Files
OwnCord/Server/api/upload_handler.go
T
jevb 4c4526e539 fix: security hardening — 45 issues from full-project Copilot audit
Critical (6):
- C1: SQL injection in VACUUM INTO backup path — strict character allowlist
- C2: Unlimited binary download in updater — 500MB LimitReader
- C3: JSON injection in SSE log stream — json.Marshal instead of concat
- C4: CSS injection via custom themes — reject () and {} in values
- C5: Silent DM message loss — error response on participant lookup failure
- C6: LiveKit URL credential leak — strip creds from diagnostics endpoint

High (11):
- H1: DB errors no longer trigger login rate-limit lockout
- H2: Permission fetch failure returns 500, not empty channel list
- H3: TOCTOU race on duplicate WS — atomic check-and-register in hub
- H5: LiveKit webhook verifies voice channel match (already implemented)
- H7: Server host address validated before storage (hostname regex)
- H8: WS message deduplication on reconnect replay (1000-entry Set)
- H9: Admin setup endpoint rate limited (5/min/IP)
- H10: Backup responses return filename only, not full path
- H11: Update binary recovery failure now alerts admin

Medium (17):
- M1: MIME type from magic bytes, not client header
- M3: Nil guard on DM broadcast recipient
- M5: LiveKit process run-done channel race fixed
- M6: Backup restore calls fsync before close
- M7: Partial download file cleaned up on error
- M8: Admin CSP uses nonce instead of unsafe-inline
- M9: Client rate limiter enforced for presence_update
- M10: Voice joinedAt not reset on double-join
- M11: Unread count skips increment during reconnect replay
- M13: Category type uses exact match, not substring
- M14: Storage LimitReader off-by-one fixed
- M15: GitHub token only sent to GitHub hosts
- M16: Content-parser ReDoS regex replaced with split approach
- M17: Audio device switch error handling added

Low (11):
- L1: CORS uses configured origins instead of wildcard
- L2: HSTS header added when TLS enabled
- L3: Consistent JSON error responses across all endpoints
- L4: File modtime from stat, not time.Now()
- L5: Malformed invite JSON returns 400
- L6: TouchSession failure logged at warn
- L8: MessageInput timers cleared on destroy
- L9: Log persistence flush errors caught
- L10: Credential save failure surfaced to user
- L11: Case-insensitive asset name matching in updater

Found by GitHub Copilot full-project review (claude-sonnet-4.6 + claude-haiku-4.5).
2026-03-29 12:35:04 +02:00

196 lines
5.9 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"fmt"
"image"
_ "image/gif"
_ "image/jpeg"
_ "image/png"
"log/slog"
"mime"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/owncord/server/db"
"github.com/owncord/server/storage"
)
// uploadResponse is the JSON shape returned by POST /api/v1/uploads.
type uploadResponse struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Filename string `json:"filename"`
Size int64 `json:"size"`
Mime string `json:"mime"`
URL string `json:"url"`
Width *int `json:"width,omitempty"`
Height *int `json:"height,omitempty"`
}
// MountUploadRoutes registers upload and file-serving endpoints.
// allowedOrigins controls the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header on served files.
func MountUploadRoutes(r chi.Router, database *db.DB, store *storage.Storage, allowedOrigins []string) {
// Upload requires authentication and a higher body size limit (100 MB).
r.With(
AuthMiddleware(database),
MaxBodySize(100<<20),
).Post("/api/v1/uploads", handleUpload(database, store))
// File serving is public (URLs are unguessable UUIDs).
r.Get("/api/v1/files/{id}", handleServeFile(database, store, allowedOrigins))
}
func handleUpload(database *db.DB, store *storage.Storage) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Parse multipart form — 10 MB in memory, rest on disk.
if err := r.ParseMultipartForm(10 << 20); err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{
"error": "BAD_REQUEST",
"message": "invalid multipart form",
})
return
}
file, header, err := r.FormFile("file")
if err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{
"error": "BAD_REQUEST",
"message": "missing file field",
})
return
}
defer file.Close() //nolint:errcheck
// Generate UUID for storage.
fileID := uuid.New().String()
// Detect MIME type from actual file bytes (never trust client header).
var sniffBuf [512]byte
n, readErr := file.Read(sniffBuf[:])
if readErr != nil && readErr.Error() != "EOF" && readErr.Error() != "unexpected EOF" {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{
"error": "BAD_REQUEST",
"message": "failed to read uploaded file",
})
return
}
detectedMime := http.DetectContentType(sniffBuf[:n])
// Seek back so the full content is available for storage.
if _, seekErr := file.Seek(0, 0); seekErr != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{
"error": "INTERNAL_ERROR",
"message": "failed to process uploaded file",
})
return
}
mime := detectedMime
// Store file on disk (validates file type via magic bytes).
if err := store.Save(fileID, file); err != nil {
slog.Warn("file upload rejected", "error", err)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{
"error": "BAD_REQUEST",
"message": fmt.Sprintf("upload rejected: %s", err),
})
return
}
// Extract image dimensions if the file is an image.
var width, height *int
if strings.HasPrefix(mime, "image/") {
f, openErr := store.Open(fileID)
if openErr == nil {
cfg, _, decErr := image.DecodeConfig(f)
f.Close() //nolint:errcheck
if decErr == nil {
w2, h2 := cfg.Width, cfg.Height
width = &w2
height = &h2
} else {
slog.Warn("failed to decode image dimensions", "id", fileID, "error", decErr)
}
}
}
// Insert attachment record in DB (unlinked — message_id is NULL).
if err := database.CreateAttachment(fileID, header.Filename, fileID, mime, header.Size, width, height); err != nil {
// Clean up stored file on DB failure.
_ = store.Delete(fileID)
slog.Error("failed to create attachment record", "error", err)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{
"error": "INTERNAL_ERROR",
"message": "failed to save attachment",
})
return
}
slog.Info("file uploaded", "id", fileID, "filename", header.Filename, "size", header.Size, "mime", mime)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, uploadResponse{
ID: fileID,
Filename: header.Filename,
Size: header.Size,
Mime: mime,
URL: "/api/v1/files/" + fileID,
Width: width,
Height: height,
})
}
}
func handleServeFile(database *db.DB, store *storage.Storage, allowedOrigins []string) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
fileID := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
if fileID == "" {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
// Look up attachment metadata.
att, err := database.GetAttachmentByID(fileID)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to look up attachment", "id", fileID, "error", err)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errorResponse{
Error: "INTERNAL_ERROR",
Message: "internal server error",
})
return
}
if att == nil {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
// Open file from storage.
f, err := store.Open(att.StoredAs)
if err != nil {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
defer f.Close() //nolint:errcheck
// Set headers before ServeContent to ensure correct MIME type.
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", att.MimeType)
w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", mime.FormatMediaType("inline", map[string]string{"filename": att.Filename}))
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=31536000, immutable")
// CORS: allow webview to read the response body using configured origins.
if origin := r.Header.Get("Origin"); origin != "" {
for _, allowed := range allowedOrigins {
if allowed == "*" || strings.EqualFold(allowed, origin) {
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", "Content-Type, Content-Length")
break
}
}
}
// Use the actual file modification time so If-Modified-Since works correctly.
var modTime time.Time
if info, statErr := f.Stat(); statErr == nil {
modTime = info.ModTime()
}
http.ServeContent(w, r, att.Filename, modTime, f)
}
}