws/*_test.go: three test comments cited voice_join.go line numbers that the
  split invalidated. They now cite the helper by name instead.
- service/message_reactions.go: reactionAudience's doc claimed to enforce
  "every gate on reacting"; it enforces the channel-scoped ones, and the doc
  now says which gates stay with the caller.
- api/emoji_handler.go: the readEmojiUpload call reused the outer `ok` from
  the auth check by assignment; it gets its own readOK.
- admin/setup_handler.go: a moved comment kept a "the response above" deictic
  that no longer had a response above it.

No behaviour change. Build, vet, full tests and -race on five packages green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(ws): clear the remaining complexity budgets across the hub

Eight files, thirteen findings. Each function is split at the stages it
already had; no branch is reordered, merged or inverted.

- handlers.go handleMessage (cyclop 28, 88 stmts): session re-check, frame
  decode and result application become handleMessageSessionRecheck,
  handleMessageDecode and handleMessageApply. The V2 constructor lookup ->
  DispatchV2 -> Result resolution order is untouched.
- serve_ready.go buildReady (cyclop 26, 61 stmts): the per-section fetches
  split out, readyChannelPayloads among them. Every visibility predicate is
  preserved verbatim — this is the payload that decides what a client may see.
- serve_pumps.go writePump (cyclop 31): writePumpWrite, writePumpDeliver,
  writePumpDrainChannel and writePumpDrainAndClose. Every channel receive
  stays in the same select statement, so scheduling is unchanged.
- hub_sweep.go sweepStaleVoiceStates (cyclop 22, 56 stmts): the staleness
  predicate, the hub-lock ordering and the position of the race hook are all
  as they were — handleVoiceJoin's BUG-088 ordering depends on them.
- hub_broadcast.go channelReadAudienceImpl and RefreshChannelVisibility
  (cyclop 22 each, 57 stmts): channelReadAudienceDM and
  refreshChannelVisibilityCanSend. The audience predicate is the OC-0090
  group-DM leak surface, so it is extracted, never simplified.
- livekit_webhook.go (nestif 13 and 14): webhookJoinedEnforceVoiceState,
  webhookLeftCleanupClient and webhookLeftFinishLeave. DB delete still
  precedes broadcast on every path.
- livekit_download.go EnsureLiveKitBinary (52 stmts): one extraction,
  ensureLiveKitStageBinary, keeping every archive path check intact.
- voice_moderation.go (nestif 8): voiceModDeafenRollback. The persisted
  server_muted flag remains the authority.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(api): clear the remaining complexity budgets across the HTTP layer

- router.go NewRouter (cyclop 28, 84 stmts): split by wiring concern into
  routerTOTPKey, routerHealthDeps, routerMiddleware, routerUploadRoutes,
  routerPluginWiring, routerVoiceRoutes and routerMetricsRoutes. Middleware
  ORDER is a security property (auth before handler, WAF before body parse,
  rate limit before work) and is unchanged; the returned cleanup func still
  closes over and releases everything it did before.
- auth_handler.go handleRegister (133 lines) and handleLogin (cyclop 21,
  152 lines): registerPolicyGate, registerReadRequest, loginReadRequest and
  loginAuthenticate. The always-compare posture, every rate-limit key, every
  counter reset and the ban-check-versus-password-compare order are all
  preserved — including loginUserFailureThreshold staying unscaled by
  scaledAuthLimit, which is deliberate and commented.
- upload_handler.go handleServeFile (cyclop 31, 128 lines): serveFileResolve
  and serveFileAuthorize. Every header this sets — Content-Disposition
  included, which is what stops a stored file being served as active content —
  is still set with the same value in the same circumstances.
- profile_handler.go handleUploadAvatar (120 lines): avatarUploadReadImage,
  mirroring readEmojiUpload in shape but with the avatar caps and MIME set.
  The two deliberately do not share a helper.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: clear the last complexity budgets in db and admin

- db/account.go DeleteAccount (cyclop 28, 55 stmts): grouped by subsystem into
  deleteAccountAdminGuard, deleteAccountDMChannels and
  deleteAccountCloseDMChannels, each taking the same transaction. The
  transaction boundary, the delete ORDER (which foreign keys depend on) and
  the rollback path are unchanged.
- admin/logstream.go handleLogStream (cyclop 24): logStreamAuthorize. Flush
  cadence, heartbeat and disconnect detection untouched.
- admin/setup_wizard.go validateWizard (cyclop 23): grouped by section into
  wizardValidateIdentity, wizardValidateNetwork and wizardValidateMedia. Every
  message and bound is unchanged — this is the first input-validation boundary
  on a fresh server, before any auth exists.

With this the tree is at zero: golangci-lint run reports 0 issues against the
budgets set in #1384 (funlen 100/50, cyclop 20, nestif 8, dupl 150), with no
//nolint and no exclusion added anywhere.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 20:39:45 +02:00

942 lines
36 KiB
Go

// OwnCord chat server — self-hosted, Windows-native.
// Build: go build -o chatserver.exe -ldflags "-s -w -X main.version=1.0.0" .
package main
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
stdlog "log"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"os"
"os/signal"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strconv"
"syscall"
"time"
"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
"github.com/owncord/server/admin"
"github.com/owncord/server/api"
"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
"github.com/owncord/server/config"
"github.com/owncord/server/db"
"github.com/owncord/server/diskutil"
"github.com/owncord/server/logctx"
"github.com/owncord/server/plugin"
"github.com/owncord/server/storage"
"github.com/owncord/server/telemetry"
"github.com/owncord/server/ws"
)
// version is overridden at build time via -ldflags "-X main.version=1.0.0".
var version = "dev"
func main() {
// `server healthcheck` probes the running instance's /health and exits
// 0/1. It exists for container healthchecks: the distroless image has no
// shell or curl, so the binary is its own probe.
if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "healthcheck" {
os.Exit(runHealthcheckCLI())
}
// `server token ...` is a direct-to-DB CLI (mint/list/revoke API tokens) —
// handled before any server/logging setup so it stays quiet and standalone.
if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "token" {
os.Exit(runTokenCLI(os.Args[2:]))
}
// Create ring buffer for admin log viewer, then build a multi-handler
// that tees log records to both stdout and the ring buffer.
logBuf := admin.NewRingBuffer(2000)
// levelVar controls both handlers' thresholds. It starts at INFO (the
// zero value) so early-startup logs are captured, then run() raises/lowers
// it once config.yaml / OWNCORD_LOGGING_LEVEL is loaded. The ring buffer
// shares it rather than hard-wiring DEBUG: with both sinks gated, Enabled
// returns false for suppressed levels and every gated Debug call across
// the server becomes a no-op instead of formatting a ring entry.
levelVar := new(slog.LevelVar)
stdoutHandler := slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stdout, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: levelVar})
multiHandler := admin.NewMultiHandler(stdoutHandler, logBuf, levelVar)
// logctx enriches records logged with a request/trace context (the
// ...Context slog variants) with req_id and, under -tags otel, trace_id.
log := slog.New(logctx.New(multiHandler))
slog.SetDefault(log)
// The restart coordinator carries a self-restart request (update apply,
// backup restore, setup wizard) across run()'s teardown — see restart.go.
// The backstop closure fires only if a requested restart's drain wedges
// past restartBackstopDelay: it performs the handoff and force-exits,
// mirroring what the code below does on the healthy path.
var rc *restartCoordinator
rc = newRestartCoordinator(restartBackstopDelay, func() {
slog.Error("restart backstop fired — teardown exceeded its budget, exiting for handoff")
reason, _ := rc.Requested()
performRestartHandoff(reason, rc.Mode(), slog.Default())
os.Exit(0)
})
err := run(log, logBuf, levelVar, rc)
rc.disarm()
// Perform the handoff even when run() returned an error: a restart is
// only ever requested after a committed binary swap or a restore that
// closed the database, so not restarting is strictly worse than
// restarting into whatever the error was.
if reason, ok := rc.Requested(); ok {
performRestartHandoff(reason, rc.Mode(), log)
}
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "\n [ERROR] %v\n\n", err)
log.Error("server exited with error", "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
// run is the real entrypoint — separated for testability. rc carries a
// self-restart request out to main(), which performs the actual handoff once
// everything here has drained (see restart.go).
func run(log *slog.Logger, logBuf *admin.RingBuffer, levelVar *slog.LevelVar, rc *restartCoordinator) error {
// bgCtx is a cancellable context shared by all background goroutines
// (event persister, event pruner, plugin loader, maintenance loop).
//
// This first deferred bgCancel is only the LIFO backstop — because it is
// registered before `defer database.Close()`, it would otherwise run
// AFTER the database is closed, leaving background goroutines running
// through teardown. The persistence and maintenance blocks below register
// their own later (= earlier-running) defers that cancel bgCtx and JOIN
// their goroutines before the database closes.
bgCtx, bgCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer bgCancel()
runRemoveOldBinary(log)
// ── 1. Load configuration ──────────────────────────────────────────────
cfg, err := runLoadConfig(log, levelVar, rc)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// ── 2. Ensure data directory exists ────────────────────────────────────
if err := runPrepareDataDir(log, cfg); err != nil {
return err
}
// ── 3. TLS ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
tlsResult, err := auth.LoadOrGenerate(cfg.TLS)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configuring TLS: %w", err)
}
tlsCfg := tlsResult.TLSConfig
// Print startup banner first so it appears above all init logs.
printBanner(cfg, version, tlsCfg != nil)
// ── 4. Open database + run migrations ─────────────────────────────────
database, err := runOpenDatabase(cfg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer database.Close() //nolint:errcheck
if err := runInitDatabase(log, cfg, database, rc); err != nil {
return err
}
// ── 4b. Telemetry (Phase B Step 8) ─────────────────────────────────────
telemetryStop := runInitTelemetry(log, cfg)
defer telemetryStop()
// ── 5a. Construct plugin runtime BEFORE the router so the router can
// wire the live registry into the plugin admin handler. ────────────────
pluginRegistry := runInitPlugins(bgCtx, log, cfg, database)
defer runClosePlugins(pluginRegistry)
// ── 5b. Build HTTP router ──────────────────────────────────────────────
router, hub, routerCleanup := api.NewRouter(cfg, database, version, logBuf, pluginRegistry)
defer routerCleanup()
// Backstop for every early return below (serve error, ACME shutdown
// failure, etc.): hub.GracefulStop is the only caller of
// LiveKitProcess.Stop(), so skipping it orphans the companion
// livekit-server process and leaves the hub's dispatch goroutine
// running. gracefulOnce makes it idempotent alongside the explicit call
// on the normal shutdown path below.
defer hub.GracefulStop()
// ── 5c. Wire event persistence (Phase B Step 7) ────────────────────────
persister, prunerDone := runStartEventPersistence(bgCtx, log, cfg, hub, database)
defer runStopEventPersistence(log, bgCancel, persister, prunerDone)
// ── 5d. Async audit writer ─────────────────────────────────────────────
// Moves audit-log INSERTs off the request path: once the writer is
// installed, WriteAudit enqueues here and a background goroutine batches
// the writes (same shape as the event persister above). Paths that never
// install a writer — the token CLI, tests — keep the synchronous
// behavior. This defer is registered after `defer database.Close()` so
// LIFO ordering drains the queue before the database is torn down.
auditWriter := runStartAuditWriter(bgCtx, database)
defer runStopAuditWriter(auditWriter)
// ── 6. Start server ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
addr := fmt.Sprintf(":%d", cfg.Server.Port)
srv := &http.Server{
Addr: addr,
Handler: router,
TLSConfig: tlsCfg,
ReadTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
IdleTimeout: 120 * time.Second,
ErrorLog: stdlog.New(io.Discard, "", 0), // suppress TLS handshake noise
}
// ── 6b. ACME HTTP challenge server on :80 ─────────────────────────────
// When using Let's Encrypt (tls.mode: acme), an HTTP server on port 80
// is needed for HTTP-01 challenge validation and HTTP→HTTPS redirect.
acmeSrv := runStartACME(log, tlsResult.HTTPHandler)
// ── 7. Background maintenance ────────────────────────────────────────
maintenanceStop := runStartMaintenance(bgCtx, log, cfg, database)
defer maintenanceStop()
// Listen for OS signals for graceful shutdown. The coordinator's context
// is the parent, so a programmatic restart request (rc.Request) drains
// exactly like a SIGTERM — including on Windows, where a process cannot
// signal itself. Signals arriving mid-drain are swallowed until stop()
// runs, same as on the real-signal path.
ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(rc.Context(), os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)
defer stop()
if err := runServeAndWait(ctx, log, rc, srv, tlsCfg, addr); err != nil {
return err
}
// Graceful shutdown.
shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
if err := runShutdownServers(shutdownCtx, log, srv, acmeSrv, hub); err != nil {
return err
}
log.Info("server stopped cleanly")
return nil
}
// runRemoveOldBinary deletes the binary a previous self-update left behind.
// Extracted from run.
func runRemoveOldBinary(log *slog.Logger) {
// Clean up old binary from a previous update. Bounded retry: in spawn
// mode the predecessor spawns this process as its very last act, so for
// the first few hundred milliseconds it may not have fully exited — and
// on Windows its image file (the .old after the swap) stays locked until
// it does.
exePath, exeErr := os.Executable()
if exeErr != nil {
log.Warn("failed to determine executable path", "error", exeErr)
return
}
oldPath := exePath + ".old"
if _, statErr := os.Stat(oldPath); statErr != nil {
return
}
var rmErr error
for attempt := range 5 {
if attempt > 0 {
time.Sleep(250 * time.Millisecond)
}
if rmErr = os.Remove(oldPath); rmErr == nil {
break
}
}
if rmErr != nil {
log.Warn("failed to remove old binary", "path", oldPath, "error", rmErr)
} else {
log.Info("removed old binary from previous update", "path", oldPath)
}
}
// runLoadConfig loads the on-disk configuration, applies its logging level
// and resolves the restart handoff mode. Extracted from run.
func runLoadConfig(log *slog.Logger, levelVar *slog.LevelVar, rc *restartCoordinator) (*config.Config, error) {
cfg, err := config.Load(config.DefaultPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("loading config: %w", err)
}
// Apply the configured log level. The admin panel's live log view (ring
// buffer) follows the same threshold — set logging.level to "debug" to
// capture debug records there.
if lvl, ok := config.ParseLevel(cfg.Logging.Level); ok {
levelVar.Set(lvl)
} else {
log.Warn("unknown logging.level, keeping info", "value", cfg.Logging.Level)
}
// Resolve how a self-restart hands off (spawn the replacement vs exit
// for a supervisor) now that config is loaded — main() reads it back
// after run() returns.
rc.SetMode(resolveRestartMode(cfg.Server.RestartMode, log))
return cfg, nil
}
// runPrepareDataDir creates the configured data directory and warns when the
// volumes the server writes to are low on free space. Extracted from run.
func runPrepareDataDir(log *slog.Logger, cfg *config.Config) error {
if mkdirErr := os.MkdirAll(cfg.Server.DataDir, 0o750); mkdirErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("creating data dir %s: %w", cfg.Server.DataDir, mkdirErr)
}
// Disk-space awareness: the database (WAL growth included), uploads,
// certs, and by default backups all live on this volume, and running it
// dry breaks several of them at once. Probe errors are ignored — unknown
// is not "full". /health repeats this check continuously at 256 MiB.
warnLowDisk(log, "data dir", cfg.Server.DataDir)
if cfg.Backup.Dir != "" && cfg.Backup.Dir != filepath.Join(cfg.Server.DataDir, "backups") {
warnLowDisk(log, "backup dir", cfg.Backup.Dir)
}
return nil
}
// runOpenDatabase validates the configured backend and opens the database.
// Extracted from run.
func runOpenDatabase(cfg *config.Config) (*db.DB, error) {
// SQLite is the only supported backend; the unfinished Postgres
// scaffolding (stubbed query layer, never wired into the runtime) was
// removed rather than completed.
if t := cfg.Database.Type; t != "" && t != "sqlite" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("database.type=%q is not supported; set \"sqlite\" or omit it", t)
}
database, err := db.OpenWithMaxReaders(cfg.Database.Path, cfg.Database.MaxReaders)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening database: %w", err)
}
return database, nil
}
// runInitDatabase points the admin panel at the live database, runs the
// migrations and clears state left over from a previous run. Extracted from
// run.
func runInitDatabase(log *slog.Logger, cfg *config.Config, database *db.DB, rc *restartCoordinator) error {
// The admin "Restore backup" handler needs the real database file path:
// without this, it falls back to a hardcoded "data/chatserver.db" and
// silently no-ops on any server with a configured database.path.
admin.SetDatabasePath(cfg.Database.Path)
// Backup handlers and the scheduled-backup maintenance write to the
// configured backup directory (defaults to data/backups).
admin.SetBackupDir(cfg.Backup.Dir)
// Admin restart requests (update apply, backup restore, setup wizard)
// land in the coordinator, which drains this process and lets main()
// perform the handoff. Wired before the listener starts serving, so no
// admin request can ever hit the unwired default hook.
admin.SetRestartHandoff(rc.Request)
if err := db.Migrate(database); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("running migrations: %w", err)
}
// Clear stale state from a previous run or crash. Startup work — nothing
// to inherit a context from yet.
if err := database.ResetAllUserStatuses(context.Background()); err != nil {
log.Warn("failed to reset stale user statuses", "error", err)
} else {
log.Info("reset all user statuses to offline")
}
if err := database.ClearAllVoiceStates(context.Background()); err != nil {
log.Warn("failed to clear stale voice states", "error", err)
} else {
log.Info("cleared stale voice states")
}
return nil
}
// runInitTelemetry initialises OpenTelemetry and returns the shutdown step
// run defers. Extracted from run.
func runInitTelemetry(log *slog.Logger, cfg *config.Config) func() {
// Init can return (nil, err) when the otel build-tag skeleton hasn't been
// finished wiring to the upstream SDK. Normalise to a no-op shutdown so
// the deferred closure never calls a nil function.
telemetryShutdown, telErr := telemetry.Init(context.Background(), cfg.Telemetry)
if telErr != nil {
log.Warn("telemetry init failed; continuing without OpenTelemetry", "error", telErr)
}
if telemetryShutdown == nil {
telemetryShutdown = func(context.Context) error { return nil }
}
return func() {
shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
if err := telemetryShutdown(shutdownCtx); err != nil {
log.Warn("telemetry shutdown returned error", "error", err)
}
}
}
// runInitPlugins constructs the plugin runtime, returning nil when plugins
// are disabled or failed to start. Extracted from run.
func runInitPlugins(bgCtx context.Context, log *slog.Logger, cfg *config.Config, database *db.DB) *plugin.Registry {
var pluginRegistry *plugin.Registry
if cfg.Plugins.Enabled {
registry, plugErr := plugin.NewRegistry(plugin.Config{
Directory: cfg.Plugins.Directory,
MaxMemoryMB: cfg.Plugins.MaxMemoryMB,
CPUBudgetMs: cfg.Plugins.CPUBudgetMs,
HTTPAllowlist: cfg.Plugins.HTTPAllowlist,
Store: database,
})
if plugErr != nil {
log.Warn("plugin runtime init failed; continuing without plugins", "error", plugErr)
} else {
pluginRegistry = registry
if err := registry.LoadAll(bgCtx); err != nil {
log.Warn("plugin loader: failed to scan directory", "error", err)
}
}
}
return pluginRegistry
}
// runClosePlugins shuts the plugin runtime down. Registered by run as a defer
// only once the registry exists, so a nil registry is the disabled case and
// has nothing to close. Extracted from run.
func runClosePlugins(registry *plugin.Registry) {
if registry == nil {
return
}
closeCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_ = registry.Close(closeCtx)
}
// runStartEventPersistence starts the event persister and pruner, returning
// both as (nil, nil) when event persistence is disabled. Extracted from run.
func runStartEventPersistence(bgCtx context.Context, log *slog.Logger, cfg *config.Config, hub *ws.Hub, database *db.DB) (*ws.EventPersister, <-chan struct{}) {
if !cfg.EventPersistence.Enabled || hub == nil {
return nil, nil
}
seedHubReplayState(bgCtx, hub, database, log)
persister := ws.NewEventPersister(
database,
4096,
cfg.EventPersistence.BatchSize,
time.Duration(cfg.EventPersistence.BatchFlushMs)*time.Millisecond,
)
persister.Start(bgCtx)
hub.SetEventPersister(persister)
hub.SetEventStore(database)
retention := time.Duration(cfg.EventPersistence.RetentionHours) * time.Hour
prunerInterval := time.Duration(cfg.EventPersistence.PrunerIntervalMinutes) * time.Minute
prunerDone := ws.StartEventPruner(bgCtx, database, retention, prunerInterval)
return persister, prunerDone
}
// runStopEventPersistence drains the event persister and pruner. Registered by
// run as a defer unconditionally, so a nil persister is the disabled case and
// must leave bgCtx alone — the LIFO backstop in run cancels it instead.
// Extracted from run.
func runStopEventPersistence(log *slog.Logger, bgCancel context.CancelFunc, persister *ws.EventPersister, prunerDone <-chan struct{}) {
if persister == nil {
return
}
stopCtx, stopCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer stopCancel()
persister.Stop(stopCtx)
// Cancel the shared background context and JOIN the pruner before
// the (LIFO-later) database.Close defer runs, so no prune is still
// mid-query against a closing pool. Bounded: a stuck prune delays
// shutdown by at most the timeout, then Close proceeds anyway.
bgCancel()
select {
case <-prunerDone:
case <-stopCtx.Done():
log.Warn("event pruner did not exit before shutdown timeout")
}
}
// runStartAuditWriter installs the async audit writer. Extracted from run.
func runStartAuditWriter(bgCtx context.Context, database *db.DB) *db.AuditWriter {
auditWriter := db.NewAuditWriter(database, 1024, 50, 100*time.Millisecond)
auditWriter.Start(bgCtx)
database.SetAuditWriter(auditWriter)
return auditWriter
}
// runStopAuditWriter drains the async audit writer. Extracted from run.
func runStopAuditWriter(auditWriter *db.AuditWriter) {
stopCtx, stopCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer stopCancel()
auditWriter.Stop(stopCtx)
}
// runStartACME starts the ACME HTTP-01 challenge server when Let's Encrypt
// is configured, and returns nil otherwise. Extracted from run.
func runStartACME(log *slog.Logger, httpHandler http.Handler) *http.Server {
var acmeSrv *http.Server
if httpHandler != nil {
acmeSrv = &http.Server{
Addr: ":80",
Handler: httpHandler,
ReadTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
}
go func() {
log.Info("ACME HTTP challenge server starting on :80")
if err := serveWithBindRetry(log, "acme-http", acmeSrv.ListenAndServe); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
log.Error("ACME HTTP server error — HTTP-01 challenges and certificate renewal will fail until the next restart", "error", err)
}
}()
}
return acmeSrv
}
// runStartMaintenance starts the periodic maintenance loop and returns the
// stop step run defers. Extracted from run.
func runStartMaintenance(bgCtx context.Context, log *slog.Logger, cfg *config.Config, database *db.DB) func() {
// Periodically purge expired sessions and orphaned attachments.
fileStorage, fileStorageErr := storage.New(cfg.Upload.StorageDir, cfg.Upload.MaxSizeMB)
if fileStorageErr != nil {
log.Warn("failed to create file storage for maintenance; orphan file cleanup disabled", "error", fileStorageErr)
}
stopMaintenance := make(chan struct{})
maintenanceDone := make(chan struct{})
go runMaintenanceLoop(bgCtx, log, database, fileStorage, stopMaintenance, maintenanceDone)
return func() {
// Backstop for early returns below (see hub.GracefulStop defer above),
// and a bounded join so an in-flight tick (which can hold the writer —
// scheduled backups run VACUUM INTO) isn't still using the database
// while the LIFO-later Close defer tears it down.
close(stopMaintenance)
select {
case <-maintenanceDone:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
log.Warn("maintenance loop did not exit before shutdown timeout")
}
}
}
// runMaintenanceLoop is the periodic maintenance goroutine started by
// runStartMaintenance. Extracted from run.
func runMaintenanceLoop(bgCtx context.Context, log *slog.Logger, database *db.DB, fileStorage *storage.Storage, stopMaintenance, maintenanceDone chan struct{}) {
defer close(maintenanceDone)
ticker := time.NewTicker(15 * time.Minute)
defer ticker.Stop()
consecutiveFailures := 0
const maxConsecutiveFailures = 5
for {
select {
case <-ticker.C:
if consecutiveFailures >= maxConsecutiveFailures {
log.Error("maintenance loop: circuit breaker open, skipping tick",
"consecutive_failures", consecutiveFailures)
// Reset after one skip to allow retry next tick.
consecutiveFailures = maxConsecutiveFailures - 1
continue
}
if runMaintenanceTick(bgCtx, log, database, fileStorage) {
consecutiveFailures++
} else {
consecutiveFailures = 0
}
case <-stopMaintenance:
return
}
}
}
// runMaintenanceTick runs one maintenance pass and reports whether any step
// of it failed. Extracted from run.
func runMaintenanceTick(bgCtx context.Context, log *slog.Logger, database *db.DB, fileStorage *storage.Storage) bool {
tickFailed := false
if err := database.DeleteExpiredSessions(bgCtx); err != nil {
log.Warn("failed to delete expired sessions", "error", err)
tickFailed = true
}
// Scheduled backups + retention pruning, driven by the
// backup_schedule / backup_retention admin settings.
if err := admin.MaintainBackups(bgCtx, database); err != nil {
log.Warn("backup maintenance failed", "error", err)
tickFailed = true
}
// Clean up orphaned attachments (uploaded but never linked to a message).
//
// Skipped entirely with no file storage configured: the delete is
// atomic (row goes the instant it's selected, by design — see
// db/attachment_queries.go), so with fileStorage nil the returned
// stored_as names — the only remaining handle on those blobs —
// would just be discarded and the files stranded on disk with no
// query left able to name them. Leaving the rows in place keeps
// them reclaimable once storage is available again.
if fileStorage != nil {
cutoff := time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour)
orphanFiles, orphanErr := database.DeleteOrphanedAttachments(bgCtx, cutoff)
if orphanErr != nil {
log.Warn("failed to delete orphaned attachments", "error", orphanErr)
tickFailed = true
} else if len(orphanFiles) > 0 {
// Best-effort file cleanup.
for _, filename := range orphanFiles {
if delErr := fileStorage.Delete(filename); delErr != nil {
log.Warn("failed to delete orphan file", "file", filename, "error", delErr)
}
}
log.Info("cleaned up orphaned attachments", "count", len(orphanFiles))
}
}
return tickFailed
}
// runServeAndWait starts the listener and blocks until it fails or a
// shutdown or restart signal arrives. Extracted from run.
func runServeAndWait(ctx context.Context, log *slog.Logger, rc *restartCoordinator, srv *http.Server, tlsCfg *tls.Config, addr string) error {
// Start serving in a goroutine.
serveErr := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
log.Info("server starting", "addr", addr, "tls", tlsCfg != nil, "version", version)
err := serveWithBindRetry(log, "server", func() error {
if tlsCfg != nil {
return srv.ListenAndServeTLS("", "")
}
return srv.ListenAndServe()
})
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
serveErr <- err
}
close(serveErr)
}()
// Wait for shutdown signal or server error.
select {
case err := <-serveErr:
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("server error: %w", err)
}
case <-ctx.Done():
if reason, ok := rc.Requested(); ok {
log.Info("restart requested, draining connections (30s timeout)", "reason", reason)
} else {
log.Info("shutdown signal received, draining connections (30s timeout)")
}
}
return nil
}
// runShutdownServers performs the ordered graceful shutdown: the ACME
// server, then in-flight HTTP handlers, then the WebSocket hub. Extracted
// from run.
func runShutdownServers(shutdownCtx context.Context, log *slog.Logger, srv, acmeSrv *http.Server, hub *ws.Hub) error {
if acmeSrv != nil {
if err := acmeSrv.Shutdown(shutdownCtx); err != nil {
log.Warn("ACME HTTP server shutdown error", "error", err)
}
}
// Drain in-flight HTTP handlers FIRST: their broadcasts must still reach
// a live hub (and the event persister) or the frames vanish from the
// replay/event store across the restart. Shutdown does not wait on
// hijacked WebSocket connections, so the hub's own stop below is not
// delayed by connected clients — they get the restart notice right after
// the drain instead of right before it.
shutdownErr := srv.Shutdown(shutdownCtx)
// Stop the WebSocket hub: notify clients, stop LiveKit, close all client
// connections. Threaded with the same 30s budget the operator was told
// about — the notice sleep and LiveKit stop count against it rather than
// extending it.
hub.GracefulStopContext(shutdownCtx)
if shutdownErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("graceful shutdown: %w", shutdownErr)
}
return nil
}
// runHealthcheckCLI probes the local server's /health endpoint and returns a
// process exit code: 0 healthy, 1 degraded or unreachable. /health answers
// 503 with a subsystem reason when the hub, database, or disk is unhealthy,
// so a container orchestrator's healthcheck surfaces those too.
func runHealthcheckCLI() int {
// Deliberately NOT config.Load: that writes a default config.yaml when
// none exists, and a probe must have no side effects. Peek at the file
// (and the env overrides) for just the values that shape the URL and the
// certificate pin.
port := 8443
scheme := "https"
certFile := "data/cert.pem"
tlsMode := ""
acmeDomain := ""
if raw, err := os.ReadFile(config.DefaultPath); err == nil {
var partial struct {
Server struct {
Port int `yaml:"port"`
} `yaml:"server"`
TLS struct {
Mode string `yaml:"mode"`
CertFile string `yaml:"cert_file"`
Domain string `yaml:"domain"`
} `yaml:"tls"`
}
if yaml.Unmarshal(raw, &partial) == nil {
if partial.Server.Port > 0 {
port = partial.Server.Port
}
tlsMode = partial.TLS.Mode
if partial.TLS.Mode == "off" {
scheme = "http"
}
if partial.TLS.CertFile != "" {
certFile = partial.TLS.CertFile
}
acmeDomain = partial.TLS.Domain
}
}
if env := os.Getenv("OWNCORD_SERVER_PORT"); env != "" {
if p, err := strconv.Atoi(env); err == nil && p > 0 {
port = p
}
}
if env := os.Getenv("OWNCORD_TLS_MODE"); env != "" {
tlsMode = env
if env == "off" {
scheme = "http"
}
}
if env := os.Getenv("OWNCORD_TLS_DOMAIN"); env != "" {
acmeDomain = env
}
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
Transport: &http.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: healthcheckTLSConfig(tlsMode, certFile, acmeDomain),
},
}
if port < 1 || port > 65535 {
port = 8443
}
resp, err := client.Get(fmt.Sprintf("%s://127.0.0.1:%d/health", scheme, port)) //nolint:gosec // G704: host is hardcoded loopback; only the port comes from the operator's own config
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "healthcheck: unreachable:", err)
return 1
}
defer resp.Body.Close() //nolint:errcheck
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 512))
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "healthcheck: status %d: %s\n", resp.StatusCode, body)
return 1
}
return 0
}
// healthcheckTLSConfig builds the probe's TLS config, per TLS mode:
//
// - acme: the served cert is CA-issued for the configured domain, so
// standard WebPKI verification works — but the probe dials 127.0.0.1, so
// ServerName must be overridden to the domain or hostname verification
// fails unconditionally and the probe reports a healthy server as down.
// A stale pre-ACME data/cert.pem must NOT be pinned in this mode either;
// the pin would mismatch the served ACME leaf forever.
// - self_signed / manual: the cert can never pass WebPKI (the generated one
// has no SANs and IsCA=false), so hostname/chain checks are replaced (not
// skipped) by pinning: the presented leaf must be byte-identical to the
// local cert file.
// - anything else with no readable local cert: plain WebPKI.
func healthcheckTLSConfig(tlsMode, certFile, acmeDomain string) *tls.Config {
if tlsMode == "acme" && acmeDomain != "" {
return &tls.Config{MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12, ServerName: acmeDomain}
}
pinned := loadPinnedCert(certFile)
if pinned == nil {
return &tls.Config{MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12}
}
return &tls.Config{
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
// Chain/hostname verification is replaced by the exact-match pin
// below, which is strictly stronger for a cert we hold on disk.
// VerifyConnection (not VerifyPeerCertificate) so the pin also runs
// on resumed sessions (gosec G123).
InsecureSkipVerify: true, //nolint:gosec // G402: VerifyConnection below pins the exact local certificate
VerifyConnection: func(cs tls.ConnectionState) error {
if len(cs.PeerCertificates) == 0 {
return errors.New("healthcheck: server presented no certificate")
}
if !bytes.Equal(cs.PeerCertificates[0].Raw, pinned) {
return errors.New("healthcheck: server certificate does not match " + certFile)
}
return nil
},
}
}
// loadPinnedCert reads the first PEM certificate block from path, returning
// its DER bytes, or nil when unavailable.
func loadPinnedCert(path string) []byte {
raw, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // G304: path is the operator's own configured cert file
if err != nil {
return nil
}
block, _ := pem.Decode(raw)
if block == nil || block.Type != "CERTIFICATE" {
return nil
}
return block.Bytes
}
// seedHubReplayState restores the hub's monotonic seq counter from the
// persisted MAX(events.seq) so wrapped-payload seqs stay monotonic across
// restarts. Without this, the events table accumulates rows whose payload
// seqs reset to 1 after every restart, breaking the reconnect "events since
// last_seq" contract.
//
// It also forces every client resuming from at or before that restored seq
// onto the full-ready path for this boot. h.seq is persisted and restored
// here, but the paired watermark that tells a resuming client whether a
// channel-visibility change happened since its last_seq
// (visibilityChangeSeq) is in-memory only and always starts at 0 on a fresh
// process — see ws/hub_events.go's mustFullResync. Channel-visibility
// changes made to an offline client (RefreshChannelVisibility,
// revokeUnreadableChannels) are sent as targeted, unsequenced messages that
// are never written to the events table, so replay can never recover them.
// Without the MarkVisibilityChanged call below, a client resuming with
// last_seq at or before the pre-restart max sails straight through
// mustFullResync's zeroed watermark and can silently miss a visibility
// change it should have converged on.
func seedHubReplayState(ctx context.Context, hub *ws.Hub, database *db.DB, log *slog.Logger) {
maxSeq, seedErr := database.GetMaxEventSeq(ctx)
if seedErr != nil {
log.Warn("event persistence: failed to read MAX(events.seq); starting hub seq from 0", "error", seedErr)
return
}
if maxSeq <= 0 {
return
}
hub.SeedSeq(uint64(maxSeq))
log.Info("event persistence: seeded hub seq from persisted events", "seq", maxSeq)
hub.MarkVisibilityChanged()
}
// printBanner writes the startup banner to stderr (so it doesn't mix with
// the structured log output on stdout).
func printBanner(cfg *config.Config, ver string, tls bool) {
scheme := "http"
if tls {
scheme = "https"
}
localIP := getOutboundIP()
port := cfg.Server.Port
baseURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s:%d", scheme, localIP, port)
adminURL := baseURL + "/admin"
tlsStatus := "disabled"
if tls {
tlsStatus = "enabled"
}
banner := fmt.Sprintf(`
___ ____ _
/ _ \__ ___ __ / ___|___ _ __ __| |
| | | \ \ /\ / / '_ \| | / _ \| '__/ _`+"`"+` |
| |_| |\ V V /| | | | |__| (_) | | | (_| |
\___/ \_/\_/ |_| |_|\____\___/|_| \__,_|
─────────────────────────────────────────────
Server %s
Version %s
TLS %s
Platform %s/%s
─────────────────────────────────────────────
API %s/api/v1/info
WebSocket %s/api/v1/ws
Admin %s
Health %s/health
─────────────────────────────────────────────
Press Ctrl+C to stop the server.
`, cfg.Server.Name, ver, tlsStatus, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH,
baseURL, wsURL(scheme, localIP, port), adminURL, baseURL)
_, _ = fmt.Fprint(os.Stderr, banner)
}
// wsURL builds the WebSocket URL with the correct scheme.
func wsURL(httpScheme, ip string, port int) string {
ws := "ws"
if httpScheme == "https" {
ws = "wss"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s:%d", ws, ip, port)
}
// Free-space thresholds for the boot-time disk warning. /health uses its own
// (lower) continuous threshold; these only shape startup log noise.
const (
diskWarnBytes = 1 << 30 // 1 GiB — warn
diskCriticalBytes = 256 << 20 // 256 MiB — error
)
// warnLowDisk logs when the volume holding path is low on space. Probe
// failures (unsupported platform, missing dir) are silent — unknown ≠ full.
func warnLowDisk(log *slog.Logger, label, path string) {
free, err := diskutil.FreeBytes(path)
if err != nil {
return
}
switch {
case free < diskCriticalBytes:
log.Error("disk space critically low — writes will start failing soon",
"volume", label, "path", path, "free_mb", free>>20)
case free < diskWarnBytes:
log.Warn("disk space low", "volume", label, "path", path, "free_mb", free>>20)
}
}
// getOutboundIP returns the preferred outbound IP of this machine by dialing
// a known external address (no actual connection is made with UDP).
func getOutboundIP() string {
conn, err := net.Dial("udp", "8.8.8.8:80")
if err != nil {
return "localhost"
}
defer conn.Close() //nolint:errcheck
addr, ok := conn.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr)
if !ok {
slog.Warn("getOutboundIP: unexpected LocalAddr type, falling back to localhost",
"type", fmt.Sprintf("%T", conn.LocalAddr()))
return "localhost"
}
return addr.IP.String()
}