mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
synced 2026-09-03 03:50:00 +03:00
* feat(auth): add revocable API tokens (bot/service auth) Add long-lived, revocable API tokens so headless clients (the introspection MCP tool, bots, CI) can authenticate without a password. Presented as "Authorization: Bearer <token>", a token authenticates as a specific user, inheriting that user's role and permissions. - migration 018 + dedicated api_tokens table (kept separate from sessions so bulk logout and the per-user session cap never touch these); only the SHA-256 hash is stored, raw token shown once at creation - auth.ResolveTokenHash: one shared bearer resolver that both AuthMiddleware and adminAuthMiddleware now call. Sessions are matched first so existing login behavior is unchanged; API tokens are a fallback only on session miss. A DB outage is returned wrapped, never mistaken for a bad token. - `server token create|list|revoke` CLI: mints directly against the DB with no HTTP and no login — the password-free bootstrap path - tests: resolver (8 cases incl. outage-not-fallthrough), db queries (6), api middleware integration (valid + revoked token) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(tools): add owncord-introspect MCP server A local MCP dev tool that lets Claude Code introspect a running OwnCord instance: read its logs, query any REST endpoint, and tail the desktop client's log file. It is a thin wrapper over the existing API plus the client log — no new product surface. - tools/mcp-introspect/index.mjs (Node/ESM, one dep: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk) exposes api_request (full read-write passthrough), server_logs (admin SSE ring-buffer stream), client_logs (reads the desktop log file) - authenticates with an API token (OWNCORD_API_TOKEN); pins the self-signed cert and skips hostname checks (the cert has no SAN) - registered in .mcp.json (secret-free ${OWNCORD_API_TOKEN}) - un-ignore tools/mcp-introspect/ so this shared dev tool is committed, while tools/livekit-server.exe and node_modules stay ignored - docs/mcp-introspect.md: how it works, tool reference, setup, troubleshooting Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(dependencies): update and add various crate versions in Cargo.lock * feat(admin): manage API tokens from the admin panel Add Owner-gated HTTP endpoints and a UI card to create, list, and revoke API tokens from the web admin panel. Previously only the `server token` CLI could manage them, which requires shell access to the host. - POST|GET|DELETE /admin/api/tokens in admin/handlers_tokens.go, wired in admin/api.go. All three are Owner-only (ownerOnlyMiddleware, like backups/updates): an HTTP token-mint endpoint is a network-reachable credential-minting surface, and API tokens deliberately survive password change + bulk logout, so a hijacked admin session must not mint one. - Reuses the same db.*APIToken calls as the CLI; create sources the actor from request context (audits who clicked, not the bound user); the raw token is returned once in the 201 body, never stored. - Add json tags to db.APITokenListItem for snake_case wire consistency. - Admin panel: "API Tokens" nav item + create modal, show-once reveal, revoke confirm in admin/static/index.html. - Tests: 7 in admin/api_test.go (+api_tokens table in the in-memory schema). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: modernize to Go 1.26 idioms + enable modernize linter Apply `golangci-lint modernize` autofixes across the server and enable the linter in .golangci.yml so these stop re-accumulating (they built up only because modernize was never in the config). Production code: slices.Contains for hand-rolled membership loops (api router, ws origin, db/account, plugin manifest); strings.SplitSeq for allocation-free line/segment iteration (db/migrate, updater, livekit_proxy); strings.Cut (config); fmt.Appendf (dm_handler); min() (event_pruner); any (ws client). Tests: range-over-int, t.Context(), WaitGroup.Go, slices.Sort, maps.Copy, new(expr), interface{}->any. - plugin/manifest.go parent-traversal check applied by hand: modernize skipped it (two conflicting rewrites); used the slices.Contains form. - Removed the now-dead ptr() test helper after newexpr inlined its callers. - Dropped dangling sort imports left by the sort.Slice->slices.Sort rewrite. No behavior change. All four tag variants build, full test suite is green, and golangci-lint (with modernize enabled) reports 0 issues. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
102 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
102 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
package admin
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"errors"
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
|
|
"github.com/owncord/server/db"
|
|
"github.com/owncord/server/permissions"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// ─── Middleware ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
// RequireAdminAuth is the exported form of adminAuthMiddleware. External
|
|
// packages (e.g. api/router.go for the plugin admin handler) reuse it so the
|
|
// session/permission gate stays in one place.
|
|
func RequireAdminAuth(database *db.DB) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return adminAuthMiddleware(database)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// adminAuthMiddleware validates the Bearer token and requires ADMINISTRATOR.
|
|
// On success it stores the *db.User and *db.Session in the request context so
|
|
// downstream handlers can retrieve them without re-querying the database.
|
|
func adminAuthMiddleware(database *db.DB) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
token, ok := auth.ExtractBearerToken(r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "missing or invalid authorization header")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hash := auth.HashToken(token)
|
|
// Resolve the bearer token: login session first, then API token. An
|
|
// API token whose user carries the ADMINISTRATOR bit authenticates
|
|
// here too, so /admin/api/* works for headless clients.
|
|
user, role, sess, err := auth.ResolveTokenHash(r.Context(), database, hash)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case errors.Is(err, auth.ErrTokenExpired):
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "session has expired")
|
|
case errors.Is(err, auth.ErrUserNotFound):
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "user not found")
|
|
case errors.Is(err, auth.ErrRoleNotFound):
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "role not found")
|
|
default:
|
|
// ErrTokenNotFound or a wrapped DB error.
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "invalid or expired session")
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// F1: reject effectively-banned users before any further processing,
|
|
// as api.AuthMiddleware does — a ban must revoke admin-panel access
|
|
// immediately, not only once the session expires. Deliberately placed
|
|
// AFTER ResolveTokenHash so it also covers the API-token path this
|
|
// commit introduces; gating only the session branch would let a
|
|
// banned administrator keep working through a bot token.
|
|
if auth.IsEffectivelyBanned(user) {
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "your account has been suspended")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !permissions.HasAdmin(role.Permissions) {
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "administrator permission required")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), adminUserKey, user)
|
|
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, adminSessionKey, sess) // nil for API-token principals; consumers guard nil
|
|
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ownerOnlyMiddleware wraps a handler to require Owner role (position == 100).
|
|
// It reads the user from context (set by adminAuthMiddleware) rather than
|
|
// re-authenticating, avoiding redundant DB queries and session-expiry gaps.
|
|
func ownerOnlyMiddleware(database *db.DB, next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
user, ok := r.Context().Value(adminUserKey).(*db.User)
|
|
if !ok || user == nil {
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "not authenticated")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
role, err := database.GetRoleByID(r.Context(), user.RoleID)
|
|
if err != nil || role == nil {
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "role not found")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if role.Position < permissions.OwnerRolePosition {
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "owner role required")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|