OwnCord/docs/api.md

REST API Reference

OwnCord server REST API reference. All endpoints use the base URL https://{server}:{port}/api/v1.

---

Authentication

All authenticated endpoints require a session token delivered via the Authorization: Bearer {token} header. Tokens are obtained from POST /api/v1/auth/login, POST /api/v1/auth/register, or POST /api/v1/auth/verify-totp after a partial 2FA challenge.

Session Lifecycle

• Sessions are created on login/register and stored with a SHA-256 hash of the raw token, the client IP, User-Agent, and an expiry timestamp.
• Each authenticated request updates the session's last_active timestamp.
• Banned users are rejected at the middleware level with 403 FORBIDDEN.

Middleware Stack (all routes)

In mount order (Server/api/router.go):

1. boundRequestID -- drops an oversized (>128 bytes) or non-printable client-supplied X-Request-Id before chi adopts it.
2. RequestID (chi) -- assigns the request ID used in logs.
3. setRequestIDHeader -- echoes the request ID into the X-Request-Id response header.
4. Recoverer -- catches panics, logs them through slog with a stack capture, returns 500.
5. Request Logger -- structured logging of method, path, status, duration.
6. Telemetry HTTP middleware -- OpenTelemetry tracing; a no-op unless the server was built with -tags otel and telemetry is enabled.
7. SecurityHeadersWithTLS -- (adds Strict-Transport-Security when TLS is on) sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, X-Frame-Options: DENY, X-XSS-Protection: 0, Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin, Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self', Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), Cache-Control: no-store.
8. MaxBodySize -- 1 MiB default for all routes except /api/v1/uploads (100 MiB), /api/v1/admin/plugins/install (16 MiB envelope), and /api/v1/users/me/avatar (2 MiB envelope).
9. Coraza WAF (optional) -- OWASP Core Rule Set request filtering, mounted only when server.waf_enabled: true (see docs/server-configuration.md).

Note: chi's middleware.RealIP is deliberately not used -- client IPs are resolved from X-Forwarded-For only when the peer is listed in server.trusted_proxies.

---

Standard Error Response

Error responses use this JSON envelope (one exception: the plugin admin endpoints return plain-text errors — see their section):

{
  "error": "ERROR_CODE",
  "message": "Human-readable detail"
}

Error Codes

Code	HTTP Status	When It Occurs
UNAUTHORIZED	401	Missing/invalid/expired session token
INVALID_CREDENTIALS	401	Login/register with bad username/password/invite (generic to prevent enumeration)
FORBIDDEN	403	Insufficient permissions, banned account, or admin IP restriction
NOT_FOUND	404	Resource (channel, message, user, invite, file, backup) not found
RATE_LIMITED	429	Too many requests; response includes Retry-After header (seconds)
INVALID_INPUT / BAD_REQUEST	400	Malformed body, missing required fields, invalid query params, or an upload exceeding the size limit (oversize uploads are rejected 400, not 413; the only 413 in the API is the plugin-install endpoint's plain-text "plugin upload too large")
CONFLICT	409	Duplicate username on register, or server already up-to-date on update
INTERNAL_ERROR	500	Internal server error
STORAGE_ERROR	507	Upload could not be persisted (storage backend write failure)
BAD_GATEWAY	502	Upstream failure (GitHub API, LiveKit, GIF provider, asset download)
GIF_DISABLED	503	GIF proxy is not configured on this server (no gif.api_key)

---

Auth Endpoints

POST /api/v1/auth/register

Create a new account using an invite code. The first user is created via /admin/api/setup instead.

Auth: None (public) Rate limit: 3 requests/minute per IP

Request

{
  "username": "alex",
  "password": "MyStr0ng!Pass",
  "invite_code": "abc123def"
}

Field	Type	Required	Notes
username	string	Yes	HTML-stripped, trimmed. Must be non-empty.
password	string	Yes	Validated for strength (min length, complexity).
invite_code	string	Yes	Must be a valid, non-expired, non-revoked invite with remaining uses.

Response 201 Created

{
  "token": "raw-session-token-64-chars",
  "user": {
    "id": 2,
    "username": "alex",
    "avatar": "",
    "display_name": null,
    "about": null,
    "custom_status": null,
    "status": "offline",
    "role_id": 4,
    "totp_enabled": false,
    "created_at": "2026-03-24T12:00:00Z"
  }
}

See GET /api/v1/auth/me for the full user-object field table.

Errors

Status	Code	Cause
400	INVALID_INPUT	Missing username/password/invite_code, or weak password
400	INVALID_CREDENTIALS	Bad invite code, expired/revoked invite, or duplicate username
403	FORBIDDEN	Registration is closed or unavailable while server-wide 2FA is required
429	RATE_LIMITED	Exceeded 3 registrations/minute from this IP
500	INTERNAL_ERROR	Hashing failure, session creation failure, or DB error

---

POST /api/v1/auth/login

Authenticate with username and password.

Auth: None (public) Rate limit: 5 requests/minute per IP. After 10 failed attempts within 15 minutes from the same IP, the IP is locked out for 15 minutes. Independently, 10 failed attempts against the same username (from any IP) lock that account out for 15 minutes. Lockouts are persisted to the database and survive server restarts.

Request

{
  "username": "alex",
  "password": "MyStr0ng!Pass"
}

Response 200 OK

If the account does not have TOTP enabled:

{
  "token": "raw-session-token-64-chars",
  "requires_2fa": false,
  "user": {
    "id": 1,
    "username": "alex",
    "avatar": "/api/v1/files/uuid",
    "display_name": "Alex",
    "about": null,
    "custom_status": null,
    "status": "offline",
    "role_id": 4,
    "totp_enabled": false,
    "created_at": "2026-03-24T12:00:00Z"
  }
}

See GET /api/v1/auth/me for the full user-object field table.

If the account has TOTP enabled:

{
  "partial_token": "opaque-partial-token",
  "requires_2fa": true
}

Errors

Status	Code	Cause
400	INVALID_INPUT	Missing username or password
401	UNAUTHORIZED	Wrong username or password
403	FORBIDDEN	Account is banned/suspended
429	RATE_LIMITED	IP locked out after 10 consecutive failures (15 min cooldown)
500	INTERNAL_ERROR	Session creation failure

---

POST /api/v1/auth/verify-totp

Complete a TOTP login challenge started by POST /api/v1/auth/login.

Auth: Required with the partial_token from the login response Rate limit: 10 requests/minute per IP, plus a 5-attempt budget per partial challenge

Request

{
  "code": "123456"
}

Response 200 OK

{
  "token": "raw-session-token-64-chars",
  "requires_2fa": false,
  "user": {
    "id": 1,
    "username": "alex",
    "avatar": "/api/v1/files/uuid",
    "display_name": "Alex",
    "about": null,
    "custom_status": null,
    "status": "offline",
    "role_id": 4,
    "totp_enabled": true,
    "created_at": "2026-03-24T12:00:00Z"
  }
}

See GET /api/v1/auth/me for the full user-object field table.

Errors

Status	Code	Cause
400	INVALID_INPUT	Malformed request body
401	UNAUTHORIZED	Missing/expired challenge, invalid TOTP code, or challenge consumed
500	INTERNAL_ERROR	Session creation failure

---

GET /api/v1/auth/me

Get the current authenticated user's profile.

Auth: Required (Bearer token)

Response 200 OK

{
  "id": 1,
  "username": "alex",
  "avatar": "/api/v1/files/uuid",
  "display_name": "Alex",
  "about": "A short bio.",
  "custom_status": "building things",
  "status": "online",
  "role_id": 2,
  "totp_enabled": true,
  "created_at": "2026-03-24T12:00:00Z"
}

This is the canonical user object, also returned as user by register, login and the TOTP challenge.

Field	Type	Description
id	int64	User ID
username	string	Unique handle; the name @mentions resolve against
avatar	string	Avatar URL (/api/v1/files/{id} after an upload, or an https:// URL), or empty string
display_name	string|null	Nickname rendered instead of username; null when unset
about	string|null	Profile bio, max 300 characters; null when unset
custom_status	string|null	Free-text status line, max 128 characters; null when unset. Set over WebSocket (presence_update), not over REST
status	string	One of: online, idle, dnd, invisible, offline. This is the caller's own true status, so invisible appears here; every payload describing this user to anyone else reports offline instead
role_id	int64	Numeric role ID (1=Owner, 2=Admin, 3=Moderator, 4=Member)
totp_enabled	bool	Whether the user has a confirmed TOTP secret
created_at	string	ISO 8601 timestamp

---

POST /api/v1/auth/logout

Invalidate the current session token.

Auth: Required (Bearer token)

Response 204 No Content

---

DELETE /api/v1/auth/account

Permanently delete the authenticated user's account. Requires password confirmation.

Auth: Required (Bearer token) Rate limit: 5 requests/minute per IP. After 3 failed password attempts, the endpoint locks out for 15 minutes per user.

Request

{
  "password": "MyStr0ng!Pass"
}

Response 204 No Content

Account deleted successfully. All sessions, messages (soft-deleted), and associated data are cleaned up.

Errors

Status	Code	Cause
400	INVALID_INPUT	Missing or incorrect password
403	FORBIDDEN	Cannot delete the last admin account
429	RATE_LIMITED	Locked out after 3 failed password attempts (15 min cooldown)
500	INTERNAL_ERROR	Database error during deletion

---

POST /api/v1/users/me/totp/enable

Start TOTP enrollment for the authenticated user. The secret is not persisted until /api/v1/users/me/totp/confirm succeeds.

Auth: Required Rate limit: 5 requests/minute per IP

Request

{
  "password": "MyStr0ng!Pass"
}

Response 200 OK

{
  "qr_uri": "otpauth://totp/OwnCord:alex?...",
  "backup_codes": []
}

---

POST /api/v1/users/me/totp/confirm

Confirm a pending TOTP enrollment.

Auth: Required Rate limit: 5 requests/minute per IP

Request

{
  "password": "MyStr0ng!Pass",
  "code": "123456"
}

Response 204 No Content

---

DELETE /api/v1/users/me/totp

Disable TOTP for the authenticated user.

Auth: Required Rate limit: 5 requests/minute per IP

Request

{
  "password": "MyStr0ng!Pass"
}

Response 204 No Content

---

User Profile & Sessions

PATCH /api/v1/users/me

Update the authenticated user's profile. Broadcasts a user_update WebSocket message to all clients on success, carrying the full profile snapshot (the event replaces the client's copy rather than patching it).

Auth: Required Rate limit: 10 requests/minute

Request

{
  "username": "newname",
  "avatar": "https://example.com/pic.png",
  "display_name": "New Name",
  "about": "A short bio."
}

Field	Rules
username	Required. The unique handle; @mentions resolve against it.
avatar	Optional. Must be an https:// URL (max 512 chars) or "" to clear. Upload a file instead with POST /api/v1/users/me/avatar.
display_name	Optional, 1–32 characters. Shown instead of username everywhere; "" clears it and falls back to the username. Rejected if it contains control or invisible (bidi-override) characters.
about	Optional, max 300 characters. "" clears it.
identity_public_key	Optional, base64, max 128 characters. Publishes the client's long-term E2EE identity public key for voice TOFU pinning (see protocol.md, Voice End-to-End Encryption).

Omitting a field leaves it unchanged; sending "" clears the nullable ones. display_name and about are HTML-sanitized and trimmed server-side, and the length caps count characters, not bytes.

Response 200 OK

Returns the updated user object (same shape as GET /api/v1/auth/me).

---

POST /api/v1/users/me/avatar

Upload an avatar image and point the authenticated user's avatar at it. Broadcasts a user_update on success, exactly like the PATCH above.

The bytes are stored as an ordinary attachment with no channel, and users.avatar is set to /api/v1/files/{id}. That URL is what makes the picture readable: GET /api/v1/files/{id} normally serves an unlinked attachment only to its uploader, and additionally admits one that some user's avatar currently points at — so an avatar is readable by every authenticated user for exactly as long as it is in use, and stops being readable the moment it is replaced.

Not registered when the server has no working storage backend.

Auth: Required Rate limit: 5 uploads/minute per user

Request

multipart/form-data with a single file part.

Rule	Value
Type	image/png, image/jpeg or image/webp, sniffed from the file's own bytes (the client's Content-Type is ignored)
Size	1 MiB
Dimensions	1024x1024, measured from the sniffed image

GIF is refused (an animated avatar renders in every message row), and so is SVG — it is markup with script and external-fetch capability, and an avatar is rendered inline by definition. The server does not re-encode or crop; the client is expected to downscale and square-crop before uploading.

Response 201 Created

{
  "id": "5f2c...",
  "filename": "me.png",
  "size": 20481,
  "mime": "image/png",
  "url": "/api/v1/files/5f2c...",
  "width": 256,
  "height": 256
}

Errors

Status	Code	Cause
400	BAD_REQUEST	Missing file part, wrong type, too large, or too many pixels
429	RATE_LIMITED	Too many uploads

---

PUT /api/v1/users/me/password

Change the authenticated user's password. Verifies the old password, enforces password strength, and revokes all other sessions on success.

Auth: Required Rate limit: 5 requests/minute, plus a failed-confirmation lockout on repeated wrong old passwords

Request

{
  "old_password": "OldPass!1",
  "new_password": "NewStr0ng!Pass"
}

Response 204 No Content

Password changed and other sessions revoked. If the password change committed but revoking other sessions failed, the endpoint returns 200 OK with a warning body instead (the new password is in effect — do not retry with the old one).

Errors

Status	Code	Cause
400	INVALID_INPUT	Weak new password, or new password equals old
403	FORBIDDEN	Incorrect old password
429	RATE_LIMITED	Too many attempts / lockout

---

GET /api/v1/users/me/sessions

List the authenticated user's active sessions.

Auth: Required

Response 200 OK

{
  "sessions": [
    {
      "id": 12,
      "device": "Mozilla/5.0 ...",
      "ip": "192.168.1.100",
      "created_at": "2026-07-01T10:00:00Z",
      "last_used": "2026-07-19T09:00:00Z",
      "is_current": true
    }
  ]
}

---

DELETE /api/v1/users/me/sessions/{id}

Revoke one of the authenticated user's sessions by ID.

Auth: Required

Response 204 No Content

---

Channel Endpoints

GET /api/v1/channels

List all channels the authenticated user has READ_MESSAGES permission for. DM channels are NOT included (use GET /api/v1/dms instead).

Auth: Required

Response 200 OK

[
  {
    "id": 1,
    "name": "general",
    "type": "text",
    "topic": "Welcome to the server!",
    "category": "Text Channels",
    "position": 0,
    "slow_mode": 0,
    "archived": false,
    "nsfw": false,
    "voice_max_users": 0,
    "voice_max_video": 0
  }
]

Field	Type	Description
id	int64	Channel ID
name	string	Channel name
type	string	text, voice, or announcement (announcement channels are read like text but only MANAGE_MESSAGES holders can post)
topic	string	Channel topic/description
category	string	Category grouping
position	int	Sort order within category
slow_mode	int	Slow-mode delay in seconds (0 = disabled)
archived	bool	Whether the channel is archived
nsfw	bool	Age-restriction label. Stored and shipped only — the server applies no content behaviour to a flagged channel (see below)
voice_max_users	int	Voice capacity, 0 = unlimited. Enforced on join (CHANNEL_FULL)
voice_max_video	int	Simultaneous cameras/screen shares, 0 = unlimited. Enforced on publish (VIDEO_LIMIT)

The nsfw flag

nsfw is metadata and nothing else. The server stores it, ships it in ready and in the channel_create / channel_update broadcasts, and audits an operator flipping it — and does not filter content, check anyone's age, or restrict who may read or post in a flagged channel. Every consequence is the client's: the desktop client shows a one-time-per-session "may contain sensitive content" gate before rendering a flagged channel's messages (remembered in sessionStorage, so a new session asks again) and marks the channel in its sidebar. A client that ignores the field behaves exactly as it did before the field existed.

---

GET /api/v1/channels/{id}/messages

Paginated message history for a channel.

Auth: Required Permission: READ_MESSAGES on the channel (or DM participant membership)

Query Parameters

Param	Type	Default	Range	Description
before	int64	0 (latest)	>= 0	Cursor: return messages with ID less than this value
limit	int	50	1-100	Number of messages to return

Response 200 OK

{
  "messages": [
    {
      "id": 1042,
      "channel_id": 5,
      "user": {
        "id": 1,
        "username": "alex",
        "avatar": "uuid.png"
      },
      "content": "Hello!",
      "reply_to": null,
      "attachments": [
        {
          "id": "file-uuid",
          "filename": "photo.jpg",
          "size": 204800,
          "mime_type": "image/jpeg",
          "url": "/api/v1/files/file-uuid",
          "width": 1920,
          "height": 1080
        }
      ],
      "reactions": [
        {
          "emoji": "\ud83d\udc4d",
          "count": 2,
          "me": true
        }
      ],
      "pinned": false,
      "edited_at": null,
      "deleted": false,
      "timestamp": "2026-03-14T10:30:00Z",
      "mentions": [7],
      "mentions_everyone": false
    }
  ],
  "has_more": true
}

mentions is the server-resolved list of mentioned user IDs (always present, empty when the message mentions nobody) and mentions_everyone reports an @everyone/@here that cleared the MENTION_EVERYONE permission. Both are resolved at send time and re-resolved on edit; an @word that matches no username, or an @everyone from a user without the bit, carries no mention semantics and stays plain text. The same two fields appear on pinned-message responses and on the WebSocket chat_message/chat_edited payloads.

Pagination

Use cursor-based pagination by passing the id of the last message as the before parameter:

GET /api/v1/channels/5/messages?before=1042&limit=50

When has_more is false, you have reached the beginning of the channel history.

---

GET /api/v1/channels/{id}/messages/around/{messageId}

The window of channel history centred on one message, for jumping to a message that is not in the client's loaded page — a search hit, a pinned entry, a reply reference, or an owncord://message/{channelId}/{messageId} permalink.

Auth: Required Permission: READ_MESSAGES on the channel (or DM participant membership) — the same gate as GET /messages

Query Parameters

Param	Type	Default	Range	Description
limit	int	50	1-100	Total window size, centre included

Half the window sits before the centre and the remainder after it: limit=50 returns up to 25 older messages, the centre, and up to 24 newer ones. Near the start or end of a channel the window is simply shorter — it is not re-balanced toward the other side.

Response 200 OK

{
  "messages": [],
  "has_more_before": true,
  "has_more_after": true
}

messages holds the same message objects as GET /messages (user, attachments, reactions with the me flag, mentions, mentions_everyone), but is ordered oldest-first, not newest-first like the paginated history endpoint.

has_more_before / has_more_after report whether the channel holds further live history on each side of the returned window. A client that renders an around-window is detached from the live tail while has_more_after is true: newly broadcast messages belong below the window and are not part of it, so the client should offer a "jump to present" affordance that refetches the normal GET /messages tail.

Errors

Status	Code	When
400	BAD_REQUEST	id or messageId is not a positive integer, or limit is not a positive integer
403	FORBIDDEN	The channel exists but READ_MESSAGES is denied
404	NOT_FOUND	The channel does not exist, the caller is not a participant of the DM, or the message does not live in this channel

Soft-deleted messages are 404 here, not an empty window: history omits deleted rows, so there is no row to centre on. Deleted messages are also excluded from the window itself, exactly as in GET /messages.

---

POST /api/v1/channels/{id}/messages/purge

Bulk soft-delete the newest messages in a channel.

Auth: Required Permission: READ_MESSAGES and MANAGE_MESSAGES on the channel (per-channel overrides apply)

Not available in DM channels — a DM has no MANAGE_MESSAGES gate, so those requests are rejected with 403.

Request Body

{
  "limit": 50,
  "before": 1042
}

Field	Type	Required	Description
limit	integer	Yes	How many messages to delete, 1--100. Values above 100 are clamped; 0 or negative is a 400.
before	integer	No	Only delete messages with an id below this one. Omit or 0 to start from the newest.

Response 200 OK

{
  "channel_id": 5,
  "ids": [1042, 1041, 1040],
  "count": 3
}

ids is newest-first and may hold fewer than limit entries when the channel has less history; already-deleted messages are skipped. Deletion is soft: the rows stay as tombstones, exactly as with a single delete. A single chat_bulk_deleted WebSocket event is broadcast to the channel (not one chat_deleted per message), and one message_purge audit entry is written.

Rate limited to 5/sec per user.

---

GET /api/v1/channels/{id}/messages/{messageId}/reactions/{emoji}/users

List the users who reacted to a message with a specific emoji — the "who reacted" tooltip behind a reaction pill.

Auth: Required Permission: READ_MESSAGES on the channel (DM: participant)

The reactor list is a separate endpoint rather than user_ids inline on every reaction summary, so message payloads stay small: a busy channel carries dozens of pills per page and almost none of them are ever hovered.

{emoji} is a path segment and must be percent-encoded (👍 → %F0%9F%91%8D). The message must belong to {id}; a message in another channel is a 404, so the channel in the URL is always the one the permission check ran against.

Response 200 OK

{
  "users": [
    { "id": 3, "username": "alice", "avatar": "" },
    { "id": 7, "username": "bob", "avatar": "/api/v1/files/abc123" }
  ]
}

Ordered oldest reaction first and capped at 100 reactors — the list is for a tooltip, not an audit. users is always an array ([] when nobody used that emoji, which is also the answer for an emoji that does not exist). avatar is "" when the user has none.

Status	Error	When
400	BAD_REQUEST	Non-positive id/messageId, or an empty / over-32-rune / control-character emoji
403	FORBIDDEN	No READ_MESSAGES on the channel
404	NOT_FOUND	Channel or message not found, the message lives in another channel, or a DM the caller is not in

---

GET /api/v1/channels/{id}/pins

Get all pinned messages for a channel.

Auth: Required Permission: READ_MESSAGES on the channel

Response 200 OK

Returns { "messages": [...], "has_more": false }. has_more is always false for pins (all pinned messages are returned at once).

---

POST /api/v1/channels/{id}/pins/{messageId}

Pin a message in a channel.

Auth: Required Permission: MANAGE_MESSAGES on the channel

Response 204 No Content

---

DELETE /api/v1/channels/{id}/pins/{messageId}

Unpin a message from a channel.

Auth: Required Permission: MANAGE_MESSAGES on the channel

Response 204 No Content

---

Search

GET /api/v1/search

Full-text search across messages in channels the user can read. Uses SQLite FTS5 for matching.

Auth: Required Rate limit: 30 requests/minute

Query Parameters

Param	Type	Default	Range	Description
q	string	(required)	non-empty	Search query (FTS5 syntax)
channel_id	int64	(all channels)	> 0	Restrict search to a single channel
limit	int	50	1-100	Maximum results to return

Response 200 OK

{
  "results": [
    {
      "message_id": 1042,
      "channel_id": 5,
      "channel_name": "general",
      "user": {
        "id": 1,
        "username": "alex"
      },
      "content": "...matched text...",
      "timestamp": "2026-03-14T10:30:00Z",
      "mentions": [7],
      "mentions_everyone": false
    }
  ]
}

---

GIFs

The server proxies the Klipy GIF API so the provider API key stays server-side. Clients never contact api.klipy.com — a key shipped in the desktop bundle would be public by construction. The key is configured as gif.api_key (see Server Configuration).

Default-off contract: with no key configured, both endpoints return 503 with error code GIF_DISABLED. Clients must treat that as "this server does not have GIFs" and hide/disable the GIF affordance — not retry.

The media URLs in the response point at Klipy's CDN; the client still validates them against its klipy.com CDN allowlist before rendering.

GET /api/v1/gif/search

Auth: Required Rate limit: 30 requests/minute (dedicated per-IP bucket)

Query Parameters

Param	Type	Default	Range	Description
q	string	(required)	1-100 chars	Search term
limit	int	20	1-50	Maximum results to return

Response 200 OK

{
  "results": [
    {
      "id": "abc123",
      "title": "happy cat",
      "media_formats": {
        "tinygif": { "url": "https://media.klipy.com/abc123_tiny.gif" },
        "gif": { "url": "https://media.klipy.com/abc123.gif" }
      }
    }
  ]
}

Only id, title, and the two media_formats URLs are forwarded. Every other field the upstream returns is dropped, so an upstream that echoed the API key could not leak it to clients. Results missing either format are omitted.

Errors

Status	Code	When
400	INVALID_INPUT	Missing/blank q, q over 100 chars, or limit outside 1-50
401	UNAUTHORIZED	No valid session (checked before the disabled check)
429	RATE_LIMITED	Over 30 requests/minute
502	BAD_GATEWAY	Upstream error, timeout, or unparseable response
503	GIF_DISABLED	gif.api_key is not configured

GET /api/v1/gif/trending

Same auth, rate limit, response shape, and error codes as /api/v1/gif/search, minus the q parameter.

Param	Type	Default	Range	Description
limit	int	20	1-50	Maximum results to return

---

Direct Messages

DM channels use participant-based authorization rather than role-based permissions.

POST /api/v1/dms

Create or retrieve a 1-on-1 DM channel with another user. If a DM channel already exists, it is returned and re-opened.

Auth: Required

Request

{
  "recipient_id": 2
}

Response 200 OK (existing channel) or 201 Created (new channel)

{
  "channel_id": 100,
  "recipient": {
    "id": 2,
    "username": "jordan",
    "avatar": "uuid.png",
    "status": "online"
  },
  "created": false
}

On a newly created channel (201, "created": true) the recipient also receives a dm_channel_open. Re-opening an existing DM (200) emits nothing — it only touches the caller's own open state. The creator is not sent the event on either path; it learns the channel from the response body above.

---

GET /api/v1/dms

List all open DM channels for the authenticated user, ordered by most recent activity.

Auth: Required

Response 200 OK

{
  "dm_channels": [
    {
      "channel_id": 100,
      "name": "Lunch crew",
      "is_group": true,
      "recipient": {
        "id": 2,
        "username": "jordan",
        "display_name": "Jo",
        "avatar": "/api/v1/files/uuid",
        "status": "online"
      },
      "recipients": [
        {
          "id": 2,
          "username": "jordan",
          "display_name": "Jo",
          "avatar": "/api/v1/files/uuid",
          "status": "online"
        },
        {
          "id": 3,
          "username": "sam",
          "display_name": "",
          "avatar": "",
          "status": "idle"
        }
      ],
      "last_message_id": 5042,
      "last_message": "Hey, how's it going?",
      "last_message_at": "2026-03-28T14:30:00Z",
      "unread_count": 3
    }
  ]
}

Field	Description
recipient	The other participant of a 1:1 DM. Backward compatibility only — for a group it carries the first of recipients.
recipients	Every participant except the caller. What group-aware clients read.
name	Optional group name; "" for a 1:1 DM and for an unnamed group.
is_group	True for a group DM. Stored, not derived from the live participant count.

status is viewer-adjusted: an invisible participant reads as offline.

---

POST /api/v1/dms/group

Create a group DM between the caller and 2–8 other users (3–10 total).

Unlike POST /api/v1/dms this always creates: the same set of people may reasonably want more than one group, so there is no "the group for these users" to look up.

Blocks are enforced in both directions, per recipient — a user may neither pull someone they have blocked into a room with them nor use a group to reach someone who has blocked them. The check is creation-time only; see docs/protocol.md § DM Authorization for why sending into a group is not block-checked.

Auth: Required

Request

{
  "recipient_ids": [2, 3],
  "name": "Lunch crew"
}

Field	Type	Required	Description
recipient_ids	int[]	Yes	2–8 other users. De-duplicated; the caller is dropped if named.
name	string	No	Group name, ≤ 100 characters. HTML-stripped. Omit or "" for an unnamed group.

Response 201 Created

The same DM summary shape GET /api/v1/dms returns, from the creator's seat. Every participant — the creator included — also receives a dm_channel_open.

Errors

Status	Code	Reason
400	BAD_REQUEST	Fewer than 2 or more than 8 recipients, or a name over 100 characters
403	FORBIDDEN	A recipient is blocked by, or has blocked, the caller
404	NOT_FOUND	A recipient does not exist

---

PATCH /api/v1/dms/{channelId}

Set or clear a group DM's name.

Any participant may rename it. That is Discord's rule and the only one that works here: a group DM has no owner column and no roles, so "who may rename" has exactly one answer that does not require inventing an ownership model. A 1:1 DM refuses — its name is who is in it.

Auth: Required (participant)

Request

{ "name": "Lunch crew" }

An empty name clears it, and the group falls back to listing its members.

Response 200 OK

The DM summary shape, from the caller's seat. Every participant also receives a dm_channel_open carrying the new name.

Errors

Status	Code	Reason
400	BAD_REQUEST	The channel is a 1:1 DM, or the name exceeds 100 characters
404	NOT_FOUND	Not a participant of this DM

---

DELETE /api/v1/dms/{channelId}

Remove a DM from the caller's sidebar. What that means depends on the kind of DM, and the route is shared because the gesture is shared:

• 1:1 DM — a hide. The channel and messages remain, the caller remains a participant, and a new message from either side re-opens it.
• Group DM — a leave. The caller comes out of dm_participants, stops receiving the group's messages, and cannot return unaided. When the last participant leaves, the channel row is deleted (a DM nobody is in is reachable by nobody, and its messages cascade off the channel).

The caller receives dm_channel_close; after a group leave the remaining participants receive a fresh dm_channel_open with the new membership.

Auth: Required (participant)

Response 204 No Content

Errors

Status	Code	Reason
404	NOT_FOUND	Not a participant of this DM

---

User Blocks

Blocking a user prevents DM creation and messaging in both directions (backed by the user_blocks table).

GET /api/v1/blocks

List the IDs of users the authenticated user has blocked.

Auth: Required

Response 200 OK

{ "blocked_user_ids": [2, 7] }

---

PUT /api/v1/blocks/{userId}

Block a user.

Auth: Required

Response 200 OK

{ "message": "user blocked" }

---

DELETE /api/v1/blocks/{userId}

Unblock a user.

Auth: Required

---

Invite Endpoints

All invite endpoints require authentication and the MANAGE_INVITES permission.

POST /api/v1/invites

Create a new invite code.

Auth: Required Permission: MANAGE_INVITES

Request

{
  "max_uses": 5,
  "expires_in_hours": 48
}

Both fields are optional. An empty body creates an invite with unlimited uses and no expiry.

Response 201 Created

{
  "id": 1,
  "code": "abc123def",
  "max_uses": 5,
  "uses": 0,
  "expires_at": "2026-03-30T10:30:00Z",
  "revoked": false,
  "created_at": "2026-03-28T10:30:00Z"
}

---

GET /api/v1/invites

List all invites (active, expired, and revoked).

Auth: Required Permission: MANAGE_INVITES

Response 200 OK

Returns a JSON array of invite objects.

---

DELETE /api/v1/invites/{code}

Revoke an invite by its code string.

Auth: Required Permission: MANAGE_INVITES

Response 204 No Content

---

File Upload and Serving

POST /api/v1/uploads

Upload a file as multipart form data.

Auth: Required Rate limit: 10 requests/minute Body size limit: 100 MiB Content-Type: multipart/form-data

Files are validated against blocked magic bytes (PE executables, ELF binaries, Mach-O binaries, shell scripts). Files are stored with UUID filenames.

Response 201 Created

{
  "id": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",
  "filename": "photo.jpg",
  "size": 204800,
  "mime": "image/jpeg",
  "url": "/api/v1/files/a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",
  "width": 1920,
  "height": 1080
}

width and height are only present for image files.

---

GET /api/v1/files/{id}

Serve a previously uploaded file by its UUID.

Auth: Required (Bearer token) — downloads are access-controlled Caching: Cache-Control: private, no-cache (never stored by shared/proxy caches; browsers must revalidate)

Supports HTTP range requests and conditional requests. MIME types that could execute under the app origin (HTML, SVG, XML, PDF) are served with Content-Disposition: attachment to force download.

---

Custom Emoji

Server-wide custom emoji, usable as :shortcode: in message content and as reaction strings.

Permission model. Reading the set is open to any authenticated member — an emoji nobody can render is not an emoji, and the set is server-wide with no per-channel scope to leak. Adding and removing require MANAGE_SERVER.

That is a deliberate reuse rather than a new permission bit: a bit is a schema-visible, forever decision, and "who may change server-wide branding" is exactly what MANAGE_SERVER already answers for the server name, icon and settings. There is no MANAGE_EMOJI.

GET /api/v1/emoji

List every custom emoji, ordered by shortcode.

Auth: Required

Response 200 OK

[
  { "id": 3, "shortcode": "wave", "url": "/api/v1/emoji/3/image" },
  { "id": 7, "shortcode": "party_blob", "url": "/api/v1/emoji/7/image" }
]

url is server-relative and authenticated — see GET /api/v1/emoji/{id}/image.

---

POST /api/v1/emoji

Upload one custom emoji as multipart form data.

Auth: Required — MANAGE_SERVER Rate limit: 10 requests/minute per user Body size limit: 1 MiB (the image itself is capped at 512 KiB) Content-Type: multipart/form-data

Field	Type	Notes
shortcode	string	[a-z0-9_]{2,32}; surrounding colons are stripped and the value is lowercased before validation, so :WAVE: and wave are the same shortcode
file	file	PNG, JPEG, GIF or WebP

Validation, in the order it is applied — the permission check runs before the multipart body is read, so a member without the bit never causes a spool to disk:

1. MANAGE_SERVER, then the rate limit, then the shortcode format.
2. At most 512 KiB of image bytes.
3. The MIME type is sniffed from the file's own bytes, never taken from the client's part header. Only image/png, image/jpeg, image/gif and image/webp are accepted. SVG is refused outright: it is markup with script and external-fetch capability, and an emoji is by definition rendered inline.
4. Dimensions are re-read from the sniffed image (WebP headers are parsed directly, since the standard library has no WebP decoder) and must be at most 128 x 128.
5. Shortcodes are unique case-insensitively; a collision is 409 CONFLICT.
6. A server holds at most 200 emoji.

On success the full set is broadcast as emoji_update (see protocol.md), so every connected client converges without a reconnect.

Response 201 Created

{ "id": 3, "shortcode": "wave", "url": "/api/v1/emoji/3/image" }

Errors

Status	Code	Cause
400	BAD_REQUEST	bad shortcode, wrong format, too large, too big
403	FORBIDDEN	caller lacks MANAGE_SERVER
409	CONFLICT	an emoji with that shortcode already exists
429	RATE_LIMITED	upload rate limit exceeded

---

GET /api/v1/emoji/{id}/image

Serve one emoji's image bytes.

Auth: Required (Bearer token) Caching: Cache-Control: private, max-age=86400, immutable

Authenticated rather than public so an emoji cannot be used as an unauthenticated tracking pixel hosted on someone else's server. There is no per-channel ACL to apply — emoji are server-wide by construction, so authentication is the whole check. An emoji's bytes never change for a given id (a replacement is a new row), which is what lets the response be cached hard. Unknown ids answer 404.

---

DELETE /api/v1/emoji/{id}

Delete one custom emoji and unlink its stored file.

Auth: Required — MANAGE_SERVER

Messages and reactions that used the shortcode fall back to rendering the literal :shortcode: text. Broadcasts emoji_update on success.

Response 204 No Content

Errors

Status	Code	Cause
400	BAD_REQUEST	id is not a positive integer
403	FORBIDDEN	caller lacks MANAGE_SERVER
404	NOT_FOUND	no emoji with that id

---

Health Check

GET /health

GET /api/v1/health

Public health check endpoint, no authentication required. The server version is deliberately not exposed here (anti-fingerprinting hardening, C-2).

{
  "status": "ok",
  "uptime": 86400,
  "online_users": 3
}

When a health probe fails, the endpoint answers 503 with "status": "degraded" and a reason field naming the failing subsystem — "hub" (WS dispatch loop dead), "database", or "disk":

{ "status": "degraded", "reason": "database", "uptime": 86400, "online_users": 3 }

---

Server Info

GET /api/v1/info

Returns the server name. The version field was removed from this unauthenticated endpoint (anti-fingerprinting hardening, C-2).

Auth: None

{
  "name": "My OwnCord Server"
}

---

Metrics

GET /api/v1/metrics

Runtime server metrics. IP-restricted (not token-based): allowed CIDRs come from server.metrics_allowed_cidrs, falling back to server.admin_allowed_cidrs when unset — set the dedicated key to admit a scraper without widening the admin perimeter.

Auth: IP restriction (metrics CIDRs, admin fallback)

{
  "uptime": "2h30m15s",
  "uptime_seconds": 9015.0,
  "goroutines": 42,
  "heap_alloc_mb": 12.5,
  "heap_sys_mb": 24.0,
  "num_gc": 156,
  "connected_users": 8,
  "voice_sessions": 2,
  "broadcast_drops": 0,
  "livekit_healthy": true,
  "reconnect_tier_buffer": 120,
  "reconnect_tier_db": 4,
  "reconnect_tier_full": 1,
  "backpressure_queue_disconnects": 0,
  "backpressure_high_fallbacks": 0,
  "backpressure_low_drops": 17,
  "ws_conn_rejects": 0,
  "disk_free_mb": 51200.5,
  "db_writer_wait_count": 3,
  "db_writer_wait_seconds": 0.021,
  "perm_cache_hits": 5120,
  "perm_cache_misses": 84,
  "event_persister": {
    "persisted": 4021,
    "dropped": 0,
    "flushes": 311,
    "errors": 0
  }
}

voice_sessions is the number of active voice connections. broadcast_drops is the cumulative count of events dropped because the hub-wide broadcast queue was full — sequenced events lost before delivery, worth alerting on if it ever grows. Per-client send-queue pressure is reported separately: backpressure_queue_disconnects (clients disconnected to force a replay-recovering reconnect), backpressure_high_fallbacks (high-priority sends that fell back to the normal queue), and backpressure_low_drops (typing/presence messages silently dropped — safe to lose, but a growth trend means clients are draining too slowly). reconnect_tier_* counts resume attempts served from the in-memory ring buffer, the persisted event log, and full-resync fallback; a rising full share means the replay budget is too small for observed disconnect gaps. db_writer_wait_count/_seconds accumulate time requests spent queueing for SQLite's single write connection — the most direct saturation signal for the write path. perm_cache_* report permission-cache effectiveness (a miss is any lookup that repopulated from the database). ws_conn_rejects counts upgrades refused by the server.max_ws_connections cap, and disk_free_mb is free space on the data volume (omitted when the platform can't report it). livekit_healthy is omitted when no LiveKit health check is wired; event_persister is omitted when event persistence is disabled.

GET /metrics (Prometheus)

A Prometheus text-format exporter is mounted at /metrics only when the server was built with -tags otel and telemetry.exporter is set to prometheus. It is admin-IP-restricted like the JSON endpoint. In the default build the route does not exist (404).

---

Admin API Authorization

The admin panel API lives under /admin/api (not /api/v1) and takes the same Authorization: Bearer {token} header — a login session or an API token, which inherits its owning user's role.

Authorization is two-layered:

1. Perimeter. The request is rejected with 403 FORBIDDEN unless the principal's role holds at least one bit of permissions.AdminPerimeter (ADMINISTRATOR, MANAGE_CHANNELS, MANAGE_ROLES, MANAGE_SERVER, VIEW_AUDIT_LOG, KICK_MEMBERS, BAN_MEMBERS, MUTE_MEMBERS). Banned users are rejected here even while their session is still valid.
2. Per-route bit. Route groups then require the specific permission below. ADMINISTRATOR bypasses every one of them; owner-only routes gate on role position (>= 100) instead of on a bit, so not even ADMINISTRATOR substitutes for being the owner.

Route	Requires
GET /admin/api/me	perimeter only
GET /admin/api/stats	perimeter only
GET /admin/api/users	perimeter only
PATCH /admin/api/users/{id}	perimeter; BAN_MEMBERS for banned, MANAGE_ROLES for role_id (checked in the service)
DELETE /admin/api/users/{id}/sessions	KICK_MEMBERS
GET/POST/PATCH/DELETE /admin/api/channels… (incl. /permissions and /user-permissions)	MANAGE_CHANNELS
GET/POST/PATCH/DELETE /admin/api/roles… (incl. /roles/reorder)	MANAGE_ROLES
GET /admin/api/audit-log	VIEW_AUDIT_LOG
GET/PATCH /admin/api/settings	MANAGE_SERVER
POST /admin/api/logs/ticket, GET /admin/api/logs/stream	ADMINISTRATOR
/api/v1/admin/plugins…	ADMINISTRATOR
/admin/api/tokens…, /admin/api/backup(s)…, /admin/api/updates…	Owner role (position 100)

Moderation routes additionally enforce the role hierarchy: the actor must strictly outrank the target (actor.position > target.position), and a role assignment may only grant a role positioned strictly below the actor's own — so an admin cannot promote anyone to Owner, and a moderator cannot demote an admin. Violations return 403 FORBIDDEN.

GET /admin/api/me

Describes the calling principal so a panel can hide what the role cannot use. Every route still re-checks its bit server-side.

Response 200 OK

{
  "id": 7,
  "username": "mod",
  "role_id": 3,
  "role_name": "Moderator",
  "role_position": 60,
  "permissions": 1048575,
  "is_owner": false
}

---

First-Run Setup

GET /admin/api/setup/status

Reports whether initial setup is needed (no users exist yet).

Auth: None (public). After the first user exists, the response reveals nothing about the configuration.

Response 200 OK

{
  "needs_setup": true,
  "defaults": {
    "server_name": "OwnCord",
    "motd": "Welcome!",
    "registration_open": false,
    "port": 8443,
    "tls_mode": "self-signed",
    "tls_domain": "",
    "upload_max_size_mb": 100,
    "voice_quality": "medium",
    "voice_auto_download": true
  }
}

defaults (wizard prefill from the running config and settings table) is present only while needs_setup is true.

---

POST /admin/api/setup

Create the first (Owner) account, optionally applying first-run wizard configuration. Only functional while no users exist; afterwards it returns an error.

Auth: None (public) Rate limit: 5 requests/minute per IP

Request

{
  "username": "owner",
  "password": "MyStr0ng!Pass",
  "wizard": {
    "server_name": "My Server",
    "motd": "Welcome!",
    "registration_open": false,
    "port": 8443,
    "tls_mode": "self-signed",
    "tls_domain": "",
    "upload_max_size_mb": 100,
    "voice_quality": "medium",
    "voice_auto_download": true
  }
}

All wizard fields are optional; server_name, motd and registration_open are stored in the settings table (live), the rest are written back to config.yaml (consumed at startup).

Response 200 OK

{
  "token": "raw-session-token",
  "user_id": 1,
  "username": "owner",
  "invite_code": "abc123def",
  "restart_required": false,
  "restart_url": "",
  "warnings": []
}

restart_required is true when wizard values that are only read at startup (port, TLS) differ from the running config; the server restarts itself right after responding, and restart_url is where the admin panel will be reachable afterwards. warnings lists non-fatal problems (e.g. config.yaml not writable) — the account exists whenever this response is returned.

---

Server Stats & User Administration

GET /admin/api/stats

Aggregate counts for the admin dashboard.

Auth: Admin perimeter

Response 200 OK

{
  "user_count": 12,
  "message_count": 4821,
  "channel_count": 9,
  "invite_count": 2,
  "db_size_bytes": 1048576,
  "online_count": 3
}

---

GET /admin/api/users

List all users with role and ban state.

Auth: Admin perimeter Query params: limit (default 50, min 1), offset (default 0)

Response 200 OK

Array of:

Field	Type	Notes
id	int
username	string
avatar	string?	omitted when unset
role_id	int
role_name	string
status	string	presence status
created_at	string
last_seen	string?	omitted when never seen
banned	bool
ban_reason	string?	omitted when unset
ban_expires	string?	omitted for permanent bans

Password hashes and TOTP secrets are never included.

---

PATCH /admin/api/users/{id}

Change a user's role and/or ban state. Both actions route through the moderation service, which enforces the required bit (MANAGE_ROLES for role_id, BAN_MEMBERS for banned), the role hierarchy, and writes the audit row.

Auth: Admin perimeter + per-action bit (see above)

Request

{
  "role_id": 3,
  "banned": true,
  "ban_reason": "spam",
  "ban_duration_hours": 24
}

All fields optional. ban_duration_hours makes the ban temporary (1–8760; omitted or 0 = permanent) and is only meaningful with banned: true.

Response 200 OK -- the updated user (same shape as the list entry).

Errors

Status	Code	Cause
400	BAD_REQUEST	Invalid id/body, ban_duration_hours out of range, or attempting to modify your own account
403	FORBIDDEN	Missing bit, or the actor does not outrank the target
404	NOT_FOUND	User not found

---

DELETE /admin/api/users/{id}/sessions

Force-logout: revoke every session of the target user. The hierarchy rule (actor outranks target) is enforced in the moderation service and the action is audited.

Auth: KICK_MEMBERS

Response 204 No Content

---

Audit Log

GET /admin/api/audit-log

Read the audit trail, newest first.

Auth: VIEW_AUDIT_LOG Query params: limit (default 50, min 1), offset (default 0)

Response 200 OK

Array of:

{
  "id": 991,
  "actor_id": 1,
  "actor_name": "owner",
  "action": "user_ban",
  "target_type": "user",
  "target_id": 7,
  "detail": "spam",
  "created_at": "2026-08-04T12:00:00Z"
}

---

Server Settings

GET /admin/api/settings

Auth: MANAGE_SERVER

Returns the settings table as a flat string map, e.g.:

{
  "server_name": "My Server",
  "motd": "Welcome!",
  "registration_open": "1",
  "require_2fa": "0"
}

---

PATCH /admin/api/settings

Update settings. Keys are validated against a whitelist before anything is written, and all updates are applied in one transaction; each change is audited as setting_change.

Auth: MANAGE_SERVER

Request

A flat map of key → string value. Allowed keys: server_name, server_icon, motd, max_upload_bytes, voice_quality, require_2fa, registration_open, backup_schedule, backup_retention. Boolean settings accept 1/0/true/false and are normalized to 1/0.

backup_schedule (off/daily/weekly) and backup_retention (days) are enforced by the server's maintenance loop — see the Backup Strategy section of docs/deployment.md for the exact semantics.

Three keys are accepted and stored but have no runtime effect: server_icon (reserved for a future release), max_upload_bytes (the real limit is upload.max_size_mb in config.yaml, applied at startup), and voice_quality (the real setting is voice.quality in config.yaml). The admin panel shows them read-only for this reason.

Enabling require_2fa is refused unless registration is closed and every user has TOTP enabled.

Response 200 OK -- the full settings map after the update.

Errors

Status	Code	Cause
400	BAD_REQUEST	Unknown key, invalid boolean, or require_2fa preconditions not met

---

API Tokens

Owner-only: minting a long-lived bearer credential over the network is the one admin action that, via a hijacked session, would outlive a password change and bulk logout (API tokens deliberately live outside the session table). These routes are the HTTP equivalent of the server token create|list|revoke CLI.

GET /admin/api/tokens

Auth: Owner role

Response 200 OK

Array of:

{
  "id": 1,
  "user_id": 1,
  "username": "owner",
  "label": "ci-bot",
  "created_at": "2026-08-01T10:00:00Z",
  "last_used": null,
  "expires_at": null,
  "revoked_at": null
}

Token hashes are never returned.

---

POST /admin/api/tokens

Auth: Owner role

Request

{
  "label": "ci-bot",
  "username": "",
  "expires_hours": 0
}

label is required. Empty username binds the token to the owner account; expires_hours: 0 means never expires.

Response 201 Created

{
  "id": 2,
  "token": "raw-api-token",
  "label": "ci-bot",
  "user": "owner"
}

The raw token is shown exactly once and is never recoverable.

---

DELETE /admin/api/tokens/{id}

Auth: Owner role

Response 204 No Content

404 NOT_FOUND if there is no active token with that id.

---

Backups

All backup routes are Owner-only. Backups are SQLite snapshots (VACUUM INTO) stored under data/backups/.

POST /admin/api/backup

Create a backup named chatserver_<UTC timestamp>.db.

Auth: Owner role

Response 200 OK

{
  "path": "chatserver_20260804_120000.db",
  "created": "20260804_120000"
}

---

GET /admin/api/backups

List backups, newest first.

Auth: Owner role

Response 200 OK

[{ "name": "chatserver_20260804_120000.db", "size": 1048576, "date": "2026-08-04T12:00:00Z" }]

---

DELETE /admin/api/backups/{name}

Auth: Owner role

name is validated against path traversal. Returns 204 No Content, or 404 NOT_FOUND if the file does not exist.

---

POST /admin/api/backups/{name}/restore

Restore the database from a backup. The server first writes a pre_restore_<timestamp>.db safety backup (the restore is aborted if that fails), broadcasts a server_restart to connected clients, checkpoints and closes the database, copies the backup over it, responds, and then restarts itself.

Auth: Owner role

Response 200 OK

{
  "message": "database restored — server restarting",
  "backup": "chatserver_20260804_120000.db"
}

---

Server Updates

Owner-only self-update from GitHub Releases (minisign/Ed25519-verified; see docs/security.md).

GET /admin/api/updates

Auth: Owner role

Response 200 OK

{
  "current": "v1.2.0-alpha.3",
  "latest": "v1.2.0",
  "update_available": true,
  "required_assets_present": true,
  "release_url": "…",
  "download_url": "…",
  "checksum_url": "…",
  "signature_url": "…",
  "manifest_url": "…",
  "manifest_signature_url": "…",
  "release_notes": "…",
  "can_apply": true
}

can_apply is false in container deployments (detected via OWNCORD_CONTAINER, which the shipped Dockerfile sets, or the engine marker files): checking still works, but POST /updates/apply will refuse — the admin SPA replaces the apply button with an image-upgrade note.

Errors

Status	Code	Cause
503	UPDATE_UNAVAILABLE	Update checking is not configured
502	UPDATE_CHECK_FAILED	GitHub API failure

---

POST /admin/api/updates/apply

Download, verify and apply the latest release. On success the server responds first, then broadcasts a restart notice, swaps the binary (with staged-hash re-verification against TOCTOU swaps), spawns the new process and shuts down.

Auth: Owner role

Response 200 OK

{ "status": "applying", "version": "v1.2.0" }

Errors

Status	Code	Cause
503	CONTAINER_DEPLOYMENT	Container deployment — the binary is image content; upgrade by pulling the new image (opt back in with OWNCORD_CONTAINER=0 if the binary is bind-mounted)
503	UPDATE_UNAVAILABLE	Update checking is not configured
409	RESTART_PENDING	A restart from an earlier apply/restore is already pending
409	UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS	Another restart-sensitive operation (update apply or backup restore) is running
409	NO_UPDATE	Already up to date
502	UPDATE_CHECK_FAILED / MISSING_ASSETS / DOWNLOAD_FAILED	Check, asset or download/verification failure

---

Server Logs (SSE)

Streaming the server log requires two steps because EventSource cannot send an Authorization header.

POST /admin/api/logs/ticket

Issue a single-use ticket (30 s TTL) bound to the calling bearer credential.

Auth: ADMINISTRATOR

Response 200 OK

{ "ticket": "64-hex-chars" }

---

GET /admin/api/logs/stream?ticket={ticket}

Server-Sent Events stream of structured log records: on connect the in-memory ring buffer (capacity 2000) is replayed as backfill, then new entries stream live, with a keepalive every 15 s. The ticket is consumed on connect; the ADMINISTRATOR bit is re-checked throughout the stream, and revoking the underlying session or API token (or banning the user) mid-stream cuts it.

Auth: single-use ticket (from POST /admin/api/logs/ticket)

Each event's data is one JSON record:

{ "ts": "2026-08-04T12:00:00Z", "level": "INFO", "msg": "…", "source": "…", "attrs": "…" }

---

Role Management

Create, edit, delete and reorder roles. The whole group requires MANAGE_ROLES; RoleService then enforces the hierarchy rules below, so a principal that clears the bit still cannot escalate through it.

Rules, all measured against the actor's role position:

• You may only create, edit, delete or reorder roles positioned strictly below your own. Equal rank is refused too, so a role cannot rewrite itself. Nothing sits above position 100, which makes the seeded Owner role immutable and undeletable for everyone, owner included.
• You may never grant a permission bit your own role lacks. Removing one is allowed — de-escalation is always safe. ADMINISTRATOR bypasses this check entirely (it is what lets the owner hand out anything).
• The default role (is_default = 1) cannot be deleted: every member falls back to it.
• Deleting a role moves its members onto the default role in one UPDATE, drops the role's channel_overrides rows, invalidates the moved members' cached permissions, and broadcasts a member_update per member.
• Names are unique case-insensitively (migration 023), matching the case-insensitive lookup the desktop client does. Max 32 characters.
• Colors are #rgb or #rrggbb, normalized to uppercase. "" clears the color. Anything else is 400.
• Unknown permission bits are masked off rather than rejected.
• Every mutation writes an audit row (role_create, role_update, role_delete, role_reorder) and broadcasts roles_update (see docs/protocol.md) carrying the full new list.

GET /admin/api/roles

Roles ordered by position descending, each with its member count.

Response 200 OK

[
  { "id": 1, "name": "Owner", "color": "#E74C3C", "permissions": 2147483647, "position": 100, "is_default": false, "member_count": 1 },
  { "id": 4, "name": "Member", "color": null, "permissions": 1635, "position": 40, "is_default": true, "member_count": 12 }
]

POST /admin/api/roles

Request

{
  "name": "Helper",
  "color": "#5865F2",
  "permissions": 3,
  "position": 50
}

Field	Type	Required	Description
name	string	Yes	1–32 characters, unique case-insensitively
color	string	No	#rgb/#rrggbb, or "" for none
permissions	integer	No	Bitfield; defaults to 0
position	integer	No	Defaults to one below the actor's own position

Response 201 Created

The created role (id, name, color, permissions, position, is_default — always false; the default role is seeded, never created).

Errors

Status	Code	When
400	BAD_REQUEST	Missing/blank/over-long name, duplicate name, bad color, negative position
403	FORBIDDEN	Missing MANAGE_ROLES, position at or above your own, or a permission bit you lack

PATCH /admin/api/roles/{id}

Partial update — every field is optional and an omitted one is left alone. Same body and same errors as POST, plus 404 NOT_FOUND for a missing role. Editing a role at or above your own position is 403.

A permission change additionally invalidates the cached permissions of that role's members and re-syncs their channel visibility (the server sends targeted channel_create/channel_delete), because a role's mask is the base every channel's effective permission derives from.

Response 200 OK

The updated role.

DELETE /admin/api/roles/{id}

Response 204 No Content

Errors

Status	Code	When
400	BAD_REQUEST	The role is the default role, or is the seeded Owner role
403	FORBIDDEN	Missing MANAGE_ROLES, or the role is at or above your own position
404	NOT_FOUND	No such role

PATCH /admin/api/roles/reorder

Request

{ "role_ids": [2, 9, 3, 4] }

role_ids is highest-rank-first and must name exactly the set of roles strictly below your own position — a partial list is refused rather than silently leaving the omitted roles at positions that now collide. Positions are normalized to N…1, so they stay unique, stay below the actor, and never collide with the untouched roles above.

Response 200 OK

The full role list after the reorder, position descending.

Errors

Status	Code	When
400	BAD_REQUEST	Wrong number of ids, or a duplicate id
403	FORBIDDEN	Missing MANAGE_ROLES, or an id that is unknown or not below your rank

---

Channel Management (admin)

POST /admin/api/channels takes {name, type, category, topic, position}; PATCH /admin/api/channels/{id} takes {name, topic, category, slow_mode, position, archived, nsfw, voice_max_users, voice_max_video} and seeds every omitted field from the current row, so a partial body is safe.

The numeric fields are bounds-checked before anything is written, and an out-of-range value is refused with 400 INVALID_INPUT rather than clamped — a caller that sent -1 meant something, and storing 0 would hide it. A refused body writes nothing at all:

Field	Range	Meaning
slow_mode	0…21600	Cooldown in seconds; 0 = off (6-hour ceiling, as Discord)
voice_max_users	0…99	Voice capacity; 0 = unlimited
voice_max_video	0…99	Simultaneous cameras/screen shares; 0 = unlimited

nsfw is a bool and is stored, broadcast and audited only — the server applies no content behaviour to a flagged channel (see GET /api/v1/channels). The audit detail names the transition: updated #foo (marked NSFW) / (unmarked NSFW), and plain updated #foo when the flag did not move.

The voice limits are stored on a channel of any type but are only meaningful on a voice one; the desktop client offers them for voice channels alone and omits the keys entirely elsewhere, so a text-channel edit cannot wipe limits the row happens to hold.

type must be text, voice or announcement (400 INVALID_INPUT otherwise). category constrains nothing. Categories are free text and a channel of any type may live under any of them — a voice channel under "Gaming", a text channel under "Voice Channels". Grouping is a display concern: the desktop client groups by whatever category a channel carries and falls back to a synthetic "Voice" group only for voice channels with no category at all. (Before phase 5 the server refused any non-voice channel under a category literally named "Voice Channels", and any voice channel outside it.)

PATCH accepts category, so moving a channel between categories is an edit rather than a delete-and-recreate. An empty string makes it uncategorized.

---

Channel Permission Overrides

Two override layers per channel, both gated on MANAGE_CHANNELS and both audit-logged. They resolve in Discord's order:

base role permissions -> role override -> user override

The later, narrower layer wins: a user deny beats a role allow, a user allow beats a role deny, and within one layer allow beats deny. ADMINISTRATOR bypasses both layers entirely. See docs/schema.md ("Permission Checking Logic") for the formula and permissions.EffectiveChannelPerms for the single implementation.

Denying READ_MESSAGES hides the channel outright — from the WS ready payload, from GET /api/v1/channels, from reconnect replay and from live broadcasts. Every write below invalidates the affected permission cache entries and then re-syncs connected clients with targeted channel_create / channel_delete messages, so sidebars converge without a reconnect.

DM channels have no override surface: 400 INVALID_INPUT.

GET /admin/api/channels/{id}/permissions

Both layers for one channel. roles lists every role (zero masks when it carries no override) so the panel can render a complete grid; users lists only members who actually have an override row.

Response 200 OK

{
  "channel_id": 4,
  "roles": [
    { "role_id": 1, "role_name": "Owner", "position": 100, "permissions": 2147483647, "allow": 0, "deny": 0 },
    { "role_id": 4, "role_name": "Member", "position": 40, "permissions": 1635, "allow": 0, "deny": 514 }
  ],
  "users": [
    { "user_id": 12, "username": "alice", "role_id": 4, "allow": 2, "deny": 0 }
  ]
}

PUT /admin/api/channels/{id}/permissions/{roleId}

PUT /admin/api/channels/{id}/user-permissions/{userId}

Write one override row. Same body for both layers:

{ "allow": 2, "deny": 1 }

Field	Type	Description
allow	integer	Bits granted in this channel
deny	integer	Bits refused in this channel

Bits outside permissions.AllPerms are masked off rather than rejected, so an unknown bit can never be persisted. A row with both masks 0 is meaningless — the admin panel sends DELETE for that case instead.

Response 200 OK

The stored row: {role_id, role_name, position, permissions, allow, deny} for the role layer, {user_id, username, role_id, allow, deny} for the user layer.

Cache and fan-out

• Role layer: InvalidateAll (any member of that role is affected), then RefreshChannelVisibility.
• User layer: InvalidateUser(userId) only — a per-user override cannot change anyone else's verdict, and dropping the whole cache for one member would cost every connected client a repopulate — then RefreshChannelVisibility, which resolves visibility per user through the full order.

Audit

channel_perms_update / channel_user_perms_update, target channel.

Errors

Status	Code	When
400	BAD_REQUEST	Unparseable id or body
400	INVALID_INPUT	The channel is a DM
403	FORBIDDEN	Missing MANAGE_CHANNELS
404	NOT_FOUND	Unknown channel, role or user

DELETE /admin/api/channels/{id}/permissions/{roleId}

DELETE /admin/api/channels/{id}/user-permissions/{userId}

Clear the override row, returning the target to the layer above it. 204 No Content; deleting a row that does not exist is a no-op, not a 404. Same cache/fan-out behavior as the writes; audits as channel_perms_clear / channel_user_perms_clear.

---

Plugin Administration

Manage WASM plugins. These endpoints sit behind both the admin IP restriction (allowed CIDRs) and admin bearer-token authentication, and require the ADMINISTRATOR bit specifically (the widened admin perimeter does not open them). Plugin execution additionally requires a server built with -tags wazero and plugins.enabled: true in config.

Unlike the rest of the API, these endpoints answer errors as plain text (http.Error), not the standard JSON envelope — the one envelope exception is install's 400 INSTALL_FAILED. When the runtime is unavailable, mutating endpoints answer 503 plugin runtime disabled; other plain-text statuses are 400 (bad multipart/zip), 415 (not a .zip), 413 (plugin upload too large — the API's only 413), and 500. GET /api/v1/admin/plugins always answers 200 and reports the runtime state in an X-Plugin-Runtime response header instead.

GET /api/v1/admin/plugins

List installed plugins.

Response 200 OK

Array of plugin rows: ID, Name, Version, Enabled, ManifestJSON, InstalledAt.

POST /api/v1/admin/plugins/install

Install a plugin from an uploaded zip (multipart form). The archive is size-capped (16 MiB compressed / 64 MiB uncompressed) and hardened against zip-slip and symlinks; installation is staged and atomically renamed.

Response 201 Created

{ "name": "plugin-name" }

POST /api/v1/admin/plugins/{id}/enable

POST /api/v1/admin/plugins/{id}/disable

Enable or disable an installed plugin.

DELETE /api/v1/admin/plugins/{id}

Uninstall a plugin.

---

LiveKit Endpoints

These endpoints are only registered when LiveKit voice is configured.

POST /api/v1/livekit/webhook

LiveKit webhook receiver. Uses LiveKit JWT verification. IP-restricted via server.livekit_webhook_allowed_cidrs (falls back to server.admin_allowed_cidrs when unset). Called by the LiveKit server, not by clients.

GET /api/v1/livekit/health

Check whether the LiveKit server is reachable.

Auth: IP restriction (server.livekit_webhook_allowed_cidrs, admin fallback)

Response 200 OK

{
  "status": "ok",
  "livekit_reachable": true
}

Response 503 Service Unavailable

{
  "status": "degraded",
  "livekit_reachable": false,
  "error": "connection refused"
}

/livekit/* (Reverse Proxy)

All requests to /livekit/* are reverse-proxied to the LiveKit server URL. The /livekit prefix is stripped before forwarding. This allows the client to connect to LiveKit through OwnCord's HTTPS server, avoiding mixed-content blocks.

Auth: None (LiveKit handles its own JWT-based auth) Rate limit: 30 requests/minute per IP

---

Diagnostics

GET /api/v1/diagnostics/connectivity

Returns connectivity diagnostics for debugging voice/network issues.

Auth: Required — ADMINISTRATOR only (H-8 hardening: the response reveals network topology) Rate limit: 5 requests/minute per IP

{
  "server": {
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "uptime_s": 3600,
    "go_version": "go1.23.0",
    "online_users": 5
  },
  "voice": {
    "enabled": true,
    "livekit_url": "localhost:7880",
    "livekit_health": true,
    "node_ip": "203.0.113.1",
    "proxy_path": "/livekit"
  },
  "client": {
    "remote_addr": "192.168.1.100",
    "is_private_network": true
  }
}

---

Client Auto-Update

GET /api/v1/client-update/{target}/{current_version}

Tauri-compatible update endpoint. The desktop client checks this to see if a newer version is available.

Auth: None

Path Parameters

Param	Type	Description
target	string	Tauri updater target {os}-{arch}-{installer} (e.g., windows-x86_64-nsis, linux-x86_64-appimage, linux-aarch64-appimage). Selects the platform's updater artifact and is echoed back as the platforms key. Targets without a published updater artifact (e.g., linux-x86_64-deb) get 204.
current_version	string	Client's current semver version (e.g., 1.0.0)

Response 200 OK (update available)

{
  "version": "1.2.0",
  "notes": "## What's Changed\n...",
  "pub_date": "2026-03-28T00:00:00Z",
  "platforms": {
    "windows-x86_64-nsis": {
      "signature": "base64-encoded-signature",
      "url": "https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/releases/download/v1.2.0/OwnCord_1.2.0_x64-setup.nsis.zip"
    }
  }
}

Response 204 No Content

Client is already up-to-date, or no client build is published for target.

---

WebSocket

GET /api/v1/ws

WebSocket upgrade endpoint. Authentication is performed in-band (first message must be an auth frame with the session token). See protocol.md for the full WebSocket message protocol.