* fix(admin): accept same-origin first-run setup requests A freshly generated config.yaml leaves allowed_origins commented out, so the list is empty. The setup handler's CSRF guard assumed "no Origin header means same-origin", but browsers send Origin on same-origin POSTs too — Chrome and Edge always, Firefox since 70. The admin panel's own setup call is one of those POSTs, so every new install hit "cross-origin setup request blocked" and could never create an owner account. The guard now accepts a request whose Origin names the same host:port as the request's own Host header, falling back to the allowlist otherwise. That is what the original comment intended. CSRF protection is unaffected: a cross-site attacker cannot set Origin, the browser does, and a foreign origin still needs an explicit allowlist entry. Scheme is not compared. Nothing in this server derives the external scheme (no r.TLS or X-Forwarded-Proto handling exists anywhere), so a scheme check would reject legitimate requests behind a TLS-terminating proxy. Tests: isSameOrigin table covering port/host/suffix/schemeless/opaque-origin cases, plus two handler-level tests pinning both halves — same-origin succeeds against an empty allowlist, a foreign origin still 403s and creates no user. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(identity): implement identity keypair caching and error handling * fix(client): use the real OS credential store, not keyring's mock (#1281) The `keyring` crate declares no `default` feature. Every platform arm in its lib.rs selects a backend only when that platform's feature is on and otherwise falls through to `pub use mock as default`, so the client's bare `keyring = "3"` compiled the in-memory mock store on Windows, macOS and Linux alike. The mock keeps its secret in the `Entry` object itself, and each command built its own `Entry`: save_identity_key -> Entry::new(..) -> set_password -> Ok(()) load_identity_key -> Entry::new(..) -> get_password -> NoEntry So a save reported success, the very next read in the same process returned nothing, `NoEntry` was mapped to `Ok(None)` so neither side logged anything, and no entry was ever written to Credential Manager on any machine. Downstream, the voice-E2EE identity keypair was regenerated on reconnect, the published identity key stopped matching the key that signed the announce, and peers correctly rejected it as a possible MITM. Name the platform backends explicitly, and stop trusting a store that reports a write it did not keep: - secret_store: read every write back and compare before reporting success. If the store returns a value we did not write, purge it so it cannot shadow the fallback on the next read. - On Windows only, fall back to a DPAPI-protected file in the app data dir, engaged solely after a proven round-trip failure and cleared as soon as the real store works again. The account name is mixed into the DPAPI entropy so a blob cannot be moved between entries and decrypt. macOS/Linux report an error instead of writing secrets to plaintext. - Log the compiled backend at startup and add `probe_credential_store` so an affected machine can be diagnosed from its own log file. - Guard the regression: `compiled_keyring_backend_is_persistent` fails the build if the features are ever dropped again. Verified to fail against `keyring = "3"`. The E2EE fail-closed posture is unchanged: a peer whose announce signature does not verify is still rejected. Linux builds now need `libdbus-1-dev` for the Secret Service backend. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016oUHtEUWWxC79eB88GvX58 Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(client, admin): make the settings panel, client, and admin panel do what they say (#1282) * fix(client): make the settings panel do what it says Functional review of every control in the settings overlay. Each fix below closes a gap between what a control promised and what it did. - Appearance: picking a theme no longer drops a saved accent colour. applyThemeByName strips every inline custom property from <body>, which includes the accent override; under neon-glow (whose body class sets --accent) the user's colour silently reverted until restart. - Overlay: reopening the panel rebuilds the active tab. The Voice & Audio mic meter and camera preview are torn down on close, so a reopened panel showed a dead meter and a black preview; tabs also now re-read prefs. The Logs tab's live listener is released when you switch away from it. - Status: the UserBar picker always started at "online" and never persisted, while the Account tab read a pref nobody else wrote — the two surfaces disagreed. Both now go through lib/userStatus, sync live via the pref-change event, and the saved status is re-asserted on connect. - Notifications: Do Not Disturb now suppresses the desktop notification and the chime, as its description in the panel claims. The taskbar flash, a passive cue, stays. - Keybinds: Ctrl+F, Ctrl+M, Ctrl+D, Ctrl+Shift+V and Ctrl+U were listed but unimplemented. They are wired now (voice ones only while in voice, all of them suspended while the settings panel is open). "Mark as Read" had no feature behind it at all and is replaced by the Escape behaviour that actually exists. - Account: backup codes now carry a "you won't see them again" warning and a copy button; the change-password form requires the current password before spending a server attempt and disables itself while in flight. - Advanced: removed the Hardware Acceleration toggle. Nothing read the preference it wrote — the webview decides GPU compositing before any JS runs, so honouring it needs a Rust startup change. - The settings sidebar name/avatar follow a rename instead of going stale, and settings/helpers no longer keeps a drifted copy of lib/preferences (the copy lacked the write guard, so a failed save could throw). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019TDE7ZPi38jLfEKhj7kvmm * fix(client): close silent-failure gaps in the inline admin surface Continuation of the settings-panel review into the rest of the client. - Member context menu had no styling at all: AdminActions renders BEM class names (context-menu__item and friends) that appear nowhere in the CSS, so the menu had no hover, no danger colour, and the "Change Role" submenu pushed the menu open instead of flying out. Added the missing rules. - The submenu offered a hardcoded admin/moderator/member list. On a server with custom roles those roles were unreachable, and picking a name that didn't resolve to a role id silently did nothing. Roles now come from the server's ready payload (owner excluded), and an unresolvable role reports an error instead of dead-ending. - Kick / ban / delete-channel now show an in-flight state, and the two-click confirm disarms after a few seconds so a menu left open can't turn a stray click into a ban (docs/architecture/ux/settings-and-admin.md §3). - Ban collects a reason, which the server already stores and displays (adminBanMember has always accepted one; the menu never passed it). - Copying an invite code was silent: no confirmation, and a clipboard rejection looked identical to success. It now toasts either way. - Creating an invite double-click-minted two of them, and revoking — which kills a live link — had neither a confirm nor an in-flight guard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019TDE7ZPi38jLfEKhj7kvmm * fix(client): restore moderator message deletion and formatting - The delete affordance was offered only on your own messages, so a moderator could not moderate anything from the client. It now also appears when the signed-in user's role carries MANAGE_MESSAGES, derived from the role bitmasks the server already sends in `ready` (this is what docs/architecture/ux/messaging.md §4 specifies as "Delete (own / moderator)"). lib/permissions.ts existed for exactly this and had no callers at all. - Developer-mode "Copy ID" was silent on success and swallowed clipboard failures; it toasts either way now. - prettier --write on AdminActions.ts (Client Static Checks). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019TDE7ZPi38jLfEKhj7kvmm * fix(admin): stop the panel reporting success it didn't have Functional review of the server admin web panel. - An expired admin session left the panel on screen toasting "invalid or expired session" for every action, with no way back to the login form — only the log-stream code handled it. api() now handles 401 centrally: clear the token, return to login, and say why. - Deleting a backup called fetch() without looking at the response, so a failed delete reported "Backup deleted" and left the file in place. It now goes through api(), and — like every other destructive action here — asks for confirmation first. - A failed update check rendered as "Up to date. You're running the latest version", which is a lie that hides a broken update path. It now says the check failed and why. A failed apply no longer leaves the button stuck on "Applying...". - The Edit Channel modal could only rename. PATCH /channels/{id} accepts topic, slow_mode, position and archived, and the channel table has an Archived column — which was read-only state with no control behind it. All four are editable now. - Banned users showed "Yes" with no reason, even though the ban reason is collected on ban and returned by the API. It's now displayed. - Login and first-run setup had no in-flight guard, so a double-click spent two attempts against the login lockout / setup rate limit. Settings' Save stayed enabled after a successful save, implying unsaved changes. - Clipboard copies (invite code, new API token) had no rejection path: a refused clipboard looked exactly like a successful copy. - Backup names in inline onclick handlers go through jsq() like every other interpolated string. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019TDE7ZPi38jLfEKhj7kvmm * feat(admin): add the plugin management UI the backend already had /api/v1/admin/plugins has exposed list/install/enable/disable/uninstall since Phase C Step 9 — its own header says it "exposes plugin lifecycle operations to the admin panel", and docs/architecture/ux/settings-and-admin.md tells operators plugin management lives in the web panel. The panel had no Plugins section at all, so installing a plugin meant hand-crafting a multipart POST. Panel: - Plugins section: installed table (name, manifest description and requested permissions, version, enabled state, install date), zip upload with the 16 MB server cap stated up front, enable/disable, and uninstall behind a confirm. One lifecycle call at a time. - The lifecycle API sits under a different prefix than the rest of the panel and answers errors as plain text (http.Error), not JSON, so it gets its own fetch helper — sharing api() would have surfaced "unexpected token" instead of the server's reason. 401 still routes back to login. Server: - PluginRow had no JSON tags, so the list marshalled Go field names and every column would have rendered empty. Now snake_case like the rest of the API. - GET /plugins returns X-Plugin-Runtime: enabled|disabled. An empty list means "nothing installed" on a live runtime and "you can't install anything" on a disabled one; the body can't tell them apart, so the panel's empty state had no way to be honest about it. The plugin-store test helper now hands back the database the registry writes to — the existing happy-path test wired a *different* in-memory DB into the handler, which is why nothing noticed the list was always empty. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019TDE7ZPi38jLfEKhj7kvmm * feat(client): gate the composer on slow mode instead of failing the send Verified the optimistic message lifecycle against docs/architecture/ux — pending → chat_send_ok → sent, failed rows with mapped reasons, retry and delete-draft all behave as documented. One thing did not: slow mode. The UX spec (§5) says slow mode should "disable send with a live countdown in the composer; do not drop the drafted message". In practice the composer knew nothing about it: you typed, sent, and got a red failed row back — the exact enabled-then-rejected pattern §6.2 forbids. The client never even received the channel's slow_mode value. - Server: channel payloads (ready, channel_create, channel_update) now carry slow_mode alongside can_send, for the same reason can_send is there — the client can express the limit as affordance. The server still enforces. - Client: after an accepted send the composer disables itself for the channel's cooldown with a per-second countdown, and a SLOW_MODE refusal restarts the full window (the server's limiter is the authority on when the next send is allowed). The draft stays in the textarea. Moderators, who bypass slow mode server-side, are not gated. - The MANAGE_MESSAGES lookup added for moderator deletes moves into lib/permissions as currentUserPermissions/currentUserHasPermission/ canManageMessages, so the composer and the message renderer share one definition instead of two. - WsErrorCode listed 9 of the server's 16 codes: SLOW_MODE, CONFLICT, BAD_REQUEST, INVALID_JSON, UNKNOWN_TYPE, BAD_PAYLOAD, NOT_KEY_HOLDER and ALREADY_JOINED were missing, so code switching on it could not name cases the server actually sends. Now mirrors Server/ws/errors.go. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019TDE7ZPi38jLfEKhj7kvmm * fix(admin): make backup restore actually restart, and fail closed without a safety copy Verification pass over the remaining review items. Two real defects in restore, one duplicate resolved; cert TOFU and the replay path checked out as-is. Restore: - The handler closed the database, swapped the file underneath it, told the admin "database restored — server restarting", broadcast a 5-second restart countdown to every client... and then kept running. Nothing restarted it, so the server answered every subsequent request against a closed DB until an operator noticed. It now respawns for real, reusing the update-apply pattern (SpawnDetached → SIGTERM → os.Exit backstop) behind a test seam. - A failed pre-restore backup was a warning, and the irreversible overwrite went ahead anyway — removing the safety net the panel explicitly promises ("A pre-restore backup will be created"), precisely when it matters. It now aborts with the database untouched. - The safety copy was written to a cwd-relative "data/backups" while every other backup handler uses the absolute backupBaseDir, so a server started from another directory filed it somewhere the operator would never find. Both new tests were confirmed to fail against the previous behaviour. Client: - SidebarArea kept a private 140-line copy of the member-list wiring that SidebarMemberSection already provides (the extracted, tested one was never imported). Fixing the silent role-change failure earlier meant patching both; now there is one copy. Verified without changes: the optimistic send lifecycle (pending → chat_send_ok → sent, failed rows with mapped reasons, retry, delete-draft), reconnect replay (monotonic last_seq, dedup on reconnect, replay suppression of unread/notifications), and cert TOFU (first-use and mismatch modals, accept re-pins and reconnects, reject disconnects back to connect). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019TDE7ZPi38jLfEKhj7kvmm * fix(admin): remove the data race in the restart test hook CI (-race) failed identically on ubuntu and windows: TestHandleRestoreBackup_ Success polled a plain bool that the restore handler's goroutine wrote, and swapped the restartSelf package var from the test goroutine while that handler read it. The hook is now behind a mutex with an atomic flag in StubRestart. Production behaviour is unchanged — the race was entirely in the test seam I added. Verified with `go test -race -count=2 ./admin/`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019TDE7ZPi38jLfEKhj7kvmm --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor + perf: split largest source files into modules; optimize hot paths (#1283) * refactor(updater): split updater.go into cohesive files Split the 1070-line updater.go into four files within the same package: updater.go (core types, release checking), download.go (download and tarball extraction), verify.go (signatures, checksums, staged binary), and assets.go (client assets, text-asset cache, HTTP fetching). Pure mechanical move — no behavior or API changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu * refactor(ws): split hub.go into cohesive files Split the 1289-line hub.go into five files within the same package: hub.go (Hub struct, lifecycle, register/unregister), hub_broadcast.go (broadcast fan-out and per-user sends), hub_events.go (sequencing, replay, persistence), hub_sweep.go (stale client/session/voice sweepers), and hub_livekit.go (LiveKit accessors). Also optimizes wrapWithSeq on the hot broadcast path: build the seq prefix with a single preallocated append + strconv.AppendUint instead of fmt.Sprintf, halving allocations per broadcast message. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu * refactor(client): extract E2EEManager from livekitSession Move all client-side E2EE key-exchange logic (~550 lines) out of LiveKitSession into a new E2EEManager class in livekitE2EE.ts: ECDH keypair management, identity signing and TOFU pin verification, announce/offer handling, key-holder election, membership rekeying, and periodic key rotation. Dependencies are injected following the existing roomEventHandlers pattern. LiveKitSession keeps thin public delegates (handleE2EEAnnounce, handleE2EEOffer, handleParticipantLeft, rePinPeerIdentity) so the module-level bound exports and the public API are unchanged. livekitSession.ts shrinks from 1955 to 1409 lines. Adds focused unit tests for E2EEManager (key-holder setup, pending announce queue, offer resolution, clearState, rotation). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu * perf(server): hot-path and query optimizations Logging (biggest win): rewrite the admin log RingBuffer as a true ring (fixed array + head/count) instead of allocating a fresh 2000-entry slice + full copy per log line; gate the ring handler on a configurable level instead of unconditional DEBUG capture; move the broadcast debug log out of the seqMu critical section; drop the per-message slog.With clone in the WS handler. Database: new migration 019 adds idx_attachments_message (message pages no longer scan the attachments table), a covering role-leading index on channel_overrides (replacing a duplicate of the UNIQUE auto-index), a partial index for pinned messages, and narrows the FTS trigger to content changes only; ANALYZE runs after migrations. Rewrite GetChannelUnreadCounts and GetUserDMChannels to correlated subqueries that range-scan idx_messages_channel — O(unread) instead of O(all messages) per WS connect. New GetUserDMChannelIDs replaces the full DM query where only IDs are needed. CreateMessage/EditMessageContent use RETURNING, removing the re-read after every send/edit. Write-path contention: TouchSession throttled to once per minute per session (was one UPDATE per authenticated request); EventPersister flushes its batch in a single transaction with per-row fallback; revoked-session and stale-voice sweeps run off the hub dispatch goroutine with an in-flight guard, and session checks are batched into one IN query; the rate limiter is sharded into 32 buckets with allocation-free strconv key building (auth.Key). WS structural: voice E2EE channel fan-out goes through the existing pubsub voice topic instead of scanning every connected client under h.mu; channelReadAudience memoizes role lookups per call; hasChannelAccess drops its redundant duplicate permission check; voice_join batches SPEAK/VIDEO/SCREENSHARE checks via HasChannelPermBatch. Also: pubsub topic builders and NewAppMetrics stop allocating via Sprintf/global mutex. Verified with go test -race across all packages, go vet, gofmt, and sqlc generate idempotency. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu * perf(client): render-path, logging, and bundle optimizations Logging: the logger no longer runs permanently at debug — level is set from the environment at startup (debug in dev, info in prod), so every hot-path debug entry stops being serialized, buffered, consoled, and persisted to disk; per-URL debug logs in embed rendering removed. Render path: MessageList's store selector is scoped to the mounted channel, so messages in other channels no longer trigger re-renders, and a new incremental tail-append fast path appends rows instead of tearing down the whole window; Intl.DateTimeFormat instances are cached at module level; parseTimestamp memoizes epoch millis; media prefs (showEmbeds/inlineMedia/showLinkPreviews/animateGifs) are cached with pref-change invalidation; members store gains a roleRevision counter so MessageList stops rebuilding a role map on every presence/typing event. MemberList patches presence changes in place (status dot + offline class) via a row map instead of rebuilding every row, with single-pass role grouping. ChannelSidebar splits its voice subscription into a structural selector (excluding speaking) and a speaking-only patcher using a cached element map instead of per-user querySelector on every speaker event. Memory: GIF/media elements are unobserved before the message window discards them, fixing unbounded IntersectionObserver retention of detached DOM (including frozen-frame data URLs). Bundle: livekit-client (1.3 MB) moves to its own chunk via dynamic imports and manualChunks; the READY handler's stale-voice check reads the voice store instead of requiring the module synchronously. Adds 11 focused tests (different-channel no-rerender, append fast path, media release, presence patch, speaking patch). Full unit suite: 3606/3606 passing; typecheck, lint, and production build clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): skip alloc test under deadlock tag; cut bcrypt cost in tests (#1284) The deadlock-tag CI pass failed on TestRingBuffer_WriteDoesNotAllocate: under -tags deadlock, syncutil.Mutex is the go-deadlock mutex whose Lock allocates, so the steady-state ring write measures 1 alloc/call. Extend the build constraint to !race && !deadlock — the test's guarantee is about the ring buffer itself, which the -race-less default pass covers. Make bcryptCost a var with an exported SetCostForTesting hook that also resets the dummy timing pad, and call it with bcrypt.MinCost from the api, auth, and admin TestMains. Password hashing at production cost 12 dominated those suites (~264 hashes): with the race detector the api package alone took ~860s; it now runs in ~33s. Nothing under test depends on hash strength, and no test asserts the cost. Hygiene in the same pass: migration 020 drops idx_sessions_token and idx_invites_code (exact duplicates of their UNIQUE auto-indexes, pure write overhead) with updated db_test assertions; remove the dead tar.TypeRegA comparison in the updater (stdlib normalises it to TypeReg since Go 1.11); gofmt storage/storage.go comment alignment. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf(ws): route hot-path permission checks through the cached PermissionService (#1285) The ws package was the only major subsystem still doing live per-check permission queries (GetRoleForUser + GetChannelPermissions per check): a V2 voice join cost 9+ DB reads across its four gates, and every channel broadcast resolved one role query per connected client. Hub now holds svc.Permissions and the voice deps carry it (nil-safe: bare test fixtures fall back to the existing live path, fail-closed semantics preserved everywhere). Converted sites: the voice join and token-refresh permission gates, USE_VIDEO/SHARE_SCREEN controls, requireChannelAccess, channelReadAudience, and RefreshChannelVisibility. Caching these is revocation-correct: every permission-changing mutation already invalidates synchronously before hub fan-out (InvalidateUser on role change, InvalidateAll on override change), the 30s TTL is only a backstop, and the service's gen-counter guard prevents a populate that races an invalidation from caching stale data — the audience-resolution comments now document that invariant. The stale-voice sweeper's check deliberately stays live: it is the last-line backstop for revocations that might bypass an invalidation hook, runs once a minute for only in-voice clients, and its eviction test pins exactly that guarantee. requirePerm keeps its INTERNAL-vs-FORBIDDEN distinction by using the cache only for positive verdicts and falling through to the live path on denial. Adds perm_cache_test.go: role-change invalidation is immediate (no TTL wait), and a counting-store test proving the second check is served from cache. All pinning tests (authz, voice_perm_stale, channel visibility agreement, sweep eviction) pass unmodified. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf + refactor: SQLite reader pool, async audits, real lazy-livekit, test splits, eslint 10 (#1286) * perf(db): batch audit writes through an async writer Audit inserts ran synchronously on the request path — including one INSERT per WebSocket connect — each an implicit transaction on the single SQLite connection. WriteAudit keeps its exact signature and D8 policy (never fail the caller, never silently discard): it now upgrades to an async path when the passed Auditor also implements AsyncAuditor. *DB implements that via an atomic pointer that main.go populates at server startup with an AuditWriter modeled on the event persister (bounded queue, batched single-transaction flush with per-row fallback, drain-on-stop, atomic counters, non-blocking enqueue that error-logs drops without leaking the detail field). The token CLI and tests never install a writer, so they keep today's synchronous behavior with zero call-site changes. The writer's Stop defer registers after database.Close's so the LIFO unwind drains the queue before the DB shuts. Adds audit_writer_test.go: batch flush, D8 drop logging, drain-on-stop, flush-failure accounting, poison-row fallback, concurrent enqueue, and seam tests pinning sync-without-writer vs async-with-writer behavior. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu * perf(client): actually defer livekit-client; honor saved log level at startup The manualChunks split was cosmetic: index.html modulepreloaded the 531 kB livekit chunk and the entry statically imported it. All four import chains from startup are now cut — auth.store's logout leaveVoice and ptt's setMuted go through dynamic imports, applyStoredAppearance moved to lib/appearance.ts so main.ts and ConnectPage stop pulling the settings tree (whose overlay now loads on first open), and MainPage itself is a dynamic import in renderPage, guarded against the destroy-before-mount race by a navigation-generation helper and pre-warmed once the socket connects. Entry chunk drops 387 kB -> 114 kB (gzip 36 kB); index.html has no modulepreload links; livekit/MainPage/SettingsOverlay/livekitSession load as lazy chunks. The logger now honors the Logs tab's saved minimum level at startup (applyStoredLogLevel with the legacy-key migration moved into lib/preferences.ts) and re-applies it live on pref changes. Dead code: remove unreachable VoiceChannel.ts (superseded by ChannelSidebar's renderer) and its test, plus all knip-flagged unused re-exports in message-list/renderers.ts and ConnectPage's unused form types — knip is now clean apart from pre-existing config hints. Tests: +12 (navigation guard incl. stale-mount discard; logger startup pref, migration, and live re-apply); ptt/stored-appearance updated for dynamic-import plumbing only. Full suite 3593 passing; typecheck, lint, and production build clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu * perf(db): split SQLite into single-writer + multi-reader connection pools The entire server serialized on one SQLite connection: every read queued behind every other read and every write, throwing away WAL's concurrent-reader capability. File-backed databases now open two pools from a DSN that carries all seven PRAGMAs as per-connection _pragma parameters (an Exec'd PRAGMA only configures one arbitrary pooled connection — moving them into the DSN is what makes >1 connection safe, foreign_keys included): a single-connection writer with _txlock=immediate, and a reader pool sized max(4, NumCPU). In-memory databases keep the exact historical single-connection behavior, which preserves every :memory: test site and the connection-scoped PRAGMA-toggle tests untouched. Routing lives in a dbtx router implementing sqlc's DBTX: statements go to the reader only when provably read-only (leading SELECT/PRAGMA after skipping comments — necessary because sqlc routes INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE ... RETURNING through QueryRowContext/QueryContext, which must stay on the writer); Exec, transactions, migrations, ANALYZE, VACUUM INTO, and the SQLDb() escape hatch all pin to the writer. Every former sqlDB reference across the package was re-pointed deliberately. New pool_test.go pins the properties the split must preserve on a file-backed DB: foreign_keys=1 across many reader connections, WAL journal mode, FK enforcement through both write paths, 8x8 concurrent reader/writer hammering with exact row counts, and a read completing against the pre-tx snapshot while a write transaction is open — the property this change exists to unlock. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu * test(client)+chore: split the two largest test files; eslint 10; audit clean Split tests/unit/ws.test.ts (3340 lines) into ws-cert / ws-reconnect / ws-messaging / ws-lifecycle plus a shared helpers/ws-mocks.ts module, and tests/unit/audio-pipeline.test.ts (2547 lines) into core / gain / vad-worklet / vad-fallback files. Test bodies moved verbatim; the suite count is unchanged at 3593 passing. Upgrade eslint 9 -> 10 (with @eslint/js 10; typescript-eslint's peer range already covers v10, flat config unchanged, zero new findings) and pin test-exclude ^8 via the existing overrides block so the coverage chain picks up patched glob/minimatch/brace-expansion. npm audit: 8 high -> 0 vulnerabilities. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu * refactor(server): split remaining large files; dependency hygiene notes Split ws/coverage_boost_test.go (2856 lines) into coverage_helpers / chat / voice / voice_lifecycle / misc test files — bodies verbatim, 746 passing tests before and after. Split service/message.go (781) into message_crud / message_reactions / message_query / message_perms with types and the constructor staying put, and ws/serve.go (754) into serve / serve_pumps / serve_auth / serve_ready. Dependency findings (no changes needed): coraza-coreruleset's stale Feb-2024 pseudo-version is unreachable from our code — it enters the module graph only through coraza's own internal tests, and our WAF uses inline directives, never the CRS (fresher rules would require adopting the /v4 module and rewiring the WAF config — deliberate follow-up, not hygiene); gogo/protobuf is likewise graph-only via the livekit SDK and never built into our binaries. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu * style: satisfy golangci-lint modernize/staticcheck in new pool and audit code CI's golangci-lint pass (not run locally until now) flagged the Phase 3/4 additions: range-over-int loops, interface{} -> any on the dbtx router, WaitGroup.Go in the pool tests, and a De Morgan simplification in isReadOnlySQL's identifier-boundary check. Pure style — verified against the same golangci-lint v2.11.3 binary CI uses (0 issues) and re-ran db/ws race + deadlock suites green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(waf) + fix(deps) + test(ws): OWASP CRS, Dependabot fixes, sleep-free ws tests (#1287) * fix(deps): clear quick-xml RUSTSEC advisories in Tauri lockfile cargo-audit identified the two Dependabot alerts on the default branch: quick-xml 0.37.5 and 0.38.4 both carry RUSTSEC-2026-0194 (quadratic runtime on duplicate-attribute checks) and RUSTSEC-2026-0195 (unbounded namespace allocation DoS), fixed in >=0.41. Both were transitive: plist 1.8.0 (via tauri) and tauri-winrt-notification 0.7.2 (via notify-rust). Semver-compatible updates fix both — plist 1.10.0 moves to quick-xml 0.41, and tauri-winrt-notification 0.7.3 drops quick-xml entirely. cargo-audit is now clean of vulnerabilities; the remaining 20 informational notices are the unmaintained GTK3-binding crates inherent to Tauri v2 on Linux. Verified plist compiles against quick-xml 0.41 (full Tauri build needs the GTK/WebKit system libs CI installs). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu * feat(waf): layer the maintained OWASP Core Rule Set onto the WAF The WAF previously ran six inline directives only — the CRS never loaded (the old coreruleset dep was a stale graph-only pseudo-version). A second Coraza engine now loads the embedded CRS from coraza-coreruleset/v4 (v4.25.0), layered on top of the inline rules, which stay byte-identical and keep blocking exactly as before. CRS ships in a new server.waf_crs_mode knob (off|detect|block), defaulting to detect: chat traffic is CRS-false-positive-prone (a new test pins that block mode rejects benign SQL-ish chat prose at the default threshold), so operators get rule-match visibility via structured logs first and opt into blocking after tuning. Setup mirrors the official connector: Host/Transfer-Encoding restored to the transaction (else 920280 fires on everything), phase 2 always runs so query-string attacks are scored, PUT/PATCH/DELETE added to the CRS method policy for this REST API, body limits matched to the app's 1 MiB cap with uploads excluded from body access and the content-type policy. Also fixes a latent middleware bug: the body was previously swapped for the buffered reader even when nothing was buffered, which would have handed body-access-off routes an empty body; now pinned by a test across all modes. Adds waf_crs_test.go (load, mode wiring, XSS/traversal detection without blocking, block-mode blocking + benign passthrough, upload body preservation); waf_test.go passes unmodified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu * test(ws): replace fixed sleeps with condition-based waits The ws suite paced async hub effects with 537 fixed time.Sleep calls — slow at best, flaky under load at worst. They are now condition-based: a small waitFor/waitRegistered/waitClientCount/waitMsgOfType helper set (waitRegistered exploits the hub's in-order client-event processing), plus blocking decode-scans for the DM tests. The bulk deletion is grounded in verified production facts, unchanged by this commit: sendMsg is a synchronous buffered send (error replies are already buffered when the handler returns), the voice control / rollback / cleanup / sweep paths are synchronous, and serve.go registers the client before writing the ready frame. Absence assertions were deliberately NOT inverted into polling — they keep bounded windows, each commented. 20 sleeps remain, all justified in place: poll intervals inside condition loops, absence windows, clock-granularity pacing, and the event-pruner's inherently time-based no-prune-after-cancel assertion. Suite: 746 tests before and after; 62.6s -> 46.1s (30s of the remainder is GracefulStop's hard-coded production 5s drain, out of scope here); race flake check passes 3 consecutive iterations; deadlock pass and golangci-lint clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: audit-driven fixes — client leaks/lazy-load, WAF detect logging, audit shutdown race (#1288) * fix(waf,db): aggregate CRS detect-mode logging; make audit Stop await goroutine exit WAF detect mode wired logCRSMatch as the engine-level error callback, which fires one slog.Warn per matched rule on the request goroutine. In the default detect mode ordinary chat prose trips several CRS SQLi/XSS rules plus anomaly scoring, so each request logged a burst of Warn lines in the hot path. Aggregate per request from per-transaction state instead of the shared global callback: in the default detect path leave the engine error callback nil and, in the existing crsTx defer, emit at most one Warn per request that had matches (count + highest-severity rule), demoting the full rule-id list to Debug. Block mode keeps per-rule logging (blocked requests are rare and their detail is wanted), and a caller-supplied onCRSMatch callback keeps per-rule delivery so existing tests stay unmodified. Detection, interruption, and body handling are unchanged — only the detect-path logging shape. The audit writer's Stop selected between <-done and <-ctx.Done(); on a slow flush the 5s ctx could win, returning while run() was still flushing. main.go's LIFO defers then closed the DB pool under a live flusher, losing audits. Stop now always waits on done (the goroutine has stopped touching the store) while ctx bounds only the drain inside run() via a published stopCtxDone channel, so a slow store delays shutdown by at most one in-flight flush and the pool is never closed under a live writer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu * fix(client): plug listener leaks, guard lazy livekit load, honor saved log level Follow-up audit of the recently-landed lazy-livekit and session wiring found three real issues: - clearAuth unconditionally dynamic-imported livekitSession to call leaveVoice on every logout, pulling the ~531 kB livekit chunk into the logout path even when no voice session was ever active. Guard the import on an active voice session (currentChannelId set and status not idle) and add a .catch so a failed teardown import can't reject unhandled. - The onStateChange handler unsubscribed session listeners only on the ready transition, not on disconnected; user_update and ready listeners registered per session were never collected for cleanup. Collect them into a sessionUnsubs array cleaned up on both ready and disconnected, preventing duplicate handlers accumulating across reconnects. - The Logs tab min-level select ignored the persisted log level when no explicit dropdown preference was saved. Add logger.getLogLevel() and default the select to it so the UI reflects the level actually in effect. Also add .catch to the ptt setMuted dynamic import. New unit tests cover the clearAuth guard, getLogLevel, and the LogsTab default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(waf): load embedded OWASP CRS ruleset correctly on Windows (#1289) The CRS WAF engine failed to initialize on Windows, taking the whole api package's test suite red there. coraza's seclang parser resolves Include globs through path/filepath: for every match of `Include @owasp_crs/*.conf` it calls filepath.Join(currentDir, match), which on Windows rewrites the forward slashes to backslashes. It then feeds names like `@owasp_crs\REQUEST-901-INITIALIZATION.conf` back into the root fs.FS. That FS is the ruleset's embed.FS, which is always forward-slash and rejects a backslash name, so newCRSWAF returned "file does not exist" and no CRS rule under a subdirectory was ever loaded. Wrap coreruleset.FS in a small slash-normalizing fs.FS (Open/ReadFile/ReadDir/ Glob) that converts backslashes to forward slashes before delegating. This fixes CRS loading on Windows without patching coraza or the ruleset module and is a no-op where the separator is already "/". The Linux-only local verification for the CRS work missed this because coraza never emits backslashes there. The new test reproduces the failure mode on any OS by constructing the exact backslash name coraza produces on Windows: the raw ruleset FS fails to read it, the wrapper resolves it, and a forward-slash path still works. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(e2e): repair the Playwright suite so the CI job stops timing out (#1291) The Client E2E CI job never completed: every run hit its 25-minute cap and was cancelled. ~229 of the 255 web tests were failing, all cascading from the shared login helper, and 255 tests x 3 attempts x 20-45s of timeout burn on 1 worker deterministically exceeds the cap. Root cause: the e2e Tauri mock predates the Rust HTTP TOFU proxy. api.ts now awaits invoke("start_http_proxy") and builds REST URLs as http://127.0.0.1:{port}/api/v1/..., but the mock's invoke returned null for the unstubbed command, so every URL got a literal "null" port and Request construction threw before the mocked plugin:http transport was consulted. Login rejected, [data-testid='app-layout'] never mounted, and every logged-in test burned its full timeout. Stubbing start_http_proxy with any numeric port fixes the cascade because route matching is substring-based. The tail of failures after that fix were tests asserting behavior the app intentionally changed: - The ready payload can no longer pre-connect the local user to voice: the dispatcher treats "self in ready.voice_states while idle" as stale state from a reload and immediately leaves. MOCK_VOICE_STATE now seeds remote users only (2, 3), and widget tests join through the real click path via a new joinVoiceChannelByName helper. - The mock's voice_join reply no longer includes a voice_token: a token starts a real LiveKit session that deterministically self-destructs in the browser mock (E2EE key exchange timeout ~15s / connect-refused retries), tearing the widget down mid-test. These web tests validate the WS/UI layer only; real LiveKit is covered by the native suite. The reply also gained the full VoiceStatePayload shape — the sidebar renders user.username directly, and the omitted field broke the whole voice-user list render. - Message-load failure now renders an inline region error + Retry instead of a toast (UX spec 2), so the toast specs assert the inline UI and get their auto-dismiss vehicle from the delete-confirmation toast. CI hardening so a future systemic breakage can never burn the full cap again: maxFailures 20 and a 20-minute globalTimeout in CI (Playwright now self-terminates with a usable report instead of being SIGKILLed), with the workflow's timeout-minutes 25 as the outer backstop. The job stays continue-on-error until it has proven stably green across a few pushes; the ci.yml comment documents that flip trigger. Full suite: 255/255 passing locally (~7.5 min at 1 worker, ~4 min at 2). Unit tests (3598), typecheck, and prettier all clean. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJM9kF4JBhRHEqtcv3sasu Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(admin): first-run setup wizard with config.yaml write-back + LiveKit auto-download (#1290) * feat(admin): first-run setup wizard with config.yaml write-back Turn the single-screen owner-account setup into a guided multi-step wizard so non-technical operators never have to hand-edit YAML: - config: new comment-preserving config.Save (yaml.Node round-trip, atomic temp+rename write, verified loadable before replacing the file) plus a shared config.DefaultPath. Persists the runtime-generated LiveKit credentials so voice tokens survive restarts. - admin: POST /admin/api/setup accepts an optional "wizard" object (server name, MOTD, registration, port, TLS mode/domain, upload limit, voice quality). Values are validated before the account is created; DB settings and config.yaml are written after; failures downgrade to warnings so the created owner is never orphaned behind a 5xx. When a startup-only value changed the server restarts itself (reusing the backup/update restart machinery) and returns the new admin URL. - admin: GET /admin/api/setup/status now returns secret-free prefill defaults while setup is pending. - admin panel: six-step wizard UI (welcome, account, server basics, uploads & voice, access, review) with plain-language explanations, a restart/reconnect screen, and a "skip" path that keeps the legacy account-only flow byte-for-byte. - legacy payload {username,password} and all existing call sites keep working (SetupOptions is a trailing variadic parameter). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018iHyK5WtjSQgjubTegSrUB * fix(lint): satisfy modernize — any over interface{}, new(expr) over ptr helper Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018iHyK5WtjSQgjubTegSrUB * feat(voice): auto-download the LiveKit server binary Voice now works with zero manual setup: when voice.auto_download_livekit is enabled and no voice.livekit_binary is configured, the server fetches the pinned livekit-server release (v1.13.5, overridable via voice.livekit_version) from the official LiveKit GitHub releases in the background at startup, verifies it against the release's checksums.txt, extracts it into data/livekit/, and manages it as the existing companion process (crash recovery, health checks, graceful shutdown). - ws: new livekit_download.go — pinned version, per-platform asset mapping (linux/windows × amd64/arm64/armv7, matching LiveKit's goreleaser config), size-capped downloads, hash verification and extraction through one open handle (TOCTOU-safe), O_EXCL staging, atomic rename, stale-version cleanup. LiveKitProcess.Start resolves the binary asynchronously with retries so boot is never blocked. - config: voice.auto_download_livekit + voice.livekit_version; enabled in the generated default config so fresh installs get working voice out of the box, while the compiled-in default stays off for existing configs. config.Load now loads the default file it just wrote, so the first boot runs with exactly the configuration the file documents. - wizard: "Voice chat" toggle (on by default) in the Uploads & voice step; the choice is written to config.yaml and factored into the restart decision. - docs: livekit-setup, server-configuration, deployment, README. Verified end-to-end against the real v1.13.5 release: download, checksum match, extraction, and process spawn all succeed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018iHyK5WtjSQgjubTegSrUB * chore: remove stray server.log, ignore local run logs Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018iHyK5WtjSQgjubTegSrUB --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(voice): desktop-client origins on LiveKit proxy + client version bump to alpha.5 + release version guard (#1293) * fix(voice): accept the desktop client's webview origins on the LiveKit proxy The desktop client's chat connection goes through its Rust proxy, which sends no Origin header, so the safe-default empty allowed_origins never blocked it. The LiveKit JS SDK's signal requests and validate probes, however, are issued directly from the webview and carry its fixed origin (http(s)://tauri.localhost on WebView2, tauri://localhost on WKWebView/WebKitGTK). isOriginAllowed treated those as cross-origin and returned 403, so on every default install voice failed for any desktop client that wasn't on the server machine — chat worked, voice didn't, with /livekit/rtc/v1 403s in the server log. Treat these fixed first-party origins as always allowed. This is the same trust already extended to absent-Origin requests: web content can never present them (browsers resolve *.localhost to loopback and cannot reach the tauri:// scheme), so the CSRF surface is unchanged. Exact, case-insensitive matching only — lookalikes (tauri.localhost.evil.com, tauri.localhost:8080) still require an explicit allowlist entry. Operators no longer need to hand-add these origins to server.allowed_origins for voice to work; that list is now only for web/browser clients. Docs and the generated config comment updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018iHyK5WtjSQgjubTegSrUB * chore(client): bump version to 1.1.0-alpha.5 The v1.1.0-alpha.4 release shipped client artifacts still versioned 1.1.0-alpha.3 because the client manifests were never bumped — deployed desktop clients therefore consider themselves up to date and never auto-update. Bump package.json, package-lock.json, tauri.conf.json, Cargo.toml and Cargo.lock to 1.1.0-alpha.5 so the next release's clients update normally. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018iHyK5WtjSQgjubTegSrUB * ci(release): fail the release when client version does not match the tag Guards against the v1.1.0-alpha.4 mistake recurring: a new verify-versions job compares the pushed tag against tauri.conf.json, package.json and Cargo.toml and fails before any build starts; every build job now depends on it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018iHyK5WtjSQgjubTegSrUB --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(admin): allow API-token principals to use the SSE log stream (#1294) The log stream was session-only: POST /admin/api/logs/ticket required a *db.Session in the request context (deliberately nil for API-token principals), and the stream handler re-validated the ticket hash against the sessions table alone. API tokens could reach every other /admin/api/* route but not the log stream, breaking the mcp-introspect server_logs tool that docs/mcp-introspect.md documents as working. Bind tickets to the hash of whichever bearer credential authenticated the request, and resolve it in the stream handler via auth.ResolveTokenHash — the same session-first, API-token-fallback path the admin middleware uses. Ban, role demotion, and mid-stream revocation of either credential kind cut the stream exactly as before. Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(voice): treat the server's own origin as same-origin on the LiveKit proxy (#1295) A page served by the server itself (e.g. a browser client at https://<server>:8443) chats fine but cannot join voice: browsers attach the page origin to every WebSocket handshake, and the LiveKit proxy's hand-rolled isOriginAllowed only recognized "no Origin" as same-origin, so the RTC upgrade 403'd while same-origin fetches (which omit Origin) succeeded — /livekit/rtc/v1 403s with validate flipping 403/200 in the server log. Allow an Origin whose host equals the request Host, mirroring websocket.Accept's default same-origin policy that the chat WS endpoint already applies — which is exactly why chat worked and voice didn't. Web content on another origin can never present this origin (the browser pins it), so the CSRF surface is unchanged. Same host on a different port remains cross-origin and denied. Also log rejected origins on the 403 path (origin, path, remote) — this failure was previously undiagnosable from the server log, which recorded the 403 but not the offending origin. Existing allowlist tests used origins colliding with httptest's default request host (example.com), which the new semantics correctly treat as same-origin; their fixtures now use distinct hosts so they keep exercising the allowlist path. Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(release): strip bundled libwayland from Linux AppImages (white screen on Arch) (#1297) linuxdeploy bundles the Ubuntu 22.04 runner's libwayland-{client,cursor, egl,server} into the AppImage, and AppRun forces them onto LD_LIBRARY_PATH. On hosts with newer Mesa (Arch, Fedora), EGL init dlopens libwayland-client, hits the stale bundled copy, and fails with "Could not create default EGL display: EGL_BAD_PARAMETER. Aborting..." - WebKit's web process dies and the window stays white. Reproduced in an Arch container with the published alpha.5 aarch64 AppImage (identical stderr to the field report); the same image renders normally on Ubuntu 24.04, and removing the four bundled libwayland libs makes it render on both. WEBKIT_DISABLE_COMPOSITING_MODE=1 does NOT help (tested). Add scripts/strip-appimage-bundled-libs.sh and run it in both Linux release jobs after the Tauri build: strip the libs, repack with appimagetool, regenerate the updater tar.gz, and re-sign both artifacts with the Tauri updater key. Every supported distro ships libwayland at or above the 1.20 the client links against, so the host copy is always the right one. Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(client): send the session bearer token when fetching attachments (#1298) Uploaded images rendered only as loading placeholders: the server's /api/v1/files/{id} endpoint requires a Bearer token (it enforces per-channel ACLs), but the client's attachment image fetch and file download never attached one, so every request came back 401 and the placeholder was never replaced. Server-hosted attachment fetches now go through fetchServerFile, which routes through the cert-pinned TOFU proxy with the session token from the auth store. The token is only ever sent to the configured server host — external image URLs keep a plain, credential-free fetch. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018tt1rh32f75EAtad6qLraa Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(client): enable microphone/camera detection on Linux (WebKitGTK) (#1299) On Linux no audio or video devices were ever detected: WebKitGTK ships with enable-media-stream and enable-webrtc off, and wry installs no permission-request handler on its webkitgtk backend (unlike macOS, where it auto-grants media capture), so WebKit's default denies every getUserMedia/enumerateDevices request. Add a Linux-only setup hook that turns both settings on for the main window's webview and grants WebKitUserMediaPermissionRequest and WebKitDeviceInfoPermissionRequest. All other permission request types still fall through to WebKit's default deny. The webkit2gtk crate becomes a direct dependency, pinned to the exact version wry already links (=2.0.2, v2_38 for enable-webrtc), so the binary's native library footprint is unchanged — the AppImage bundle set stays identical and the libwayland strip step from #1297 is unaffected. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018tt1rh32f75EAtad6qLraa Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(client): kick to login and reset call state on server shutdown (#1300) When the server shut down, connected clients stayed on the main page in an endless "Reconnecting..." loop, and a live call's webcam/screenshare toggles kept whatever state they had. The server already broadcasts server_restart with reason "shutdown" from hub.GracefulStop before closing connections — the client just ignored the reason. The dispatcher now treats reason "shutdown" as terminal: it signs the user out (clearAuth), which navigates back to the login screen, leaves the voice session — stopping any live camera/screenshare tracks — and resets all call settings (camera, screenshare, mute, deafen, channel) to their normal state. Other restart reasons (update, setup, backup_restore) keep the existing countdown-banner + auto-reconnect behavior. clearAuth gains a LogoutReason so the logout wiring can tell a server-initiated kick from a user logout or invalid-token path: on "server_shutdown" the saved credential is kept (the token is still valid), so profiles with auto-login reconnect on their own once the server comes back, instead of losing their stored login on every server restart. The main page also skips the restart countdown banner for shutdown notices since the page unmounts immediately. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018tt1rh32f75EAtad6qLraa Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(client): credential fallback store on every OS, not just Windows (#1301) Credential saves still failed outright on machines where the OS keychain does not round-trip — most commonly a Linux desktop with no Secret Service provider (no gnome-keyring / KWallet, e.g. a bare window manager) and a locked macOS Keychain. The verified-write fallback introduced for the 2026-07 keyring regression existed on Windows only; on macOS and Linux secret_store::set returned an error and nothing was persisted, so logins and the voice-E2EE identity key vanished on every restart. The fallback now engages on every desktop platform, under the same rule as before: only after a keychain write has provably failed to round-trip, with the OS credential store taking over again the moment it recovers. Windows keeps DPAPI. macOS/Linux entries are sealed with ChaCha20-Poly1305 (via ring, already in the tree) under a per-install random key file written owner-only (0600) to the app data dir; the account name is bound in as AEAD associated data, mirroring the DPAPI entropy, so a blob cannot be moved between entries. Secrets at rest are never plaintext, and a copied fallback store is useless without the key file beside it. The shared set/get fallback path is now platform-neutral with only the sealing primitive per-OS, Backend gains an EncryptedFile variant, and fallback_crypto ships round-trip, AAD-mismatch, tamper, nonce uniqueness, and key-file permission tests that run in CI. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018tt1rh32f75EAtad6qLraa Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(voice): keep stream audio playing when the user mutes/deafens (#1302) Muting yourself in a call (which the deafen control also engages — deafen forces mute) silenced the audio of any screen-share stream being watched: the deafen path unsubscribed every remote audio publication, including ScreenShareAudio tracks, and the subscribe-time guard blocked new stream-audio tracks the same way. Muting/deafening yourself gates voices, not the content someone is streaming. Both paths now exempt ScreenShareAudio: the stream's audio keeps playing while the user is muted or deafened, and remains controllable through its own per-tile mute button and volume slider. Microphone (voice) audio is still fully unsubscribed on deafen exactly as before. The mic-mute path itself never touched incoming stream audio (verified against livekit-client: setMicrophoneEnabled, RemoteParticipant.setVolume and the audio pipeline are all scoped to the Microphone source) — the coupling was only ever the deafen subscription sweep. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018tt1rh32f75EAtad6qLraa Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: Discord-parity quick wins (blocks UI, topics, role colors, profile popup, temp bans, archived filtering) (#1303) * feat: Discord-parity quick wins — blocks UI, topics, role colors, profile popup, temp bans, archived filtering Adds docs/plans/discord-parity.md (full gap analysis vs Discord free/Nitro, phased plan) and lands phase 1 — the six features where one side already existed and the other was never finished: - Block/unblock from the client: PUT/DELETE /blocks/{userId} were server-only; the member context menu now offers Block (with confirm) / Unblock to every user, admin actions stay role-gated. New setUserBlockedByMe store helper. - Channel topics end-to-end: topic now ships in the WS ready payload (protocol.md updated), renders live in the chat header, and is editable in the client's Edit Channel modal (PATCH already supported it). - Role colors from server data: member list groups and message username colors now use roles.color from ready (with theme-var fallbacks) instead of a hardcoded 4-name switch; custom roles render their own groups, and members with an unknown role render in a gray group instead of vanishing. - Profile popup mounted: left-clicking a member opens the existing UserProfilePopup (previously dead code); its Message button starts a DM. Action buttons without handlers are no longer rendered. - Temp bans: PATCH /admin/api/users/{id} accepts ban_duration_hours (1..8760) feeding the existing BanUser expiry plumbing; ban menu gains a duration selector (Forever/1h/1d/7d/30d). - Archived channels actually hide: VisibleChannelIDs now skips archived refs, so REST list, ready payload, and replay filtering all exclude them; archiving live-syncs connected clients via RefreshChannelVisibility. The admin panel still lists archived channels for unarchiving. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * fix(lint): rewrite visibility if-else chain as switch (gocritic ifElseChain) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: Discord-parity phases 2–6 (moderation, mentions, markdown, roles, social) (#1304) * feat: parity phase 2 — moderation depth (live permission bits, voice moderation, purge) - Admin perimeter now admits any role holding a moderation-capable bit (AdminPerimeter mask); each route group re-checks its own bit: channels/overrides -> MANAGE_CHANNELS, audit log -> VIEW_AUDIT_LOG, settings -> MANAGE_SERVER, force-logout -> KICK_MEMBERS. Ban and role assignment authorize inside ModerationService (BAN_MEMBERS / MANAGE_ROLES). New GET /admin/api/me lets the panel hide tabs and row actions the caller cannot use; the desktop member-list menu gates on permission bits from the ready role list instead of role names. - Hierarchy beyond ban: ChangeUserRole requires the actor to strictly outrank the target and refuses to assign a role at or above the actor's own position (closes "any admin can promote anyone to Owner"); ForceLogout enforces the same rule. - Voice moderation on MUTE_MEMBERS: voice_mod_mute/deafen/move/kick WS commands (bit + strict outrank, 5/s rate limit, audit-logged). voice_states gains server_muted/server_deafened, carried on voice_state; server mute is enforced at the SFU via LiveKit MutePublishedTrack and the target's own unmute attempts are refused with SERVER_MUTED/SERVER_DEAFENED. Move/kick run the hub voice-leave routine then send voice_moved (client rejoins through the normal join path) or voice_disconnected. Client voice-row menu grows a moderation section gated on the bit. - Bulk delete: POST /api/v1/channels/{id}/messages/purge {limit 1-100, before?} gated on READ|MANAGE_MESSAGES, soft-deletes preserving tombstones, one message_purge audit row, fans out a single chat_bulk_deleted broadcast. Channel context menu gains "Purge Messages…" for holders of MANAGE_MESSAGES. - Honest kick semantics: the session-revoking "Kick" action is renamed Force Logout in the client and admin panel (endpoint unchanged). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * fix(lint): use slices.Contains in voice moderation tests (modernize) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * fix(test): widen the occupied pre_restore window in the abort-restore test The test blocked the safety backup by occupying pre_restore_<ts>.db names for the next 4 seconds; on slow Windows CI runners the request outlived the window and the restore succeeded, failing the 500 assertion. Occupy two minutes of candidates instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * feat: parity phase 3 — real mentions (server resolution, badges, notifications, autocomplete) - Mentions resolve server-side at send time: whole-word @username parsing (address-shaped text rejected), case-insensitive against unique usernames, 20-mention cap; stored in message_mentions in the same writer transaction as the message. chat_message/chat_edited and REST history/pinned/search carry mentions + mentions_everyone. - New MENTION_EVERYONE permission (bit 21, seeded to Owner/Admin/Moderator) gates @everyone/@here; never honored in DMs. @here skips offline users. Fan-out respects per-channel read permissions and skips users who blocked the author. - read_states.mention_count is live: incremented on insert (never on edit), zeroed by channel_focus, shipped per channel in ready. - Client: mentions highlight only when they resolve; mentioning the current user accents the whole row; #channel-name renders a navigating chip; channels show a red mention badge that outranks the unread badge; notifications say "X mentioned you in #channel" and the suppress-@everyone pref now suppresses only honored everyone-mentions; the composer gets an @-autocomplete popup (prefix-ranked, keyboard-driven, @everyone/@here offered only with the permission). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * feat: parity phase 4 — markdown rendering, message navigation, reactions/media/read-state polish - Discord-flavored markdown via a tokenizer (message-list/markdown.ts): bold/italic/underline/strike/spoiler with nesting, escaping and a word-boundary rule keeping snake_case literal; line-start quotes, headings, lists; masked links restricted to absolute http(s) + isSafeUrl (rejects render as literal source); language-tagged code fences with a hand-rolled highlighter (no new dependency); markdown is inert inside code. Renderer stays a strict DOM builder — no innerHTML. Composer gains Ctrl+B/I/U wrapping. - Message navigation: GET /channels/{id}/messages/around/{messageId} (half-before/half-after window, has-more flags via over-fetch); detached-window support in the messages store with a "Jump to Present" pill; search/pin jumps fetch the window when the target isn't loaded; reply previews are clickable; "Copy Message Link" + owncord://message/{channel}/{message} deep-link route; pasted message links render as jump chips. - Who-reacted: GET .../reactions/{emoji}/users (100 cap) + hover tooltip with per-message+emoji cache invalidated on reaction_update. - Inline media: video/audio attachments render native players from MIME allowlists (unknown containers keep the download chip); SVG stays out. - Read-state polish: NEW-messages divider, explicit Mark as Read / Mark All as Read, DM unread count badges (real counts shipped in ready instead of a dot; DM mention counts survive reconnect). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * feat: parity phase 5 — role CRUD, per-user overrides, override matrix, client channel management - Roles are real entities: /admin/api/roles CRUD + reorder behind MANAGE_ROLES, with all rules in a new RoleService measured against the actor's position (only strictly-below roles may be touched; never grant a bit your own role lacks; seeded Owner immutable; default role undeletable — deletion reassigns members, drops its overrides, and invalidates exactly the moved members' cached perms in one writer transaction). Case-insensitive unique names (migration 023), normalized colors, roles_update broadcast keeps clients current, and both admin surfaces stopped hardcoding the four seeded roles. A new ASCII guard test protects sqlc-generated SQL from a byte/rune offset bug that silently splices queries when comments contain non-ASCII. - Per-user channel overrides (migration 024): resolution is now base -> role override -> user override with one implementation (EffectiveChannelPerms); both layers load in two batch queries behind every visibility/permission site, per-role visibility memoization removed (two members of one role can now differ), and the @everyone fan-out honors user-layer allow and deny. Admin REST + full tri-state override matrix UI (role or user per channel) replace the single "Can access" checkbox; the visibility-agreement test grew a same-role different-overrides case. - Categories stopped being magic strings: any channel type under any free-text category (server + client validation removed), category editable everywhere with datalist suggestions, voice channels group under their real category. - Desktop channel management: Edit Channel gains slowmode presets, NSFW toggle, and voice user/video limits (bounds-checked server-side, broadcast on channel_create/update via one shared constructor); NSFW channels show a per-session age-gate overlay; VIEW_AUDIT_LOG holders get an Audit Log entry point opening the admin panel at #audit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * feat: parity phase 6 — custom emoji, profiles & presence, group DMs, DM calls, channel mutes - Custom emoji end-to-end: the dormant emoji table gains a mime column and real routes (list/upload/delete + authenticated image serving, MANAGE_SERVER-gated, 512KiB / 128px caps validated against sniffed bytes, SVG refused, 200-emoji cap, audited, emoji_update broadcast). :shortcode: renders inline (jumbo when emoji-only, never in code), the picker gains a Server category, the composer a :-autocomplete, reactions accept and render custom emoji, and the admin panel gets an Emoji section. - Profiles: avatar upload (sniffed, capped, served authenticated) with one shared client avatar helper replacing letter-initials everywhere; display_name (heading with @username handle preserved for mentions), about, and custom_status columns with sanitized bounds; user_update broadcast keeps clients current. - Presence: invisible is a real stored status collapsed to offline for every other viewer at every serialization site (owner sees truth); connect no longer force-stamps online (idle/dnd/invisible survive reconnect — the flash-online bug is gone); auto-idle after 10 minutes of inactivity that never overrides a manual status. The @here fan-out now collapses status first so invisible users are not pinged. - Group DMs: channels.is_group discriminator; create (2-8 others, bidirectional block checks), rename (participants only), leave (channel deleted with the last participant); per-viewer dm_channel_open payloads; stacked-avatar rows, multi-select member picker, participant headers; 1:1-only composer block gating. - DM calls: call_ring/call_decline signaling over existing DM voice (no new call state), Call button in DM headers, incoming-call banner with accept/decline/30s timeout and chime. - Per-channel mutes (client prefs): muted channels/DMs stay silent for non-mention noise (badge dims, mentions still notify), managed from context menus and the Notifications tab. The dead Friends nav item is removed as the plan prescribed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * Pre-release review fixes + v1.2.0-alpha.1 prep (#1305) * fix(review): pre-release security & performance fixes for the parity work Security: - Channel-override endpoints (role + per-user) now enforce grantability: a MANAGE_CHANNELS holder can no longer grant itself or a user a permission bit its own role lacks, and the role-layer endpoint refuses targeting a role at or above the actor's position (Administrator bypasses). Closes a privilege-escalation path opened when the override routes were downgraded from ADMINISTRATOR-only. - DM voice events no longer leak: channelReadAudience resolves a DM channel's audience from its participants (intersected with connected clients) instead of the role scan, which passed every user with base READ_MESSAGES since DMs carry no overrides. A private DM call's voice_state/voice_leave now reaches only its participants. - Invisible users no longer flash online on connect: member_join carries a viewer-safe status (db.BroadcastStatus) and the client defaults a missing status to offline instead of hardcoding online. - Voice moderation can no longer reach a private DM call: voiceModTarget refuses a DM-channel target unless the actor is a participant, with the same shape as "not in voice" so nothing about the call leaks. Correctness: - Un-deafening a member now also clears the deafen-implied server mute, so the target regains the ability to unmute themselves instead of staying silenced at the SFU until a separate unmute. Performance: - IncrementMentionCounts batches its upserts into chunked multi-row statements instead of one exec per recipient, so an @everyone mention holds the SQLite writer for one exec per 500 readers instead of N. - applyMentionCounts resolves mentions against a set built once from the readers instead of a nested O(mentions x readers) scan. - The markdown parser's bracket/paren matching is computed once per line instead of rescanned at every opener, removing the O(n^2) worst case on pathological input. - Video/audio attachment blob URLs are now LRU-capped and revoked, and the attachment caches are cleared on logout, fixing an unbounded per-session Blob leak. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * chore(release): prep v1.2.0-alpha.1 Bump the client manifests (package.json, package-lock.json, tauri.conf.json, Cargo.toml, Cargo.lock) from 1.1.0-alpha.5 to 1.2.0-alpha.1 so the release workflow's verify-versions guard passes for tag v1.2.0-alpha.1. The server version is injected via ldflags at build time and needs no bump. Add a curated CHANGELOG section for v1.2.0-alpha.1 documenting the Discord-parity feature drop (mentions, markdown, custom emoji, message navigation, role management, per-user overrides, voice moderation, profiles, group DMs, DM calls, channel mutes) and the pre-release security/performance review, plus an operator note covering the nine new migrations and the new WebSocket message types. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * perf(mentions): apply mention counts off the send path SendMessage resolved every reader and wrote the mention/@everyone badge counts synchronously after the commit but before returning, so a mention in a large channel delayed delivering the message to everyone else by the full reader-resolution chain plus the batched increment. Move that bookkeeping onto a background goroutine via an injectable dispatcher field (bg, defaulting to `go fn()`). The write already ran on a cancellation-detached context and swallowed its errors, so detaching it from the request is safe; the count is advisory, so the tiny window where a reader's channel_focus clears it just before the increment lands is harmless (matching Discord's eventual consistency). Tests read the counts synchronously right after a send, so the shared mention fixture and the ws mentions test opt into an inline runner (RunBackgroundInlineForTest / the hub's RunMentionCountsInlineForTest seam); a new test exercises the real async path by polling. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * refactor(client): extract shared inline-autocomplete factory MentionAutocomplete and EmojiAutocomplete duplicated ~90 lines of identical listbox scaffolding (AbortController cleanup, suggestions/ activeIndex state, the root listbox + .ma-list, mousedown-to-choose rows, and a byte-identical arrow/Enter/Tab/Escape keydown switch), so a fix to one silently diverged from the other. Factor that into createInlineAutocomplete<T>, parameterized by the four things that actually differ: the filter, the selected value, the per-row children, and the row/root test ids + class (emoji keeps the shared mention-autocomplete base class plus its own, and only mentions prime the list on create). Both components become thin adapters that keep their existing exports — createMention/EmojiAutocomplete, the pure filter functions, and the MIN/MAX constants — unchanged, so MessageInput and every test are untouched and still pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * fix(lint): drop now-unused appendChildren import in MentionAutocomplete The row rendering moved into the shared inline-autocomplete factory, so the import is no longer referenced; oxlint fails the Client Static Checks job on the unused identifier. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): full-project review — hierarchy, role positions, search, clarity (#1306) From a full-codebase review (Opus security + Sonnet server/client + Haiku consistency): - Per-user channel overrides now enforce the same role-hierarchy guard the role-layer endpoint already has: a non-admin MANAGE_CHANNELS holder can no longer write or clear a per-user override against a member ranked at or above their own. Without it, because the per-user layer is last in the resolution order, a Moderator could deny a higher-ranked member the channel access their role grants. Applied to both PUT and DELETE. - CreateRole no longer places two default-positioned roles at the same position: it steps to the highest free slot below the actor and rejects an explicit position that is already taken. Colliding positions read as equal rank in every hierarchy check, so two such roles could never manage each other's members. The rank guard still takes precedence over the collision message for an at/above-rank position. - Search overlay no longer silently drops a query that arrives inside the 500ms rate-limit window (which sits above the 300ms debounce): it reschedules the search for when the window opens instead of leaving the previous query's results on screen. - Corrected a misleading TODO on chat_send attachments: they are upload UUIDs resolved by ownership at link time, not URLs, so a javascript:/data: string is never stored or rendered — a scheme check would wrongly reject valid ids. The comment now states this and the loop variable/error name say "id". Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * Test hardening: fuzzing, contract/upgrade, load, e2e (#1307) * fix(image): reject zero-dimension images in header decode FuzzImageDimensions found two inputs the emoji/image size guard accepted as valid with a nil error despite having no real dimensions: - a GIF whose logical screen descriptor decodes to height=0 via Go's own image.DecodeConfig, and - a VP8 keyframe whose size field is all zeros (VP8, unlike VP8L/VP8X, stores the size directly, so 0x0 is a validly-shaped header). Both callers compare the returned size straight against their pixel cap, so a degenerate 0-dimension header slipped through as a "small" image. Reject non-positive dimensions centrally in imageDimensions and reject zero VP8 dimensions in webpDimensions, so the invariant holds even for a caller that forgets its own bounds check. The two crashers are checked in as the fuzz regression corpus. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * test(fuzz): add Go fuzzers and TS property tests for parsers/validators Adds coverage on the parsers and validators most exposed to hostile input, each with a tricky seed corpus and invariant assertions: Server (Go native fuzzing): - FuzzParseMentionTokens: never panics; resolved count within cap. - FuzzSanitizeFTSQuery: output never errors against real SQLite FTS5. - FuzzValidateShortcode: accepted shortcodes match the documented charset/length. - FuzzEffectivePerms / FuzzEffectiveChannelPerms: ADMINISTRATOR implies all bits, user-deny beats role-allow, result is a subset of AllPerms. Client (fast-check property tests): - markdown tokenizer never throws and emits no script/on*/javascript: sinks, bounded time on pathological input. - mention/emoji content parsing never throws. - filterMentionSuggestions/filterEmojiSuggestions never throw and respect the caps and the MIN_EMOJI_QUERY/permission gates. The image-header fuzzer that found the zero-dimension bug landed with its fix in the preceding commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * test(migration): add full-chain and upgrade round-trip tests Applies every embedded migration to a fresh DB and asserts the resulting schema is coherent, then applies the full chain on top of a pre-parity (migration 019) snapshot and asserts it upgrades without error and preserves seeded rows. Protects existing operators on the v1.2.0 upgrade (9 new migrations, 020 through 028). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * test(protocol): assert protocol schema matches generated Go constants Asserts every wire constant in docs/protocol-schema.json has a matching generated Go constant and vice-versa, with a small explicit exception list for intentionally-undocumented internal constants. Catches the chat_command-style drift the review flagged before it reaches the wire. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * test(load): add hub load/soak harness with goleak verification Adds a long test (skipped under -short, run under -race in CI) that concurrently registers and unregisters 200 WS clients across churn rounds while six broadcaster goroutines fan out to the hub, then asserts via go.uber.org/goleak that no goroutines leak and no deadlock or panic occurs. Exercises the client registry, broadcast audience resolution, and the background mention goroutine under contention -- the class of bug the race detector only reveals at scale. Adds a BroadcastVoiceEventForTest seam to export_test.go for the broadcaster loop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * test(e2e): add blocking parity-feature Playwright specs Adds end-to-end coverage for the v1.2.0 parity features that had none, all tagged "@parity" and driven through the existing mocked-Tauri harness (tests/e2e/helpers.ts) — 15 tests across three files: - gating-badges.parity.spec.ts: NSFW age-gate mount/continue, mention red badge (ready-payload render + live incoming-mention bump), per-channel mute toggle + localStorage persistence. - social.parity.spec.ts: group-DM create via the member picker (asserts the POST /dms/group request), group render + leave (DELETE), and Change Role via the member context menu (asserts the PATCH /admin/api/users/{id}). - emoji-voicemod.parity.spec.ts: custom-emoji ":shortcode" autocomplete + message-list <img> render, and the voice-moderation menu — both the admin-can path (asserts voice_mod_mute / voice_mod_kick ws_send) and the gated path (menu absent without MUTE_MEMBERS). The specs assert the exact outgoing HTTP/WS request where the flow is request-driven, not just DOM side effects. No product bugs were found. Adds a dedicated CI job "Client E2E (parity subset, blocking)" that runs only the @parity specs (playwright --grep "@parity") WITHOUT continue-on-error, so a regression in these features fails CI. The pre-existing full e2e job stays non-blocking, per the maintainer note that it needs a few green pushes before graduating. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * More hardening: fuzz the input surface + fix mis-written tests (#1308) * fix(upload): keep sanitizeUploadFilename output a safe, valid basename FuzzSanitizeUploadFilename found two inputs the upload-filename sanitizer returned unchanged in violation of its own contract: - "/" survived verbatim: filepath.Base("/") returns "/" (root is its own basename), and the final reserved-name check only special-cased "", ".", and "..", so a path separator reached the served download name and the client's save-dialog prefill. - a name longer than the 255-byte cap was truncated with a byte slice (name[:max]), which can land mid-rune and yield invalid UTF-8 — which then misbehaves in JSON encoding, on disk, and in download-name handling. Now any residual '/' is dropped in the character filter, and truncation trims back to the last full rune so the result is always valid UTF-8. The two crashers are checked in as the fuzz regression corpus. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * test(fuzz): fuzz the file/path and content/identity input surface Adds Go native fuzzers on the untrusted-input parsers/validators the first fuzzing pass didn't reach, each with a tricky seed corpus and both a never-panics and a semantic/security invariant: - storage.sanitizeFilename + resolvedPath composition (a name that passes sanitize must resolve inside the storage dir — no traversal), and storage.ValidateFileType (error iff a blocked magic prefix matches, for any header length). - plugin.validateRelativePath (accepted paths are non-absolute, separator- and traversal-free). - service.sanitizeContent: output carries no surviving <script/js:/on* sink, is length-bounded, and is idempotent (the bluemonday StrictPolicy contract). Two documented regression seeds pin the "inert plain text that merely contains the word javascript:/onclick=" non-bug. - auth.ValidateUsername / ValidatePasswordStrength — accept implies the documented charset/length. - api.validateAvatarURL (never accepts a non-https / javascript: / data: URL) and api.validateDisplayName. - ws.parseParticipantIdentity / parseRoomChannelID — never panic on adversarial LiveKit webhook strings. Each target survived active fuzzing (hundreds of thousands to millions of execs) with no crash; the one real bug found (sanitizeUploadFilename) landed with its fix in the preceding commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * test: make mis-written tests actually assert their claimed behavior A test-quality audit found tests that ran an action but asserted nothing (or asserted a tautology), so they would pass even if the code under test were deleted. Each is now wired to the real observable effect it names — no product code changed, no assertion weakened: Client (vitest): - notifications.test.ts: 19 notifyIncomingMessage tests had zero expect() calls; each now asserts the sendNotification / requestUserAttention / oscillator mock per its name (suppress vs fire, truncation, fallback title), with mockClear() so a stale call can't make it trivially green. Three catch-path tests now assert the debug log fired. One test whose title contradicted its body (and the code's guard) was renamed to match verified behavior. - livekit-session.test.ts: token-refresh test asserts the stored token and the rearmed refresh timer; the two "no active room" device-switch tests assert Room.switchActiveDevice is not called. - connection-stats.test.ts: the "start is idempotent" test now advances timers and asserts the poll callback fires once per tick (no double interval). - voice-audio-tab.test.ts: the cleanup test now actually starts a camera preview (it previously couldn't reach the camera-stop path) and asserts both mic and camera tracks are stopped. - dispatcher.test.ts: replaced an expect(true).toBe(true) with assertions on the voice-store speaking state the handler writes, incl. a control. - sidebar-area.test.ts: performs the back-navigation the test described and asserts the pre-DM text channel (not the DM) is restored. - profiles.test.ts: asserts no profile is created/mutated for a missing id. - log-persistence.test.ts: activeFlush tests assert flush sequencing, and the cleanup error test asserts the logged error. Server (Go): - db/coverage_boost_test.go: TestCreateAttachment_WithDimensions now links the attachment to a message and verifies the persisted width/height via GetAttachmentsByMessageIDs, instead of only checking a row exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR * style(fuzz): satisfy golangci-lint on the new fuzz seed corpora - Escape the raw bidi/zero-width Unicode format characters embedded in the seed strings as \u escape sequences (staticcheck ST1018) — same runes, now greppable and lint-clean. - Range over strings.SplitSeq instead of strings.Split in the relative-path fuzzer's traversal check (modernize). No change to what any seed exercises. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BGozcKwpbG5GHU8e4cJYmR --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(changelog): note pre-release test hardening and the two bugs it found #1307 and #1308 landed fuzzing, migration/protocol/load tests, a blocking @parity e2e job, and a test-quality audit. Two of those were real product fixes (zero-dimension image headers, sanitizeUploadFilename) that belong in the release notes, not just the test log. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(changelog): restore the alpha.5 behavioural notes dropped in the rewrite The v1.2.0-alpha.1 section replaced the v1.1.0-alpha.5 one wholesale, taking the LiveKit-proxy origin-gate and log-stream API-token bullets with it. Both fixes are in this release's code (#1293, #1294, #1295) — only their operator notes went missing, and an operator upgrading from alpha.3 would never have seen them. Restored verbatim from main. This is the sole content main had that dev lacked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(client): gate CREDENTIAL_FALLBACK_KEY_FILE to non-Windows `cargo clippy -- -D warnings` failed the Windows Tauri build with "constant CREDENTIAL_FALLBACK_KEY_FILE is never used". Its only consumer, `fallback_crypto`, is `#[cfg(not(windows))]` (lib.rs:6) because Windows seals fallback entries with DPAPI instead — so on Windows the constant is genuinely dead and -D warnings promotes that to an error. Gated the constant to match its consumer rather than silencing it with #[allow(dead_code)], so it still trips if it ever goes dead on the platforms that do use it. Latent on dev, not introduced here: Tauri Full Build is gated on base_ref == 'main', and the fast suite only compiles Rust on ubuntu (rust-tests runs on ubuntu-22.04), where fallback_crypto *is* compiled. Nothing built the Rust lib for Windows until this dev -> main PR. Verified locally on Windows: `cargo clippy -- -D warnings` and `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings` both exit 0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(voice): stop writing a credential byte to the log on bad LiveKit config CodeQL go/clear-text-logging (high, alert #13): the YAML-safety check in generateConfig rejected a bad credential with fmt.Errorf("LiveKit credential contains unsafe YAML character %q", ch) where ch is a byte taken from LiveKitAPIKey or LiveKitAPISecret. Start() wraps that error and api/router.go logs it, so a byte of the API key or secret reached the server log in clear text. The check now uses strings.ContainsAny and names the offending config field instead of echoing the byte — strictly more useful to an operator, who previously got a character with no indication of which credential it came from. Same rejection set, so behaviour is otherwise unchanged. Adds a regression test asserting the error names the field and contains no part of either credential. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(plugin): resolve UI asset paths at construction, not per request CodeQL go/path-injection (high, alerts #11 and #12): AssetHandler built the on-disk path from req.URL.Path on every request, then validated it with filepath.Rel. The validation was sound — traversal was already blocked by the manifest allowlist, the Rel check, and the serve-time Lstat — but a path was still being constructed from user input, which is the pattern the rule flags and the one that goes wrong when someone later edits the ordering. Each declared asset is now resolved and traversal-checked once, when the handler is built, into an asset-name -> absolute-path map. At serve time the request path is only ever a map key, so no filesystem path is derived from user input at all. An asset that fails validation is absent from the map and 404s, as an undeclared file already did. Also moves filepath.Abs/Join/Rel off the per-request path. The serve-time Lstat symlink and IsRegular checks stay exactly as they were — they close the post-install TOCTOU window and are still needed per request. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(plugin): constrain default-build registry tests to !wazero registry_test.go opens "Registry lifecycle tests for the default (non-wazero) build" and asserts activation fails with ErrRuntimeUnavailable, but carried no build constraint. Under -tags wazero a real runtime is linked in, so TestRegistry_Activate_ WithoutRuntime and TestRegistry_EnablePlugin_RollsBackWhenActivationFails both failed. Nothing caught it: CI builds all three tag variants but only runs tests untagged, so these have been red under -tags wazero without surfacing. Adds the //go:build !wazero the file always implied, matching the sandbox_default.go / sandbox_wazero.go split already used here. Its helpers are used by no other file, so nothing else loses coverage; the wazero build keeps its own activation tests in sandbox_wazero_test.go. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
59 KiB
REST API Reference
OwnCord server REST API reference. All endpoints use the base URL https://{server}:{port}/api/v1.
Authentication
All authenticated endpoints require a session token delivered via the Authorization: Bearer {token} header. Tokens are obtained from POST /api/v1/auth/login, POST /api/v1/auth/register, or POST /api/v1/auth/verify-totp after a partial 2FA challenge.
Session Lifecycle
- Sessions are created on login/register and stored with a SHA-256 hash of the raw token, the client IP, User-Agent, and an expiry timestamp.
- Each authenticated request updates the session's
last_activetimestamp. - Banned users are rejected at the middleware level with
403 FORBIDDEN.
Middleware Stack (all routes)
- RequestID -- assigns a unique
X-Request-Idresponse header. - Recoverer -- catches panics and returns 500.
- Request Logger -- structured logging of method, path, status, duration.
- SecurityHeadersWithTLS -- (adds
Strict-Transport-Securitywhen TLS is on) setsX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,X-Frame-Options: DENY,X-XSS-Protection: 0,Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin,Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self',Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(),Cache-Control: no-store. - MaxBodySize -- 1 MiB default for all routes except
/api/v1/uploads(which has its own 100 MiB limit).
Standard Error Response
All error responses use this JSON envelope:
{
"error": "ERROR_CODE",
"message": "Human-readable detail"
}
Error Codes
| Code | HTTP Status | When It Occurs |
|---|---|---|
UNAUTHORIZED |
401 | Missing/invalid/expired session token |
INVALID_CREDENTIALS |
401 | Login/register with bad username/password/invite (generic to prevent enumeration) |
FORBIDDEN |
403 | Insufficient permissions, banned account, or admin IP restriction |
NOT_FOUND |
404 | Resource (channel, message, user, invite, file, backup) not found |
RATE_LIMITED |
429 | Too many requests; response includes Retry-After header (seconds) |
INVALID_INPUT / BAD_REQUEST |
400 | Malformed body, missing required fields, invalid query params |
CONFLICT |
409 | Duplicate username on register, or server already up-to-date on update |
TOO_LARGE |
413 | File exceeds upload size limit |
SERVER_ERROR / INTERNAL |
500 | Internal server error |
BAD_GATEWAY |
502 | Upstream failure (GitHub API, LiveKit, GIF provider, asset download) |
GIF_DISABLED |
503 | GIF proxy is not configured on this server (no gif.api_key) |
Auth Endpoints
POST /api/v1/auth/register
Create a new account using an invite code. The first user is created via /admin/api/setup instead.
Auth: None (public) Rate limit: 3 requests/minute per IP
Request
{
"username": "alex",
"password": "MyStr0ng!Pass",
"invite_code": "abc123def"
}
| Field | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
username |
string | Yes | HTML-stripped, trimmed. Must be non-empty. |
password |
string | Yes | Validated for strength (min length, complexity). |
invite_code |
string | Yes | Must be a valid, non-expired, non-revoked invite with remaining uses. |
Response 201 Created
{
"token": "raw-session-token-64-chars",
"user": {
"id": 2,
"username": "alex",
"avatar": "",
"display_name": null,
"about": null,
"custom_status": null,
"status": "offline",
"role_id": 4,
"totp_enabled": false,
"created_at": "2026-03-24T12:00:00Z"
}
}
See GET /api/v1/auth/me for the full user-object field table.
Errors
| Status | Code | Cause |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | INVALID_INPUT |
Missing username/password/invite_code, or weak password |
| 400 | INVALID_CREDENTIALS |
Bad invite code, expired/revoked invite, or duplicate username |
| 403 | FORBIDDEN |
Registration is closed or unavailable while server-wide 2FA is required |
| 429 | RATE_LIMITED |
Exceeded 3 registrations/minute from this IP |
| 500 | SERVER_ERROR |
Hashing failure, session creation failure, or DB error |
POST /api/v1/auth/login
Authenticate with username and password.
Auth: None (public) Rate limit: 60 requests/minute per IP. After 10 consecutive failures from the same IP, the IP is locked out for 15 minutes.
Request
{
"username": "alex",
"password": "MyStr0ng!Pass"
}
Response 200 OK
If the account does not have TOTP enabled:
{
"token": "raw-session-token-64-chars",
"requires_2fa": false,
"user": {
"id": 1,
"username": "alex",
"avatar": "/api/v1/files/uuid",
"display_name": "Alex",
"about": null,
"custom_status": null,
"status": "offline",
"role_id": 4,
"totp_enabled": false,
"created_at": "2026-03-24T12:00:00Z"
}
}
See GET /api/v1/auth/me for the full user-object field table.
If the account has TOTP enabled:
{
"partial_token": "opaque-partial-token",
"requires_2fa": true
}
Errors
| Status | Code | Cause |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | INVALID_INPUT |
Missing username or password |
| 401 | UNAUTHORIZED |
Wrong username or password |
| 403 | FORBIDDEN |
Account is banned/suspended |
| 429 | RATE_LIMITED |
IP locked out after 10 consecutive failures (15 min cooldown) |
| 500 | SERVER_ERROR |
Session creation failure |
POST /api/v1/auth/verify-totp
Complete a TOTP login challenge started by POST /api/v1/auth/login.
Auth: Required with the partial_token from the login response
Rate limit: 10 requests/minute per IP, plus a 5-attempt budget per partial challenge
Request
{
"code": "123456"
}
Response 200 OK
{
"token": "raw-session-token-64-chars",
"requires_2fa": false,
"user": {
"id": 1,
"username": "alex",
"avatar": "/api/v1/files/uuid",
"display_name": "Alex",
"about": null,
"custom_status": null,
"status": "offline",
"role_id": 4,
"totp_enabled": true,
"created_at": "2026-03-24T12:00:00Z"
}
}
See GET /api/v1/auth/me for the full user-object field table.
Errors
| Status | Code | Cause |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | INVALID_INPUT |
Malformed request body |
| 401 | UNAUTHORIZED |
Missing/expired challenge, invalid TOTP code, or challenge consumed |
| 500 | SERVER_ERROR |
Session creation failure |
GET /api/v1/auth/me
Get the current authenticated user's profile.
Auth: Required (Bearer token)
Response 200 OK
{
"id": 1,
"username": "alex",
"avatar": "/api/v1/files/uuid",
"display_name": "Alex",
"about": "A short bio.",
"custom_status": "building things",
"status": "online",
"role_id": 2,
"totp_enabled": true,
"created_at": "2026-03-24T12:00:00Z"
}
This is the canonical user object, also returned as user by register,
login and the TOTP challenge.
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
id |
int64 | User ID |
username |
string | Unique handle; the name @mentions resolve against |
avatar |
string | Avatar URL (/api/v1/files/{id} after an upload, or an https:// URL), or empty string |
display_name |
string|null | Nickname rendered instead of username; null when unset |
about |
string|null | Profile bio, max 300 characters; null when unset |
custom_status |
string|null | Free-text status line, max 128 characters; null when unset. Set over WebSocket (presence_update), not over REST |
status |
string | One of: online, idle, dnd, invisible, offline. This is the caller's own true status, so invisible appears here; every payload describing this user to anyone else reports offline instead |
role_id |
int64 | Numeric role ID (1=Owner, 2=Admin, 3=Moderator, 4=Member) |
totp_enabled |
bool | Whether the user has a confirmed TOTP secret |
created_at |
string | ISO 8601 timestamp |
POST /api/v1/auth/logout
Invalidate the current session token.
Auth: Required (Bearer token)
Response 204 No Content
DELETE /api/v1/auth/account
Permanently delete the authenticated user's account. Requires password confirmation.
Auth: Required (Bearer token) Rate limit: 5 requests/minute per IP. After 3 failed password attempts, the endpoint locks out for 15 minutes per user.
Request
{
"password": "MyStr0ng!Pass"
}
Response 204 No Content
Account deleted successfully. All sessions, messages (soft-deleted), and associated data are cleaned up.
Errors
| Status | Code | Cause |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | INVALID_INPUT |
Missing or incorrect password |
| 403 | FORBIDDEN |
Cannot delete the last admin account |
| 429 | RATE_LIMITED |
Locked out after 3 failed password attempts (15 min cooldown) |
| 500 | SERVER_ERROR |
Database error during deletion |
POST /api/v1/users/me/totp/enable
Start TOTP enrollment for the authenticated user. The secret is not persisted until /api/v1/users/me/totp/confirm succeeds.
Auth: Required Rate limit: 5 requests/minute per IP
Request
{
"password": "MyStr0ng!Pass"
}
Response 200 OK
{
"qr_uri": "otpauth://totp/OwnCord:alex?...",
"backup_codes": []
}
POST /api/v1/users/me/totp/confirm
Confirm a pending TOTP enrollment.
Auth: Required Rate limit: 5 requests/minute per IP
Request
{
"password": "MyStr0ng!Pass",
"code": "123456"
}
Response 204 No Content
DELETE /api/v1/users/me/totp
Disable TOTP for the authenticated user.
Auth: Required Rate limit: 5 requests/minute per IP
Request
{
"password": "MyStr0ng!Pass"
}
Response 204 No Content
User Profile & Sessions
PATCH /api/v1/users/me
Update the authenticated user's profile. Broadcasts a user_update WebSocket
message to all clients on success, carrying the full profile snapshot (the
event replaces the client's copy rather than patching it).
Auth: Required Rate limit: 10 requests/minute
Request
{
"username": "newname",
"avatar": "https://example.com/pic.png",
"display_name": "New Name",
"about": "A short bio."
}
| Field | Rules |
|---|---|
username |
Required. The unique handle; @mentions resolve against it. |
avatar |
Optional. Must be an https:// URL (max 512 chars) or "" to clear. Upload a file instead with POST /api/v1/users/me/avatar. |
display_name |
Optional, 1–32 characters. Shown instead of username everywhere; "" clears it and falls back to the username. Rejected if it contains control or invisible (bidi-override) characters. |
about |
Optional, max 300 characters. "" clears it. |
Omitting a field leaves it unchanged; sending "" clears the nullable ones.
display_name and about are HTML-sanitized and trimmed server-side, and the
length caps count characters, not bytes.
Response 200 OK
Returns the updated user object (same shape as GET /api/v1/auth/me).
POST /api/v1/users/me/avatar
Upload an avatar image and point the authenticated user's avatar at it.
Broadcasts a user_update on success, exactly like the PATCH above.
The bytes are stored as an ordinary attachment with no channel, and
users.avatar is set to /api/v1/files/{id}. That URL is what makes the
picture readable: GET /api/v1/files/{id} normally serves an unlinked
attachment only to its uploader, and additionally admits one that some user's
avatar currently points at — so an avatar is readable by every authenticated
user for exactly as long as it is in use, and stops being readable the moment
it is replaced.
Not registered when the server has no working storage backend.
Auth: Required Rate limit: 5 uploads/minute per user
Request
multipart/form-data with a single file part.
| Rule | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | image/png, image/jpeg or image/webp, sniffed from the file's own bytes (the client's Content-Type is ignored) |
| Size | 1 MiB |
| Dimensions | 1024x1024, measured from the sniffed image |
GIF is refused (an animated avatar renders in every message row), and so is SVG — it is markup with script and external-fetch capability, and an avatar is rendered inline by definition. The server does not re-encode or crop; the client is expected to downscale and square-crop before uploading.
Response 201 Created
{
"id": "5f2c...",
"filename": "me.png",
"size": 20481,
"mime": "image/png",
"url": "/api/v1/files/5f2c...",
"width": 256,
"height": 256
}
Errors
| Status | Code | Cause |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | BAD_REQUEST |
Missing file part, wrong type, too large, or too many pixels |
| 429 | RATE_LIMITED |
Too many uploads |
PUT /api/v1/users/me/password
Change the authenticated user's password. Verifies the old password, enforces password strength, and revokes all other sessions on success.
Auth: Required Rate limit: 5 requests/minute, plus a failed-confirmation lockout on repeated wrong old passwords
Request
{
"old_password": "OldPass!1",
"new_password": "NewStr0ng!Pass"
}
Response 204 No Content
Password changed and other sessions revoked. If the password change committed but revoking other sessions failed, the endpoint returns 200 OK with a warning body instead (the new password is in effect — do not retry with the old one).
Errors
| Status | Code | Cause |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | INVALID_INPUT |
Weak new password, or new password equals old |
| 403 | FORBIDDEN |
Incorrect old password |
| 429 | RATE_LIMITED |
Too many attempts / lockout |
GET /api/v1/users/me/sessions
List the authenticated user's active sessions.
Auth: Required
Response 200 OK
{
"sessions": [
{
"id": 12,
"device": "Mozilla/5.0 ...",
"ip": "192.168.1.100",
"created_at": "2026-07-01T10:00:00Z",
"last_used": "2026-07-19T09:00:00Z",
"is_current": true
}
]
}
DELETE /api/v1/users/me/sessions/{id}
Revoke one of the authenticated user's sessions by ID.
Auth: Required
Response 204 No Content
Channel Endpoints
GET /api/v1/channels
List all channels the authenticated user has READ_MESSAGES permission for. DM channels are NOT included (use GET /api/v1/dms instead).
Auth: Required
Response 200 OK
[
{
"id": 1,
"name": "general",
"type": "text",
"topic": "Welcome to the server!",
"category": "Text Channels",
"position": 0,
"slow_mode": 0,
"archived": false,
"nsfw": false,
"voice_max_users": 0,
"voice_max_video": 0
}
]
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
id |
int64 | Channel ID |
name |
string | Channel name |
type |
string | text, voice, or announcement (announcement channels are read like text but only MANAGE_MESSAGES holders can post) |
topic |
string | Channel topic/description |
category |
string | Category grouping |
position |
int | Sort order within category |
slow_mode |
int | Slow-mode delay in seconds (0 = disabled) |
archived |
bool | Whether the channel is archived |
nsfw |
bool | Age-restriction label. Stored and shipped only — the server applies no content behaviour to a flagged channel (see below) |
voice_max_users |
int | Voice capacity, 0 = unlimited. Enforced on join (CHANNEL_FULL) |
voice_max_video |
int | Simultaneous cameras/screen shares, 0 = unlimited. Enforced on publish (VIDEO_LIMIT) |
The nsfw flag
nsfw is metadata and nothing else. The server stores it, ships it in ready
and in the channel_create / channel_update broadcasts, and audits an
operator flipping it — and does not filter content, check anyone's age, or
restrict who may read or post in a flagged channel. Every consequence is the
client's: the desktop client shows a one-time-per-session "may contain
sensitive content" gate before rendering a flagged channel's messages
(remembered in sessionStorage, so a new session asks again) and marks the
channel in its sidebar. A client that ignores the field behaves exactly as it
did before the field existed.
GET /api/v1/channels/{id}/messages
Paginated message history for a channel.
Auth: Required
Permission: READ_MESSAGES on the channel (or DM participant membership)
Query Parameters
| Param | Type | Default | Range | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
before |
int64 | 0 (latest) | >= 0 | Cursor: return messages with ID less than this value |
limit |
int | 50 | 1-100 | Number of messages to return |
Response 200 OK
{
"messages": [
{
"id": 1042,
"channel_id": 5,
"user": {
"id": 1,
"username": "alex",
"avatar": "uuid.png"
},
"content": "Hello!",
"reply_to": null,
"attachments": [
{
"id": "file-uuid",
"filename": "photo.jpg",
"size": 204800,
"mime_type": "image/jpeg",
"url": "/api/v1/files/file-uuid",
"width": 1920,
"height": 1080
}
],
"reactions": [
{
"emoji": "\ud83d\udc4d",
"count": 2,
"me": true
}
],
"pinned": false,
"edited_at": null,
"deleted": false,
"timestamp": "2026-03-14T10:30:00Z",
"mentions": [7],
"mentions_everyone": false
}
],
"has_more": true
}
mentions is the server-resolved list of mentioned user IDs (always present,
empty when the message mentions nobody) and mentions_everyone reports an
@everyone/@here that cleared the MENTION_EVERYONE permission. Both are
resolved at send time and re-resolved on edit; an @word that matches no
username, or an @everyone from a user without the bit, carries no mention
semantics and stays plain text. The same two fields appear on pinned-message
responses and on the WebSocket chat_message/chat_edited payloads.
Pagination
Use cursor-based pagination by passing the id of the last message as the before parameter:
GET /api/v1/channels/5/messages?before=1042&limit=50
When has_more is false, you have reached the beginning of the channel history.
GET /api/v1/channels/{id}/messages/around/{messageId}
The window of channel history centred on one message, for jumping to a message
that is not in the client's loaded page — a search hit, a pinned entry, a reply
reference, or an owncord://message/{channelId}/{messageId} permalink.
Auth: Required
Permission: READ_MESSAGES on the channel (or DM participant membership) — the same gate as GET /messages
Query Parameters
| Param | Type | Default | Range | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
limit |
int | 50 | 1-100 | Total window size, centre included |
Half the window sits before the centre and the remainder after it: limit=50
returns up to 25 older messages, the centre, and up to 24 newer ones. Near the
start or end of a channel the window is simply shorter — it is not re-balanced
toward the other side.
Response 200 OK
{
"messages": [],
"has_more_before": true,
"has_more_after": true
}
messages holds the same message objects as GET /messages (user, attachments,
reactions with the me flag, mentions, mentions_everyone), but is ordered
oldest-first, not newest-first like the paginated history endpoint.
has_more_before / has_more_after report whether the channel holds further
live history on each side of the returned window. A client that renders an
around-window is detached from the live tail while has_more_after is true:
newly broadcast messages belong below the window and are not part of it, so the
client should offer a "jump to present" affordance that refetches the normal
GET /messages tail.
Errors
| Status | Code | When |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | BAD_REQUEST |
id or messageId is not a positive integer, or limit is not a positive integer |
| 403 | FORBIDDEN |
The channel exists but READ_MESSAGES is denied |
| 404 | NOT_FOUND |
The channel does not exist, the caller is not a participant of the DM, or the message does not live in this channel |
Soft-deleted messages are 404 here, not an empty window: history omits deleted
rows, so there is no row to centre on. Deleted messages are also excluded from
the window itself, exactly as in GET /messages.
POST /api/v1/channels/{id}/messages/purge
Bulk soft-delete the newest messages in a channel.
Auth: Required
Permission: READ_MESSAGES and MANAGE_MESSAGES on the channel (per-channel overrides apply)
Not available in DM channels — a DM has no MANAGE_MESSAGES gate, so those
requests are rejected with 403.
Request Body
{
"limit": 50,
"before": 1042
}
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
limit |
integer | Yes | How many messages to delete, 1--100. Values above 100 are clamped; 0 or negative is a 400. |
before |
integer | No | Only delete messages with an id below this one. Omit or 0 to start from the newest. |
Response 200 OK
{
"channel_id": 5,
"ids": [1042, 1041, 1040],
"count": 3
}
ids is newest-first and may hold fewer than limit entries when the channel
has less history; already-deleted messages are skipped. Deletion is soft: the
rows stay as tombstones, exactly as with a single delete. A single
chat_bulk_deleted
WebSocket event is broadcast to the channel (not one chat_deleted per
message), and one message_purge audit entry is written.
Rate limited to 5/sec per user.
GET /api/v1/channels/{id}/messages/{messageId}/reactions/{emoji}/users
List the users who reacted to a message with a specific emoji — the "who reacted" tooltip behind a reaction pill.
Auth: Required
Permission: READ_MESSAGES on the channel (DM: participant)
The reactor list is a separate endpoint rather than user_ids inline on every
reaction summary, so message payloads stay small: a busy channel carries dozens
of pills per page and almost none of them are ever hovered.
{emoji} is a path segment and must be percent-encoded (👍 → %F0%9F%91%8D).
The message must belong to {id}; a message in another channel is a 404, so the
channel in the URL is always the one the permission check ran against.
Response 200 OK
{
"users": [
{ "id": 3, "username": "alice", "avatar": "" },
{ "id": 7, "username": "bob", "avatar": "/api/v1/files/abc123" }
]
}
Ordered oldest reaction first and capped at 100 reactors — the list is for a
tooltip, not an audit. users is always an array ([] when nobody used that
emoji, which is also the answer for an emoji that does not exist). avatar is
"" when the user has none.
| Status | Error | When |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | BAD_REQUEST |
Non-positive id/messageId, or an empty / over-32-rune / control-character emoji |
| 403 | FORBIDDEN |
No READ_MESSAGES on the channel |
| 404 | NOT_FOUND |
Channel or message not found, the message lives in another channel, or a DM the caller is not in |
GET /api/v1/channels/{id}/pins
Get all pinned messages for a channel.
Auth: Required
Permission: READ_MESSAGES on the channel
Response 200 OK
Returns { "messages": [...], "has_more": false }. has_more is always false for pins (all pinned messages are returned at once).
POST /api/v1/channels/{id}/pins/{messageId}
Pin a message in a channel.
Auth: Required
Permission: MANAGE_MESSAGES on the channel
Response 204 No Content
DELETE /api/v1/channels/{id}/pins/{messageId}
Unpin a message from a channel.
Auth: Required
Permission: MANAGE_MESSAGES on the channel
Response 204 No Content
Search
GET /api/v1/search
Full-text search across messages in channels the user can read. Uses SQLite FTS5 for matching.
Auth: Required Rate limit: 30 requests/minute
Query Parameters
| Param | Type | Default | Range | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
q |
string | (required) | non-empty | Search query (FTS5 syntax) |
channel_id |
int64 | (all channels) | > 0 | Restrict search to a single channel |
limit |
int | 50 | 1-100 | Maximum results to return |
Response 200 OK
{
"results": [
{
"message_id": 1042,
"channel_id": 5,
"channel_name": "general",
"user": {
"id": 1,
"username": "alex"
},
"content": "...matched text...",
"timestamp": "2026-03-14T10:30:00Z",
"mentions": [7],
"mentions_everyone": false
}
]
}
GIFs
The server proxies the Klipy GIF API so the provider API key stays server-side.
Clients never contact api.klipy.com — a key shipped in the desktop bundle
would be public by construction. The key is configured as gif.api_key
(see Server Configuration).
Default-off contract: with no key configured, both endpoints return
503 with error code GIF_DISABLED. Clients must treat that as "this server
does not have GIFs" and hide/disable the GIF affordance — not retry.
The media URLs in the response point at Klipy's CDN; the client still validates
them against its klipy.com CDN allowlist before rendering.
GET /api/v1/gif/search
Auth: Required Rate limit: 30 requests/minute (dedicated per-IP bucket)
Query Parameters
| Param | Type | Default | Range | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
q |
string | (required) | 1-100 chars | Search term |
limit |
int | 20 | 1-50 | Maximum results to return |
Response 200 OK
{
"results": [
{
"id": "abc123",
"title": "happy cat",
"media_formats": {
"tinygif": { "url": "https://media.klipy.com/abc123_tiny.gif" },
"gif": { "url": "https://media.klipy.com/abc123.gif" }
}
}
]
}
Only id, title, and the two media_formats URLs are forwarded. Every other
field the upstream returns is dropped, so an upstream that echoed the API key
could not leak it to clients. Results missing either format are omitted.
Errors
| Status | Code | When |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | INVALID_INPUT |
Missing/blank q, q over 100 chars, or limit outside 1-50 |
| 401 | UNAUTHORIZED |
No valid session (checked before the disabled check) |
| 429 | RATE_LIMITED |
Over 30 requests/minute |
| 502 | BAD_GATEWAY |
Upstream error, timeout, or unparseable response |
| 503 | GIF_DISABLED |
gif.api_key is not configured |
GET /api/v1/gif/trending
Same auth, rate limit, response shape, and error codes as
/api/v1/gif/search, minus the q parameter.
| Param | Type | Default | Range | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
limit |
int | 20 | 1-50 | Maximum results to return |
Direct Messages
DM channels use participant-based authorization rather than role-based permissions.
POST /api/v1/dms
Create or retrieve a 1-on-1 DM channel with another user. If a DM channel already exists, it is returned and re-opened.
Auth: Required
Request
{
"recipient_id": 2
}
Response 200 OK (existing channel) or 201 Created (new channel)
{
"channel_id": 100,
"recipient": {
"id": 2,
"username": "jordan",
"avatar": "uuid.png",
"status": "online"
},
"created": false
}
GET /api/v1/dms
List all open DM channels for the authenticated user, ordered by most recent activity.
Auth: Required
Response 200 OK
{
"dm_channels": [
{
"channel_id": 100,
"name": "Lunch crew",
"is_group": true,
"recipient": {
"id": 2,
"username": "jordan",
"display_name": "Jo",
"avatar": "/api/v1/files/uuid",
"status": "online"
},
"recipients": [
{
"id": 2,
"username": "jordan",
"display_name": "Jo",
"avatar": "/api/v1/files/uuid",
"status": "online"
},
{
"id": 3,
"username": "sam",
"display_name": "",
"avatar": "",
"status": "idle"
}
],
"last_message_id": 5042,
"last_message": "Hey, how's it going?",
"last_message_at": "2026-03-28T14:30:00Z",
"unread_count": 3
}
]
}
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
recipient |
The other participant of a 1:1 DM. Backward compatibility only — for a group it carries the first of recipients. |
recipients |
Every participant except the caller. What group-aware clients read. |
name |
Optional group name; "" for a 1:1 DM and for an unnamed group. |
is_group |
True for a group DM. Stored, not derived from the live participant count. |
status is viewer-adjusted: an invisible participant reads as offline.
POST /api/v1/dms/group
Create a group DM between the caller and 2–8 other users (3–10 total).
Unlike POST /api/v1/dms this always creates: the same set of people may
reasonably want more than one group, so there is no "the group for these users"
to look up.
Blocks are enforced in both directions, per recipient — a user may neither pull
someone they have blocked into a room with them nor use a group to reach
someone who has blocked them. The check is creation-time only; see
docs/protocol.md § DM Authorization for why sending into a group is not
block-checked.
Auth: Required
Request
{
"recipient_ids": [2, 3],
"name": "Lunch crew"
}
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
recipient_ids |
int[] | Yes | 2–8 other users. De-duplicated; the caller is dropped if named. |
name |
string | No | Group name, ≤ 100 characters. HTML-stripped. Omit or "" for an unnamed group. |
Response 201 Created
The same DM summary shape GET /api/v1/dms returns, from the creator's seat.
Every participant — the creator included — also receives a dm_channel_open.
Errors
| Status | Code | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | BAD_REQUEST |
Fewer than 2 or more than 8 recipients, or a name over 100 characters |
| 403 | FORBIDDEN |
A recipient is blocked by, or has blocked, the caller |
| 404 | NOT_FOUND |
A recipient does not exist |
PATCH /api/v1/dms/{channelId}
Set or clear a group DM's name.
Any participant may rename it. That is Discord's rule and the only one that works here: a group DM has no owner column and no roles, so "who may rename" has exactly one answer that does not require inventing an ownership model. A 1:1 DM refuses — its name is who is in it.
Auth: Required (participant)
Request
{ "name": "Lunch crew" }
An empty name clears it, and the group falls back to listing its members.
Response 200 OK
The DM summary shape, from the caller's seat. Every participant also receives a
dm_channel_open carrying the new name.
Errors
| Status | Code | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | BAD_REQUEST |
The channel is a 1:1 DM, or the name exceeds 100 characters |
| 404 | NOT_FOUND |
Not a participant of this DM |
DELETE /api/v1/dms/{channelId}
Remove a DM from the caller's sidebar. What that means depends on the kind of DM, and the route is shared because the gesture is shared:
- 1:1 DM — a hide. The channel and messages remain, the caller remains a participant, and a new message from either side re-opens it.
- Group DM — a leave. The caller comes out of
dm_participants, stops receiving the group's messages, and cannot return unaided. When the last participant leaves, the channel row is deleted (a DM nobody is in is reachable by nobody, and its messages cascade off the channel).
The caller receives dm_channel_close; after a group leave the remaining
participants receive a fresh dm_channel_open with the new membership.
Auth: Required (participant)
Response 204 No Content
Errors
| Status | Code | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| 404 | NOT_FOUND |
Not a participant of this DM |
User Blocks
Blocking a user prevents DM creation and messaging in both directions
(backed by the user_blocks table).
GET /api/v1/blocks
List the IDs of users the authenticated user has blocked.
Auth: Required
Response 200 OK
{ "blocked_user_ids": [2, 7] }
PUT /api/v1/blocks/{userId}
Block a user.
Auth: Required
Response 200 OK
{ "message": "user blocked" }
DELETE /api/v1/blocks/{userId}
Unblock a user.
Auth: Required
Invite Endpoints
All invite endpoints require authentication and the MANAGE_INVITES permission.
POST /api/v1/invites
Create a new invite code.
Auth: Required
Permission: MANAGE_INVITES
Request
{
"max_uses": 5,
"expires_in_hours": 48
}
Both fields are optional. An empty body creates an invite with unlimited uses and no expiry.
Response 201 Created
{
"id": 1,
"code": "abc123def",
"max_uses": 5,
"uses": 0,
"expires_at": "2026-03-30T10:30:00Z",
"revoked": false,
"created_at": "2026-03-28T10:30:00Z"
}
GET /api/v1/invites
List all invites (active, expired, and revoked).
Auth: Required
Permission: MANAGE_INVITES
Response 200 OK
Returns a JSON array of invite objects.
DELETE /api/v1/invites/{code}
Revoke an invite by its code string.
Auth: Required
Permission: MANAGE_INVITES
Response 204 No Content
File Upload and Serving
POST /api/v1/uploads
Upload a file as multipart form data.
Auth: Required
Rate limit: 10 requests/minute
Body size limit: 100 MiB
Content-Type: multipart/form-data
Files are validated against blocked magic bytes (PE executables, ELF binaries, Mach-O binaries, shell scripts). Files are stored with UUID filenames.
Response 201 Created
{
"id": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",
"filename": "photo.jpg",
"size": 204800,
"mime": "image/jpeg",
"url": "/api/v1/files/a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",
"width": 1920,
"height": 1080
}
width and height are only present for image files.
GET /api/v1/files/{id}
Serve a previously uploaded file by its UUID.
Auth: Required (Bearer token) — downloads are access-controlled
Caching: Cache-Control: private, no-cache (never stored by shared/proxy caches; browsers must revalidate)
Supports HTTP range requests and conditional requests. MIME types that could
execute under the app origin (HTML, SVG, XML, PDF) are served with
Content-Disposition: attachment to force download.
Custom Emoji
Server-wide custom emoji, usable as :shortcode: in message content and as
reaction strings.
Permission model. Reading the set is open to any authenticated member — an emoji nobody can render is not an emoji, and the set is server-wide with no per-channel scope to leak. Adding and removing require MANAGE_SERVER.
That is a deliberate reuse rather than a new permission bit: a bit is a
schema-visible, forever decision, and "who may change server-wide branding" is
exactly what MANAGE_SERVER already answers for the server name, icon and
settings. There is no MANAGE_EMOJI.
GET /api/v1/emoji
List every custom emoji, ordered by shortcode.
Auth: Required
Response 200 OK
[
{ "id": 3, "shortcode": "wave", "url": "/api/v1/emoji/3/image" },
{ "id": 7, "shortcode": "party_blob", "url": "/api/v1/emoji/7/image" }
]
url is server-relative and authenticated — see GET /api/v1/emoji/{id}/image.
POST /api/v1/emoji
Upload one custom emoji as multipart form data.
Auth: Required — MANAGE_SERVER
Rate limit: 10 requests/minute per user
Body size limit: 1 MiB (the image itself is capped at 512 KiB)
Content-Type: multipart/form-data
| Field | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
shortcode |
string | [a-z0-9_]{2,32}; surrounding colons are stripped and the value is lowercased before validation, so :WAVE: and wave are the same shortcode |
file |
file | PNG, JPEG, GIF or WebP |
Validation, in the order it is applied — the permission check runs before the multipart body is read, so a member without the bit never causes a spool to disk:
- MANAGE_SERVER, then the rate limit, then the shortcode format.
- At most 512 KiB of image bytes.
- The MIME type is sniffed from the file's own bytes, never taken from the
client's part header. Only
image/png,image/jpeg,image/gifandimage/webpare accepted. SVG is refused outright: it is markup with script and external-fetch capability, and an emoji is by definition rendered inline. - Dimensions are re-read from the sniffed image (WebP headers are parsed directly, since the standard library has no WebP decoder) and must be at most 128 x 128.
- Shortcodes are unique case-insensitively; a collision is
409 CONFLICT. - A server holds at most 200 emoji.
On success the full set is broadcast as emoji_update (see protocol.md), so
every connected client converges without a reconnect.
Response 201 Created
{ "id": 3, "shortcode": "wave", "url": "/api/v1/emoji/3/image" }
Errors
| Status | Code | Cause |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | BAD_REQUEST |
bad shortcode, wrong format, too large, too big |
| 403 | FORBIDDEN |
caller lacks MANAGE_SERVER |
| 409 | CONFLICT |
an emoji with that shortcode already exists |
| 429 | RATE_LIMITED |
upload rate limit exceeded |
GET /api/v1/emoji/{id}/image
Serve one emoji's image bytes.
Auth: Required (Bearer token)
Caching: Cache-Control: private, max-age=86400, immutable
Authenticated rather than public so an emoji cannot be used as an unauthenticated tracking pixel hosted on someone else's server. There is no per-channel ACL to apply — emoji are server-wide by construction, so authentication is the whole check. An emoji's bytes never change for a given id (a replacement is a new row), which is what lets the response be cached hard. Unknown ids answer 404.
DELETE /api/v1/emoji/{id}
Delete one custom emoji and unlink its stored file.
Auth: Required — MANAGE_SERVER
Messages and reactions that used the shortcode fall back to rendering the
literal :shortcode: text. Broadcasts emoji_update on success.
Response 204 No Content
Errors
| Status | Code | Cause |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | BAD_REQUEST |
id is not a positive integer |
| 403 | FORBIDDEN |
caller lacks MANAGE_SERVER |
| 404 | NOT_FOUND |
no emoji with that id |
Health Check
GET /health
GET /api/v1/health
Public health check endpoint, no authentication required. The server version is deliberately not exposed here (anti-fingerprinting hardening, C-2).
{
"status": "ok",
"uptime": 86400,
"online_users": 3
}
Server Info
GET /api/v1/info
Returns the server name. The version field was removed from this unauthenticated endpoint (anti-fingerprinting hardening, C-2).
Auth: None
{
"name": "My OwnCord Server"
}
Metrics
GET /api/v1/metrics
Runtime server metrics. Restricted to admin-allowed CIDRs.
Auth: Admin IP restriction (not token-based)
{
"uptime": "2h30m15s",
"uptime_seconds": 9015.0,
"goroutines": 42,
"heap_alloc_mb": 12.5,
"heap_sys_mb": 24.0,
"num_gc": 156,
"connected_users": 8,
"livekit_healthy": true
}
Admin API Authorization
The admin panel API lives under /admin/api (not /api/v1) and takes the same
Authorization: Bearer {token} header — a login session or an API token, which
inherits its owning user's role.
Authorization is two-layered:
- Perimeter. The request is rejected with
403 FORBIDDENunless the principal's role holds at least one bit ofpermissions.AdminPerimeter(ADMINISTRATOR,MANAGE_CHANNELS,MANAGE_ROLES,MANAGE_SERVER,VIEW_AUDIT_LOG,KICK_MEMBERS,BAN_MEMBERS,MUTE_MEMBERS). Banned users are rejected here even while their session is still valid. - Per-route bit. Route groups then require the specific permission below.
ADMINISTRATORbypasses every one of them; owner-only routes gate on role position (>= 100) instead of on a bit, so not evenADMINISTRATORsubstitutes for being the owner.
| Route | Requires |
|---|---|
GET /admin/api/me |
perimeter only |
GET /admin/api/stats |
perimeter only |
GET /admin/api/users |
perimeter only |
PATCH /admin/api/users/{id} |
perimeter; BAN_MEMBERS for banned, MANAGE_ROLES for role_id (checked in the service) |
DELETE /admin/api/users/{id}/sessions |
KICK_MEMBERS |
GET/POST/PATCH/DELETE /admin/api/channels… (incl. /permissions and /user-permissions) |
MANAGE_CHANNELS |
GET/POST/PATCH/DELETE /admin/api/roles… (incl. /roles/reorder) |
MANAGE_ROLES |
GET /admin/api/audit-log |
VIEW_AUDIT_LOG |
GET/PATCH /admin/api/settings |
MANAGE_SERVER |
POST /admin/api/logs/ticket, GET /admin/api/logs/stream |
ADMINISTRATOR |
/api/v1/admin/plugins… |
ADMINISTRATOR |
/admin/api/tokens…, /admin/api/backup(s)…, /admin/api/updates… |
Owner role (position 100) |
Moderation routes additionally enforce the role hierarchy: the actor must
strictly outrank the target (actor.position > target.position), and a role
assignment may only grant a role positioned strictly below the actor's own —
so an admin cannot promote anyone to Owner, and a moderator cannot demote an
admin. Violations return 403 FORBIDDEN.
GET /admin/api/me
Describes the calling principal so a panel can hide what the role cannot use. Every route still re-checks its bit server-side.
Response 200 OK
{
"id": 7,
"username": "mod",
"role_id": 3,
"role_name": "Moderator",
"role_position": 60,
"permissions": 1048575,
"is_owner": false
}
Role Management
Create, edit, delete and reorder roles. The whole group requires
MANAGE_ROLES; RoleService then enforces the hierarchy rules below, so a
principal that clears the bit still cannot escalate through it.
Rules, all measured against the actor's role position:
- You may only create, edit, delete or reorder roles positioned strictly below your own. Equal rank is refused too, so a role cannot rewrite itself. Nothing sits above position 100, which makes the seeded Owner role immutable and undeletable for everyone, owner included.
- You may never grant a permission bit your own role lacks. Removing one is
allowed — de-escalation is always safe.
ADMINISTRATORbypasses this check entirely (it is what lets the owner hand out anything). - The default role (
is_default = 1) cannot be deleted: every member falls back to it. - Deleting a role moves its members onto the default role in one
UPDATE, drops the role'schannel_overridesrows, invalidates the moved members' cached permissions, and broadcasts amember_updateper member. - Names are unique case-insensitively (migration
023), matching the case-insensitive lookup the desktop client does. Max 32 characters. - Colors are
#rgbor#rrggbb, normalized to uppercase.""clears the color. Anything else is400. - Unknown permission bits are masked off rather than rejected.
- Every mutation writes an audit row (
role_create,role_update,role_delete,role_reorder) and broadcastsroles_update(seedocs/protocol.md) carrying the full new list.
GET /admin/api/roles
Roles ordered by position descending, each with its member count.
Response 200 OK
[
{ "id": 1, "name": "Owner", "color": "#E74C3C", "permissions": 2147483647, "position": 100, "is_default": false, "member_count": 1 },
{ "id": 4, "name": "Member", "color": null, "permissions": 1635, "position": 40, "is_default": true, "member_count": 12 }
]
POST /admin/api/roles
Request
{
"name": "Helper",
"color": "#5865F2",
"permissions": 3,
"position": 50
}
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
name |
string | Yes | 1–32 characters, unique case-insensitively |
color |
string | No | #rgb/#rrggbb, or "" for none |
permissions |
integer | No | Bitfield; defaults to 0 |
position |
integer | No | Defaults to one below the actor's own position |
Response 201 Created
The created role (id, name, color, permissions, position,
is_default — always false; the default role is seeded, never created).
Errors
| Status | Code | When |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | BAD_REQUEST |
Missing/blank/over-long name, duplicate name, bad color, negative position |
| 403 | FORBIDDEN |
Missing MANAGE_ROLES, position at or above your own, or a permission bit you lack |
PATCH /admin/api/roles/{id}
Partial update — every field is optional and an omitted one is left alone.
Same body and same errors as POST, plus 404 NOT_FOUND for a missing role.
Editing a role at or above your own position is 403.
A permission change additionally invalidates the cached permissions of that
role's members and re-syncs their channel visibility (the server sends targeted
channel_create/channel_delete), because a role's mask is the base every
channel's effective permission derives from.
Response 200 OK
The updated role.
DELETE /admin/api/roles/{id}
Response 204 No Content
Errors
| Status | Code | When |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | BAD_REQUEST |
The role is the default role, or is the seeded Owner role |
| 403 | FORBIDDEN |
Missing MANAGE_ROLES, or the role is at or above your own position |
| 404 | NOT_FOUND |
No such role |
PATCH /admin/api/roles/reorder
Request
{ "role_ids": [2, 9, 3, 4] }
role_ids is highest-rank-first and must name exactly the set of roles
strictly below your own position — a partial list is refused rather than
silently leaving the omitted roles at positions that now collide. Positions are
normalized to N…1, so they stay unique, stay below the actor, and never
collide with the untouched roles above.
Response 200 OK
The full role list after the reorder, position descending.
Errors
| Status | Code | When |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | BAD_REQUEST |
Wrong number of ids, or a duplicate id |
| 403 | FORBIDDEN |
Missing MANAGE_ROLES, or an id that is unknown or not below your rank |
Channel Management (admin)
POST /admin/api/channels takes {name, type, category, topic, position};
PATCH /admin/api/channels/{id} takes {name, topic, category, slow_mode, position, archived, nsfw, voice_max_users, voice_max_video} and seeds every
omitted field from the current row, so a partial body is safe.
The numeric fields are bounds-checked before anything is written, and an
out-of-range value is refused with 400 INVALID_INPUT rather than clamped —
a caller that sent -1 meant something, and storing 0 would hide it. A
refused body writes nothing at all:
| Field | Range | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
slow_mode |
0…21600 | Cooldown in seconds; 0 = off (6-hour ceiling, as Discord) |
voice_max_users |
0…99 | Voice capacity; 0 = unlimited |
voice_max_video |
0…99 | Simultaneous cameras/screen shares; 0 = unlimited |
nsfw is a bool and is stored, broadcast and audited only — the server applies
no content behaviour to a flagged channel (see GET /api/v1/channels). The
audit detail names the transition: updated #foo (marked NSFW) /
(unmarked NSFW), and plain updated #foo when the flag did not move.
The voice limits are stored on a channel of any type but are only meaningful on a voice one; the desktop client offers them for voice channels alone and omits the keys entirely elsewhere, so a text-channel edit cannot wipe limits the row happens to hold.
type must be text, voice or announcement (400 INVALID_INPUT
otherwise). category constrains nothing. Categories are free text and a
channel of any type may live under any of them — a voice channel under
"Gaming", a text channel under "Voice Channels". Grouping is a display concern:
the desktop client groups by whatever category a channel carries and falls back
to a synthetic "Voice" group only for voice channels with no category at all.
(Before phase 5 the server refused any non-voice channel under a category
literally named "Voice Channels", and any voice channel outside it.)
PATCH accepts category, so moving a channel between categories is an edit
rather than a delete-and-recreate. An empty string makes it uncategorized.
Channel Permission Overrides
Two override layers per channel, both gated on MANAGE_CHANNELS and both
audit-logged. They resolve in Discord's order:
base role permissions -> role override -> user override
The later, narrower layer wins: a user deny beats a role allow, a user
allow beats a role deny, and within one layer allow beats deny. ADMINISTRATOR
bypasses both layers entirely. See docs/schema.md ("Permission Checking
Logic") for the formula and permissions.EffectiveChannelPerms for the single
implementation.
Denying READ_MESSAGES hides the channel outright — from the WS ready
payload, from GET /api/v1/channels, from reconnect replay and from live
broadcasts. Every write below invalidates the affected permission cache entries
and then re-syncs connected clients with targeted channel_create /
channel_delete messages, so sidebars converge without a reconnect.
DM channels have no override surface: 400 INVALID_INPUT.
GET /admin/api/channels/{id}/permissions
Both layers for one channel. roles lists every role (zero masks when it
carries no override) so the panel can render a complete grid; users lists
only members who actually have an override row.
Response 200 OK
{
"channel_id": 4,
"roles": [
{ "role_id": 1, "role_name": "Owner", "position": 100, "permissions": 2147483647, "allow": 0, "deny": 0 },
{ "role_id": 4, "role_name": "Member", "position": 40, "permissions": 1635, "allow": 0, "deny": 514 }
],
"users": [
{ "user_id": 12, "username": "alice", "role_id": 4, "allow": 2, "deny": 0 }
]
}
PUT /admin/api/channels/{id}/permissions/{roleId}
PUT /admin/api/channels/{id}/user-permissions/{userId}
Write one override row. Same body for both layers:
{ "allow": 2, "deny": 1 }
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
allow |
integer | Bits granted in this channel |
deny |
integer | Bits refused in this channel |
Bits outside permissions.AllPerms are masked off rather than rejected, so an
unknown bit can never be persisted. A row with both masks 0 is meaningless —
the admin panel sends DELETE for that case instead.
Response 200 OK
The stored row: {role_id, role_name, position, permissions, allow, deny} for
the role layer, {user_id, username, role_id, allow, deny} for the user layer.
Cache and fan-out
- Role layer:
InvalidateAll(any member of that role is affected), thenRefreshChannelVisibility. - User layer:
InvalidateUser(userId)only — a per-user override cannot change anyone else's verdict, and dropping the whole cache for one member would cost every connected client a repopulate — thenRefreshChannelVisibility, which resolves visibility per user through the full order.
Audit
channel_perms_update / channel_user_perms_update, target channel.
Errors
| Status | Code | When |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | BAD_REQUEST |
Unparseable id or body |
| 400 | INVALID_INPUT |
The channel is a DM |
| 403 | FORBIDDEN |
Missing MANAGE_CHANNELS |
| 404 | NOT_FOUND |
Unknown channel, role or user |
DELETE /admin/api/channels/{id}/permissions/{roleId}
DELETE /admin/api/channels/{id}/user-permissions/{userId}
Clear the override row, returning the target to the layer above it. 204 No Content; deleting a row that does not exist is a no-op, not a 404. Same
cache/fan-out behavior as the writes; audits as channel_perms_clear /
channel_user_perms_clear.
Plugin Administration
Manage WASM plugins. These endpoints sit behind both the admin IP
restriction (allowed CIDRs) and admin bearer-token authentication, and
require the ADMINISTRATOR bit specifically (the widened admin perimeter does
not open them).
Plugin execution additionally requires a server built with -tags wazero
and plugins.enabled: true in config.
GET /api/v1/admin/plugins
List installed plugins.
Response 200 OK
Array of plugin rows: ID, Name, Version, Enabled, ManifestJSON,
InstalledAt.
POST /api/v1/admin/plugins/install
Install a plugin from an uploaded zip (multipart form). The archive is size-capped (16 MiB compressed / 64 MiB uncompressed) and hardened against zip-slip and symlinks; installation is staged and atomically renamed.
Response 201 Created
{ "name": "plugin-name" }
POST /api/v1/admin/plugins/{id}/enable
POST /api/v1/admin/plugins/{id}/disable
Enable or disable an installed plugin.
DELETE /api/v1/admin/plugins/{id}
Uninstall a plugin.
LiveKit Endpoints
These endpoints are only registered when LiveKit voice is configured.
POST /api/v1/livekit/webhook
LiveKit webhook receiver. Uses LiveKit JWT verification. Admin-IP-restricted. Called by the LiveKit server, not by clients.
GET /api/v1/livekit/health
Check whether the LiveKit server is reachable.
Auth: Admin IP restriction
Response 200 OK
{
"status": "ok",
"livekit_reachable": true
}
Response 503 Service Unavailable
{
"status": "degraded",
"livekit_reachable": false,
"error": "connection refused"
}
/livekit/* (Reverse Proxy)
All requests to /livekit/* are reverse-proxied to the LiveKit server URL. The /livekit prefix is stripped before forwarding. This allows the client to connect to LiveKit through OwnCord's HTTPS server, avoiding mixed-content blocks.
Auth: None (LiveKit handles its own JWT-based auth) Rate limit: 30 requests/minute per IP
Diagnostics
GET /api/v1/diagnostics/connectivity
Returns connectivity diagnostics for debugging voice/network issues.
Auth: Required (any authenticated user) Rate limit: 5 requests/minute per user
{
"server": {
"version": "1.0.0",
"uptime_s": 3600,
"go_version": "go1.23.0",
"online_users": 5
},
"voice": {
"enabled": true,
"livekit_url": "ws://localhost:7880",
"livekit_health": true,
"node_ip": "203.0.113.1",
"proxy_path": "/livekit"
},
"client": {
"remote_addr": "192.168.1.100",
"is_private_network": true
}
}
Client Auto-Update
GET /api/v1/client-update/{target}/{current_version}
Tauri-compatible update endpoint. The desktop client checks this to see if a newer version is available.
Auth: None
Path Parameters
| Param | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
target |
string | Tauri updater target {os}-{arch}-{installer} (e.g., windows-x86_64-nsis, linux-x86_64-appimage, linux-aarch64-appimage). Selects the platform's updater artifact and is echoed back as the platforms key. Targets without a published updater artifact (e.g., linux-x86_64-deb) get 204. |
current_version |
string | Client's current semver version (e.g., 1.0.0) |
Response 200 OK (update available)
{
"version": "1.2.0",
"notes": "## What's Changed\n...",
"pub_date": "2026-03-28T00:00:00Z",
"platforms": {
"windows-x86_64-nsis": {
"signature": "base64-encoded-signature",
"url": "https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/releases/download/v1.2.0/OwnCord_1.2.0_x64-setup.nsis.zip"
}
}
}
Response 204 No Content
Client is already up-to-date, or no client build is published for target.
WebSocket
GET /api/v1/ws
WebSocket upgrade endpoint. Authentication is performed in-band (first message must be an auth frame with the session token). See protocol.md for the full WebSocket message protocol.