mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
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Make server failures debuggable without leaking secrets: - configurable stdout log level (config.yaml logging.level + OWNCORD_LOGGING_LEVEL) - preserve the DB cause in ErrInternal wraps; log auth-DB failures distinctly from bad tokens; log the previously-silent expired-session cleanup goroutine - route HTTP handler panics through slog (was chi stderr-only, invisible to the admin log stream) - stackutil: argument-free panic stacks so key/token bytes never reach the admin ring buffer / SSE; slog.LogValuer redaction on VoiceConfig/GitHubConfig/ GIFConfig/Config and db.User/db.Session - logctx: req_id/trace_id correlation on ...Context log calls Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
363 lines
12 KiB
Go
363 lines
12 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
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"github.com/owncord/server/db"
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"github.com/owncord/server/service"
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)
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// ─── Request / Response types ────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// updateProfileRequest is the JSON body for PATCH /api/v1/users/me.
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// identity_public_key, when present, publishes the client's long-term E2EE
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// identity public key (F3 voice E2EE TOFU); omitted = leave unchanged.
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type updateProfileRequest struct {
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Username string `json:"username"`
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Avatar *string `json:"avatar"`
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IdentityPublicKey *string `json:"identity_public_key"`
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}
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// changePasswordRequest is the JSON body for PUT /api/v1/users/me/password.
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type changePasswordRequest struct {
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OldPassword string `json:"old_password"`
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NewPassword string `json:"new_password"`
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}
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// sessionResponse is the JSON shape for a single session in list responses.
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type sessionResponse struct {
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ID int64 `json:"id"`
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Device string `json:"device"`
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IP string `json:"ip"`
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CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
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LastUsed string `json:"last_used"`
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IsCurrent bool `json:"is_current"`
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}
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// sessionsListResponse is the JSON envelope for GET /api/v1/users/me/sessions.
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type sessionsListResponse struct {
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Sessions []sessionResponse `json:"sessions"`
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}
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// ─── Route mounting ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// ProfileBroadcaster is the interface the profile handler uses to notify
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// connected WebSocket clients about profile changes.
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type ProfileBroadcaster interface {
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BroadcastUserUpdate(userID int64, username string, avatar *string, identityPublicKey *string)
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}
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// MountProfileRoutes registers user profile management endpoints.
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// All routes require authentication. trustedProxies is used for rate limiting.
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func MountProfileRoutes(r chi.Router, database *db.DB, svc *service.Services, limiter *auth.RateLimiter, trustedProxies []string, broadcaster ProfileBroadcaster) {
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r.Route("/api/v1/users/me", func(r chi.Router) {
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r.Use(AuthMiddleware(database))
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r.With(RateLimitMiddleware(limiter, profileUpdateRateLimitPerMinute, time.Minute, trustedProxies)).
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Patch("/", handleUpdateProfile(svc, broadcaster))
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r.With(RateLimitMiddleware(limiter, profilePasswordRateLimitPerMinute, time.Minute, trustedProxies)).
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Put("/password", handleChangePassword(svc, limiter))
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r.Get("/sessions", handleListSessions(svc))
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r.Delete("/sessions/{id}", handleRevokeSession(svc))
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})
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}
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// ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// validateIdentityKey checks that key is non-empty, at most 128 characters and
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// valid standard-alphabet base64 (padded or unpadded) — the same posture as
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// the WS voice_e2ee_announce public_key validation.
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func validateIdentityKey(key string) error {
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if key == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("identity_public_key must not be empty")
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}
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if len(key) > 128 {
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return fmt.Errorf("identity_public_key too large (max 128 characters)")
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}
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if _, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(key); err == nil {
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return nil
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}
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if _, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(key); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("identity_public_key is not valid base64")
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}
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return nil
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}
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// validateAvatarURL checks that avatar is either empty or a valid https:// URL
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// no longer than maxAvatarURLLen characters.
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func validateAvatarURL(avatar string) error {
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if avatar == "" {
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return nil
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}
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if len(avatar) > maxAvatarURLLen {
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return fmt.Errorf("avatar URL too long (max %d characters)", maxAvatarURLLen)
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}
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parsed, err := url.Parse(avatar)
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if err != nil || parsed.Scheme != "https" || parsed.Host == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("avatar URL must use https://")
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}
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return nil
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}
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// ─── Handlers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// handleUpdateProfile processes PATCH /api/v1/users/me.
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func handleUpdateProfile(svc *service.Services, broadcaster ProfileBroadcaster) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
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if !ok || user == nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
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Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "not authenticated",
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})
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return
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}
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var req updateProfileRequest
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
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Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: "malformed request body",
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})
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return
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}
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req.Username = strings.TrimSpace(sanitizer.Sanitize(req.Username))
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if req.Username == "" {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
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Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: "username is required",
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})
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return
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}
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if err := auth.ValidateUsername(req.Username); err != nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
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Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: err.Error(),
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})
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return
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}
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// Sanitize and validate avatar if provided.
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if req.Avatar != nil {
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trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(sanitizer.Sanitize(*req.Avatar))
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if err := validateAvatarURL(trimmed); err != nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
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Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: err.Error(),
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})
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return
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}
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req.Avatar = &trimmed
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}
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// Validate the identity key before any write so the request is
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// all-or-nothing.
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if req.IdentityPublicKey != nil {
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trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(*req.IdentityPublicKey)
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if err := validateIdentityKey(trimmed); err != nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
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Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: err.Error(),
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})
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return
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}
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req.IdentityPublicKey = &trimmed
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}
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updated, err := svc.Users.UpdateProfile(r.Context(), user.ID, req.Username, req.Avatar)
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if err != nil {
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writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
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return
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}
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if req.IdentityPublicKey != nil {
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updated, err = svc.Users.UpdateIdentityKey(r.Context(), user.ID, *req.IdentityPublicKey)
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if err != nil {
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writeServiceError(w, err)
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return
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}
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}
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// Broadcast profile change to all connected WebSocket clients.
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if broadcaster != nil {
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broadcaster.BroadcastUserUpdate(updated.ID, updated.Username, updated.Avatar, updated.IdentityPublicKey)
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, toUserResponse(updated))
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}
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}
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// handleChangePassword processes PUT /api/v1/users/me/password.
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func handleChangePassword(svc *service.Services, limiter *auth.RateLimiter) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
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if !ok || user == nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
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Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "not authenticated",
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})
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return
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}
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// BUG-111: Per-user lockout to prevent password brute-force via stolen session.
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lockKey := fmt.Sprintf("pw_confirm_lock:%d", user.ID)
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if limiter.IsLockedOut(lockKey) {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, errorResponse{
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Error: "RATE_LIMITED", Message: "too many failed attempts, try again later",
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})
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return
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}
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var req changePasswordRequest
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
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Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: "malformed request body",
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})
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return
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}
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if req.OldPassword == "" || req.NewPassword == "" {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
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Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: "old_password and new_password are required",
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})
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return
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}
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// Verify old password using constant-time bcrypt comparison.
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failKey := fmt.Sprintf("pw_confirm_fail:%d", user.ID)
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if !auth.CheckPassword(user.PasswordHash, req.OldPassword) {
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if !limiter.Allow(failKey, pwConfirmFailureThreshold, pwConfirmFailureWindow) {
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limiter.Lockout(r.Context(), lockKey, pwConfirmLockoutDuration)
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, errorResponse{
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Error: "FORBIDDEN", Message: "incorrect password",
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})
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return
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}
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limiter.Reset(r.Context(), failKey)
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// Reject same old/new password.
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if req.OldPassword == req.NewPassword {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
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Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: "new password must be different from old password",
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})
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return
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}
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// Validate new password strength.
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if err := auth.ValidatePasswordStrength(req.NewPassword); err != nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
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Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: err.Error(),
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})
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return
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}
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// Hash new password.
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hash, err := auth.HashPassword(req.NewPassword)
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if err != nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errorResponse{
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Error: "INTERNAL_ERROR", Message: "failed to process password change",
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})
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return
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}
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// Delegate to service for password update + session revocation.
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sess, _ := r.Context().Value(SessionKey).(*db.Session)
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keepSessionID := int64(0)
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if sess != nil {
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keepSessionID = sess.ID
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}
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res, err := svc.Users.ChangePassword(r.Context(), user.ID, hash, keepSessionID)
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if err != nil {
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// Only reachable when the password itself failed to commit.
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writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
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return
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}
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if res.RevokeFailed {
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// Partial success: the password IS changed; only revoking the
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// other sessions failed. A 5xx here would tell the user to retry
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// with a password that no longer works.
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
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"warning": "password changed, but other sessions could not be revoked; revoke them from the sessions list",
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"sessions_revoked": res.SessionsRevoked,
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})
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return
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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}
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// handleListSessions processes GET /api/v1/users/me/sessions.
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func handleListSessions(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
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if !ok || user == nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
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Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "not authenticated",
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})
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return
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}
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sess, ok := r.Context().Value(SessionKey).(*db.Session)
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if !ok || sess == nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
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Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "not authenticated",
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})
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return
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}
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sessions, err := svc.Users.ListSessions(r.Context(), user.ID)
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if err != nil {
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writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
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return
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}
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resp := sessionsListResponse{
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Sessions: make([]sessionResponse, 0, len(sessions)),
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}
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for _, s := range sessions {
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resp.Sessions = append(resp.Sessions, sessionResponse{
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ID: s.ID,
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Device: s.Device,
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IP: s.IP,
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CreatedAt: s.CreatedAt,
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LastUsed: s.LastUsed,
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IsCurrent: s.ID == sess.ID,
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})
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
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}
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}
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// handleRevokeSession processes DELETE /api/v1/users/me/sessions/{id}.
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func handleRevokeSession(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
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if !ok || user == nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
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Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "not authenticated",
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})
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return
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}
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sessionID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "id")
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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if err := svc.Users.RevokeSession(r.Context(), user.ID, sessionID); err != nil {
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writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
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return
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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}
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