Files
OwnCord/Server/db/admin_queries.go
T
J3vbandClaude Fable 5 6afa9e974c refactor(server): thread context.Context through the db layer and all callers
Fixes all 109 golangci-lint findings (106 contextcheck, 1 gocritic,
2 gosec) that accumulated after D2 wired dbgen (whose queries take ctx)
under ctx-less db.DB wrappers while CI lint was quota-dead. No nolint
comments added; every finding fixed by genuinely threading context.

- db: all 138 hand-written db.DB methods take ctx first; the dbCtx()
  Background shim is deleted; raw Query/QueryRow/Exec/Begin use their
  Context variants; the four redundant ctx-less passthroughs removed.
  db.Auditor/WriteAudit gain ctx.
- Seams: permissions.Checker (DB iface, HasChannelPerm,
  RequireChannelAccess) and the service.Store interface mirror the new
  signatures (ws.EventStore and plugin.PluginStore already did).
- Callers: api/admin handlers use r.Context(); ws per-message paths use
  the connection ctx via DispatchV2; hub loops and startup wiring use
  context.Background(); service methods thread ctx where they have one
  and Background where no ctx exists. Public service surface reached by
  ctx-holding chains (PermissionService.HasChannelPerm/GetRoleForUser/
  RequireChannelAccess, message/dm/block/invite/profile methods) is now
  ctx-first.
- Detached (context.WithoutCancel) where cancellation would break an
  invariant, found by a 3-lens adversarial review of the diff:
  * voice-leave background retries (a dead webhook/connection ctx killed
    retry 2 before it ran, leaving ghost capacity-holding voice rows)
  * rollbackVoiceJoin's compensating delete (its trigger IS the cancel)
  * post-2FA-change DeleteOtherSessions and logout DeleteSession (the
    security tail of a committed change must not die with the request)
  * all api/ws audit writes (a banned user could suppress their own
    login_blocked_banned row by aborting the request mid-bcrypt)
  * admin backup VACUUM INTO (an interrupt left a truncated .db that
    the backup list presented as restorable)
  * post-commit message/edit refetches (a committed message must still
    fan out when the sender disconnects)
  * hub settings-cache refresh (one dead connection could pin stale
    values for the 30s TTL)
- gocritic rangeValCopy fixed (index iteration); gosec G306 excluded in
  config with justification (generated source must stay world-readable)
  instead of flipping genprotocol output to 0o600.

Verified: gofmt/vet, all four build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock
pass, full -race pass, golangci-lint 0 issues uncapped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 17:03:52 +02:00

320 lines
11 KiB
Go

package db
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"errors"
"fmt"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/owncord/server/db/dbgen"
)
// ─── Setup ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// UserCount returns the total number of registered users.
func (d *DB) UserCount(ctx context.Context) (int64, error) {
count, err := d.q.UserCount(ctx)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("UserCount: %w", err)
}
return count, nil
}
// ─── Server Stats ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// GetServerStats returns aggregate counts for the admin dashboard.
// DBSizeBytes is 0 for in-memory databases (page_count * page_size returns
// a meaningful value only for file-backed databases).
func (d *DB) GetServerStats(ctx context.Context) (*ServerStats, error) {
stats := &ServerStats{}
var err error
if stats.UserCount, err = d.q.CountUsers(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetServerStats users: %w", err)
}
if stats.MessageCount, err = d.q.CountActiveMessages(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetServerStats messages: %w", err)
}
if stats.ChannelCount, err = d.q.CountChannels(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetServerStats channels: %w", err)
}
if stats.InviteCount, err = d.q.CountActiveInvites(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetServerStats invites: %w", err)
}
// page_count * page_size gives the database size in bytes. PRAGMAs are not
// expressible as sqlc queries, so they stay on the raw connection.
// For :memory: databases this still works (returns the in-memory size).
var pageCount, pageSize int64
if err := d.sqlDB.QueryRowContext(ctx, `PRAGMA page_count`).Scan(&pageCount); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetServerStats page_count: %w", err)
}
if err := d.sqlDB.QueryRowContext(ctx, `PRAGMA page_size`).Scan(&pageSize); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetServerStats page_size: %w", err)
}
stats.DBSizeBytes = pageCount * pageSize
return stats, nil
}
// ─── User Management ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// ListAllUsers returns users joined with their role name, ordered by ID.
// limit=0 returns no rows.
func (d *DB) ListAllUsers(ctx context.Context, limit, offset int) ([]UserWithRole, error) {
rows, err := d.q.ListAllUsers(ctx, dbgen.ListAllUsersParams{
Limit: int64(limit),
Offset: int64(offset),
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ListAllUsers: %w", err)
}
result := make([]UserWithRole, 0, len(rows))
for _, r := range rows {
result = append(result, UserWithRole{
User: User{
ID: r.ID,
Username: r.Username,
Avatar: r.Avatar,
RoleID: r.RoleID,
Status: r.Status,
CreatedAt: r.CreatedAt,
LastSeen: r.LastSeen,
Banned: r.Banned != 0,
BanReason: r.BanReason,
BanExpires: r.BanExpires,
},
RoleName: r.RoleName,
})
}
return result, nil
}
// UpdateUserRole changes the role_id of a user.
func (d *DB) UpdateUserRole(ctx context.Context, userID, roleID int64) error {
if err := d.q.UpdateUserRole(ctx, dbgen.UpdateUserRoleParams{
RoleID: roleID,
ID: userID,
}); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("UpdateUserRole: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// ForceLogoutUser deletes all sessions for the given user ID.
func (d *DB) ForceLogoutUser(ctx context.Context, userID int64) error {
if err := d.q.ForceLogoutUser(ctx, userID); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("ForceLogoutUser: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// GetUserSessions returns all active sessions for the given user ID.
func (d *DB) GetUserSessions(ctx context.Context, userID int64) ([]Session, error) {
rows, err := d.q.GetUserSessions(ctx, userID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetUserSessions: %w", err)
}
sessions := make([]Session, 0, len(rows))
for _, s := range rows {
sessions = append(sessions, sessionFromGen(s))
}
return sessions, nil
}
// ─── Channel Management (admin) ───────────────────────────────────────────────
// AdminCreateChannel creates a channel with full field control including position.
// No sqlc query covers this exact INSERT shape, so it stays on raw SQL.
func (d *DB) AdminCreateChannel(ctx context.Context, name, chanType, category, topic string, position int) (int64, error) {
res, err := d.sqlDB.ExecContext(ctx,
`INSERT INTO channels (name, type, category, topic, position)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
name, chanType, strToNullPtr(category), strToNullPtr(topic), position,
)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("AdminCreateChannel: %w", err)
}
return res.LastInsertId()
}
// AdminUpdateChannel updates all mutable channel fields.
func (d *DB) AdminUpdateChannel(ctx context.Context, id int64, name, topic string, slowMode, position int, archived bool) error {
if err := d.q.AdminUpdateChannel(ctx, dbgen.AdminUpdateChannelParams{
Name: name,
Topic: strToNullPtr(topic),
SlowMode: int64(slowMode),
Position: int64(position),
Archived: b2i64(archived),
ID: id,
}); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("AdminUpdateChannel: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// AdminDeleteChannel removes a channel by ID (cascades to messages, etc.).
func (d *DB) AdminDeleteChannel(ctx context.Context, id int64) error {
if err := d.q.DeleteChannel(ctx, id); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("AdminDeleteChannel: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// ─── Audit Log ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// LogAudit inserts an audit log entry.
func (d *DB) LogAudit(ctx context.Context, actorID int64, action, targetType string, targetID int64, detail string) error {
if err := d.q.LogAudit(ctx, dbgen.LogAuditParams{
ActorID: actorID,
Action: action,
TargetType: targetType,
TargetID: targetID,
Detail: detail,
}); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("LogAudit: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// GetAuditLog returns audit log entries ordered newest-first with pagination.
func (d *DB) GetAuditLog(ctx context.Context, limit, offset int) ([]AuditEntry, error) {
rows, err := d.q.GetAuditLog(ctx, dbgen.GetAuditLogParams{
Limit: int64(limit),
Offset: int64(offset),
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetAuditLog: %w", err)
}
entries := make([]AuditEntry, 0, len(rows))
for _, r := range rows {
entries = append(entries, AuditEntry{
ID: r.ID,
ActorID: r.ActorID,
ActorName: r.ActorName,
Action: r.Action,
TargetType: r.TargetType,
TargetID: r.TargetID,
Detail: r.Detail,
CreatedAt: r.CreatedAt,
})
}
return entries, nil
}
// ─── Settings ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// GetSetting returns the value for the given settings key.
// Returns an error (wrapping sql.ErrNoRows) when the key does not exist.
func (d *DB) GetSetting(ctx context.Context, key string) (string, error) {
value, err := d.q.GetSetting(ctx, key)
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("GetSetting: key %q: %w", key, ErrNotFound)
}
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("GetSetting: %w", err)
}
return value, nil
}
// SetSetting upserts a setting value for the given key.
func (d *DB) SetSetting(ctx context.Context, key, value string) error {
if err := d.q.SetSetting(ctx, dbgen.SetSettingParams{
Key: key,
Value: value,
}); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("SetSetting: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// GetAllSettings returns all settings as a key→value map.
func (d *DB) GetAllSettings(ctx context.Context) (map[string]string, error) {
rows, err := d.q.GetAllSettings(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetAllSettings: %w", err)
}
result := make(map[string]string, len(rows))
for _, s := range rows {
result[s.Key] = s.Value
}
return result, nil
}
// CountUsersWithoutTOTP returns the number of non-banned users that do not
// currently have a confirmed TOTP secret.
func (d *DB) CountUsersWithoutTOTP(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
count, err := d.q.CountUsersWithoutTOTP(ctx)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("CountUsersWithoutTOTP: %w", err)
}
return int(count), nil
}
// ─── Backup ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// BackupTo creates an online backup of the database using SQLite's VACUUM INTO.
// The destination path must not already exist.
//
// Security: VACUUM INTO does not support bind parameters, so the path is
// interpolated into SQL. To prevent injection we enforce two structural guards:
// 1. The path must resolve to a location under safeRoot (after filepath.Clean
// and filepath.Abs).
// 2. After structural validation, any single-quote, semicolon, double-dash,
// or null byte in the cleaned path causes rejection as defence-in-depth.
//
// The caller in handleBackup constructs the path from a hardcoded directory
// and a timestamp — no user input reaches this function.
func (d *DB) BackupTo(ctx context.Context, path string) error {
return d.BackupToSafe(ctx, path, filepath.Join("data", "backups"))
}
// BackupToSafe is the internal implementation that accepts an explicit safe
// root directory. Exported for testing with isolated directories.
func (d *DB) BackupToSafe(ctx context.Context, path, safeRoot string) error {
clean := filepath.Clean(path)
absRoot, err := filepath.Abs(safeRoot)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("BackupToSafe: resolving safe root: %w", err)
}
absClean, err := filepath.Abs(clean)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("BackupToSafe: resolving path: %w", err)
}
// Structural guard: path must be under the safe root directory.
if !strings.HasPrefix(absClean, absRoot+string(filepath.Separator)) {
return fmt.Errorf("BackupToSafe: path %q is not under safe root %q", absClean, absRoot)
}
// Defence-in-depth: only allow safe characters (alphanumeric, path separators,
// hyphen, underscore, dot, space, colon, tilde). This is a strict allowlist —
// anything else is rejected to prevent SQL injection via the interpolated path.
for _, ch := range absClean {
switch {
case ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z',
ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z',
ch >= '0' && ch <= '9',
ch == '/' || ch == '\\' || ch == '-' || ch == '_' || ch == '.' || ch == ' ' || ch == ':' || ch == '~':
// allowed (colon for Windows drive letters, tilde for temp paths)
default:
return fmt.Errorf("BackupToSafe: path contains forbidden character %q", string(ch))
}
}
// Reject SQL comment sequences that could break the VACUUM INTO statement,
// even though individual hyphens are allowed for filenames.
if strings.Contains(absClean, "--") {
return fmt.Errorf("BackupToSafe: path contains forbidden sequence %q", "--")
}
_, err = d.sqlDB.ExecContext(ctx, fmt.Sprintf("VACUUM INTO '%s'", absClean))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("BackupToSafe: %w", err)
}
return nil
}