Files
OwnCord/Server/service/message_crud.go
T
J3vbandClaude Opus 5 39551de4a6 refactor(server): work off the complexity backlog — 62 findings to 0 (#1389)
* refactor(ws): split handleVoiceJoin into cohesive join-stage helpers

handleVoiceJoin was 130 statements / cyclomatic 59 / nestif 11, breaking all
three complexity budgets at once. Split along the stage boundaries the doc
comment already described: precheck, leave-current, persist, restore
moderator flags, grant token, complete. The publish-permission derivation
becomes its own helper because it is the one branch-heavy block inside the
token grant.

Pure move: every statement is preserved verbatim. The only edits are bare
`return`s becoming the typed returns of their new helper, `c.userID` becoming
the `userID` parameter inside voiceJoinPublishPerms, and voiceJoinComplete
re-reading `ch.VoiceMaxUsers` instead of receiving it — `ch` is never mutated,
so the value is identical.

Verified by normalising both revisions of the region to sorted, comment- and
whitespace-stripped statements and diffing: the only deltas are the ones
listed above.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: collapse the three duplicated sibling pairs

dupl flagged three pairs of adjacent near-identical functions. Each pair is
now one parameterised implementation plus two thin, still-greppable wrappers.

- ws/voice_controls.go: handleVoiceMuteV2 / handleVoiceDeafenV2 share
  voiceSelfToggleV2; handleVoiceCameraV2 / handleVoiceScreenshareV2 share
  voiceStreamToggleV2. Camera and screenshare drawing from one
  voice_max_video budget (OC-0023) was a bug caused by exactly this
  duplication drifting, so one body is the point, not a side effect.
- db/mention_queries.go: ListMentionTargetsByRoles / ListMentionTargetsByUserIDs
  share listMentionTargets. The matched column is a closed named type
  (mentionTargetColumn) rather than a bare string, so the value interpolated
  into the SELECT cannot become caller-supplied.

Behaviour is unchanged: every rate-limit key, error code, error string, slog
message and slog key is preserved verbatim, including the two "failed to
update <kind> state" messages, which are now assembled the same way
enableVideoSlot already assembled them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(api): extract readEmojiUpload from handleCreateEmoji

handleCreateEmoji was 101 lines against a 100-line budget. The upload-bytes
stage — pull the file out of the parsed form, cap its size, sniff its MIME
type and sniff its dimensions — is the one self-contained block in it, and it
already wrote its own refusals, so it moves out whole as readEmojiUpload.

The permission-before-parse ordering the doc comment calls out is unchanged;
so is every error string. file.Close() now runs when the helper returns
rather than when the handler does, which is strictly earlier and unobservable:
the bytes are already copied into raw and nothing else touches the handle.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: extract one cohesive block from three single-budget offenders

Each of these was over exactly one budget, so each gets exactly one extraction
rather than a restructure:

- api/totp_handler.go handleVerifyTOTP (102 lines / 100): the block that
  resolves the user behind the partial-auth challenge and decrypts their TOTP
  secret becomes totpChallengeSecret. The ban-inside-the-partial-window check
  moves with it.
- service/message_reactions.go handleReaction (cyclop 21 / 20): the whole
  authorisation chain — channel lookup, archived gate, DM participant and
  block checks, non-DM permission check — becomes reactionAudience, which
  also returns the DM fan-out audience it already resolved. Check order is
  unchanged and load-bearing.
- db/admin_queries.go BackupToSafe (cyclop 21 / 20): the character allowlist
  loop and the SQL-comment rejection become validateBackupPathChars. That
  loop alone was most of the branch count.

No error string, no check and no ordering changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(plugin): split InstallFromZip into staged install helpers

104 statements / cyclomatic 44 / nestif 12. Split along the stages the code
already had: installZipExtract (the per-entry write loop, with
installZipEntryDest holding the mode/symlink/zip-slip guard chain and
installZipWriteEntry the size-capped copy), installZipStagedManifest,
installZipPromote, and installZipReactivate for the :399 nested block.

Every zip-slip, symlink, entry-mode and uncompressed-size check is preserved
in the same order relative to the writes it guards. The 19 inline
`cleanup(); return` sites collapse to 4 in the orchestrator, one per stage,
because each helper now returns an error instead of unwinding itself — the
staging directory is still removed on exactly the same set of failures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(api): split newWAFMiddleware into engine build and per-phase helpers

184 lines / cyclomatic 38, and the request-body block at :382 was the worst
nested site in the tree at nestif 17.

Engine construction moves out of the closure (wafInlineEngine, wafCRSEngine —
the Coraza directive string is lifted verbatim), and each request phase
becomes its own helper: wafInlineRequestHeaders, wafCRSRequestHeaders
(including the Host/Transfer-Encoding re-add for CRS 920280), wafFeedCRSBody
and wafInspectRequestBody, which is the old :382 block.

The three `handleWAFInterruption(w, it); return` sites inside the body block
become one: the helper now returns the interruption and the orchestrator
handles it. No statement runs between the two points on either side, so the
verdict is honoured identically — in particular a CRS body interruption still
returns without replacing r.Body.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(service): split SendMessage and lift EditMessage's access check

SendMessage was 79 statements / cyclomatic 35 with an 11-deep nested
attachment block at :101; EditMessage was one point over cyclop.

SendMessage becomes sendMessagePrecheck (permission and DM-block gates,
content sanitisation), sendMessageLinkAttachments (the :101 block: attachment
ownership, claim and link) and sendMessageDMSideEffects. EditMessage gets
editMessageCheckAccess and nothing else — one budget over earns one
extraction.

The sanitizeContent fixpoint and the attachment ownership check are unchanged,
as is the order of every gate. The DM side effects run behind
`isDM && !s.sendMessageDMSideEffects(...)`, so a non-DM never enters them;
inside, only the GetDMParticipantIDs failure returns false, matching the one
error the original early-returned on.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(admin): split handlePatchUser into per-field apply helpers

106 lines / cyclomatic 29, with the ban block at :154 nested 9 deep.

Each optional field of the partial edit becomes its own helper —
patchUserPrecheck, patchUserAuthorizeRole, patchUserApplyBan (the :154 block,
including the session disconnect and the broadcast) and patchUserApplyRole.
Each returns a bool meaning "keep going"; none of them writes a success
response, so the single response site in the orchestrator is unchanged.

Field application order, the permission-cache invalidation on a role change
and the disconnect-and-broadcast on a ban are all preserved, as are the three
fail-closed `mod == nil` guards, which now sit at the top of their own helper
and still fire on exactly the same conditions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(admin): split handleSetup into first-run setup stages

143 lines / cyclomatic 30, with the optional-wizard block at :219 sitting
exactly on the nestif threshold.

Split into the stages the endpoint already had: request gating (rate limit and
origin check, which run before any auth exists on a fresh server), owner
account creation, and the wizard application that was the :219 block.

Every gate in front of the handler is a security control on an unauthenticated
endpoint; none moved relative to the work it protects. setup_wizard.go is
untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: split run() into named bootstrap and shutdown steps

131 statements / cyclomatic 57, with the executable-path fallback at :126
nested 9 deep.

The five anonymous `defer func(){...}()` blocks become named functions —
telemetryStop, runClosePlugins, runStopEventPersistence, runStopAuditWriter,
maintenanceStop — and the bootstrap stages move out likewise.

Every defer is still registered in run() itself, at the same point in the
sequence, so the LIFO teardown order is unchanged; that order is documented
in the surrounding comments and is load-bearing (the audit-writer stop must
follow database.Close's registration, the event-persistence stop must precede
it). runStopEventPersistence is now registered unconditionally with a nil
persister meaning "disabled", where the old code registered its defer inside
the enabled branch — a no-op occupying that slot cannot change the relative
order of the others.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(ws): split handleReconnect into resume stages

77 statements / cyclomatic 41, plus the replay block at :199 and, in
handleFreshConnect, the voice-state restore at :622.

handleReconnect becomes reconnectPrecheck, reconnectSelectReplay (with
reconnectVetColdTail for the cold-tier gap check), reconnectRegister and
reconnectWriteReplay. handleFreshConnect's stale-voice cleanup moves to its
own helper, where the `if h.livekit != nil` wrapper becomes a guard clause —
that block was the tail of its scope, so returning early and falling off the
end are the same.

The parts that carry the invariants are moved verbatim: reconnectRegister
still takes h.seqMu, still calls registerNow inside that same critical
section (BUG-123 / OC-0206), still unlocks on every exit, and still emits the
"full" tier counter and telemetry on each of its three re-check failures.
handleReconnect's two-boolean contract is unchanged — the collapsed
`return false, false` sites are all fall-through-to-full-ready, and the
single `return true, false` is still the handshake-write-failure path whose
teardown already ran (OC-0051).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(server): fold in the adversarial review of the complexity refactors

Eleven skeptic passes over the refactor commits on this branch found no
blocker and no major — behaviour is preserved throughout. They did find
comment and accuracy defects worth correcting:

- db/mention_queries.go: the mentionTargetColumn rationale claimed the named
  type made the interpolated column "only ever one of the two constants". A
  Go named type is not closed, so that is a convention the type makes visible,
  not one it enforces. Reworded, gosec justification included.
- ws/voice_controls.go: the dupl collapse generalised away three specifics —
  that a server deafen is the moderator's to lift (now on the serverDeafen
  field), the concrete voice_states.camera / voice_states.screenshare column
  names, and the half of the OC-0023 rationale about neither stream kind
  hiding from the other's count. All three restored.
- ws/voice_join.go: `maxUsers := ch.VoiceMaxUsers` had been hoisted to the top
  of voiceJoinComplete, moving a read across the tail supersession guard. The
  read is inert, but it was the one statement in that commit whose position
  relative to a security guard changed; it now sits at its use, as before.
- ws/*_test.go: three test comments cited voice_join.go line numbers that the
  split invalidated. They now cite the helper by name instead.
- service/message_reactions.go: reactionAudience's doc claimed to enforce
  "every gate on reacting"; it enforces the channel-scoped ones, and the doc
  now says which gates stay with the caller.
- api/emoji_handler.go: the readEmojiUpload call reused the outer `ok` from
  the auth check by assignment; it gets its own readOK.
- admin/setup_handler.go: a moved comment kept a "the response above" deictic
  that no longer had a response above it.

No behaviour change. Build, vet, full tests and -race on five packages green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(ws): clear the remaining complexity budgets across the hub

Eight files, thirteen findings. Each function is split at the stages it
already had; no branch is reordered, merged or inverted.

- handlers.go handleMessage (cyclop 28, 88 stmts): session re-check, frame
  decode and result application become handleMessageSessionRecheck,
  handleMessageDecode and handleMessageApply. The V2 constructor lookup ->
  DispatchV2 -> Result resolution order is untouched.
- serve_ready.go buildReady (cyclop 26, 61 stmts): the per-section fetches
  split out, readyChannelPayloads among them. Every visibility predicate is
  preserved verbatim — this is the payload that decides what a client may see.
- serve_pumps.go writePump (cyclop 31): writePumpWrite, writePumpDeliver,
  writePumpDrainChannel and writePumpDrainAndClose. Every channel receive
  stays in the same select statement, so scheduling is unchanged.
- hub_sweep.go sweepStaleVoiceStates (cyclop 22, 56 stmts): the staleness
  predicate, the hub-lock ordering and the position of the race hook are all
  as they were — handleVoiceJoin's BUG-088 ordering depends on them.
- hub_broadcast.go channelReadAudienceImpl and RefreshChannelVisibility
  (cyclop 22 each, 57 stmts): channelReadAudienceDM and
  refreshChannelVisibilityCanSend. The audience predicate is the OC-0090
  group-DM leak surface, so it is extracted, never simplified.
- livekit_webhook.go (nestif 13 and 14): webhookJoinedEnforceVoiceState,
  webhookLeftCleanupClient and webhookLeftFinishLeave. DB delete still
  precedes broadcast on every path.
- livekit_download.go EnsureLiveKitBinary (52 stmts): one extraction,
  ensureLiveKitStageBinary, keeping every archive path check intact.
- voice_moderation.go (nestif 8): voiceModDeafenRollback. The persisted
  server_muted flag remains the authority.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(api): clear the remaining complexity budgets across the HTTP layer

- router.go NewRouter (cyclop 28, 84 stmts): split by wiring concern into
  routerTOTPKey, routerHealthDeps, routerMiddleware, routerUploadRoutes,
  routerPluginWiring, routerVoiceRoutes and routerMetricsRoutes. Middleware
  ORDER is a security property (auth before handler, WAF before body parse,
  rate limit before work) and is unchanged; the returned cleanup func still
  closes over and releases everything it did before.
- auth_handler.go handleRegister (133 lines) and handleLogin (cyclop 21,
  152 lines): registerPolicyGate, registerReadRequest, loginReadRequest and
  loginAuthenticate. The always-compare posture, every rate-limit key, every
  counter reset and the ban-check-versus-password-compare order are all
  preserved — including loginUserFailureThreshold staying unscaled by
  scaledAuthLimit, which is deliberate and commented.
- upload_handler.go handleServeFile (cyclop 31, 128 lines): serveFileResolve
  and serveFileAuthorize. Every header this sets — Content-Disposition
  included, which is what stops a stored file being served as active content —
  is still set with the same value in the same circumstances.
- profile_handler.go handleUploadAvatar (120 lines): avatarUploadReadImage,
  mirroring readEmojiUpload in shape but with the avatar caps and MIME set.
  The two deliberately do not share a helper.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: clear the last complexity budgets in db and admin

- db/account.go DeleteAccount (cyclop 28, 55 stmts): grouped by subsystem into
  deleteAccountAdminGuard, deleteAccountDMChannels and
  deleteAccountCloseDMChannels, each taking the same transaction. The
  transaction boundary, the delete ORDER (which foreign keys depend on) and
  the rollback path are unchanged.
- admin/logstream.go handleLogStream (cyclop 24): logStreamAuthorize. Flush
  cadence, heartbeat and disconnect detection untouched.
- admin/setup_wizard.go validateWizard (cyclop 23): grouped by section into
  wizardValidateIdentity, wizardValidateNetwork and wizardValidateMedia. Every
  message and bound is unchanged — this is the first input-validation boundary
  on a fresh server, before any auth exists.

With this the tree is at zero: golangci-lint run reports 0 issues against the
budgets set in #1384 (funlen 100/50, cyclop 20, nestif 8, dupl 150), with no
//nolint and no exclusion added anywhere.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 20:39:45 +02:00

491 lines
21 KiB
Go

package service
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"time"
"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
"github.com/owncord/server/db"
"github.com/owncord/server/permissions"
"github.com/owncord/server/telemetry"
)
// SendMessage validates, persists, and prepares broadcast data for a new message.
// Callers are responsible for emitting the appropriate events.
func (s *MessageService) SendMessage(ctx context.Context, p SendMessageParams) (*SendMessageResult, error) {
// Phase B Step 8 — wrap the public service entrypoint in a tracing span
// and a duration histogram. Both are no-ops in the default build.
ctx, span := telemetry.GlobalTracer("service/message").Start(ctx, "MessageService.SendMessage",
telemetry.Int64("user_id", p.UserID),
telemetry.Int64("channel_id", p.ChannelID),
)
start := time.Now()
defer func() {
telemetry.TimeSince(ctx, telemetry.NewAppMetrics().ServiceCallDurationSec, start,
telemetry.String("method", "SendMessage"))
span.End()
}()
ch, content, err := s.sendMessagePrecheck(ctx, p)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
isDM := ch.Type == "dm"
// Resolve mentions against the sanitized content, before the insert, so the
// row and its mention set are written together. Unknown @words and an
// unauthorized @everyone resolve to nothing and stay plain text.
mentions := s.resolveMentions(ctx, content, p.UserID, p.ChannelID, isDM)
// Persist message. RETURNING hands back the inserted row, so the DB-assigned
// timestamp the fan-out needs arrives with the insert instead of a re-read.
msg, err := s.st.CreateMessageWithMentions(ctx, p.ChannelID, p.UserID, content, p.ReplyTo,
mentions.UserIDs, mentions.Everyone)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("MessageService.SendMessage CreateMessage", "err", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: failed to save message", ErrInternal)
}
msgID := msg.ID
attachments, err := s.sendMessageLinkAttachments(ctx, p, msgID, content)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Advance the author's own read state past the message they just sent.
// Both unread queries count "messages with id > my read_states row" and
// neither filters by author, so without this an author's own message
// counts as unread to themselves: post in a channel, navigate away, and
// the next `ready` restates it as an unread badge that never clears until
// something else marks the channel read.
//
// Done here rather than by adding an author filter to the two queries so
// the stored read state stays truthful — you have, in fact, seen your own
// message — and so the fix covers DMs and text channels through one path.
//
// Best-effort: the message is already committed and broadcast-bound, so a
// failure here must not fail the send. The worst case is the pre-existing
// stale-badge behaviour, which the next mark_read corrects.
if err := s.st.UpdateReadState(ctx, p.UserID, p.ChannelID, msgID); err != nil {
slog.Warn("MessageService.SendMessage: could not advance author read state",
"err", err, "user_id", p.UserID, "channel_id", p.ChannelID, "msg_id", msgID)
}
result := &SendMessageResult{
MessageID: msgID,
Timestamp: msg.Timestamp,
Content: content,
IsDM: isDM,
Channel: ch,
Attachments: attachments,
Mentions: mentions.UserIDs,
MentionsEveryone: mentions.Everyone,
}
// DM path: open DM for recipients.
if isDM && !s.sendMessageDMSideEffects(ctx, p, result) {
return result, nil // Message saved, skip DM side effects.
}
// Mention badges run off the send path: the message is already committed, so
// the recipients' badge bookkeeping (the full reader-resolution chain plus
// the batched increment) must not delay delivering the message to the rest
// of the channel. The ctx is detached from cancellation — for the same
// reason audit writes are — so a client hanging up mid-request cannot drop
// the badges. If a reader's channel_focus clears the badge in the tiny
// window before the increment lands, IncrementMentionCounts' own read-state
// guard (msgID vs. last_message_id) makes the increment a no-op instead of
// resurrecting it — the badge does not reappear.
channelID, authorID, participantIDs := p.ChannelID, p.UserID, result.ParticipantIDs
s.bg(func() {
s.applyMentionCounts(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), channelID, msgID, authorID, mentions, isDM, participantIDs)
})
slog.Debug("message sent", "user", p.Username, "channel_id", p.ChannelID, "msg_id", msgID)
return result, nil
}
// sendMessagePrecheck runs every gate a send must clear before anything is
// written: rate limit, channel lookup, send permission, content sanitization,
// attachment permission and slow mode. It returns the resolved channel and the
// sanitized content for the caller to persist.
func (s *MessageService) sendMessagePrecheck(ctx context.Context, p SendMessageParams) (*db.Channel, string, error) {
// Rate limit.
ratKey := auth.Key("chat", p.UserID)
if s.limiter != nil && !s.limiter.Allow(ratKey, 10, time.Second) {
return nil, "", ErrRateLimited
}
if p.ChannelID <= 0 {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: channel_id must be a positive integer", ErrBadRequest)
}
ch, err := s.st.GetChannel(ctx, p.ChannelID)
if err != nil || ch == nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: channel not found", ErrNotFound)
}
isDM := ch.Type == "dm"
// Permission check. Also refuses a write against an archived channel — see
// requireChannelWritable in message_perms.go, the shared gate every
// message write sink routes through.
if err := s.checkSendPermission(ctx, p.UserID, ch); err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
// Validate and sanitize content.
content, err := sanitizeContent(p.Content, len(p.AttachmentIDs) > 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
// Attachment permission (non-DM).
if !isDM && len(p.AttachmentIDs) > 0 {
if !s.perms.HasChannelPerm(ctx, p.UserID, p.ChannelID, permissions.AttachFiles) {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: missing ATTACH_FILES permission", ErrForbidden)
}
}
// Slow mode (non-DM only). Deliberately checked last, after content and
// attachment validation: Allow() below records the cooldown timestamp the
// instant it returns true, so a send that fails validation after this
// point must not have already spent the once-per-window token — that
// would lock the composer for up to ch.SlowMode seconds for a send that
// never actually posted anything.
if !isDM && ch.SlowMode > 0 && !s.perms.HasChannelPerm(ctx, p.UserID, p.ChannelID, permissions.ManageMessages) {
slowKey := auth.Key(auth.Key("slow", p.UserID), p.ChannelID)
if s.limiter != nil && !s.limiter.Allow(slowKey, 1, time.Duration(ch.SlowMode)*time.Second) {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: channel has %ds slow mode", ErrSlowMode, ch.SlowMode)
}
}
return ch, content, nil
}
// sendMessageLinkAttachments links the requested uploads to the message row
// that was just committed and returns the attachment data the broadcast needs.
// Nothing requested is a no-op. A failed link, or a link that attached nothing
// to a message with no content of its own, compensates by soft-deleting the
// row and returns the error the caller surfaces to the sender.
func (s *MessageService) sendMessageLinkAttachments(ctx context.Context, p SendMessageParams, msgID int64, content string) ([]db.AttachmentInfo, error) {
if len(p.AttachmentIDs) == 0 {
return nil, nil
}
// Link attachments. Ownership is enforced atomically inside the link
// UPDATE itself (uploader match + still unlinked), so another user's
// upload, an already-linked attachment, or a nonexistent id is skipped by
// the statement — no check-then-link race and no N+1 pre-verification.
var attachments []db.AttachmentInfo
linked, linkErr := s.st.LinkAttachmentsToMessage(ctx, msgID, p.UserID, p.AttachmentIDs)
if linkErr != nil {
slog.Error("MessageService.SendMessage LinkAttachments", "err", linkErr, "msg_id", msgID)
// Cleanup: soft-delete the message. The compensating delete must run
// even when the link failed because the request ctx was canceled.
if delErr := s.st.DeleteMessage(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), msgID, p.UserID, true); delErr != nil {
slog.Error("MessageService.SendMessage DeleteMessage (cleanup)", "err", delErr, "msg_id", msgID)
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: failed to send message with attachments", ErrInternal)
}
if linked < int64(len(p.AttachmentIDs)) {
slog.Warn("MessageService.SendMessage: skipped attachments (not owned, already linked, or missing)",
"msg_id", msgID, "user_id", p.UserID, "requested", len(p.AttachmentIDs), "linked", linked)
}
if linked == 0 && content == "" {
// sanitizeContent waived the empty-content check purely on the
// requested attachment count, before any link attempt. None of
// them actually linked (all missing, foreign, or already
// linked — e.g. a retry of a partially-completed send), so the
// row that just committed has no content and no attachments.
// Compensate the same way the linkErr path above does, rather
// than broadcasting a blank message.
if delErr := s.st.DeleteMessage(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), msgID, p.UserID, true); delErr != nil {
slog.Error("MessageService.SendMessage DeleteMessage (empty-after-link cleanup)", "err", delErr, "msg_id", msgID)
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: message content cannot be empty", ErrBadRequest)
}
if linked > 0 {
// Detached from ctx for the same reason as the compensating deletes
// above: the link already committed, so a request ctx canceled the
// instant it returns (sender disconnects right after) must not turn
// a successful attachment-only send into a blank broadcast bubble.
attMap, attErr := s.st.GetAttachmentsByMessageIDs(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), []int64{msgID})
if attErr != nil {
slog.Error("MessageService.SendMessage GetAttachments", "err", attErr)
} else {
attachments = attMap[msgID]
}
}
return attachments, nil
}
// sendMessageDMSideEffects fills in the DM-specific fields of result and
// (re)opens the DM for every other participant. It reports false when the
// participant lookup failed, which is the one case where the caller returns
// the already-saved message without the remaining side effects.
func (s *MessageService) sendMessageDMSideEffects(ctx context.Context, p SendMessageParams, result *SendMessageResult) bool {
// The message is already committed, so everything below must survive
// the sender's connection dropping the instant the write commits — the
// same reason the compensating deletes and applyMentionCounts below
// detach from ctx. Without WithoutCancel, a canceled request ctx here
// silently drops every recipient from the fan-out (ParticipantIDs
// stays nil), skips re-opening the recipient's dm_open_state, and
// degrades the payload shape — with no error surfaced to anyone: the
// sender sees chat_send_ok and the other participant never gets the
// message live.
bgCtx := context.WithoutCancel(ctx)
participantIDs, pErr := s.st.GetDMParticipantIDs(bgCtx, p.ChannelID)
if pErr != nil {
slog.Error("MessageService.SendMessage GetDMParticipantIDs", "err", pErr, "channel_id", p.ChannelID)
return false
}
result.ParticipantIDs = participantIDs
sender, _ := s.st.GetUserByID(bgCtx, p.UserID)
result.SenderUser = sender
// Viewer-neutral (viewerID 0 matches nobody, so every status is
// broadcast-collapsed); the ws layer re-derives "who is the recipient"
// per addressee. A read failure is non-fatal — the message is already
// committed, and the caller falls back to the 1:1 shape.
if participants, partErr := s.st.GetDMParticipants(bgCtx, p.ChannelID, 0); partErr == nil {
result.DMParticipants = participants
} else {
slog.Warn("MessageService.SendMessage GetDMParticipants", "err", partErr, "channel_id", p.ChannelID)
}
if isGroup, gErr := s.st.IsGroupDM(bgCtx, p.ChannelID); gErr == nil {
result.DMIsGroup = isGroup
}
for _, pid := range participantIDs {
if pid == p.UserID {
continue
}
// OpenDM is INSERT OR IGNORE and idempotent: opened reports whether
// this call actually inserted the row. Only a genuine (re)open goes
// into OpenedDMFor — the ws layer emits a dm_channel_open per id in
// that slice, and each one bumps the hub's global visibility
// watermark, forcing every other connected client's next reconnect
// onto a full resync. An already-open DM must not pay that cost on
// every single message.
opened, openErr := s.st.OpenDM(bgCtx, pid, p.ChannelID)
if openErr != nil {
slog.Error("MessageService.SendMessage OpenDM", "err", openErr, "recipient_id", pid, "channel_id", p.ChannelID)
continue
}
if opened {
result.OpenedDMFor = append(result.OpenedDMFor, pid)
}
}
return true
}
// EditMessage validates and persists a message edit.
func (s *MessageService) EditMessage(ctx context.Context, userID, msgID int64, rawContent string) (*EditMessageResult, error) {
// Rate limit.
ratKey := auth.Key("chat_edit", userID)
if s.limiter != nil && !s.limiter.Allow(ratKey, 10, time.Second) {
return nil, ErrRateLimited
}
if msgID <= 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: message_id must be positive integer", ErrBadRequest)
}
content, err := sanitizeContent(rawContent, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Fetch message.
msg, err := s.st.GetMessage(ctx, msgID)
if err != nil || msg == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot edit this message", ErrForbidden)
}
if msg.Deleted {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot edit this message", ErrDeletedMessage)
}
// Channel type for DM-aware permissions. Fail closed: a lookup failure must
// not fall through with chanType="", which routes into the non-DM
// permission branch below. That branch passes on the base role mask alone
// (SEND_MESSAGES|READ_MESSAGES, no per-channel override exists for a DM),
// skipping both the DM-participant check and requireDMNotBlocked entirely.
ch, chErr := s.st.GetChannel(ctx, msg.ChannelID)
if chErr != nil || ch == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot edit this message", ErrForbidden)
}
chanType := ch.Type
isDM := chanType == "dm"
if accessErr := s.editMessageCheckAccess(ctx, userID, msg.ChannelID, ch, isDM); accessErr != nil {
return nil, accessErr
}
// EditMessage checks ownership internally and returns the updated row via
// RETURNING, so the edited_at the broadcast needs arrives with the write.
msg, err = s.st.EditMessage(ctx, msgID, userID, content)
if err != nil || msg == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot edit this message", ErrForbidden)
}
editedAt := ""
if msg.EditedAt != nil {
editedAt = *msg.EditedAt
}
// Re-resolve mentions from the new content and replace the stored set, so a
// mention added by an edit is highlighted and one removed by an edit stops
// being. Mention counts are deliberately NOT advanced here: an edit that
// re-adds an already-counted mention would otherwise raise the badge twice,
// and "only the original insert can raise a badge" is the simplest rule that
// is always correct.
mentions := s.resolveMentions(ctx, content, userID, msg.ChannelID, isDM)
if mErr := s.st.ReplaceMessageMentions(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), msgID, mentions.UserIDs, mentions.Everyone); mErr != nil {
slog.Error("MessageService.EditMessage ReplaceMessageMentions", "err", mErr, "msg_id", msgID)
}
result := &EditMessageResult{
MessageID: msgID,
ChannelID: msg.ChannelID,
Content: content,
EditedAt: editedAt,
IsDM: isDM,
Mentions: mentions.UserIDs,
MentionsEveryone: mentions.Everyone,
}
if isDM {
// Detached from ctx for the same reason as the SendMessage post-commit
// lookup: the edit already committed, so an editor whose connection
// drops right after must not silently drop the chat_edited fan-out.
participantIDs, pErr := s.st.GetDMParticipantIDs(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), msg.ChannelID)
if pErr != nil {
slog.Error("MessageService.EditMessage GetDMParticipantIDs", "err", pErr, "channel_id", msg.ChannelID)
} else {
result.ParticipantIDs = participantIDs
}
}
slog.Debug("message edited", "user_id", userID, "msg_id", msgID, "channel_id", msg.ChannelID)
return result, nil
}
// editMessageCheckAccess gates an edit on the channel the message lives in:
// participation plus the block check for a DM, the shared send gate for
// everything else. isDM is the caller's already-computed ch.Type == "dm".
func (s *MessageService) editMessageCheckAccess(ctx context.Context, userID, channelID int64, ch *db.Channel, isDM bool) error {
if isDM {
ok, dmErr := s.st.IsDMParticipant(ctx, userID, channelID)
if dmErr != nil || !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot edit this message", ErrForbidden)
}
if blkErr := requireDMNotBlocked(ctx, s.st, userID, channelID); blkErr != nil {
return blkErr
}
} else if permErr := s.checkSendPermission(ctx, userID, ch); permErr != nil {
// An edit injects new text into the channel and is fanned out to every
// reader, so it must clear the same gate as a send rather than
// SEND_MESSAGES alone: READ_MESSAGES so a role locked out of a private
// channel (the panel's "Can access" toggle denies
// READ_MESSAGES|CONNECT_VOICE and leaves SEND_MESSAGES intact) cannot
// rewrite its old posts, and the announcement rule so a demoted
// moderator cannot rewrite a trusted broadcast. Mirrors DeleteMessage,
// SetMessagePinned and handleReaction, which already require
// READ_MESSAGES. The reason is collapsed into this sink's single opaque
// error so the reply stays an ownership/permission non-oracle.
return fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot edit this message", ErrForbidden)
}
return nil
}
// DeleteMessage validates and soft-deletes a message.
func (s *MessageService) DeleteMessage(ctx context.Context, userID, msgID int64) (*DeleteMessageResult, error) {
// Rate limit.
ratKey := auth.Key("chat_delete", userID)
if s.limiter != nil && !s.limiter.Allow(ratKey, 10, time.Second) {
return nil, ErrRateLimited
}
if msgID <= 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: message_id must be positive integer", ErrBadRequest)
}
msg, err := s.st.GetMessage(ctx, msgID)
if err != nil || msg == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot delete this message", ErrForbidden)
}
// Fail closed, mirroring EditMessage: a lookup failure must not fall
// through to the non-DM permission branch (skipping the DM-participant
// check) or past the archived gate below.
ch, chErr := s.st.GetChannel(ctx, msg.ChannelID)
if chErr != nil || ch == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot delete this message", ErrForbidden)
}
isDM := ch.Type == "dm"
// Archived channels are read-only — see requireChannelWritable in
// message_perms.go, the shared gate every message write sink routes
// through.
if err := requireChannelWritable(ch); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var isMod bool
if isDM {
ok, dmErr := s.st.IsDMParticipant(ctx, userID, msg.ChannelID)
if dmErr != nil || !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot delete this message", ErrForbidden)
}
} else {
// Require READ_MESSAGES alongside MANAGE_MESSAGES (and alongside
// SEND_MESSAGES on the author path) so a role explicitly denied access to
// a channel cannot delete messages in it. Mirrors handleReaction and
// checkSendPermission, which both require ReadMessages for non-DM channels.
isMsgOwner := msg.UserID == userID
canManage := s.perms.HasChannelPerm(ctx, userID, msg.ChannelID, permissions.ReadMessages|permissions.ManageMessages)
canDelete := canManage || (isMsgOwner && s.perms.HasChannelPerm(ctx, userID, msg.ChannelID, permissions.ReadMessages|permissions.SendMessages))
if !canDelete {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot delete this message", ErrForbidden)
}
// db.DeleteMessage skips the ownership check when ismod is true, so the
// moderation flag must reuse the decision made above rather than
// re-checking MANAGE_MESSAGES without READ_MESSAGES.
isMod = canManage
}
if err := s.st.DeleteMessage(ctx, msgID, userID, isMod); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot delete this message", ErrForbidden)
}
slog.Debug("message deleted", "user_id", userID, "msg_id", msgID, "channel_id", msg.ChannelID, "is_mod", isMod)
// Audit rows must survive a request canceled after the delete committed.
db.WriteAudit(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), s.st, userID, "message_delete", "message", msgID,
fmt.Sprintf("channel %d, mod_action=%v", msg.ChannelID, isMod))
result := &DeleteMessageResult{
MessageID: msgID,
ChannelID: msg.ChannelID,
IsDM: isDM,
IsMod: isMod,
}
if isDM {
// Detached from ctx for the same reason as the send/edit paths: the
// soft-delete already committed, so a deleter whose connection drops
// right after must not silently drop the chat_deleted fan-out.
participantIDs, pErr := s.st.GetDMParticipantIDs(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), msg.ChannelID)
if pErr != nil {
slog.Error("MessageService.DeleteMessage GetDMParticipantIDs", "err", pErr, "channel_id", msg.ChannelID)
} else {
result.ParticipantIDs = participantIDs
}
}
return result, nil
}