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* refactor(ws): split handleVoiceJoin into cohesive join-stage helpers handleVoiceJoin was 130 statements / cyclomatic 59 / nestif 11, breaking all three complexity budgets at once. Split along the stage boundaries the doc comment already described: precheck, leave-current, persist, restore moderator flags, grant token, complete. The publish-permission derivation becomes its own helper because it is the one branch-heavy block inside the token grant. Pure move: every statement is preserved verbatim. The only edits are bare `return`s becoming the typed returns of their new helper, `c.userID` becoming the `userID` parameter inside voiceJoinPublishPerms, and voiceJoinComplete re-reading `ch.VoiceMaxUsers` instead of receiving it — `ch` is never mutated, so the value is identical. Verified by normalising both revisions of the region to sorted, comment- and whitespace-stripped statements and diffing: the only deltas are the ones listed above. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: collapse the three duplicated sibling pairs dupl flagged three pairs of adjacent near-identical functions. Each pair is now one parameterised implementation plus two thin, still-greppable wrappers. - ws/voice_controls.go: handleVoiceMuteV2 / handleVoiceDeafenV2 share voiceSelfToggleV2; handleVoiceCameraV2 / handleVoiceScreenshareV2 share voiceStreamToggleV2. Camera and screenshare drawing from one voice_max_video budget (OC-0023) was a bug caused by exactly this duplication drifting, so one body is the point, not a side effect. - db/mention_queries.go: ListMentionTargetsByRoles / ListMentionTargetsByUserIDs share listMentionTargets. The matched column is a closed named type (mentionTargetColumn) rather than a bare string, so the value interpolated into the SELECT cannot become caller-supplied. Behaviour is unchanged: every rate-limit key, error code, error string, slog message and slog key is preserved verbatim, including the two "failed to update <kind> state" messages, which are now assembled the same way enableVideoSlot already assembled them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): extract readEmojiUpload from handleCreateEmoji handleCreateEmoji was 101 lines against a 100-line budget. The upload-bytes stage — pull the file out of the parsed form, cap its size, sniff its MIME type and sniff its dimensions — is the one self-contained block in it, and it already wrote its own refusals, so it moves out whole as readEmojiUpload. The permission-before-parse ordering the doc comment calls out is unchanged; so is every error string. file.Close() now runs when the helper returns rather than when the handler does, which is strictly earlier and unobservable: the bytes are already copied into raw and nothing else touches the handle. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: extract one cohesive block from three single-budget offenders Each of these was over exactly one budget, so each gets exactly one extraction rather than a restructure: - api/totp_handler.go handleVerifyTOTP (102 lines / 100): the block that resolves the user behind the partial-auth challenge and decrypts their TOTP secret becomes totpChallengeSecret. The ban-inside-the-partial-window check moves with it. - service/message_reactions.go handleReaction (cyclop 21 / 20): the whole authorisation chain — channel lookup, archived gate, DM participant and block checks, non-DM permission check — becomes reactionAudience, which also returns the DM fan-out audience it already resolved. Check order is unchanged and load-bearing. - db/admin_queries.go BackupToSafe (cyclop 21 / 20): the character allowlist loop and the SQL-comment rejection become validateBackupPathChars. That loop alone was most of the branch count. No error string, no check and no ordering changed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(plugin): split InstallFromZip into staged install helpers 104 statements / cyclomatic 44 / nestif 12. Split along the stages the code already had: installZipExtract (the per-entry write loop, with installZipEntryDest holding the mode/symlink/zip-slip guard chain and installZipWriteEntry the size-capped copy), installZipStagedManifest, installZipPromote, and installZipReactivate for the :399 nested block. Every zip-slip, symlink, entry-mode and uncompressed-size check is preserved in the same order relative to the writes it guards. The 19 inline `cleanup(); return` sites collapse to 4 in the orchestrator, one per stage, because each helper now returns an error instead of unwinding itself — the staging directory is still removed on exactly the same set of failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): split newWAFMiddleware into engine build and per-phase helpers 184 lines / cyclomatic 38, and the request-body block at :382 was the worst nested site in the tree at nestif 17. Engine construction moves out of the closure (wafInlineEngine, wafCRSEngine — the Coraza directive string is lifted verbatim), and each request phase becomes its own helper: wafInlineRequestHeaders, wafCRSRequestHeaders (including the Host/Transfer-Encoding re-add for CRS 920280), wafFeedCRSBody and wafInspectRequestBody, which is the old :382 block. The three `handleWAFInterruption(w, it); return` sites inside the body block become one: the helper now returns the interruption and the orchestrator handles it. No statement runs between the two points on either side, so the verdict is honoured identically — in particular a CRS body interruption still returns without replacing r.Body. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(service): split SendMessage and lift EditMessage's access check SendMessage was 79 statements / cyclomatic 35 with an 11-deep nested attachment block at :101; EditMessage was one point over cyclop. SendMessage becomes sendMessagePrecheck (permission and DM-block gates, content sanitisation), sendMessageLinkAttachments (the :101 block: attachment ownership, claim and link) and sendMessageDMSideEffects. EditMessage gets editMessageCheckAccess and nothing else — one budget over earns one extraction. The sanitizeContent fixpoint and the attachment ownership check are unchanged, as is the order of every gate. The DM side effects run behind `isDM && !s.sendMessageDMSideEffects(...)`, so a non-DM never enters them; inside, only the GetDMParticipantIDs failure returns false, matching the one error the original early-returned on. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(admin): split handlePatchUser into per-field apply helpers 106 lines / cyclomatic 29, with the ban block at :154 nested 9 deep. Each optional field of the partial edit becomes its own helper — patchUserPrecheck, patchUserAuthorizeRole, patchUserApplyBan (the :154 block, including the session disconnect and the broadcast) and patchUserApplyRole. Each returns a bool meaning "keep going"; none of them writes a success response, so the single response site in the orchestrator is unchanged. Field application order, the permission-cache invalidation on a role change and the disconnect-and-broadcast on a ban are all preserved, as are the three fail-closed `mod == nil` guards, which now sit at the top of their own helper and still fire on exactly the same conditions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(admin): split handleSetup into first-run setup stages 143 lines / cyclomatic 30, with the optional-wizard block at :219 sitting exactly on the nestif threshold. Split into the stages the endpoint already had: request gating (rate limit and origin check, which run before any auth exists on a fresh server), owner account creation, and the wizard application that was the :219 block. Every gate in front of the handler is a security control on an unauthenticated endpoint; none moved relative to the work it protects. setup_wizard.go is untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: split run() into named bootstrap and shutdown steps 131 statements / cyclomatic 57, with the executable-path fallback at :126 nested 9 deep. The five anonymous `defer func(){...}()` blocks become named functions — telemetryStop, runClosePlugins, runStopEventPersistence, runStopAuditWriter, maintenanceStop — and the bootstrap stages move out likewise. Every defer is still registered in run() itself, at the same point in the sequence, so the LIFO teardown order is unchanged; that order is documented in the surrounding comments and is load-bearing (the audit-writer stop must follow database.Close's registration, the event-persistence stop must precede it). runStopEventPersistence is now registered unconditionally with a nil persister meaning "disabled", where the old code registered its defer inside the enabled branch — a no-op occupying that slot cannot change the relative order of the others. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(ws): split handleReconnect into resume stages 77 statements / cyclomatic 41, plus the replay block at :199 and, in handleFreshConnect, the voice-state restore at :622. handleReconnect becomes reconnectPrecheck, reconnectSelectReplay (with reconnectVetColdTail for the cold-tier gap check), reconnectRegister and reconnectWriteReplay. handleFreshConnect's stale-voice cleanup moves to its own helper, where the `if h.livekit != nil` wrapper becomes a guard clause — that block was the tail of its scope, so returning early and falling off the end are the same. The parts that carry the invariants are moved verbatim: reconnectRegister still takes h.seqMu, still calls registerNow inside that same critical section (BUG-123 / OC-0206), still unlocks on every exit, and still emits the "full" tier counter and telemetry on each of its three re-check failures. handleReconnect's two-boolean contract is unchanged — the collapsed `return false, false` sites are all fall-through-to-full-ready, and the single `return true, false` is still the handshake-write-failure path whose teardown already ran (OC-0051). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(server): fold in the adversarial review of the complexity refactors Eleven skeptic passes over the refactor commits on this branch found no blocker and no major — behaviour is preserved throughout. They did find comment and accuracy defects worth correcting: - db/mention_queries.go: the mentionTargetColumn rationale claimed the named type made the interpolated column "only ever one of the two constants". A Go named type is not closed, so that is a convention the type makes visible, not one it enforces. Reworded, gosec justification included. - ws/voice_controls.go: the dupl collapse generalised away three specifics — that a server deafen is the moderator's to lift (now on the serverDeafen field), the concrete voice_states.camera / voice_states.screenshare column names, and the half of the OC-0023 rationale about neither stream kind hiding from the other's count. All three restored. - ws/voice_join.go: `maxUsers := ch.VoiceMaxUsers` had been hoisted to the top of voiceJoinComplete, moving a read across the tail supersession guard. The read is inert, but it was the one statement in that commit whose position relative to a security guard changed; it now sits at its use, as before. - ws/*_test.go: three test comments cited voice_join.go line numbers that the split invalidated. They now cite the helper by name instead. - service/message_reactions.go: reactionAudience's doc claimed to enforce "every gate on reacting"; it enforces the channel-scoped ones, and the doc now says which gates stay with the caller. - api/emoji_handler.go: the readEmojiUpload call reused the outer `ok` from the auth check by assignment; it gets its own readOK. - admin/setup_handler.go: a moved comment kept a "the response above" deictic that no longer had a response above it. No behaviour change. Build, vet, full tests and -race on five packages green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(ws): clear the remaining complexity budgets across the hub Eight files, thirteen findings. Each function is split at the stages it already had; no branch is reordered, merged or inverted. - handlers.go handleMessage (cyclop 28, 88 stmts): session re-check, frame decode and result application become handleMessageSessionRecheck, handleMessageDecode and handleMessageApply. The V2 constructor lookup -> DispatchV2 -> Result resolution order is untouched. - serve_ready.go buildReady (cyclop 26, 61 stmts): the per-section fetches split out, readyChannelPayloads among them. Every visibility predicate is preserved verbatim — this is the payload that decides what a client may see. - serve_pumps.go writePump (cyclop 31): writePumpWrite, writePumpDeliver, writePumpDrainChannel and writePumpDrainAndClose. Every channel receive stays in the same select statement, so scheduling is unchanged. - hub_sweep.go sweepStaleVoiceStates (cyclop 22, 56 stmts): the staleness predicate, the hub-lock ordering and the position of the race hook are all as they were — handleVoiceJoin's BUG-088 ordering depends on them. - hub_broadcast.go channelReadAudienceImpl and RefreshChannelVisibility (cyclop 22 each, 57 stmts): channelReadAudienceDM and refreshChannelVisibilityCanSend. The audience predicate is the OC-0090 group-DM leak surface, so it is extracted, never simplified. - livekit_webhook.go (nestif 13 and 14): webhookJoinedEnforceVoiceState, webhookLeftCleanupClient and webhookLeftFinishLeave. DB delete still precedes broadcast on every path. - livekit_download.go EnsureLiveKitBinary (52 stmts): one extraction, ensureLiveKitStageBinary, keeping every archive path check intact. - voice_moderation.go (nestif 8): voiceModDeafenRollback. The persisted server_muted flag remains the authority. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): clear the remaining complexity budgets across the HTTP layer - router.go NewRouter (cyclop 28, 84 stmts): split by wiring concern into routerTOTPKey, routerHealthDeps, routerMiddleware, routerUploadRoutes, routerPluginWiring, routerVoiceRoutes and routerMetricsRoutes. Middleware ORDER is a security property (auth before handler, WAF before body parse, rate limit before work) and is unchanged; the returned cleanup func still closes over and releases everything it did before. - auth_handler.go handleRegister (133 lines) and handleLogin (cyclop 21, 152 lines): registerPolicyGate, registerReadRequest, loginReadRequest and loginAuthenticate. The always-compare posture, every rate-limit key, every counter reset and the ban-check-versus-password-compare order are all preserved — including loginUserFailureThreshold staying unscaled by scaledAuthLimit, which is deliberate and commented. - upload_handler.go handleServeFile (cyclop 31, 128 lines): serveFileResolve and serveFileAuthorize. Every header this sets — Content-Disposition included, which is what stops a stored file being served as active content — is still set with the same value in the same circumstances. - profile_handler.go handleUploadAvatar (120 lines): avatarUploadReadImage, mirroring readEmojiUpload in shape but with the avatar caps and MIME set. The two deliberately do not share a helper. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: clear the last complexity budgets in db and admin - db/account.go DeleteAccount (cyclop 28, 55 stmts): grouped by subsystem into deleteAccountAdminGuard, deleteAccountDMChannels and deleteAccountCloseDMChannels, each taking the same transaction. The transaction boundary, the delete ORDER (which foreign keys depend on) and the rollback path are unchanged. - admin/logstream.go handleLogStream (cyclop 24): logStreamAuthorize. Flush cadence, heartbeat and disconnect detection untouched. - admin/setup_wizard.go validateWizard (cyclop 23): grouped by section into wizardValidateIdentity, wizardValidateNetwork and wizardValidateMedia. Every message and bound is unchanged — this is the first input-validation boundary on a fresh server, before any auth exists. With this the tree is at zero: golangci-lint run reports 0 issues against the budgets set in #1384 (funlen 100/50, cyclop 20, nestif 8, dupl 150), with no //nolint and no exclusion added anywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
491 lines
21 KiB
Go
491 lines
21 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"time"
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"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
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"github.com/owncord/server/db"
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"github.com/owncord/server/permissions"
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"github.com/owncord/server/telemetry"
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)
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// SendMessage validates, persists, and prepares broadcast data for a new message.
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// Callers are responsible for emitting the appropriate events.
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func (s *MessageService) SendMessage(ctx context.Context, p SendMessageParams) (*SendMessageResult, error) {
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// Phase B Step 8 — wrap the public service entrypoint in a tracing span
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// and a duration histogram. Both are no-ops in the default build.
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ctx, span := telemetry.GlobalTracer("service/message").Start(ctx, "MessageService.SendMessage",
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telemetry.Int64("user_id", p.UserID),
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telemetry.Int64("channel_id", p.ChannelID),
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)
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start := time.Now()
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defer func() {
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telemetry.TimeSince(ctx, telemetry.NewAppMetrics().ServiceCallDurationSec, start,
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telemetry.String("method", "SendMessage"))
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span.End()
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}()
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ch, content, err := s.sendMessagePrecheck(ctx, p)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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isDM := ch.Type == "dm"
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// Resolve mentions against the sanitized content, before the insert, so the
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// row and its mention set are written together. Unknown @words and an
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// unauthorized @everyone resolve to nothing and stay plain text.
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mentions := s.resolveMentions(ctx, content, p.UserID, p.ChannelID, isDM)
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// Persist message. RETURNING hands back the inserted row, so the DB-assigned
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// timestamp the fan-out needs arrives with the insert instead of a re-read.
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msg, err := s.st.CreateMessageWithMentions(ctx, p.ChannelID, p.UserID, content, p.ReplyTo,
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mentions.UserIDs, mentions.Everyone)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Error("MessageService.SendMessage CreateMessage", "err", err)
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: failed to save message", ErrInternal)
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}
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msgID := msg.ID
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attachments, err := s.sendMessageLinkAttachments(ctx, p, msgID, content)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// Advance the author's own read state past the message they just sent.
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// Both unread queries count "messages with id > my read_states row" and
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// neither filters by author, so without this an author's own message
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// counts as unread to themselves: post in a channel, navigate away, and
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// the next `ready` restates it as an unread badge that never clears until
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// something else marks the channel read.
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//
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// Done here rather than by adding an author filter to the two queries so
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// the stored read state stays truthful — you have, in fact, seen your own
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// message — and so the fix covers DMs and text channels through one path.
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//
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// Best-effort: the message is already committed and broadcast-bound, so a
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// failure here must not fail the send. The worst case is the pre-existing
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// stale-badge behaviour, which the next mark_read corrects.
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if err := s.st.UpdateReadState(ctx, p.UserID, p.ChannelID, msgID); err != nil {
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slog.Warn("MessageService.SendMessage: could not advance author read state",
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"err", err, "user_id", p.UserID, "channel_id", p.ChannelID, "msg_id", msgID)
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}
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result := &SendMessageResult{
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MessageID: msgID,
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Timestamp: msg.Timestamp,
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Content: content,
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IsDM: isDM,
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Channel: ch,
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Attachments: attachments,
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Mentions: mentions.UserIDs,
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MentionsEveryone: mentions.Everyone,
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}
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// DM path: open DM for recipients.
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if isDM && !s.sendMessageDMSideEffects(ctx, p, result) {
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return result, nil // Message saved, skip DM side effects.
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}
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// Mention badges run off the send path: the message is already committed, so
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// the recipients' badge bookkeeping (the full reader-resolution chain plus
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// the batched increment) must not delay delivering the message to the rest
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// of the channel. The ctx is detached from cancellation — for the same
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// reason audit writes are — so a client hanging up mid-request cannot drop
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// the badges. If a reader's channel_focus clears the badge in the tiny
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// window before the increment lands, IncrementMentionCounts' own read-state
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// guard (msgID vs. last_message_id) makes the increment a no-op instead of
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// resurrecting it — the badge does not reappear.
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channelID, authorID, participantIDs := p.ChannelID, p.UserID, result.ParticipantIDs
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s.bg(func() {
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s.applyMentionCounts(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), channelID, msgID, authorID, mentions, isDM, participantIDs)
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})
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slog.Debug("message sent", "user", p.Username, "channel_id", p.ChannelID, "msg_id", msgID)
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return result, nil
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}
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// sendMessagePrecheck runs every gate a send must clear before anything is
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// written: rate limit, channel lookup, send permission, content sanitization,
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// attachment permission and slow mode. It returns the resolved channel and the
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// sanitized content for the caller to persist.
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func (s *MessageService) sendMessagePrecheck(ctx context.Context, p SendMessageParams) (*db.Channel, string, error) {
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// Rate limit.
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ratKey := auth.Key("chat", p.UserID)
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if s.limiter != nil && !s.limiter.Allow(ratKey, 10, time.Second) {
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return nil, "", ErrRateLimited
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}
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if p.ChannelID <= 0 {
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return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: channel_id must be a positive integer", ErrBadRequest)
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}
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ch, err := s.st.GetChannel(ctx, p.ChannelID)
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if err != nil || ch == nil {
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return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: channel not found", ErrNotFound)
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}
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isDM := ch.Type == "dm"
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// Permission check. Also refuses a write against an archived channel — see
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// requireChannelWritable in message_perms.go, the shared gate every
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// message write sink routes through.
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if err := s.checkSendPermission(ctx, p.UserID, ch); err != nil {
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return nil, "", err
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}
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// Validate and sanitize content.
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content, err := sanitizeContent(p.Content, len(p.AttachmentIDs) > 0)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, "", err
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}
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// Attachment permission (non-DM).
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if !isDM && len(p.AttachmentIDs) > 0 {
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if !s.perms.HasChannelPerm(ctx, p.UserID, p.ChannelID, permissions.AttachFiles) {
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return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: missing ATTACH_FILES permission", ErrForbidden)
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}
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}
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// Slow mode (non-DM only). Deliberately checked last, after content and
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// attachment validation: Allow() below records the cooldown timestamp the
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// instant it returns true, so a send that fails validation after this
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// point must not have already spent the once-per-window token — that
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// would lock the composer for up to ch.SlowMode seconds for a send that
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// never actually posted anything.
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if !isDM && ch.SlowMode > 0 && !s.perms.HasChannelPerm(ctx, p.UserID, p.ChannelID, permissions.ManageMessages) {
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slowKey := auth.Key(auth.Key("slow", p.UserID), p.ChannelID)
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if s.limiter != nil && !s.limiter.Allow(slowKey, 1, time.Duration(ch.SlowMode)*time.Second) {
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return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: channel has %ds slow mode", ErrSlowMode, ch.SlowMode)
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}
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}
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return ch, content, nil
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}
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// sendMessageLinkAttachments links the requested uploads to the message row
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// that was just committed and returns the attachment data the broadcast needs.
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// Nothing requested is a no-op. A failed link, or a link that attached nothing
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// to a message with no content of its own, compensates by soft-deleting the
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// row and returns the error the caller surfaces to the sender.
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func (s *MessageService) sendMessageLinkAttachments(ctx context.Context, p SendMessageParams, msgID int64, content string) ([]db.AttachmentInfo, error) {
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if len(p.AttachmentIDs) == 0 {
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return nil, nil
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}
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// Link attachments. Ownership is enforced atomically inside the link
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// UPDATE itself (uploader match + still unlinked), so another user's
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// upload, an already-linked attachment, or a nonexistent id is skipped by
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// the statement — no check-then-link race and no N+1 pre-verification.
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var attachments []db.AttachmentInfo
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linked, linkErr := s.st.LinkAttachmentsToMessage(ctx, msgID, p.UserID, p.AttachmentIDs)
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if linkErr != nil {
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slog.Error("MessageService.SendMessage LinkAttachments", "err", linkErr, "msg_id", msgID)
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// Cleanup: soft-delete the message. The compensating delete must run
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// even when the link failed because the request ctx was canceled.
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if delErr := s.st.DeleteMessage(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), msgID, p.UserID, true); delErr != nil {
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slog.Error("MessageService.SendMessage DeleteMessage (cleanup)", "err", delErr, "msg_id", msgID)
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}
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: failed to send message with attachments", ErrInternal)
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}
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if linked < int64(len(p.AttachmentIDs)) {
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slog.Warn("MessageService.SendMessage: skipped attachments (not owned, already linked, or missing)",
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"msg_id", msgID, "user_id", p.UserID, "requested", len(p.AttachmentIDs), "linked", linked)
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}
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if linked == 0 && content == "" {
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// sanitizeContent waived the empty-content check purely on the
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// requested attachment count, before any link attempt. None of
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// them actually linked (all missing, foreign, or already
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// linked — e.g. a retry of a partially-completed send), so the
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// row that just committed has no content and no attachments.
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// Compensate the same way the linkErr path above does, rather
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// than broadcasting a blank message.
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if delErr := s.st.DeleteMessage(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), msgID, p.UserID, true); delErr != nil {
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slog.Error("MessageService.SendMessage DeleteMessage (empty-after-link cleanup)", "err", delErr, "msg_id", msgID)
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}
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: message content cannot be empty", ErrBadRequest)
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}
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if linked > 0 {
|
|
// Detached from ctx for the same reason as the compensating deletes
|
|
// above: the link already committed, so a request ctx canceled the
|
|
// instant it returns (sender disconnects right after) must not turn
|
|
// a successful attachment-only send into a blank broadcast bubble.
|
|
attMap, attErr := s.st.GetAttachmentsByMessageIDs(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), []int64{msgID})
|
|
if attErr != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("MessageService.SendMessage GetAttachments", "err", attErr)
|
|
} else {
|
|
attachments = attMap[msgID]
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return attachments, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sendMessageDMSideEffects fills in the DM-specific fields of result and
|
|
// (re)opens the DM for every other participant. It reports false when the
|
|
// participant lookup failed, which is the one case where the caller returns
|
|
// the already-saved message without the remaining side effects.
|
|
func (s *MessageService) sendMessageDMSideEffects(ctx context.Context, p SendMessageParams, result *SendMessageResult) bool {
|
|
// The message is already committed, so everything below must survive
|
|
// the sender's connection dropping the instant the write commits — the
|
|
// same reason the compensating deletes and applyMentionCounts below
|
|
// detach from ctx. Without WithoutCancel, a canceled request ctx here
|
|
// silently drops every recipient from the fan-out (ParticipantIDs
|
|
// stays nil), skips re-opening the recipient's dm_open_state, and
|
|
// degrades the payload shape — with no error surfaced to anyone: the
|
|
// sender sees chat_send_ok and the other participant never gets the
|
|
// message live.
|
|
bgCtx := context.WithoutCancel(ctx)
|
|
participantIDs, pErr := s.st.GetDMParticipantIDs(bgCtx, p.ChannelID)
|
|
if pErr != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("MessageService.SendMessage GetDMParticipantIDs", "err", pErr, "channel_id", p.ChannelID)
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
result.ParticipantIDs = participantIDs
|
|
|
|
sender, _ := s.st.GetUserByID(bgCtx, p.UserID)
|
|
result.SenderUser = sender
|
|
|
|
// Viewer-neutral (viewerID 0 matches nobody, so every status is
|
|
// broadcast-collapsed); the ws layer re-derives "who is the recipient"
|
|
// per addressee. A read failure is non-fatal — the message is already
|
|
// committed, and the caller falls back to the 1:1 shape.
|
|
if participants, partErr := s.st.GetDMParticipants(bgCtx, p.ChannelID, 0); partErr == nil {
|
|
result.DMParticipants = participants
|
|
} else {
|
|
slog.Warn("MessageService.SendMessage GetDMParticipants", "err", partErr, "channel_id", p.ChannelID)
|
|
}
|
|
if isGroup, gErr := s.st.IsGroupDM(bgCtx, p.ChannelID); gErr == nil {
|
|
result.DMIsGroup = isGroup
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, pid := range participantIDs {
|
|
if pid == p.UserID {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
// OpenDM is INSERT OR IGNORE and idempotent: opened reports whether
|
|
// this call actually inserted the row. Only a genuine (re)open goes
|
|
// into OpenedDMFor — the ws layer emits a dm_channel_open per id in
|
|
// that slice, and each one bumps the hub's global visibility
|
|
// watermark, forcing every other connected client's next reconnect
|
|
// onto a full resync. An already-open DM must not pay that cost on
|
|
// every single message.
|
|
opened, openErr := s.st.OpenDM(bgCtx, pid, p.ChannelID)
|
|
if openErr != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("MessageService.SendMessage OpenDM", "err", openErr, "recipient_id", pid, "channel_id", p.ChannelID)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if opened {
|
|
result.OpenedDMFor = append(result.OpenedDMFor, pid)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// EditMessage validates and persists a message edit.
|
|
func (s *MessageService) EditMessage(ctx context.Context, userID, msgID int64, rawContent string) (*EditMessageResult, error) {
|
|
// Rate limit.
|
|
ratKey := auth.Key("chat_edit", userID)
|
|
if s.limiter != nil && !s.limiter.Allow(ratKey, 10, time.Second) {
|
|
return nil, ErrRateLimited
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if msgID <= 0 {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: message_id must be positive integer", ErrBadRequest)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
content, err := sanitizeContent(rawContent, false)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fetch message.
|
|
msg, err := s.st.GetMessage(ctx, msgID)
|
|
if err != nil || msg == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot edit this message", ErrForbidden)
|
|
}
|
|
if msg.Deleted {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot edit this message", ErrDeletedMessage)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Channel type for DM-aware permissions. Fail closed: a lookup failure must
|
|
// not fall through with chanType="", which routes into the non-DM
|
|
// permission branch below. That branch passes on the base role mask alone
|
|
// (SEND_MESSAGES|READ_MESSAGES, no per-channel override exists for a DM),
|
|
// skipping both the DM-participant check and requireDMNotBlocked entirely.
|
|
ch, chErr := s.st.GetChannel(ctx, msg.ChannelID)
|
|
if chErr != nil || ch == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot edit this message", ErrForbidden)
|
|
}
|
|
chanType := ch.Type
|
|
isDM := chanType == "dm"
|
|
|
|
if accessErr := s.editMessageCheckAccess(ctx, userID, msg.ChannelID, ch, isDM); accessErr != nil {
|
|
return nil, accessErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// EditMessage checks ownership internally and returns the updated row via
|
|
// RETURNING, so the edited_at the broadcast needs arrives with the write.
|
|
msg, err = s.st.EditMessage(ctx, msgID, userID, content)
|
|
if err != nil || msg == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot edit this message", ErrForbidden)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
editedAt := ""
|
|
if msg.EditedAt != nil {
|
|
editedAt = *msg.EditedAt
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Re-resolve mentions from the new content and replace the stored set, so a
|
|
// mention added by an edit is highlighted and one removed by an edit stops
|
|
// being. Mention counts are deliberately NOT advanced here: an edit that
|
|
// re-adds an already-counted mention would otherwise raise the badge twice,
|
|
// and "only the original insert can raise a badge" is the simplest rule that
|
|
// is always correct.
|
|
mentions := s.resolveMentions(ctx, content, userID, msg.ChannelID, isDM)
|
|
if mErr := s.st.ReplaceMessageMentions(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), msgID, mentions.UserIDs, mentions.Everyone); mErr != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("MessageService.EditMessage ReplaceMessageMentions", "err", mErr, "msg_id", msgID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
result := &EditMessageResult{
|
|
MessageID: msgID,
|
|
ChannelID: msg.ChannelID,
|
|
Content: content,
|
|
EditedAt: editedAt,
|
|
IsDM: isDM,
|
|
Mentions: mentions.UserIDs,
|
|
MentionsEveryone: mentions.Everyone,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if isDM {
|
|
// Detached from ctx for the same reason as the SendMessage post-commit
|
|
// lookup: the edit already committed, so an editor whose connection
|
|
// drops right after must not silently drop the chat_edited fan-out.
|
|
participantIDs, pErr := s.st.GetDMParticipantIDs(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), msg.ChannelID)
|
|
if pErr != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("MessageService.EditMessage GetDMParticipantIDs", "err", pErr, "channel_id", msg.ChannelID)
|
|
} else {
|
|
result.ParticipantIDs = participantIDs
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
slog.Debug("message edited", "user_id", userID, "msg_id", msgID, "channel_id", msg.ChannelID)
|
|
return result, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// editMessageCheckAccess gates an edit on the channel the message lives in:
|
|
// participation plus the block check for a DM, the shared send gate for
|
|
// everything else. isDM is the caller's already-computed ch.Type == "dm".
|
|
func (s *MessageService) editMessageCheckAccess(ctx context.Context, userID, channelID int64, ch *db.Channel, isDM bool) error {
|
|
if isDM {
|
|
ok, dmErr := s.st.IsDMParticipant(ctx, userID, channelID)
|
|
if dmErr != nil || !ok {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot edit this message", ErrForbidden)
|
|
}
|
|
if blkErr := requireDMNotBlocked(ctx, s.st, userID, channelID); blkErr != nil {
|
|
return blkErr
|
|
}
|
|
} else if permErr := s.checkSendPermission(ctx, userID, ch); permErr != nil {
|
|
// An edit injects new text into the channel and is fanned out to every
|
|
// reader, so it must clear the same gate as a send rather than
|
|
// SEND_MESSAGES alone: READ_MESSAGES so a role locked out of a private
|
|
// channel (the panel's "Can access" toggle denies
|
|
// READ_MESSAGES|CONNECT_VOICE and leaves SEND_MESSAGES intact) cannot
|
|
// rewrite its old posts, and the announcement rule so a demoted
|
|
// moderator cannot rewrite a trusted broadcast. Mirrors DeleteMessage,
|
|
// SetMessagePinned and handleReaction, which already require
|
|
// READ_MESSAGES. The reason is collapsed into this sink's single opaque
|
|
// error so the reply stays an ownership/permission non-oracle.
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot edit this message", ErrForbidden)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DeleteMessage validates and soft-deletes a message.
|
|
func (s *MessageService) DeleteMessage(ctx context.Context, userID, msgID int64) (*DeleteMessageResult, error) {
|
|
// Rate limit.
|
|
ratKey := auth.Key("chat_delete", userID)
|
|
if s.limiter != nil && !s.limiter.Allow(ratKey, 10, time.Second) {
|
|
return nil, ErrRateLimited
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if msgID <= 0 {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: message_id must be positive integer", ErrBadRequest)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
msg, err := s.st.GetMessage(ctx, msgID)
|
|
if err != nil || msg == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot delete this message", ErrForbidden)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fail closed, mirroring EditMessage: a lookup failure must not fall
|
|
// through to the non-DM permission branch (skipping the DM-participant
|
|
// check) or past the archived gate below.
|
|
ch, chErr := s.st.GetChannel(ctx, msg.ChannelID)
|
|
if chErr != nil || ch == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot delete this message", ErrForbidden)
|
|
}
|
|
isDM := ch.Type == "dm"
|
|
|
|
// Archived channels are read-only — see requireChannelWritable in
|
|
// message_perms.go, the shared gate every message write sink routes
|
|
// through.
|
|
if err := requireChannelWritable(ch); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var isMod bool
|
|
if isDM {
|
|
ok, dmErr := s.st.IsDMParticipant(ctx, userID, msg.ChannelID)
|
|
if dmErr != nil || !ok {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot delete this message", ErrForbidden)
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Require READ_MESSAGES alongside MANAGE_MESSAGES (and alongside
|
|
// SEND_MESSAGES on the author path) so a role explicitly denied access to
|
|
// a channel cannot delete messages in it. Mirrors handleReaction and
|
|
// checkSendPermission, which both require ReadMessages for non-DM channels.
|
|
isMsgOwner := msg.UserID == userID
|
|
canManage := s.perms.HasChannelPerm(ctx, userID, msg.ChannelID, permissions.ReadMessages|permissions.ManageMessages)
|
|
canDelete := canManage || (isMsgOwner && s.perms.HasChannelPerm(ctx, userID, msg.ChannelID, permissions.ReadMessages|permissions.SendMessages))
|
|
if !canDelete {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot delete this message", ErrForbidden)
|
|
}
|
|
// db.DeleteMessage skips the ownership check when ismod is true, so the
|
|
// moderation flag must reuse the decision made above rather than
|
|
// re-checking MANAGE_MESSAGES without READ_MESSAGES.
|
|
isMod = canManage
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := s.st.DeleteMessage(ctx, msgID, userID, isMod); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot delete this message", ErrForbidden)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
slog.Debug("message deleted", "user_id", userID, "msg_id", msgID, "channel_id", msg.ChannelID, "is_mod", isMod)
|
|
// Audit rows must survive a request canceled after the delete committed.
|
|
db.WriteAudit(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), s.st, userID, "message_delete", "message", msgID,
|
|
fmt.Sprintf("channel %d, mod_action=%v", msg.ChannelID, isMod))
|
|
|
|
result := &DeleteMessageResult{
|
|
MessageID: msgID,
|
|
ChannelID: msg.ChannelID,
|
|
IsDM: isDM,
|
|
IsMod: isMod,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if isDM {
|
|
// Detached from ctx for the same reason as the send/edit paths: the
|
|
// soft-delete already committed, so a deleter whose connection drops
|
|
// right after must not silently drop the chat_deleted fan-out.
|
|
participantIDs, pErr := s.st.GetDMParticipantIDs(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), msg.ChannelID)
|
|
if pErr != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("MessageService.DeleteMessage GetDMParticipantIDs", "err", pErr, "channel_id", msg.ChannelID)
|
|
} else {
|
|
result.ParticipantIDs = participantIDs
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return result, nil
|
|
}
|