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* refactor(ws): split handleVoiceJoin into cohesive join-stage helpers handleVoiceJoin was 130 statements / cyclomatic 59 / nestif 11, breaking all three complexity budgets at once. Split along the stage boundaries the doc comment already described: precheck, leave-current, persist, restore moderator flags, grant token, complete. The publish-permission derivation becomes its own helper because it is the one branch-heavy block inside the token grant. Pure move: every statement is preserved verbatim. The only edits are bare `return`s becoming the typed returns of their new helper, `c.userID` becoming the `userID` parameter inside voiceJoinPublishPerms, and voiceJoinComplete re-reading `ch.VoiceMaxUsers` instead of receiving it — `ch` is never mutated, so the value is identical. Verified by normalising both revisions of the region to sorted, comment- and whitespace-stripped statements and diffing: the only deltas are the ones listed above. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: collapse the three duplicated sibling pairs dupl flagged three pairs of adjacent near-identical functions. Each pair is now one parameterised implementation plus two thin, still-greppable wrappers. - ws/voice_controls.go: handleVoiceMuteV2 / handleVoiceDeafenV2 share voiceSelfToggleV2; handleVoiceCameraV2 / handleVoiceScreenshareV2 share voiceStreamToggleV2. Camera and screenshare drawing from one voice_max_video budget (OC-0023) was a bug caused by exactly this duplication drifting, so one body is the point, not a side effect. - db/mention_queries.go: ListMentionTargetsByRoles / ListMentionTargetsByUserIDs share listMentionTargets. The matched column is a closed named type (mentionTargetColumn) rather than a bare string, so the value interpolated into the SELECT cannot become caller-supplied. Behaviour is unchanged: every rate-limit key, error code, error string, slog message and slog key is preserved verbatim, including the two "failed to update <kind> state" messages, which are now assembled the same way enableVideoSlot already assembled them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): extract readEmojiUpload from handleCreateEmoji handleCreateEmoji was 101 lines against a 100-line budget. The upload-bytes stage — pull the file out of the parsed form, cap its size, sniff its MIME type and sniff its dimensions — is the one self-contained block in it, and it already wrote its own refusals, so it moves out whole as readEmojiUpload. The permission-before-parse ordering the doc comment calls out is unchanged; so is every error string. file.Close() now runs when the helper returns rather than when the handler does, which is strictly earlier and unobservable: the bytes are already copied into raw and nothing else touches the handle. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: extract one cohesive block from three single-budget offenders Each of these was over exactly one budget, so each gets exactly one extraction rather than a restructure: - api/totp_handler.go handleVerifyTOTP (102 lines / 100): the block that resolves the user behind the partial-auth challenge and decrypts their TOTP secret becomes totpChallengeSecret. The ban-inside-the-partial-window check moves with it. - service/message_reactions.go handleReaction (cyclop 21 / 20): the whole authorisation chain — channel lookup, archived gate, DM participant and block checks, non-DM permission check — becomes reactionAudience, which also returns the DM fan-out audience it already resolved. Check order is unchanged and load-bearing. - db/admin_queries.go BackupToSafe (cyclop 21 / 20): the character allowlist loop and the SQL-comment rejection become validateBackupPathChars. That loop alone was most of the branch count. No error string, no check and no ordering changed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(plugin): split InstallFromZip into staged install helpers 104 statements / cyclomatic 44 / nestif 12. Split along the stages the code already had: installZipExtract (the per-entry write loop, with installZipEntryDest holding the mode/symlink/zip-slip guard chain and installZipWriteEntry the size-capped copy), installZipStagedManifest, installZipPromote, and installZipReactivate for the :399 nested block. Every zip-slip, symlink, entry-mode and uncompressed-size check is preserved in the same order relative to the writes it guards. The 19 inline `cleanup(); return` sites collapse to 4 in the orchestrator, one per stage, because each helper now returns an error instead of unwinding itself — the staging directory is still removed on exactly the same set of failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): split newWAFMiddleware into engine build and per-phase helpers 184 lines / cyclomatic 38, and the request-body block at :382 was the worst nested site in the tree at nestif 17. Engine construction moves out of the closure (wafInlineEngine, wafCRSEngine — the Coraza directive string is lifted verbatim), and each request phase becomes its own helper: wafInlineRequestHeaders, wafCRSRequestHeaders (including the Host/Transfer-Encoding re-add for CRS 920280), wafFeedCRSBody and wafInspectRequestBody, which is the old :382 block. The three `handleWAFInterruption(w, it); return` sites inside the body block become one: the helper now returns the interruption and the orchestrator handles it. No statement runs between the two points on either side, so the verdict is honoured identically — in particular a CRS body interruption still returns without replacing r.Body. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(service): split SendMessage and lift EditMessage's access check SendMessage was 79 statements / cyclomatic 35 with an 11-deep nested attachment block at :101; EditMessage was one point over cyclop. SendMessage becomes sendMessagePrecheck (permission and DM-block gates, content sanitisation), sendMessageLinkAttachments (the :101 block: attachment ownership, claim and link) and sendMessageDMSideEffects. EditMessage gets editMessageCheckAccess and nothing else — one budget over earns one extraction. The sanitizeContent fixpoint and the attachment ownership check are unchanged, as is the order of every gate. The DM side effects run behind `isDM && !s.sendMessageDMSideEffects(...)`, so a non-DM never enters them; inside, only the GetDMParticipantIDs failure returns false, matching the one error the original early-returned on. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(admin): split handlePatchUser into per-field apply helpers 106 lines / cyclomatic 29, with the ban block at :154 nested 9 deep. Each optional field of the partial edit becomes its own helper — patchUserPrecheck, patchUserAuthorizeRole, patchUserApplyBan (the :154 block, including the session disconnect and the broadcast) and patchUserApplyRole. Each returns a bool meaning "keep going"; none of them writes a success response, so the single response site in the orchestrator is unchanged. Field application order, the permission-cache invalidation on a role change and the disconnect-and-broadcast on a ban are all preserved, as are the three fail-closed `mod == nil` guards, which now sit at the top of their own helper and still fire on exactly the same conditions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(admin): split handleSetup into first-run setup stages 143 lines / cyclomatic 30, with the optional-wizard block at :219 sitting exactly on the nestif threshold. Split into the stages the endpoint already had: request gating (rate limit and origin check, which run before any auth exists on a fresh server), owner account creation, and the wizard application that was the :219 block. Every gate in front of the handler is a security control on an unauthenticated endpoint; none moved relative to the work it protects. setup_wizard.go is untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: split run() into named bootstrap and shutdown steps 131 statements / cyclomatic 57, with the executable-path fallback at :126 nested 9 deep. The five anonymous `defer func(){...}()` blocks become named functions — telemetryStop, runClosePlugins, runStopEventPersistence, runStopAuditWriter, maintenanceStop — and the bootstrap stages move out likewise. Every defer is still registered in run() itself, at the same point in the sequence, so the LIFO teardown order is unchanged; that order is documented in the surrounding comments and is load-bearing (the audit-writer stop must follow database.Close's registration, the event-persistence stop must precede it). runStopEventPersistence is now registered unconditionally with a nil persister meaning "disabled", where the old code registered its defer inside the enabled branch — a no-op occupying that slot cannot change the relative order of the others. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(ws): split handleReconnect into resume stages 77 statements / cyclomatic 41, plus the replay block at :199 and, in handleFreshConnect, the voice-state restore at :622. handleReconnect becomes reconnectPrecheck, reconnectSelectReplay (with reconnectVetColdTail for the cold-tier gap check), reconnectRegister and reconnectWriteReplay. handleFreshConnect's stale-voice cleanup moves to its own helper, where the `if h.livekit != nil` wrapper becomes a guard clause — that block was the tail of its scope, so returning early and falling off the end are the same. The parts that carry the invariants are moved verbatim: reconnectRegister still takes h.seqMu, still calls registerNow inside that same critical section (BUG-123 / OC-0206), still unlocks on every exit, and still emits the "full" tier counter and telemetry on each of its three re-check failures. handleReconnect's two-boolean contract is unchanged — the collapsed `return false, false` sites are all fall-through-to-full-ready, and the single `return true, false` is still the handshake-write-failure path whose teardown already ran (OC-0051). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(server): fold in the adversarial review of the complexity refactors Eleven skeptic passes over the refactor commits on this branch found no blocker and no major — behaviour is preserved throughout. They did find comment and accuracy defects worth correcting: - db/mention_queries.go: the mentionTargetColumn rationale claimed the named type made the interpolated column "only ever one of the two constants". A Go named type is not closed, so that is a convention the type makes visible, not one it enforces. Reworded, gosec justification included. - ws/voice_controls.go: the dupl collapse generalised away three specifics — that a server deafen is the moderator's to lift (now on the serverDeafen field), the concrete voice_states.camera / voice_states.screenshare column names, and the half of the OC-0023 rationale about neither stream kind hiding from the other's count. All three restored. - ws/voice_join.go: `maxUsers := ch.VoiceMaxUsers` had been hoisted to the top of voiceJoinComplete, moving a read across the tail supersession guard. The read is inert, but it was the one statement in that commit whose position relative to a security guard changed; it now sits at its use, as before. - ws/*_test.go: three test comments cited voice_join.go line numbers that the split invalidated. They now cite the helper by name instead. - service/message_reactions.go: reactionAudience's doc claimed to enforce "every gate on reacting"; it enforces the channel-scoped ones, and the doc now says which gates stay with the caller. - api/emoji_handler.go: the readEmojiUpload call reused the outer `ok` from the auth check by assignment; it gets its own readOK. - admin/setup_handler.go: a moved comment kept a "the response above" deictic that no longer had a response above it. No behaviour change. Build, vet, full tests and -race on five packages green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(ws): clear the remaining complexity budgets across the hub Eight files, thirteen findings. Each function is split at the stages it already had; no branch is reordered, merged or inverted. - handlers.go handleMessage (cyclop 28, 88 stmts): session re-check, frame decode and result application become handleMessageSessionRecheck, handleMessageDecode and handleMessageApply. The V2 constructor lookup -> DispatchV2 -> Result resolution order is untouched. - serve_ready.go buildReady (cyclop 26, 61 stmts): the per-section fetches split out, readyChannelPayloads among them. Every visibility predicate is preserved verbatim — this is the payload that decides what a client may see. - serve_pumps.go writePump (cyclop 31): writePumpWrite, writePumpDeliver, writePumpDrainChannel and writePumpDrainAndClose. Every channel receive stays in the same select statement, so scheduling is unchanged. - hub_sweep.go sweepStaleVoiceStates (cyclop 22, 56 stmts): the staleness predicate, the hub-lock ordering and the position of the race hook are all as they were — handleVoiceJoin's BUG-088 ordering depends on them. - hub_broadcast.go channelReadAudienceImpl and RefreshChannelVisibility (cyclop 22 each, 57 stmts): channelReadAudienceDM and refreshChannelVisibilityCanSend. The audience predicate is the OC-0090 group-DM leak surface, so it is extracted, never simplified. - livekit_webhook.go (nestif 13 and 14): webhookJoinedEnforceVoiceState, webhookLeftCleanupClient and webhookLeftFinishLeave. DB delete still precedes broadcast on every path. - livekit_download.go EnsureLiveKitBinary (52 stmts): one extraction, ensureLiveKitStageBinary, keeping every archive path check intact. - voice_moderation.go (nestif 8): voiceModDeafenRollback. The persisted server_muted flag remains the authority. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): clear the remaining complexity budgets across the HTTP layer - router.go NewRouter (cyclop 28, 84 stmts): split by wiring concern into routerTOTPKey, routerHealthDeps, routerMiddleware, routerUploadRoutes, routerPluginWiring, routerVoiceRoutes and routerMetricsRoutes. Middleware ORDER is a security property (auth before handler, WAF before body parse, rate limit before work) and is unchanged; the returned cleanup func still closes over and releases everything it did before. - auth_handler.go handleRegister (133 lines) and handleLogin (cyclop 21, 152 lines): registerPolicyGate, registerReadRequest, loginReadRequest and loginAuthenticate. The always-compare posture, every rate-limit key, every counter reset and the ban-check-versus-password-compare order are all preserved — including loginUserFailureThreshold staying unscaled by scaledAuthLimit, which is deliberate and commented. - upload_handler.go handleServeFile (cyclop 31, 128 lines): serveFileResolve and serveFileAuthorize. Every header this sets — Content-Disposition included, which is what stops a stored file being served as active content — is still set with the same value in the same circumstances. - profile_handler.go handleUploadAvatar (120 lines): avatarUploadReadImage, mirroring readEmojiUpload in shape but with the avatar caps and MIME set. The two deliberately do not share a helper. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: clear the last complexity budgets in db and admin - db/account.go DeleteAccount (cyclop 28, 55 stmts): grouped by subsystem into deleteAccountAdminGuard, deleteAccountDMChannels and deleteAccountCloseDMChannels, each taking the same transaction. The transaction boundary, the delete ORDER (which foreign keys depend on) and the rollback path are unchanged. - admin/logstream.go handleLogStream (cyclop 24): logStreamAuthorize. Flush cadence, heartbeat and disconnect detection untouched. - admin/setup_wizard.go validateWizard (cyclop 23): grouped by section into wizardValidateIdentity, wizardValidateNetwork and wizardValidateMedia. Every message and bound is unchanged — this is the first input-validation boundary on a fresh server, before any auth exists. With this the tree is at zero: golangci-lint run reports 0 issues against the budgets set in #1384 (funlen 100/50, cyclop 20, nestif 8, dupl 150), with no //nolint and no exclusion added anywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
656 lines
30 KiB
Go
656 lines
30 KiB
Go
package ws
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"log/slog"
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"time"
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"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
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"github.com/owncord/server/db"
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"github.com/owncord/server/permissions"
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"github.com/owncord/server/service"
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)
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// Voice join/leave rate limits. voice_join and voice_leave each fan out a
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// broadcast to every connected client, so a single user must not be able to
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// trigger them in a tight loop. Mirrors the named-constant idiom used by the
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// voice control handlers (see voice_broadcast.go / voice_controls.go).
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// voiceLeaveRateLimit/Window are consumed by the voice_leave message dispatch
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// in handlers_voice.go (same package).
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const (
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voiceJoinRateLimit = 5
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voiceJoinWindow = time.Second
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voiceLeaveRateLimit = 5
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voiceLeaveWindow = time.Second
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)
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// validVoiceQuality returns true if q is an accepted voice quality preset.
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// Uses voiceQualities (defined in voice_broadcast.go) as the single source of truth.
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func validVoiceQuality(q string) bool {
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_, ok := voiceQualities[q]
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return ok
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}
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// voiceJoinPostTokenRaceHook, when non-nil, runs immediately after
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// GenerateToken succeeds and before the minted token is checked for
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// supersession / handed to the client. Test-only (always nil in production):
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// GenerateToken is a local JWT mint with no I/O, so the window it pins (a
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// concurrent eviction landing between token generation and delivery, OC-0008)
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// is too narrow to land reliably by staggering real goroutines. Mirrors
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// cleanupVoiceRaceClearHook (hub_sweep.go), used the same way for the
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// analogous CleanupVoiceForChannel race.
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var voiceJoinPostTokenRaceHook func(*Client)
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// handleVoiceJoin processes a voice_join message.
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// 1. Parses channel_id.
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// 2. Checks CONNECT_VOICE permission.
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// 3. If already in a different voice channel, leaves it first.
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// 4. Checks channel capacity (voice_max_users).
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// 5. Persists join in DB.
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// 6. Generates LiveKit token and sends voice_token to the client.
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// 7. Sends existing voice states to the joiner.
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// 8. Broadcasts voice_state to all clients.
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// 9. Sends voice_config to the joiner.
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func (h *Hub) handleVoiceJoin(ctx context.Context, c *Client, payload json.RawMessage) {
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channelID, ch, ok := h.voiceJoinPrecheck(ctx, c, payload)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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wasServerMuted, wasServerDeafened, ok := h.voiceJoinLeaveCurrent(ctx, c, channelID)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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state, ok := h.voiceJoinPersist(ctx, c, ch, channelID)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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state = h.voiceJoinRestoreModFlags(ctx, c, channelID, state, wasServerMuted, wasServerDeafened)
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if !h.voiceJoinGrantToken(ctx, c, channelID, state) {
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return
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}
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h.voiceJoinComplete(ctx, c, ch, channelID, state)
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}
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// voiceJoinPrecheck runs every gate that must pass before handleVoiceJoin
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// mutates any state: rate limit, payload parse, CONNECT_VOICE, channel
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// existence, channel type, DM block, archive, authenticated user and LiveKit
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// availability. It reports the target channel id and row when the join may
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// proceed; on refusal it has already sent the error frame and returns false.
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func (h *Hub) voiceJoinPrecheck(ctx context.Context, c *Client, payload json.RawMessage) (int64, *db.Channel, bool) {
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// Rate limit: voice_join broadcasts a voice_state update to every connected
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// client, so cap how often a single user can trigger the fan-out. Mirrors the
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// Limiter.Allow(...) idiom used by the voice control handlers.
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ratKey := auth.Key("voice_join", c.userID)
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if h.limiter != nil && !h.limiter.Allow(ratKey, voiceJoinRateLimit, voiceJoinWindow) {
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c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeRateLimited, "too many voice join attempts"))
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return 0, nil, false
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}
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channelID, err := parseChannelID(payload)
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if err != nil || channelID <= 0 {
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c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeBadRequest, "channel_id must be a positive integer"))
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return 0, nil, false
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}
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// channel_id is attacker-controlled, so the gate must be channel-TYPE aware:
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// a role-only check passes for any DM channel id (DMs have no overrides), and
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// the token minted below carries RoomJoin+CanSubscribe for that DM's room.
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if !h.requireChannelAccess(ctx, c, channelID, permissions.ConnectVoice, "CONNECT_VOICE") {
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return 0, nil, false
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}
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// Validate the target channel exists before any state changes (leaving
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// the current voice channel, persisting join, etc.).
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ch, err := h.db.GetChannel(ctx, channelID)
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if err != nil || ch == nil {
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c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeNotFound, "channel not found"))
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return 0, nil, false
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}
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// channel_id is attacker-controlled and requireChannelAccess above only
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// gates CONNECT_VOICE, which says nothing about channel type — a text or
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// announcement channel would otherwise accept a join, persist a
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// voice_states row, mint a LiveKit room and broadcast voice_state for a
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// channel the UI can never render or moderate. 'dm' stays allowed: DM and
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// group voice calls join through this same handler.
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if ch.Type != "voice" && ch.Type != "dm" {
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c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeBadRequest, "not a voice channel"))
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return 0, nil, false
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}
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// A blocked user is still a DM participant — blocking never touches
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// dm_participants (service/block.go), so the CONNECT_VOICE + IsDMParticipant
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// gate above passes them straight through into the blocker's DM voice room.
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// Every other 1:1-DM interaction sink (send, edit, react, pin, typing,
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// call_ring) already routes through this same check
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// (service.requireDMNotBlocked); voice was the one gap. Group DMs are
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// exempt inside it, matching every other sink. h.db satisfies
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// service.Store directly, so no MessageService wiring is needed here.
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if ch.Type == "dm" {
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if err := service.RequireDMNotBlocked(ctx, h.db, c.userID, channelID); err != nil {
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c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeForbidden, "cannot join voice: blocked"))
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return 0, nil, false
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}
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}
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// Archived channels are hidden from every client and their voice states are
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// dropped from `ready`, but `archived` was consulted only by the visibility
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// predicate — so a caller still holding the id could join the room of a
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// channel nobody can see or moderate. Refuse the join outright; the sibling
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// archive transition also evicts whoever is already inside.
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if ch.Archived {
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c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeBadRequest, "channel is archived"))
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return 0, nil, false
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}
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// Ensure authenticated user is present before any state changes.
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// This guard covers all downstream paths (LiveKit configured or not)
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// that dereference c.user (e.g. c.user.Username in the success log).
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if c.user == nil {
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slog.Error("handleVoiceJoin: nil user on client", "user_id", c.userID)
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c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeInternal, "not authenticated"))
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return 0, nil, false
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}
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// Hard-fail when LiveKit is not configured — without an SFU the client
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// cannot connect to voice, so persisting state would create a ghost.
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if h.livekit == nil {
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c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeVoiceError, "voice is not configured on this server"))
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return 0, nil, false
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}
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// Guard: reject voice join if the companion LiveKit process is not running
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// (e.g. crashed 10 times and gave up).
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if h.lkProcess != nil && !h.lkProcess.IsRunning() {
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slog.Warn("handleVoiceJoin: LiveKit process not running", "user_id", c.userID)
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c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeVoiceError, "voice is temporarily unavailable — LiveKit is not running"))
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return 0, nil, false
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}
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return channelID, ch, true
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}
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// voiceJoinLeaveCurrent handles the case where the client is already in a
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// voice channel: it no-ops a re-join of the same channel, and for a switch it
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// snapshots the moderator-imposed mute/deafen flags, leaves the old channel
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// and verifies the old row is really gone. The two booleans are the
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// snapshotted flags for voiceJoinRestoreModFlags; false in the third position
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// means the join must not proceed (the error frame has already been sent).
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func (h *Hub) voiceJoinLeaveCurrent(ctx context.Context, c *Client, channelID int64) (bool, bool, bool) {
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currentChID := c.getVoiceChID()
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// If user is already in the same voice channel, no-op.
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if currentChID == channelID {
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c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeAlreadyJoined, "already in this voice channel"))
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return false, false, false
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}
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// A moderator-imposed mute/deafen must survive a channel switch.
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// voice.sql's ON CONFLICT branch preserves server_muted/server_deafened
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// across a plain re-join, but the switch below deletes the row via
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// handleVoiceLeave and lets JoinVoiceChannel(IfCapacity) re-insert it, so
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// that branch is never reached: the flags are snapshotted here and
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// reapplied once the new row exists.
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//
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// This covers the self-switch only. voice_mod_move deletes the row on the
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// moderator's goroutine (DisconnectFromVoice) before the target's client
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// re-joins, so by the time this handler runs there is nothing left to read
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// and currentChID is already 0 — preserving the flags across a move needs
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// state that outlives the row (see the cross-batch note on v029).
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var wasServerMuted, wasServerDeafened bool
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if currentChID > 0 {
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if prevState, prevErr := h.db.GetVoiceState(ctx, c.userID); prevErr == nil && prevState != nil {
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wasServerMuted = prevState.ServerMuted
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wasServerDeafened = prevState.ServerDeafened
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}
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}
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// If user is already in a different voice channel, leave it first.
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if currentChID > 0 {
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h.handleVoiceLeave(ctx, c)
|
|
|
|
// BUG-088: Verify old voice state is actually cleared before joining
|
|
// the new channel. If the DB delete failed (retry still running in
|
|
// background), the old row persists and JoinVoiceChannelIfCapacity's
|
|
// COUNT(*) may produce an incorrect result. Fail the switch so the
|
|
// user can retry cleanly.
|
|
vs, err := h.db.GetVoiceState(ctx, c.userID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
slog.Warn("handleVoiceJoin: could not verify voice state cleared",
|
|
"user_id", c.userID, "err", err)
|
|
c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeInternal, "voice channel switch failed — please try again"))
|
|
return false, false, false
|
|
}
|
|
if vs != nil {
|
|
slog.Warn("handleVoiceJoin: stale voice state persists after leave, aborting switch",
|
|
"user_id", c.userID, "stale_channel", vs.ChannelID, "target_channel", channelID)
|
|
// OC-0034: do NOT restore the client's local voice state here.
|
|
// handleVoiceLeave above already broadcast voice_leave for the old
|
|
// channel to every client that can see it — including this one,
|
|
// since finishVoiceLeave always adds the leaver to the audience —
|
|
// so every client, this user's own session included, has already
|
|
// torn the old membership down (dispatcher.ts runs leaveVoice on a
|
|
// self voice_leave). Restoring c.voiceChID/the topic subscription
|
|
// would resurrect a session nobody else believes exists anymore,
|
|
// while the stale DB row (this branch's trigger) stays orphaned.
|
|
// Leaving the client cleared keeps it consistent with the
|
|
// voice_leave it just received: the row now disagrees with every
|
|
// connected client's voiceChID, so sweepStaleVoiceStates reaps it
|
|
// (re-broadcasting voice_leave, harmlessly) within one tick, and
|
|
// the user_id-PK upsert lets the user rejoin immediately.
|
|
c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeInternal, "voice channel switch failed — please try again"))
|
|
return false, false, false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return wasServerMuted, wasServerDeafened, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// voiceJoinPersist commits the join to the DB under the channel's capacity
|
|
// limit, loads back the persisted row and publishes the client's in-memory
|
|
// voice state. Returns false once the error frame has been sent.
|
|
func (h *Hub) voiceJoinPersist(ctx context.Context, c *Client, ch *db.Channel, channelID int64) (*db.VoiceState, bool) {
|
|
// Check channel capacity and persist to DB atomically.
|
|
maxUsers := ch.VoiceMaxUsers
|
|
if maxUsers > 0 {
|
|
if err := h.db.JoinVoiceChannelIfCapacity(ctx, c.userID, channelID, maxUsers); err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, db.ErrChannelFull) {
|
|
c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeChannelFull, "voice channel is full"))
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
slog.Error("ws handleVoiceJoin JoinVoiceChannelIfCapacity", "err", err, "user_id", c.userID)
|
|
c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeInternal, "failed to join voice channel"))
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// No capacity limit — use standard join.
|
|
if err := h.db.JoinVoiceChannel(ctx, c.userID, channelID); err != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("ws handleVoiceJoin JoinVoiceChannel", "err", err, "user_id", c.userID)
|
|
c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeInternal, "failed to join voice channel"))
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Load the persisted row immediately so later cleanup can target this exact
|
|
// join instance even if the user rejoins the same channel.
|
|
state, err := h.db.GetVoiceState(ctx, c.userID)
|
|
if err != nil || state == nil {
|
|
slog.Error("ws handleVoiceJoin GetVoiceState", "err", err, "user_id", c.userID)
|
|
h.rollbackVoiceJoin(ctx, c, channelID, "", false)
|
|
c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeInternal, "failed to join voice channel"))
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// BUG-088: set the client's voice channel as soon as the DB row is
|
|
// confirmed committed, before the permission checks and LiveKit token
|
|
// generation below (which can take several round trips). Leaving this
|
|
// until after those steps left a window where the concurrent stale-voice
|
|
// sweep sees c.getVoiceChID() still 0 while the row already exists,
|
|
// misclassifies the in-flight join as a ghost and deletes it — leaving
|
|
// the joiner live on the hub and in the SFU with no DB row. A failure
|
|
// further down still unwinds this via rollbackVoiceJoin's
|
|
// c.clearVoiceChID(), same as before.
|
|
c.setVoiceState(channelID, state.JoinedAt)
|
|
|
|
return state, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// voiceJoinRestoreModFlags re-applies a moderator-imposed mute/deafen that
|
|
// predates a channel switch and returns the voice state the caller should
|
|
// broadcast — the re-read row when the restore ran, the original otherwise.
|
|
func (h *Hub) voiceJoinRestoreModFlags(ctx context.Context, c *Client, channelID int64, state *db.VoiceState, wasServerMuted, wasServerDeafened bool) *db.VoiceState {
|
|
// Restore a moderator-imposed mute/deafen that predates this switch (see
|
|
// the snapshot above). Best-effort: a failure here is logged but does not
|
|
// fail the join, matching every other SetVoiceServerMute/Deafen call site.
|
|
if wasServerMuted || wasServerDeafened {
|
|
if wasServerMuted {
|
|
if _, err := h.db.SetVoiceServerMute(ctx, c.userID, channelID, true); err != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("ws handleVoiceJoin SetVoiceServerMute (restore)", "err", err, "user_id", c.userID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if wasServerDeafened {
|
|
if _, err := h.db.SetVoiceServerDeafen(ctx, c.userID, channelID, true); err != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("ws handleVoiceJoin SetVoiceServerDeafen (restore)", "err", err, "user_id", c.userID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Re-read so the voice_state broadcast below carries the restored
|
|
// flags rather than the plain-insert defaults — that broadcast is what
|
|
// makes the mute effective on the target's own client and visible to
|
|
// everyone else.
|
|
//
|
|
// No SFU mute is applied here: MuteParticipantAudio resolves the
|
|
// participant in the destination room first, and this join has not even
|
|
// minted its token yet, so the call could only fail (after a LiveKit
|
|
// round trip on the read pump). As everywhere else in the voice
|
|
// moderation path, the persisted server_muted is the authority — it
|
|
// blocks the target's own unmute and is re-applied at the SFU whenever
|
|
// the moderator next acts.
|
|
if refreshed, refErr := h.db.GetVoiceState(ctx, c.userID); refErr == nil && refreshed != nil {
|
|
state = refreshed
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return state
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// voiceJoinPublishPerms derives the SFU publish permissions from role —
|
|
// prevents SFU-level bypass when the client connects directly via direct_url
|
|
// (BUG-128). With a PermissionService the three bits come from the per-user
|
|
// cache; the bare-hub fallback answers them from one role fetch + one
|
|
// overrides fetch via HasChannelPermBatch instead of three hasChannelPerm
|
|
// round trips. Both branches fail closed: an unresolved role or override map
|
|
// yields no publish grants (admins bypass overrides, so an override fetch
|
|
// error cannot demote them).
|
|
func (h *Hub) voiceJoinPublishPerms(ctx context.Context, userID, channelID int64) (canPublish, canVideo, canScreenShare bool) {
|
|
if h.perms != nil {
|
|
// PermissionService answers all three bits from one cached
|
|
// role+overrides snapshot (populated by the CONNECT_VOICE gate
|
|
// above, so these are cache hits). Same fail-closed posture: an
|
|
// unresolved role or override map yields no publish grants.
|
|
canPublish = h.perms.HasChannelPerm(ctx, userID, channelID, permissions.SpeakVoice)
|
|
canVideo = h.perms.HasChannelPerm(ctx, userID, channelID, permissions.UseVideo)
|
|
canScreenShare = h.perms.HasChannelPerm(ctx, userID, channelID, permissions.ShareScreen)
|
|
} else if role, roleErr := h.db.GetRoleForUser(ctx, userID); roleErr == nil && role != nil {
|
|
// Admins bypass overrides, so skip the fetch for them (mirrors
|
|
// computeAllowedChannels); HasChannelPermBatch answers true from
|
|
// the role bits alone.
|
|
var overrides map[int64]db.ChannelOverride
|
|
var oErr error
|
|
if !permissions.HasAdmin(role.Permissions) {
|
|
overrides, oErr = h.db.GetChannelOverridesFor(ctx, role.ID, userID)
|
|
}
|
|
if oErr == nil {
|
|
po := permOverrides(overrides)
|
|
canPublish = h.permChecker.HasChannelPermBatch(role.Permissions, po, channelID, permissions.SpeakVoice)
|
|
canVideo = h.permChecker.HasChannelPermBatch(role.Permissions, po, channelID, permissions.UseVideo)
|
|
canScreenShare = h.permChecker.HasChannelPermBatch(role.Permissions, po, channelID, permissions.ShareScreen)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return canPublish, canVideo, canScreenShare
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// voiceJoinGrantToken mints the LiveKit credential and delivers it, withholding
|
|
// it if the join was superseded in the meantime. Returns false once the join
|
|
// has been abandoned (rolled back, or superseded) and must not complete.
|
|
func (h *Hub) voiceJoinGrantToken(ctx context.Context, c *Client, channelID int64, state *db.VoiceState) bool {
|
|
// Generate LiveKit token if LiveKit client is available.
|
|
// Token generation failure is fatal — without a token the client cannot
|
|
// connect to the SFU, so we must roll back the DB join.
|
|
// NOTE: the joiner's own state was already set above (BUG-088), but
|
|
// nobody else has been told about the join yet — rollbackVoiceJoin below
|
|
// is still called with broadcast=false, so a failure here does not
|
|
// broadcast a spurious voice_leave for a join no other client ever saw.
|
|
if h.livekit != nil {
|
|
canPublish, canVideo, canScreenShare := h.voiceJoinPublishPerms(ctx, c.userID, channelID)
|
|
canSubscribe := true
|
|
token, tokenErr := h.livekit.GenerateToken(c.userID, c.user.Username, channelID, state.JoinedAt, canPublish, canSubscribe, canVideo, canScreenShare)
|
|
if tokenErr != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("ws handleVoiceJoin GenerateToken", "err", tokenErr, "user_id", c.userID)
|
|
h.rollbackVoiceJoin(ctx, c, channelID, state.JoinedAt, false)
|
|
c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeInternal, "failed to generate voice token"))
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
if voiceJoinPostTokenRaceHook != nil {
|
|
voiceJoinPostTokenRaceHook(c)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// OC-0008: a concurrent eviction (voice_mod_kick/move via
|
|
// DisconnectFromVoiceInChannel, the CONNECT_VOICE revocation sweep, or
|
|
// CleanupVoiceForChannel) can land anywhere between c.setVoiceState
|
|
// (BUG-088, above) and here — all of them delete the voice_states row
|
|
// and clear the client's in-memory state, then call RemoveParticipant,
|
|
// which no-ops because this join has never reached the SFU yet
|
|
// (GenerateToken is a local JWT mint, no LiveKit round trip). The tail
|
|
// guard below used to be the only check, but by then the token had
|
|
// already been queued for delivery — the client ends up with a live
|
|
// 5-minute RoomJoin credential for a membership the server just decided
|
|
// does not exist, and connects to the SFU with it regardless of what
|
|
// happens after. Re-check here, immediately before the credential
|
|
// leaves the process, and withhold it if superseded.
|
|
if curChID, curToken := c.getVoiceState(); curChID != channelID || curToken != state.JoinedAt {
|
|
slog.Info("ws handleVoiceJoin: join superseded before token delivery",
|
|
"user_id", c.userID, "channel_id", channelID, "current_channel_id", curChID)
|
|
// Best-effort defense in depth: this join has not reached the SFU
|
|
// (see above), so this is normally a no-op, but it closes the
|
|
// sliver of time between this check and c.sendMsg below the same
|
|
// way every other eviction path's RemoveParticipant call does.
|
|
rbCtx := context.WithoutCancel(ctx)
|
|
if err := h.livekit.RemoveParticipant(rbCtx, channelID, c.userID, state.JoinedAt); err != nil {
|
|
slog.Warn("ws handleVoiceJoin: RemoveParticipant after supersession failed (may already be gone)",
|
|
"err", err, "user_id", c.userID, "channel_id", channelID)
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
// Send both proxy path and direct URL. The client uses direct_url
|
|
// when on localhost (avoids self-signed TLS issues with WebView
|
|
// fetch) and falls back to the /livekit proxy for remote clients.
|
|
// NOTE: E2EE keys are no longer server-generated. Clients exchange
|
|
// keys via ECDH (voice_e2ee_announce / voice_e2ee_offer messages).
|
|
// C-2: Include is_key_holder so the client knows whether to initiate
|
|
// key distribution after connecting to the SFU.
|
|
isKeyHolder := h.computeIsKeyHolder(channelID, c.userID)
|
|
c.sendMsg(buildVoiceToken(channelID, token, "/livekit", h.livekit.URL(), isKeyHolder))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// voiceJoinComplete finishes a join that survived every guard: voice topic
|
|
// subscription, key-holder election, the joiner's own voice_state fan-out, the
|
|
// existing participants' states and E2EE keys, and voice_config.
|
|
func (h *Hub) voiceJoinComplete(ctx context.Context, c *Client, ch *db.Channel, channelID int64, state *db.VoiceState) {
|
|
// Voice channel state itself was already set above (BUG-088), immediately
|
|
// after the DB row committed — which also means a concurrent eviction (the
|
|
// revocation sweep, a participant_left webhook, a moderator kick/move) can
|
|
// now land on THIS join instance while the token round trip above is in
|
|
// flight. The check inside the h.livekit block above (OC-0008) already
|
|
// withholds the token itself in that case; this is the tail guard for
|
|
// everything downstream of it (voice topic subscription, the joiner's own
|
|
// voice_state broadcast) when no token round trip ran at all (h.livekit ==
|
|
// nil is unreachable in practice — handleVoiceJoin returns earlier — but
|
|
// kept here as the single completion gate for both paths). Those evictors
|
|
// all clear the client's voice state and delete the row after deciding
|
|
// against it, so completing the join here would resurrect a membership
|
|
// that was deliberately torn down: subscribed to the voice topic and
|
|
// broadcast as present, with no row behind it. Their decision wins; a
|
|
// same-instance state is the only thing this join may finish.
|
|
if curChID, curToken := c.getVoiceState(); curChID != channelID || curToken != state.JoinedAt {
|
|
slog.Info("ws handleVoiceJoin: join superseded before completion",
|
|
"user_id", c.userID, "channel_id", channelID, "current_channel_id", curChID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Subscribe to voice topic for voice-scoped events.
|
|
h.pubsub.Subscribe(c, VoiceTopic(channelID))
|
|
|
|
// Update key holder map now that this client's voice state is set.
|
|
h.updateKeyHolder(channelID)
|
|
|
|
// Broadcast the joiner's state to the clients allowed to see this channel.
|
|
h.broadcastVoiceEvent(ctx, channelID, buildVoiceState(*state))
|
|
|
|
// Send existing channel voice states to the joiner.
|
|
existing, err := h.db.GetChannelVoiceStates(ctx, channelID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("ws handleVoiceJoin GetChannelVoiceStates", "err", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
for _, vs := range existing {
|
|
if vs.UserID == c.userID {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
c.sendMsg(buildVoiceState(vs))
|
|
// Send existing participant's ECDH public key (and its identity
|
|
// signature, F3 TOFU) so the joiner can participate in the
|
|
// client-side E2EE key exchange.
|
|
if pubKey, sig := h.getClientE2EEPubKey(vs.UserID); pubKey != "" {
|
|
c.sendMsg(buildVoiceE2EEAnnounce(vs.UserID, pubKey, sig))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Send voice_config to the joiner.
|
|
quality := "medium"
|
|
if ch.VoiceQuality != nil && *ch.VoiceQuality != "" {
|
|
q := *ch.VoiceQuality
|
|
if validVoiceQuality(q) {
|
|
quality = q
|
|
} else {
|
|
slog.Warn("ws handleVoiceJoin invalid voice quality, using default",
|
|
"quality", q, "channel_id", channelID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
maxUsers := ch.VoiceMaxUsers
|
|
bitrate := qualityBitrate(quality)
|
|
c.sendMsg(buildVoiceConfig(channelID, quality, bitrate, maxUsers))
|
|
|
|
lkURL := ""
|
|
if h.livekit != nil {
|
|
lkURL = h.livekit.URL()
|
|
}
|
|
slog.Info("voice join",
|
|
"user_id", c.userID,
|
|
"username", c.user.Username,
|
|
"channel_id", channelID,
|
|
"remote", c.remoteAddr,
|
|
"livekit_url", lkURL,
|
|
"quality", quality,
|
|
"channel_users", len(existing),
|
|
"channel_max", maxUsers,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleVoiceTokenRefreshV2 is the V2 (pure) handler for voice_token_refresh.
|
|
// It generates a fresh LiveKit token for a client already in a voice channel.
|
|
func handleVoiceTokenRefreshV2(ctx context.Context, cmd Command, info ClientInfo, deps any) Result {
|
|
d := deps.(VoiceDeps)
|
|
userID := info.UserID
|
|
channelID := info.VoiceChannelID
|
|
|
|
ratKey := auth.Key("voice_token_refresh", userID)
|
|
if d.Limiter != nil && !d.Limiter.Allow(ratKey, 1, 60*time.Second) {
|
|
return Result{Error: ClientError{Code: ErrCodeRateLimited, Message: "token refresh rate limited"}}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if channelID == 0 {
|
|
return Result{Error: ClientError{Code: ErrCodeBadRequest, Message: "not in voice"}}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if d.TokenGen == nil {
|
|
return Result{Error: ClientError{Code: ErrCodeInternal, Message: "voice not configured"}}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Re-check CONNECT_VOICE where the credential is minted. The channel comes
|
|
// from the client's own session state, and voice_join (voice_join.go:61) was
|
|
// the only place this bit was ever checked — so a user whose CONNECT_VOICE
|
|
// was revoked mid-session kept minting fresh SFU room-join grants. Refusing
|
|
// alone would leave the live session in place, so the refusal also evicts:
|
|
// LeaveVoice runs handleVoiceLeave, which clears the client's voice state,
|
|
// deletes the voice_states row and removes the LiveKit participant.
|
|
// Channel-type aware, like the voice_join gate: this mints the same
|
|
// RoomJoin+CanSubscribe credential, so a role-only check here would keep
|
|
// re-issuing one for a DM the user is not a participant of.
|
|
if !hasChannelAccess(ctx, d.DB, d.Permissions, d.PermSvc, userID, channelID, permissions.ConnectVoice) {
|
|
return Result{
|
|
Error: ClientError{Code: ErrCodeForbidden, Message: "missing CONNECT_VOICE permission"},
|
|
LeaveVoice: true,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Same block gate as voice_join (voice_join.go, OC-0018): a block imposed
|
|
// mid-session must not let the refresh keep minting a fresh SFU credential
|
|
// for a DM the other participant has since blocked. RequireDMNotBlocked is
|
|
// a safe no-op for a non-DM channelID (no dm_participants row to match), so
|
|
// this needs no channel-type fetch of its own. d.DB satisfies service.Store
|
|
// directly.
|
|
if err := service.RequireDMNotBlocked(ctx, d.DB, userID, channelID); err != nil {
|
|
return Result{
|
|
Error: ClientError{Code: ErrCodeForbidden, Message: "cannot refresh voice token: blocked"},
|
|
LeaveVoice: true,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// With a PermissionService these three are cache hits after the gate above
|
|
// populated the user's entry — the refresh drops from ~9 DB reads to at
|
|
// most one channel-row lookup.
|
|
canPublish := hasPerm(ctx, d.DB, d.Permissions, d.PermSvc, userID, channelID, permissions.SpeakVoice)
|
|
canSubscribe := true
|
|
canVideo := hasPerm(ctx, d.DB, d.Permissions, d.PermSvc, userID, channelID, permissions.UseVideo)
|
|
canScreenShare := hasPerm(ctx, d.DB, d.Permissions, d.PermSvc, userID, channelID, permissions.ShareScreen)
|
|
|
|
joinToken := info.VoiceJoinToken
|
|
var result Result
|
|
if joinToken == "" {
|
|
state, stateErr := d.DB.GetVoiceState(ctx, userID)
|
|
if stateErr != nil || state == nil {
|
|
slog.Error("ws handleVoiceTokenRefreshV2 GetVoiceState", "err", stateErr, "user_id", userID)
|
|
return Result{Error: ClientError{Code: ErrCodeInternal, Message: "failed to refresh voice token"}}
|
|
}
|
|
joinToken = state.JoinedAt
|
|
result.SetVoiceJoinToken = &joinToken
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
token, err := d.TokenGen.GenerateToken(userID, info.Username, channelID, joinToken, canPublish, canSubscribe, canVideo, canScreenShare)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("ws handleVoiceTokenRefreshV2 GenerateToken", "err", err, "user_id", userID)
|
|
return Result{Error: ClientError{Code: ErrCodeInternal, Message: "failed to generate voice token"}}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
isKeyHolder := false
|
|
if d.KeyHolder != nil {
|
|
isKeyHolder = d.KeyHolder.IsVoiceKeyHolder(channelID, userID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
result.Reply = buildVoiceToken(channelID, token, "/livekit", d.TokenGen.URL(), isKeyHolder)
|
|
slog.Info("voice token refreshed (v2)", "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
|
|
return result
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// rollbackVoiceJoin undoes a partially-completed voice join: clears the
|
|
// client's voice channel ID, removes the DB voice state row, and broadcasts
|
|
// voice_leave so other clients don't see a ghost participant.
|
|
//
|
|
// joinedAt scopes the compensating delete to the join instance being undone
|
|
// (mirrors LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch, used for the same reason by every
|
|
// sibling leave path). A rollback fires most often because the connection
|
|
// that started the join just died, and that same cancellation is exactly
|
|
// what lets a second connection for this user race ahead and establish a
|
|
// newer, legitimate voice_states row before this rollback runs — an
|
|
// unconditional "DELETE ... WHERE user_id = ?" would destroy that newer row
|
|
// instead of the failed one. When joinedAt is empty (the caller never read
|
|
// the row back far enough to learn it), the row is re-read here and the
|
|
// delete is skipped unless it still names channelID.
|
|
func (h *Hub) rollbackVoiceJoin(ctx context.Context, c *Client, channelID int64, joinedAt string, broadcast bool) {
|
|
c.clearVoiceChID()
|
|
// The client's voice state is now set before token generation (BUG-088),
|
|
// so a concurrent join/leave in the same channel can have elected this
|
|
// half-joined client key holder. Re-run the election after taking it back
|
|
// out, or the map keeps naming a user who never reached the SFU and the
|
|
// real lowest-uid participant's rekey offers are rejected with
|
|
// NOT_KEY_HOLDER until the next join or leave.
|
|
h.updateKeyHolder(channelID)
|
|
// The compensating delete must run even when the join failed BECAUSE the
|
|
// connection died — that cancellation is the most common rollback trigger.
|
|
rbCtx := context.WithoutCancel(ctx)
|
|
if joinedAt == "" {
|
|
if state, err := h.db.GetVoiceState(rbCtx, c.userID); err == nil && state != nil && state.ChannelID == channelID {
|
|
joinedAt = state.JoinedAt
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if joinedAt != "" {
|
|
if _, err := h.db.LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch(rbCtx, c.userID, channelID, joinedAt); err != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("ws rollbackVoiceJoin LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch", "err", err,
|
|
"user_id", c.userID, "channel_id", channelID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if broadcast {
|
|
h.broadcastVoiceEvent(ctx, channelID, buildVoiceLeave(channelID, c.userID))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|