mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
synced 2026-09-03 03:50:00 +03:00
Critical (6):
- C1: SQL injection in VACUUM INTO backup path — strict character allowlist
- C2: Unlimited binary download in updater — 500MB LimitReader
- C3: JSON injection in SSE log stream — json.Marshal instead of concat
- C4: CSS injection via custom themes — reject () and {} in values
- C5: Silent DM message loss — error response on participant lookup failure
- C6: LiveKit URL credential leak — strip creds from diagnostics endpoint
High (11):
- H1: DB errors no longer trigger login rate-limit lockout
- H2: Permission fetch failure returns 500, not empty channel list
- H3: TOCTOU race on duplicate WS — atomic check-and-register in hub
- H5: LiveKit webhook verifies voice channel match (already implemented)
- H7: Server host address validated before storage (hostname regex)
- H8: WS message deduplication on reconnect replay (1000-entry Set)
- H9: Admin setup endpoint rate limited (5/min/IP)
- H10: Backup responses return filename only, not full path
- H11: Update binary recovery failure now alerts admin
Medium (17):
- M1: MIME type from magic bytes, not client header
- M3: Nil guard on DM broadcast recipient
- M5: LiveKit process run-done channel race fixed
- M6: Backup restore calls fsync before close
- M7: Partial download file cleaned up on error
- M8: Admin CSP uses nonce instead of unsafe-inline
- M9: Client rate limiter enforced for presence_update
- M10: Voice joinedAt not reset on double-join
- M11: Unread count skips increment during reconnect replay
- M13: Category type uses exact match, not substring
- M14: Storage LimitReader off-by-one fixed
- M15: GitHub token only sent to GitHub hosts
- M16: Content-parser ReDoS regex replaced with split approach
- M17: Audio device switch error handling added
Low (11):
- L1: CORS uses configured origins instead of wildcard
- L2: HSTS header added when TLS enabled
- L3: Consistent JSON error responses across all endpoints
- L4: File modtime from stat, not time.Now()
- L5: Malformed invite JSON returns 400
- L6: TouchSession failure logged at warn
- L8: MessageInput timers cleared on destroy
- L9: Log persistence flush errors caught
- L10: Credential save failure surfaced to user
- L11: Case-insensitive asset name matching in updater
Found by GitHub Copilot full-project review (claude-sonnet-4.6 + claude-haiku-4.5).
196 lines
5.9 KiB
Go
196 lines
5.9 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"fmt"
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"image"
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_ "image/gif"
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_ "image/jpeg"
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_ "image/png"
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"log/slog"
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"mime"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/owncord/server/db"
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"github.com/owncord/server/storage"
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)
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// uploadResponse is the JSON shape returned by POST /api/v1/uploads.
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type uploadResponse struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Filename string `json:"filename"`
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Size int64 `json:"size"`
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Mime string `json:"mime"`
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URL string `json:"url"`
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Width *int `json:"width,omitempty"`
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Height *int `json:"height,omitempty"`
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}
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// MountUploadRoutes registers upload and file-serving endpoints.
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// allowedOrigins controls the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header on served files.
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func MountUploadRoutes(r chi.Router, database *db.DB, store *storage.Storage, allowedOrigins []string) {
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// Upload requires authentication and a higher body size limit (100 MB).
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r.With(
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AuthMiddleware(database),
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MaxBodySize(100<<20),
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).Post("/api/v1/uploads", handleUpload(database, store))
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// File serving is public (URLs are unguessable UUIDs).
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r.Get("/api/v1/files/{id}", handleServeFile(database, store, allowedOrigins))
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}
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func handleUpload(database *db.DB, store *storage.Storage) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Parse multipart form — 10 MB in memory, rest on disk.
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if err := r.ParseMultipartForm(10 << 20); err != nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{
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"error": "BAD_REQUEST",
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"message": "invalid multipart form",
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})
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return
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}
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file, header, err := r.FormFile("file")
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if err != nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{
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"error": "BAD_REQUEST",
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"message": "missing file field",
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})
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return
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}
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defer file.Close() //nolint:errcheck
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// Generate UUID for storage.
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fileID := uuid.New().String()
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// Detect MIME type from actual file bytes (never trust client header).
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var sniffBuf [512]byte
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n, readErr := file.Read(sniffBuf[:])
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if readErr != nil && readErr.Error() != "EOF" && readErr.Error() != "unexpected EOF" {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{
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"error": "BAD_REQUEST",
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"message": "failed to read uploaded file",
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})
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return
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}
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detectedMime := http.DetectContentType(sniffBuf[:n])
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// Seek back so the full content is available for storage.
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if _, seekErr := file.Seek(0, 0); seekErr != nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{
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"error": "INTERNAL_ERROR",
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"message": "failed to process uploaded file",
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})
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return
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}
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mime := detectedMime
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// Store file on disk (validates file type via magic bytes).
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if err := store.Save(fileID, file); err != nil {
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slog.Warn("file upload rejected", "error", err)
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{
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"error": "BAD_REQUEST",
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"message": fmt.Sprintf("upload rejected: %s", err),
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})
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return
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}
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// Extract image dimensions if the file is an image.
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var width, height *int
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if strings.HasPrefix(mime, "image/") {
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f, openErr := store.Open(fileID)
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if openErr == nil {
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cfg, _, decErr := image.DecodeConfig(f)
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f.Close() //nolint:errcheck
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if decErr == nil {
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w2, h2 := cfg.Width, cfg.Height
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width = &w2
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height = &h2
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} else {
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slog.Warn("failed to decode image dimensions", "id", fileID, "error", decErr)
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}
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}
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}
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// Insert attachment record in DB (unlinked — message_id is NULL).
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if err := database.CreateAttachment(fileID, header.Filename, fileID, mime, header.Size, width, height); err != nil {
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// Clean up stored file on DB failure.
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_ = store.Delete(fileID)
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slog.Error("failed to create attachment record", "error", err)
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{
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"error": "INTERNAL_ERROR",
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"message": "failed to save attachment",
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})
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return
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}
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slog.Info("file uploaded", "id", fileID, "filename", header.Filename, "size", header.Size, "mime", mime)
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, uploadResponse{
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ID: fileID,
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Filename: header.Filename,
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Size: header.Size,
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Mime: mime,
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URL: "/api/v1/files/" + fileID,
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Width: width,
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Height: height,
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})
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}
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}
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func handleServeFile(database *db.DB, store *storage.Storage, allowedOrigins []string) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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fileID := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
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if fileID == "" {
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http.NotFound(w, r)
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return
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}
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// Look up attachment metadata.
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att, err := database.GetAttachmentByID(fileID)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to look up attachment", "id", fileID, "error", err)
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errorResponse{
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Error: "INTERNAL_ERROR",
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Message: "internal server error",
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})
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return
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}
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if att == nil {
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http.NotFound(w, r)
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return
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}
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// Open file from storage.
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f, err := store.Open(att.StoredAs)
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if err != nil {
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http.NotFound(w, r)
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return
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}
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defer f.Close() //nolint:errcheck
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// Set headers before ServeContent to ensure correct MIME type.
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", att.MimeType)
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w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", mime.FormatMediaType("inline", map[string]string{"filename": att.Filename}))
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w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=31536000, immutable")
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// CORS: allow webview to read the response body using configured origins.
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if origin := r.Header.Get("Origin"); origin != "" {
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for _, allowed := range allowedOrigins {
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if allowed == "*" || strings.EqualFold(allowed, origin) {
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", "Content-Type, Content-Length")
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break
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}
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}
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}
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// Use the actual file modification time so If-Modified-Since works correctly.
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var modTime time.Time
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if info, statErr := f.Stat(); statErr == nil {
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modTime = info.ModTime()
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}
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http.ServeContent(w, r, att.Filename, modTime, f)
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}
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}
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