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The REST path previously used tauri-plugin-http with danger.acceptInvalidCerts, so it accepted ANY certificate while the WS and LiveKit paths were TOFU-pinned in Rust — and the bearer token rides every REST request. This routes REST through a new Rust loopback TCP->TLS proxy that pins the server certificate to the same trust-on-first-use fingerprint as the WS proxy. Rust (src-tauri): - New http_proxy.rs: per-host loopback tunnels (HttpProxyState map); per-connection TOFU via CaptureVerifier + tofu_check, sharing ws_proxy's cert store (cert_store_key) and emitting the same cert-tofu events (first-use banner / mismatch modal). First request's Host is rewritten and Connection: close injected so one request rides each connection. Mismatch returns a clean 502 to the loopback fetch. - Register HttpProxyState + start_http_proxy/stop_http_proxy in lib.rs. - Drop the dangerous-settings feature from tauri-plugin-http. TypeScript (src): - New lib/httpProxy.ts: ensureHttpProxy(host) (per-host cache + concurrent-start dedup) / stopHttpProxy(host). - api.ts, profiles.ts (health), attachments.ts (image + download) resolve server URLs to http://127.0.0.1:{port}; remove the allowSelfSigned config field and every acceptInvalidCerts block. External hosts (CDNs, OG previews, YouTube) keep normal TLS validation. - main.ts constructs the API client without allowSelfSigned. - capabilities/default.json: allow http://127.0.0.1:* fetch scope. Tests: - New tests/unit/http-proxy.test.ts (cache, dedup, stop/restart). - api.test.ts and attachments-render.test.ts: mock httpProxy, replace the acceptInvalidCerts assertions with proxy-origin assertions. Verified: tsc --noEmit clean; new + affected vitest suites green (176 tests); the http_proxy pure logic (host validation, header rewrite) passes as standalone Rust unit tests; oxlint/eslint counts unchanged from HEAD; prettier clean. The full Tauri build (cargo) requires GUI system libs not present in this environment and runs on CI/real runners. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UA17KPvqGBX3XbXYnMf1rA
553 lines
20 KiB
Rust
553 lines
20 KiB
Rust
// Local TCP-to-TLS proxy for REST/HTTP requests — closes audit A-2026-07-02.
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//
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// Problem: HTTP API calls previously used tauri-plugin-http with
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// `danger.acceptInvalidCerts`, so the REST path (which carries the bearer
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// token on every request) accepted ANY certificate while the WebSocket and
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// LiveKit paths were TOFU-pinned in Rust.
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//
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// Solution: This module starts one plain TCP listener on localhost per remote
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// host. The webview fetches http://127.0.0.1:{port}/api/v1/... and the proxy
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// opens a TLS connection to the real server, enforcing the same TOFU
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// (Trust On First Use) fingerprint pinning as ws_proxy:
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// - Unknown host → accept, persist the fingerprint, emit `cert-tofu`
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// (status "trusted_first_use") so the UI can show the banner. HTTP is the
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// FIRST TLS contact with a server (login precedes the WS connect), so this
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// proxy — not ws_proxy — usually establishes the pin.
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// - Pinned host → fingerprint must match or the connection is refused and a
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// `cert-tofu` mismatch event fires (CertMismatchModal flow).
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//
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// Design notes (docs/plans/http-tofu-proxy.md):
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// - One request per tunnel connection: the proxy rewrites the first request's
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// Host header to the real host and injects `Connection: close`, so
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// keep-alive reuse (whose later requests would bypass the rewrite) never
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// happens. Per-request TLS overhead is acceptable for this app's REST
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// traffic; the hot path is the WebSocket.
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// - Per-host tunnels: the Connect page polls health for every profile, so
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// multiple proxies can run concurrently (bounded by profile count).
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// - The accept loop exits after 5 consecutive errors to prevent CPU spin.
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use log::{debug, error, info, warn};
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use ring::digest::{digest, SHA256};
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::net::IpAddr;
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use std::sync::Arc;
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use rustls::pki_types::ServerName;
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use serde_json::Value;
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use tauri::{AppHandle, Emitter, Runtime};
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use tauri_plugin_store::StoreExt;
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use tokio::io::{self, AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
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use tokio::net::{TcpListener, TcpStream};
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use tokio::sync::Mutex;
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use tokio::time::{timeout, Duration};
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use crate::constants::CERTS_STORE;
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use crate::livekit_proxy::cert_store_key;
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/// Tauri-managed state: one running tunnel per remote host.
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pub struct HttpProxyState {
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inner: Mutex<HashMap<String, ProxyEntry>>,
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}
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struct ProxyEntry {
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port: u16,
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shutdown_tx: tokio::sync::oneshot::Sender<()>,
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}
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impl HttpProxyState {
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pub fn new() -> Self {
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Self {
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inner: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
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}
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}
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}
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/// Validate a remote host string before it is used in header rewriting and
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/// dialing. Mirrors start_livekit_proxy's checks.
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fn validate_remote_host(remote_host: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
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if remote_host.is_empty() || remote_host.len() > 260 {
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return Err("remote_host is empty or too long".into());
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}
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if remote_host.contains('\r') || remote_host.contains('\n') || remote_host.contains('\0') {
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return Err("remote_host contains invalid characters".into());
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}
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if !remote_host
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.chars()
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.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(c, '.' | '-' | ':' | '[' | ']'))
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{
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return Err("remote_host contains unexpected characters".into());
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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/// Start (or reuse) a local HTTP→TLS tunnel for `remote_host` and return the
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/// loopback port. The webview should send its REST traffic to
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/// `http://127.0.0.1:{port}`.
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#[tauri::command]
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pub async fn start_http_proxy<R: Runtime>(
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app: AppHandle<R>,
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state: tauri::State<'_, HttpProxyState>,
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remote_host: String,
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) -> Result<u16, String> {
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validate_remote_host(&remote_host)?;
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let mut inner = state.inner.lock().await;
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if let Some(entry) = inner.get(&remote_host) {
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debug!(
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"[http_proxy] reusing tunnel on port {} for {}",
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entry.port, remote_host
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);
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return Ok(entry.port);
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}
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let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0")
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.await
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.map_err(|e| format!("http proxy bind failed: {e}"))?;
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let port = listener
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.local_addr()
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.map_err(|e| format!("http proxy local_addr: {e}"))?
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.port();
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let (shutdown_tx, shutdown_rx) = tokio::sync::oneshot::channel::<()>();
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tokio::spawn(run_proxy_loop(
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app.clone(),
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listener,
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remote_host.clone(),
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shutdown_rx,
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));
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info!(
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"[http_proxy] tunnel started on 127.0.0.1:{} → {}",
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port, remote_host
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);
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inner.insert(remote_host, ProxyEntry { port, shutdown_tx });
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Ok(port)
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}
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/// Stop the tunnel for `remote_host` (no-op if none is running).
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#[tauri::command]
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pub async fn stop_http_proxy(
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state: tauri::State<'_, HttpProxyState>,
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remote_host: String,
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) -> Result<(), String> {
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let mut inner = state.inner.lock().await;
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if let Some(entry) = inner.remove(&remote_host) {
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let _ = entry.shutdown_tx.send(());
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info!("[http_proxy] tunnel stopped for {}", remote_host);
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// TOFU verification (mirrors ws_proxy semantics; shared cert store)
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/// Fingerprint captured during the TLS handshake.
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type CapturedFingerprint = Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Option<String>>>;
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/// Accepts the handshake while recording the leaf certificate's SHA-256
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/// fingerprint; the TOFU decision happens immediately after the handshake,
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/// before any request bytes are forwarded.
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#[derive(Debug)]
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struct CaptureVerifier {
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captured: CapturedFingerprint,
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}
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impl CaptureVerifier {
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fn new() -> (Self, CapturedFingerprint) {
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let fp = Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(None));
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(Self { captured: fp.clone() }, fp)
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}
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}
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impl rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerifier for CaptureVerifier {
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fn verify_server_cert(
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&self,
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end_entity: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
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_intermediates: &[rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>],
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_server_name: &rustls::pki_types::ServerName<'_>,
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_ocsp_response: &[u8],
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_now: rustls::pki_types::UnixTime,
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) -> Result<rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerified, rustls::Error> {
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let hash = digest(&SHA256, end_entity.as_ref());
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let hex = hash
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.as_ref()
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.iter()
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.map(|b| format!("{b:02x}"))
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.collect::<Vec<_>>()
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.join(":");
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if let Ok(mut guard) = self.captured.lock() {
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*guard = Some(hex);
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}
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Ok(rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerified::assertion())
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}
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fn verify_tls12_signature(
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&self,
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message: &[u8],
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cert: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
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dss: &rustls::DigitallySignedStruct,
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) -> Result<rustls::client::danger::HandshakeSignatureValid, rustls::Error> {
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rustls::crypto::verify_tls12_signature(
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message,
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cert,
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dss,
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&rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().signature_verification_algorithms,
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)
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}
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fn verify_tls13_signature(
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&self,
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message: &[u8],
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cert: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
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dss: &rustls::DigitallySignedStruct,
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) -> Result<rustls::client::danger::HandshakeSignatureValid, rustls::Error> {
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rustls::crypto::verify_tls13_signature(
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message,
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cert,
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dss,
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&rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().signature_verification_algorithms,
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)
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}
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fn supported_verify_schemes(&self) -> Vec<rustls::SignatureScheme> {
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rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider()
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.signature_verification_algorithms
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.supported_schemes()
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}
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}
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/// TOFU decision for `host` (cert-store key, i.e. without a default :443):
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/// first use stores the pin, match passes, mismatch fails. Same store, same
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/// save-rollback behavior, and same event payloads as ws_proxy::tofu_check.
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fn tofu_check<R: Runtime>(
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app: &AppHandle<R>,
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host: &str,
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fingerprint: &str,
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) -> Result<String, String> {
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let store = app
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.store(CERTS_STORE)
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.map_err(|e| format!("failed to open certs store: {e}"))?;
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let stored = store.get(host).and_then(|v| {
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if let Value::String(s) = v {
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Some(s)
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} else {
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None
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}
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});
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match stored {
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None => {
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let old_value = store.get(host);
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store.set(host, Value::String(fingerprint.to_string()));
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if let Err(e) = store.save() {
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match old_value {
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Some(v) => {
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store.set(host, v);
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}
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None => {
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let _ = store.delete(host);
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}
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}
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return Err(format!("failed to persist cert fingerprint: {e}"));
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}
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Ok("trusted_first_use".to_string())
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}
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Some(ref stored_fp) if stored_fp == fingerprint => Ok("trusted".to_string()),
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Some(stored_fp) => Err(format!(
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"Certificate fingerprint changed for {host}.\n\
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Stored: {stored_fp}\n\
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Current: {fingerprint}\n\
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This may indicate a man-in-the-middle attack or a server certificate rotation.\n\
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Use accept_cert_fingerprint to trust the new certificate."
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)),
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}
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Proxy internals
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/// Maximum consecutive accept errors before the proxy loop exits.
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const MAX_CONSECUTIVE_ACCEPT_ERRORS: u32 = 5;
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async fn run_proxy_loop<R: Runtime>(
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app: AppHandle<R>,
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listener: TcpListener,
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remote_host: String,
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mut shutdown_rx: tokio::sync::oneshot::Receiver<()>,
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) {
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let mut consecutive_errors: u32 = 0;
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loop {
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tokio::select! {
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result = listener.accept() => {
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match result {
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Ok((stream, addr)) => {
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consecutive_errors = 0;
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let host = remote_host.clone();
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let app = app.clone();
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debug!("[http_proxy] accepted connection from {}", addr);
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tokio::spawn(async move {
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if let Err(e) = handle_connection(app, stream, &host).await {
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warn!("[http_proxy] connection to {} failed: {}", host, e);
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}
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});
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}
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Err(e) => {
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consecutive_errors += 1;
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error!(
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"[http_proxy] accept error ({}/{}): {}",
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consecutive_errors, MAX_CONSECUTIVE_ACCEPT_ERRORS, e
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);
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if consecutive_errors >= MAX_CONSECUTIVE_ACCEPT_ERRORS {
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error!(
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"[http_proxy] {} consecutive accept errors, stopping proxy loop",
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MAX_CONSECUTIVE_ACCEPT_ERRORS
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);
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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_ = &mut shutdown_rx => break,
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}
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}
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}
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/// Rewrite the first request's headers: replace Host with the real remote
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/// host and force `Connection: close` so exactly one request rides each
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/// tunnel connection (later keep-alive requests would bypass this rewrite).
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/// `raw` must end with the "\r\n\r\n" header terminator.
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fn rewrite_request_headers(raw: &[u8], remote_host: &str) -> String {
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let request = String::from_utf8_lossy(raw);
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let mut modified = String::with_capacity(raw.len() + 128);
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let mut lines = request.split("\r\n").peekable();
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let mut first = true;
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while let Some(line) = lines.next() {
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if !first {
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modified.push_str("\r\n");
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}
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first = false;
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// The terminator produces two trailing empty strings; emit them as-is.
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if line.is_empty() && lines.peek().is_none() {
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break;
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}
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let lower = line.to_ascii_lowercase();
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if lower.starts_with("host:") {
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modified.push_str("Host: ");
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modified.push_str(remote_host);
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} else if lower.starts_with("connection:") {
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modified.push_str("Connection: close");
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} else {
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modified.push_str(line);
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}
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}
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// `break` above consumed one empty segment; restore the full terminator.
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if !modified.ends_with("\r\n\r\n") {
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while !modified.ends_with("\r\n\r\n") {
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modified.push_str("\r\n");
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}
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}
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// If the client never sent a Connection header, inject one.
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if !modified.to_ascii_lowercase().contains("\r\nconnection:") {
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let insert_at = modified.len() - 2; // before final CRLF
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modified.insert_str(insert_at, "Connection: close\r\n");
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}
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modified
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}
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/// Handle one proxied connection:
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/// 1. Read the request headers from the loopback side
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/// 2. TLS-connect to the remote and run the TOFU check (store/emit/reject)
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/// 3. Forward the rewritten request, then shovel bytes bidirectionally
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async fn handle_connection<R: Runtime>(
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app: AppHandle<R>,
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mut local: TcpStream,
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remote_host: &str,
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) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
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// ── 1. Read HTTP request headers (up to \r\n\r\n), 10s guard ─────────
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let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(4096);
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timeout(Duration::from_secs(10), async {
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let mut trailer = [0u8; 4];
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loop {
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let mut byte = [0u8; 1];
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local.read_exact(&mut byte).await?;
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buf.push(byte[0]);
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trailer[0] = trailer[1];
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trailer[1] = trailer[2];
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trailer[2] = trailer[3];
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trailer[3] = byte[0];
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if trailer == *b"\r\n\r\n" {
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break;
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}
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if buf.len() > 16_384 {
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return Err(Box::<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>::from(
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"HTTP request headers too large",
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));
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}
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}
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Ok::<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>(())
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})
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.await
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.map_err(|_| {
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Box::<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>::from("request header read timed out")
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})??;
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// Defense-in-depth (primary validation is in start_http_proxy).
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validate_remote_host(remote_host)?;
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let modified = rewrite_request_headers(&buf, remote_host);
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// ── 2. TLS connect + TOFU check ──────────────────────────────────────
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let (verifier, captured_fp) = CaptureVerifier::new();
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let tls_config = rustls::ClientConfig::builder()
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.dangerous()
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.with_custom_certificate_verifier(Arc::new(verifier))
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.with_no_client_auth();
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let connector = tokio_rustls::TlsConnector::from(Arc::new(tls_config));
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let (raw_hostname, _port) = remote_host.rsplit_once(':').unwrap_or((remote_host, "443"));
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let hostname = raw_hostname.trim_start_matches('[').trim_end_matches(']');
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let server_name = if let Ok(ip) = hostname.parse::<IpAddr>() {
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ServerName::IpAddress(ip.into())
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} else {
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ServerName::try_from(hostname.to_string())
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.map_err(|e| format!("invalid server name '{hostname}': {e}"))?
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};
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let dial_target = if remote_host.contains(':') {
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remote_host.to_string()
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} else {
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format!("{remote_host}:443")
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};
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let tcp = timeout(Duration::from_secs(10), TcpStream::connect(&dial_target))
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.await
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.map_err(|_| Box::<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>::from("TCP connect timed out"))??;
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let mut tls = timeout(Duration::from_secs(10), connector.connect(server_name, tcp))
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.await
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.map_err(|_| Box::<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>::from("TLS handshake timed out"))??;
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let fingerprint = captured_fp
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.lock()
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.map_err(|e| format!("failed to read captured fingerprint: {e}"))?
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.clone()
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.unwrap_or_default();
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if fingerprint.is_empty() {
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return Err("TLS handshake completed but no certificate fingerprint was captured".into());
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}
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let store_key = cert_store_key(remote_host);
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match tofu_check(&app, &store_key, &fingerprint) {
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Ok(status) => {
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if status == "trusted_first_use" {
|
|
info!("[http_proxy] TOFU first-use pin for {}", store_key);
|
|
}
|
|
let _ = app.emit(
|
|
"cert-tofu",
|
|
serde_json::json!({
|
|
"host": store_key,
|
|
"fingerprint": fingerprint,
|
|
"status": status,
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
Err(mismatch_msg) => {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
"[http_proxy] TOFU check FAILED for {} — certificate fingerprint mismatch",
|
|
store_key
|
|
);
|
|
let _ = app.emit(
|
|
"cert-tofu",
|
|
serde_json::json!({
|
|
"host": store_key,
|
|
"fingerprint": fingerprint,
|
|
"status": "mismatch",
|
|
"message": mismatch_msg,
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
// Give the local fetch a clean HTTP failure instead of a reset.
|
|
let _ = local
|
|
.write_all(
|
|
b"HTTP/1.1 502 Bad Gateway\r\nConnection: close\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\n",
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
return Err(mismatch_msg.into());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── 3. Forward request + bidirectional copy ──────────────────────────
|
|
tls.write_all(modified.as_bytes()).await?;
|
|
match io::copy_bidirectional(&mut local, &mut tls).await {
|
|
Ok((to_remote, from_remote)) => {
|
|
debug!(
|
|
"[http_proxy] connection closed: {}B sent, {}B received",
|
|
to_remote, from_remote
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
Err(e) => {
|
|
debug!("[http_proxy] bidirectional copy ended: {}", e);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Tests
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod tests {
|
|
use super::*;
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn validate_rejects_crlf_and_null() {
|
|
assert!(validate_remote_host("evil\r\nhost").is_err());
|
|
assert!(validate_remote_host("evil\0host").is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn validate_rejects_empty_and_odd_chars() {
|
|
assert!(validate_remote_host("").is_err());
|
|
assert!(validate_remote_host("host name").is_err());
|
|
assert!(validate_remote_host("host/path").is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn validate_accepts_typical_hosts() {
|
|
assert!(validate_remote_host("example.com:8443").is_ok());
|
|
assert!(validate_remote_host("192.168.1.10:8443").is_ok());
|
|
assert!(validate_remote_host("[::1]:8443").is_ok());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn rewrite_replaces_host_and_forces_close() {
|
|
let raw = b"GET /api/v1/health HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 127.0.0.1:5000\r\nAccept: */*\r\n\r\n";
|
|
let out = rewrite_request_headers(raw, "example.com:8443");
|
|
assert!(out.contains("Host: example.com:8443\r\n"));
|
|
assert!(!out.contains("127.0.0.1"));
|
|
assert!(out.to_ascii_lowercase().contains("connection: close"));
|
|
assert!(out.ends_with("\r\n\r\n"));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn rewrite_overrides_existing_keepalive() {
|
|
let raw =
|
|
b"POST /x HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 127.0.0.1:5000\r\nConnection: keep-alive\r\n\r\n";
|
|
let out = rewrite_request_headers(raw, "example.com:8443");
|
|
assert!(out.contains("Connection: close\r\n"));
|
|
assert!(!out.to_ascii_lowercase().contains("keep-alive"));
|
|
// Exactly one Connection header.
|
|
assert_eq!(out.to_ascii_lowercase().matches("\r\nconnection:").count(), 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn rewrite_preserves_other_headers_and_body_boundary() {
|
|
let raw = b"POST /api/v1/auth/login HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 127.0.0.1:9\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nContent-Length: 2\r\n\r\n";
|
|
let out = rewrite_request_headers(raw, "myserver.lan:8443");
|
|
assert!(out.contains("Content-Type: application/json\r\n"));
|
|
assert!(out.contains("Content-Length: 2\r\n"));
|
|
assert!(out.ends_with("\r\n\r\n"));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|