mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
synced 2026-09-03 03:50:00 +03:00
Applies fixes for 20 adversarially-verified findings from a whole-codebase security review (server side). All Go build-tag variants build, `go vet` is clean, and the suite passes (the sole failing test, ws TestEmitEvents, is a pre-existing nil-harness failure unrelated to these changes). High severity: - auth: close TOCTOU in TOTP verify rate-limit by recording each attempt atomically up-front (was Check-then-Allow), restoring the per-user brute-force cap. - plugin: enforce the CPU/time budget on every WASM guest call via a WithTimeout context (WithCloseOnContextDone interrupts runaways); the configured budget was previously parsed but never applied. - api/waf: inspect request bodies for chunked (ContentLength==-1) requests so the SQLi/XSS/RCE body rules can no longer be bypassed. - ws: rate-limit voice_join/voice_leave and voice_e2ee announce/offer, which fan out to every participant and could force mass disconnects. Medium severity: - api: run bcrypt on the unknown-user login path (no || short-circuit) to remove the timing-based username-enumeration oracle. - ws: verify LiveKit webhooks via the SDK receiver so the signature is bound to the body hash (kills forgery/replay). - authz: require READ_MESSAGES for reactions and for plugin-command broadcasts; route the latter through RequireChannelAccess. - api: cache the client-update signature fetch and rate-limit the endpoint. - service: propagate DeleteOtherSessions failure from ChangePassword instead of silently reporting success. - api: trust the rightmost non-proxy X-Forwarded-For entry, not the client-controllable leftmost one. - plugin: route auto-registered commands through the conflict-checked RegisterCommand; pin the DNS-validated IP for host_http dials (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU). - api: mark access-controlled downloads private/no-cache + Vary: Origin. Low severity: - auth: fail closed when a fully-shaped TOTP ciphertext fails GCM auth (was returning the ciphertext as plaintext). - api: apply the livekit-proxy path allowlist to WebSocket upgrades too. - service: verify attachment ownership before linking (IDOR). - admin: bound the bootstrap setup invite (5 uses / 24h); re-verify the update binary hash immediately before rename+spawn (TOCTOU). - service: require BanMembers + role hierarchy for moderation ban/unban. chore: stop tracking the stray Server/owncord-server.exe build artifact. Test infra: add uploader_id to the hand-rolled ws test attachment schemas and make MemStore.GetAttachmentByID a no-op lookup, matching production/DB behavior. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
95 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
95 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
package service
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"errors"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"log/slog"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/owncord/server/db"
|
|
"github.com/owncord/server/store"
|
|
"github.com/owncord/server/telemetry"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// UserService handles user profile and session operations.
|
|
type UserService struct {
|
|
st store.Store
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NewUserService creates a UserService.
|
|
func NewUserService(st store.Store) *UserService {
|
|
return &UserService{st: st}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateProfile updates a user's username and/or avatar.
|
|
// Returns the updated user for response building.
|
|
func (s *UserService) UpdateProfile(ctx context.Context, userID int64, username string, avatar *string) (*db.User, error) {
|
|
ctx, span := telemetry.GlobalTracer("service/user").Start(ctx, "UserService.UpdateProfile",
|
|
telemetry.Int64("user_id", userID),
|
|
)
|
|
start := time.Now()
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
telemetry.TimeSince(ctx, telemetry.NewAppMetrics().ServiceCallDurationSec, start,
|
|
telemetry.String("method", "UpdateProfile"))
|
|
span.End()
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
if err := s.st.UpdateUserProfile(userID, username, avatar); err != nil {
|
|
if db.IsUniqueConstraintError(err) {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: username is already taken", ErrConflict)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: failed to update profile", ErrInternal)
|
|
}
|
|
user, err := s.st.GetUserByID(userID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: failed to fetch updated user", ErrInternal)
|
|
}
|
|
_ = s.st.LogAudit(userID, "profile_update", "user", userID,
|
|
fmt.Sprintf("username=%s", username))
|
|
slog.Info("profile updated", "user_id", userID, "username", username)
|
|
return user, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ChangePassword updates the user's password and revokes other sessions.
|
|
// Returns the number of other sessions revoked.
|
|
func (s *UserService) ChangePassword(userID int64, newPasswordHash string, keepSessionID int64) (int64, error) {
|
|
if err := s.st.UpdateUserPassword(userID, newPasswordHash); err != nil {
|
|
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: failed to update password", ErrInternal)
|
|
}
|
|
revoked, err := s.st.DeleteOtherSessions(userID, keepSessionID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("UserService.ChangePassword DeleteOtherSessions", "err", err, "user_id", userID)
|
|
// The password was updated, but other sessions could not be revoked, so
|
|
// devices authenticated under the old password remain valid. Surface this
|
|
// as a failure instead of silently reporting success — a password change
|
|
// is a security action and the caller must be able to warn/retry.
|
|
return revoked, fmt.Errorf("%w: password changed but failed to revoke other sessions", ErrInternal)
|
|
}
|
|
_ = s.st.LogAudit(userID, "password_change", "user", userID, "password changed")
|
|
slog.Info("password changed", "user_id", userID, "sessions_revoked", revoked)
|
|
return revoked, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ListSessions returns all active sessions for a user.
|
|
func (s *UserService) ListSessions(userID int64) ([]db.Session, error) {
|
|
sessions, err := s.st.ListUserSessions(userID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: failed to list sessions", ErrInternal)
|
|
}
|
|
return sessions, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RevokeSession deletes a specific session owned by the user.
|
|
func (s *UserService) RevokeSession(userID, sessionID int64) error {
|
|
if err := s.st.DeleteSessionByID(sessionID, userID); err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, db.ErrNotFound) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("%w: session not found", ErrNotFound)
|
|
}
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("%w: failed to revoke session", ErrInternal)
|
|
}
|
|
_ = s.st.LogAudit(userID, "session_revoke", "session", sessionID, "session revoked")
|
|
slog.Info("session revoked", "user_id", userID, "session_id", sessionID)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|