Files
OwnCord/Server/admin/api.go
T
Claude 7a4e5dc357 refactor: rename the Go module to github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server (RL-13)
`Server/go.mod` declared `github.com/owncord/server` while the public
repository is `github.com/J3vb/OwnCord`. Nothing resolves that path — there is
no `owncord` GitHub org and no vanity-import host serving go-import metadata
for it — so every import line in the tree named a location that does not
exist. It compiles because a main module's own path is never fetched, which is
exactly why it went unnoticed.

The obvious fix — an AST-aware import rewriter (`gomvpkg`, `go mod edit`) —
is wrong here, and provably so. Six of the 722 occurrences are not imports at
all: `api/main_test.go:20` (a goleak `IgnoreTopFunction` pattern),
`telemetry/metrics.go:17-19` (three OTel instrumentation-scope names),
`invariants/syncutil_locks.go:73` (a diagnostic message), and
`invariants/syncutil_locks_test.go:56` (an import line inside a raw-string Go
fixture). An import rewriter touches none of them, and the compiler cannot
see any of them either.

Done as one scripted substitution over `git ls-files`, anchored on the full
`github.com/owncord/server` string. The anchor matters: `owncord-server` is a
different identifier — the OTel `service.name` (`config/config.go`,
`telemetry/telemetry_otel.go`) and the GHCR image name
(`.github/workflows/release.yml`, `docker-compose.yml`) — and a looser pattern
would have moved it. It is untouched: 10 occurrences across 9 files, before
and after.

350 files, 728 insertions, 728 deletions. 722 occurrences in 344 Go files,
plus `go.mod:1`, the `sed` at `Makefile:67`, `Server/CLAUDE.md:3`,
`docs/architecture/server.md:5`, and the ledger pair
(`findings-ledger.json:3758` plus a `render-ledger.mjs` re-render of
`FINDINGS.md`). Zero in any workflow, zero in the Dockerfile, zero in
`Server/.golangci.yml` (no `local-prefixes`, `gci`, `importas` or `depguard`
rule keys on the module path, so import grouping is not configured anywhere).

The plan's blast-radius estimate missed one thing, and it is the one that
would have gone red: **gofmt**. `J` (0x4A) sorts before every lowercase
letter, so in the 36 files where a module-local import shares a contiguous
group with a third-party one, the module's imports must move above
`github.com/go-chi/...`. `gofmt -l` was clean before the substitution and
listed exactly 36 files after it; `gofmt -w` on those 36 restores it to
clean. `gofmt` is an enforced gate — the `formatters` block in
`Server/.golangci.yml`, which is S-05 — so a substitution-only commit fails
Lint.

Verified: both directions, and the line accounting is exact. Every added line
in this diff contains the new module path (728) and every removed line
contains the old one (728); the count of changed lines containing neither is
**zero**, so the gofmt re-sort moved module-path lines only and touched no
third-party import. The residual check
(`git ls-files -z | xargs -0 grep -n 'github\.com/owncord/server'`) returns
exactly two hits, both deliberately out of scope: the RL-13 row in
`docs/audit-2026-08-23-repository-layout.md` and the measurement row in this
phase's own plan. The compiler-invisible half was proven by reverting *only*
`api/main_test.go:20` to the old path on the otherwise-renamed tree:
`go build ./...` and `go vet ./api/` both still pass — they see nothing wrong
— while `go test ./api/` FAILS, because the runtime function name now carries
the new path and goleak stops ignoring `ws.(*Hub).Run.func1`. Restoring the
line makes it pass. `go.sum` is byte-identical (no `go mod tidy` was run and
none was needed). All four build-tag variants compile; `go vet ./...`,
`go vet -tags otel,wazero ./...` and `go vet -tags deadlock ./...` pass;
`go test -race ./...` is 16/16 packages green; `go test -tags deadlock ./...`
passes; the tag-gated `./plugin/...` (wazero) and `./telemetry/...` (otel)
runs pass. `golangci-lint` v2.11.3 — the pinned CI version, rebuilt locally
against Go 1.26 because the packaged binary cannot load a 1.26 config —
reports **0 issues**. `go run ./cmd/genprotocol` leaves
`git diff --exit-code ws/message_types.go ../Client/src/lib/protocolTypes.ts`
clean, so the rename does not reach the generated protocol constants.
`npx prettier --check .` and `node .superpowers/render-ledger.mjs --check`
pass.

Not included: `docs/audit-2026-08-23-repository-layout.md` and
`docs/plans/b1-repository-foundation-2026-08-25.md` keep the old path — they
are the audit row and the measurement that motivated this change, and
rewriting them would erase the record of what was measured. They are why the
residual check needs a two-path allowance rather than being empty; that
allowance is stated above rather than hidden in a pathspec.
`telemetry/metrics.go:19` declares `scopeVoice` for a `Server/voice` package
that does not exist; the substitution carried the dead path forward verbatim
as `github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/voice` rather than fixing it, because
correcting a real observability bug inside a mechanical rename would hide it
in a 350-file diff. It needs its own item. No `go.work`, no second module,
and no vanity-import host was set up — the new path resolves against the real
repository, but nothing imports this module as a library, so `go get`
reachability was not exercised either way.

Refs RL-13, L-12
2026-08-26 20:23:49 +00:00

185 lines
9.0 KiB
Go

package admin
import (
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/auth"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/db"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/permissions"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/service"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/updater"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
)
// setupLimiterReapInterval and setupLimiterReapMaxWindow control how often
// the setup endpoint's dedicated rate limiter reaps stale window entries.
// Vars, not consts, so tests can shrink them instead of waiting on the real
// interval (see export_test.go).
var (
setupLimiterReapInterval = 5 * time.Minute
setupLimiterReapMaxWindow = 15 * time.Minute
)
// setupLimiterHook, when non-nil, receives the *auth.RateLimiter NewAdminAPI
// creates for the /setup endpoint. Test-only seam: NewAdminAPI returns only
// an http.Handler, so tests otherwise have no way to reach that limiter to
// verify it gets reaped.
var setupLimiterHook func(*auth.RateLimiter)
// startSetupLimiterReap keeps rl's window map bounded for the life of the
// process. Every distinct source IP that ever hits POST /setup leaves an
// entry that Allow itself only prunes on a repeat call from that same key —
// a one-shot caller's entry sits forever unless something sweeps the whole
// map. api/router.go reaps its own limiter with RateLimiter.StartCleanup, a
// goroutine parked in a ticker select until a stop channel closes — but
// NewAdminAPI has no shutdown hook and is called directly by ~180 tests that
// never capture one, so a parked goroutine here would leak under every
// test's goleak check. time.AfterFunc self-rescheduling avoids that: between
// fires there is no live goroutine, only a runtime timer, so nothing needs
// to stop it.
func startSetupLimiterReap(rl *auth.RateLimiter) {
// Capture the timing once, synchronously, on the caller's goroutine.
// The rescheduled AfterFunc callbacks below must never re-read the
// package vars themselves: those callbacks run on their own goroutine
// indefinitely (nothing stops the chain), so a later test's
// SetSetupLimiterReapTiming restoring the vars on its own goroutine
// would otherwise race an in-flight reap here.
interval, maxWindow := setupLimiterReapInterval, setupLimiterReapMaxWindow
var reap func()
reap = func() {
rl.Cleanup(maxWindow)
time.AfterFunc(interval, reap)
}
time.AfterFunc(interval, reap)
}
// ─── NewAdminAPI ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// NewAdminAPI returns a chi router with all /admin/api/* routes. All routes
// except the unauthenticated setup endpoints are protected by
// adminAuthMiddleware, which admits any role holding a bit of
// permissions.AdminPerimeter; route groups then require the specific bit
// (requirePerm) or the Owner role (ownerOnlyMiddleware).
//
// The optional trailing SetupOptions enables the first-run wizard's
// config.yaml write-back and restart; without it the setup endpoints keep
// their legacy account-only behaviour (the case in most tests).
func NewAdminAPI(database *db.DB, version string, hub HubBroadcaster, u *updater.Updater, logBuf *RingBuffer, allowedOrigins []string, permInvalidator PermissionInvalidator, mod *service.ModerationService, roles *service.RoleService, opts ...SetupOptions) http.Handler {
r := chi.NewRouter()
var setupOpts SetupOptions
if len(opts) > 0 {
setupOpts = opts[0]
}
// Setup endpoints — unauthenticated, only functional when no users exist.
setupLimiter := auth.NewRateLimiter()
if setupLimiterHook != nil {
setupLimiterHook(setupLimiter)
}
startSetupLimiterReap(setupLimiter)
r.Get("/setup/status", handleSetupStatus(database, setupOpts))
r.Post("/setup", handleSetup(database, setupLimiter, allowedOrigins, hub, setupOpts))
// SSE log stream — auth is via a single-use ticket from POST /logs/ticket.
// EventSource cannot send Authorization headers, so the client first
// obtains a short-lived ticket via the authenticated ticket endpoint,
// then passes it as ?ticket= to the SSE stream.
if logBuf != nil {
r.Get("/logs/stream", handleLogStream(database, logBuf))
}
// All remaining routes require authentication plus at least one
// moderation-capable bit (permissions.AdminPerimeter). Route groups that
// map onto a specific bit re-check it with requirePerm; the rest
// (stats, users list, me) are perimeter-level.
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(adminAuthMiddleware(database))
// Log stream ticket — issues a single-use, 30s TTL ticket for SSE auth.
// ADMINISTRATOR-gated to match handleLogStream's own re-check: server
// logs are not scoped to any narrower moderation bit.
r.With(requirePerm(permissions.Administrator)).
Post("/logs/ticket", handleLogTicket(database))
r.Get("/stats", handleGetStats(database, hub))
r.Get("/me", handleGetMe())
r.Get("/users", handleListUsers(database))
// Ban/unban and role change are authorized inside ModerationService
// (BAN_MEMBERS / MANAGE_ROLES + hierarchy), so the route itself stays
// perimeter-level — a moderator with only BAN_MEMBERS must reach it.
r.Patch("/users/{id}", handlePatchUser(database, hub, permInvalidator, mod))
r.With(requirePerm(permissions.KickMembers)).
Delete("/users/{id}/sessions", handleForceLogout(mod))
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(requirePerm(permissions.ManageChannels))
r.Get("/channels", handleListChannels(database))
r.Post("/channels", handleCreateChannel(database, hub))
r.Patch("/channels/{id}", handlePatchChannel(database, hub))
r.Delete("/channels/{id}", handleDeleteChannel(database, hub))
r.Get("/channels/{id}/permissions", handleGetChannelPermissions(database))
r.Put("/channels/{id}/permissions/{roleId}", handlePutChannelPermission(database, hub, permInvalidator))
r.Delete("/channels/{id}/permissions/{roleId}", handleDeleteChannelPermission(database, hub, permInvalidator))
// Per-user overrides — the last layer of the resolution order,
// gated on the same MANAGE_CHANNELS bit as the role layer.
r.Put("/channels/{id}/user-permissions/{userId}", handlePutChannelUserPermission(database, hub, permInvalidator))
r.Delete("/channels/{id}/user-permissions/{userId}", handleDeleteChannelUserPermission(database, hub, permInvalidator))
})
// Role CRUD. MANAGE_ROLES gates the group; RoleService additionally
// enforces the hierarchy (manage only roles below your own position,
// never grant a bit your role lacks) and refuses to delete the Owner
// or the default role.
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(requirePerm(permissions.ManageRoles))
r.Get("/roles", handleListRoles(roles))
r.Post("/roles", handleCreateRole(database, hub, roles))
// Registered before /roles/{id} so "reorder" is never parsed as an id.
r.Patch("/roles/reorder", handleReorderRoles(hub, permInvalidator, roles))
r.Patch("/roles/{id}", handlePatchRole(database, hub, permInvalidator, roles))
r.Delete("/roles/{id}", handleDeleteRole(database, hub, permInvalidator, roles))
})
r.With(requirePerm(permissions.ViewAuditLog)).
Get("/audit-log", handleGetAuditLog(database))
// API tokens — Owner-only. Minting a network-reachable, revocation-
// surviving bearer credential is gated like backups/updates.
r.Get("/tokens", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleListAPITokens(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
r.Post("/tokens", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleCreateAPIToken(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
r.Delete("/tokens/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleRevokeAPIToken(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(requirePerm(permissions.ManageServer))
r.Get("/settings", handleGetSettings(database))
r.Patch("/settings", handlePatchSettings(database))
})
r.Post("/backup", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleBackup(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
r.Get("/backups", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleListBackups()).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
r.Delete("/backups/{name}", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleDeleteBackup(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
r.Post("/backups/{name}/restore", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleRestoreBackup(database, hub)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
r.Get("/updates", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleCheckUpdate(u)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
r.Post("/updates/apply", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleApplyUpdate(u, hub, version)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
})
return r
}