Files
OwnCord/Server/admin/middleware.go
T
J3vbandClaude Opus 4.8 58005c9c6f feat(auth): revocable API tokens, introspect MCP server, and a Go 1.26 idiom pass (#1266)
* feat(auth): add revocable API tokens (bot/service auth)

Add long-lived, revocable API tokens so headless clients (the introspection
MCP tool, bots, CI) can authenticate without a password. Presented as
"Authorization: Bearer <token>", a token authenticates as a specific user,
inheriting that user's role and permissions.

- migration 018 + dedicated api_tokens table (kept separate from sessions so
  bulk logout and the per-user session cap never touch these); only the
  SHA-256 hash is stored, raw token shown once at creation
- auth.ResolveTokenHash: one shared bearer resolver that both AuthMiddleware
  and adminAuthMiddleware now call. Sessions are matched first so existing
  login behavior is unchanged; API tokens are a fallback only on session miss.
  A DB outage is returned wrapped, never mistaken for a bad token.
- `server token create|list|revoke` CLI: mints directly against the DB with no
  HTTP and no login — the password-free bootstrap path
- tests: resolver (8 cases incl. outage-not-fallthrough), db queries (6),
  api middleware integration (valid + revoked token)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(tools): add owncord-introspect MCP server

A local MCP dev tool that lets Claude Code introspect a running OwnCord
instance: read its logs, query any REST endpoint, and tail the desktop
client's log file. It is a thin wrapper over the existing API plus the
client log — no new product surface.

- tools/mcp-introspect/index.mjs (Node/ESM, one dep: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk)
  exposes api_request (full read-write passthrough), server_logs (admin SSE
  ring-buffer stream), client_logs (reads the desktop log file)
- authenticates with an API token (OWNCORD_API_TOKEN); pins the self-signed
  cert and skips hostname checks (the cert has no SAN)
- registered in .mcp.json (secret-free ${OWNCORD_API_TOKEN})
- un-ignore tools/mcp-introspect/ so this shared dev tool is committed, while
  tools/livekit-server.exe and node_modules stay ignored
- docs/mcp-introspect.md: how it works, tool reference, setup, troubleshooting

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(dependencies): update and add various crate versions in Cargo.lock

* feat(admin): manage API tokens from the admin panel

Add Owner-gated HTTP endpoints and a UI card to create, list, and revoke
API tokens from the web admin panel. Previously only the `server token`
CLI could manage them, which requires shell access to the host.

- POST|GET|DELETE /admin/api/tokens in admin/handlers_tokens.go, wired in
  admin/api.go. All three are Owner-only (ownerOnlyMiddleware, like
  backups/updates): an HTTP token-mint endpoint is a network-reachable
  credential-minting surface, and API tokens deliberately survive password
  change + bulk logout, so a hijacked admin session must not mint one.
- Reuses the same db.*APIToken calls as the CLI; create sources the actor
  from request context (audits who clicked, not the bound user); the raw
  token is returned once in the 201 body, never stored.
- Add json tags to db.APITokenListItem for snake_case wire consistency.
- Admin panel: "API Tokens" nav item + create modal, show-once reveal,
  revoke confirm in admin/static/index.html.
- Tests: 7 in admin/api_test.go (+api_tokens table in the in-memory schema).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: modernize to Go 1.26 idioms + enable modernize linter

Apply `golangci-lint modernize` autofixes across the server and enable the
linter in .golangci.yml so these stop re-accumulating (they built up only
because modernize was never in the config).

Production code: slices.Contains for hand-rolled membership loops (api
router, ws origin, db/account, plugin manifest); strings.SplitSeq for
allocation-free line/segment iteration (db/migrate, updater, livekit_proxy);
strings.Cut (config); fmt.Appendf (dm_handler); min() (event_pruner);
any (ws client). Tests: range-over-int, t.Context(), WaitGroup.Go,
slices.Sort, maps.Copy, new(expr), interface{}->any.

- plugin/manifest.go parent-traversal check applied by hand: modernize
  skipped it (two conflicting rewrites); used the slices.Contains form.
- Removed the now-dead ptr() test helper after newexpr inlined its callers.
- Dropped dangling sort imports left by the sort.Slice->slices.Sort rewrite.

No behavior change. All four tag variants build, full test suite is green,
and golangci-lint (with modernize enabled) reports 0 issues.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 13:25:46 +02:00

102 lines
3.9 KiB
Go

package admin
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/http"
"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
"github.com/owncord/server/db"
"github.com/owncord/server/permissions"
)
// ─── Middleware ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// RequireAdminAuth is the exported form of adminAuthMiddleware. External
// packages (e.g. api/router.go for the plugin admin handler) reuse it so the
// session/permission gate stays in one place.
func RequireAdminAuth(database *db.DB) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return adminAuthMiddleware(database)
}
// adminAuthMiddleware validates the Bearer token and requires ADMINISTRATOR.
// On success it stores the *db.User and *db.Session in the request context so
// downstream handlers can retrieve them without re-querying the database.
func adminAuthMiddleware(database *db.DB) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
token, ok := auth.ExtractBearerToken(r)
if !ok {
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "missing or invalid authorization header")
return
}
hash := auth.HashToken(token)
// Resolve the bearer token: login session first, then API token. An
// API token whose user carries the ADMINISTRATOR bit authenticates
// here too, so /admin/api/* works for headless clients.
user, role, sess, err := auth.ResolveTokenHash(r.Context(), database, hash)
if err != nil {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, auth.ErrTokenExpired):
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "session has expired")
case errors.Is(err, auth.ErrUserNotFound):
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "user not found")
case errors.Is(err, auth.ErrRoleNotFound):
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "role not found")
default:
// ErrTokenNotFound or a wrapped DB error.
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "invalid or expired session")
}
return
}
// F1: reject effectively-banned users before any further processing,
// as api.AuthMiddleware does — a ban must revoke admin-panel access
// immediately, not only once the session expires. Deliberately placed
// AFTER ResolveTokenHash so it also covers the API-token path this
// commit introduces; gating only the session branch would let a
// banned administrator keep working through a bot token.
if auth.IsEffectivelyBanned(user) {
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "your account has been suspended")
return
}
if !permissions.HasAdmin(role.Permissions) {
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "administrator permission required")
return
}
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), adminUserKey, user)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, adminSessionKey, sess) // nil for API-token principals; consumers guard nil
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
}
// ownerOnlyMiddleware wraps a handler to require Owner role (position == 100).
// It reads the user from context (set by adminAuthMiddleware) rather than
// re-authenticating, avoiding redundant DB queries and session-expiry gaps.
func ownerOnlyMiddleware(database *db.DB, next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
user, ok := r.Context().Value(adminUserKey).(*db.User)
if !ok || user == nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "not authenticated")
return
}
role, err := database.GetRoleByID(r.Context(), user.RoleID)
if err != nil || role == nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "role not found")
return
}
if role.Position < permissions.OwnerRolePosition {
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "owner role required")
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}