mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
synced 2026-09-03 03:50:00 +03:00
Applies fixes for 20 adversarially-verified findings from a whole-codebase security review (server side). All Go build-tag variants build, `go vet` is clean, and the suite passes (the sole failing test, ws TestEmitEvents, is a pre-existing nil-harness failure unrelated to these changes). High severity: - auth: close TOCTOU in TOTP verify rate-limit by recording each attempt atomically up-front (was Check-then-Allow), restoring the per-user brute-force cap. - plugin: enforce the CPU/time budget on every WASM guest call via a WithTimeout context (WithCloseOnContextDone interrupts runaways); the configured budget was previously parsed but never applied. - api/waf: inspect request bodies for chunked (ContentLength==-1) requests so the SQLi/XSS/RCE body rules can no longer be bypassed. - ws: rate-limit voice_join/voice_leave and voice_e2ee announce/offer, which fan out to every participant and could force mass disconnects. Medium severity: - api: run bcrypt on the unknown-user login path (no || short-circuit) to remove the timing-based username-enumeration oracle. - ws: verify LiveKit webhooks via the SDK receiver so the signature is bound to the body hash (kills forgery/replay). - authz: require READ_MESSAGES for reactions and for plugin-command broadcasts; route the latter through RequireChannelAccess. - api: cache the client-update signature fetch and rate-limit the endpoint. - service: propagate DeleteOtherSessions failure from ChangePassword instead of silently reporting success. - api: trust the rightmost non-proxy X-Forwarded-For entry, not the client-controllable leftmost one. - plugin: route auto-registered commands through the conflict-checked RegisterCommand; pin the DNS-validated IP for host_http dials (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU). - api: mark access-controlled downloads private/no-cache + Vary: Origin. Low severity: - auth: fail closed when a fully-shaped TOTP ciphertext fails GCM auth (was returning the ciphertext as plaintext). - api: apply the livekit-proxy path allowlist to WebSocket upgrades too. - service: verify attachment ownership before linking (IDOR). - admin: bound the bootstrap setup invite (5 uses / 24h); re-verify the update binary hash immediately before rename+spawn (TOCTOU). - service: require BanMembers + role hierarchy for moderation ban/unban. chore: stop tracking the stray Server/owncord-server.exe build artifact. Test infra: add uploader_id to the hand-rolled ws test attachment schemas and make MemStore.GetAttachmentByID a no-op lookup, matching production/DB behavior. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
129 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
129 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"time"
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"github.com/owncord/server/permissions"
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"github.com/owncord/server/store"
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"github.com/owncord/server/telemetry"
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)
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// ModerationService handles user ban/unban operations.
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type ModerationService struct {
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st store.Store
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perms *PermissionService
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}
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// NewModerationService creates a ModerationService.
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func NewModerationService(st store.Store, perms *PermissionService) *ModerationService {
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return &ModerationService{st: st, perms: perms}
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}
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// requireBanAuthority verifies the actor is allowed to ban/unban the target.
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// The actor must hold BAN_MEMBERS (or Administrator, which bypasses permission
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// checks) and must outrank the target in the role hierarchy — mirroring the
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// position-based hierarchy used elsewhere (see admin/middleware.go and
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// permissions.OwnerRolePosition). Returns ErrForbidden when either check fails.
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func (s *ModerationService) requireBanAuthority(actorID, targetID int64) error {
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if s.perms == nil {
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// No permission service wired — fail closed rather than allow unchecked bans.
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: permission service unavailable", ErrForbidden)
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}
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actorRole, err := s.perms.GetRoleForUser(actorID)
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if err != nil || actorRole == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: failed to load actor role", ErrForbidden)
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}
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if !permissions.HasAdmin(actorRole.Permissions) &&
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!permissions.HasPerm(actorRole.Permissions, permissions.BanMembers) {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: missing BAN_MEMBERS permission", ErrForbidden)
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}
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// Role hierarchy: the actor must strictly outrank the target so a user
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// cannot ban a peer or a higher-ranked user (e.g. the owner).
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targetRole, err := s.perms.GetRoleForUser(targetID)
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if err != nil || targetRole == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: failed to load target role", ErrForbidden)
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}
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if actorRole.Position <= targetRole.Position {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot moderate a user of equal or higher rank", ErrForbidden)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// BanUser bans a target user. Validates the target exists and
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// prevents self-banning.
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func (s *ModerationService) BanUser(actorID, targetID int64, reason string, expires *time.Time) error {
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ctx, span := telemetry.GlobalTracer("service/moderation").Start(context.Background(), "ModerationService.BanUser",
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telemetry.Int64("actor_id", actorID),
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telemetry.Int64("target_id", targetID),
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)
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start := time.Now()
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defer func() {
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telemetry.TimeSince(ctx, telemetry.NewAppMetrics().ServiceCallDurationSec, start,
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telemetry.String("method", "BanUser"))
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span.End()
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}()
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if targetID <= 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: user_id must be positive", ErrBadRequest)
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}
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if actorID == targetID {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot ban yourself", ErrBadRequest)
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}
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target, err := s.st.GetUserByID(targetID)
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if err != nil || target == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: user not found", ErrNotFound)
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}
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// Authorization: actor must hold BAN_MEMBERS and outrank the target.
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if err := s.requireBanAuthority(actorID, targetID); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := s.st.BanUser(targetID, reason, expires); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: failed to ban user", ErrInternal)
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}
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if err := s.st.LogAudit(actorID, "ban", "user", targetID, reason); err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to log audit entry", "error", err)
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}
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slog.Info("user banned", "actor_id", actorID, "target_id", targetID, "reason", reason)
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return nil
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}
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// UnbanUser removes a ban on a target user.
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func (s *ModerationService) UnbanUser(actorID, targetID int64) error {
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if targetID <= 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: user_id must be positive", ErrBadRequest)
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}
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target, err := s.st.GetUserByID(targetID)
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if err != nil || target == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: user not found", ErrNotFound)
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}
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// Authorization: actor must hold BAN_MEMBERS and outrank the target.
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if err := s.requireBanAuthority(actorID, targetID); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := s.st.UnbanUser(targetID); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: failed to unban user", ErrInternal)
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}
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if err := s.st.LogAudit(actorID, "unban", "user", targetID, ""); err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to log audit entry", "error", err)
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}
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slog.Info("user unbanned", "actor_id", actorID, "target_id", targetID)
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return nil
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}
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