mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
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`Server/go.mod` declared `github.com/owncord/server` while the public repository is `github.com/J3vb/OwnCord`. Nothing resolves that path — there is no `owncord` GitHub org and no vanity-import host serving go-import metadata for it — so every import line in the tree named a location that does not exist. It compiles because a main module's own path is never fetched, which is exactly why it went unnoticed. The obvious fix — an AST-aware import rewriter (`gomvpkg`, `go mod edit`) — is wrong here, and provably so. Six of the 722 occurrences are not imports at all: `api/main_test.go:20` (a goleak `IgnoreTopFunction` pattern), `telemetry/metrics.go:17-19` (three OTel instrumentation-scope names), `invariants/syncutil_locks.go:73` (a diagnostic message), and `invariants/syncutil_locks_test.go:56` (an import line inside a raw-string Go fixture). An import rewriter touches none of them, and the compiler cannot see any of them either. Done as one scripted substitution over `git ls-files`, anchored on the full `github.com/owncord/server` string. The anchor matters: `owncord-server` is a different identifier — the OTel `service.name` (`config/config.go`, `telemetry/telemetry_otel.go`) and the GHCR image name (`.github/workflows/release.yml`, `docker-compose.yml`) — and a looser pattern would have moved it. It is untouched: 10 occurrences across 9 files, before and after. 350 files, 728 insertions, 728 deletions. 722 occurrences in 344 Go files, plus `go.mod:1`, the `sed` at `Makefile:67`, `Server/CLAUDE.md:3`, `docs/architecture/server.md:5`, and the ledger pair (`findings-ledger.json:3758` plus a `render-ledger.mjs` re-render of `FINDINGS.md`). Zero in any workflow, zero in the Dockerfile, zero in `Server/.golangci.yml` (no `local-prefixes`, `gci`, `importas` or `depguard` rule keys on the module path, so import grouping is not configured anywhere). The plan's blast-radius estimate missed one thing, and it is the one that would have gone red: **gofmt**. `J` (0x4A) sorts before every lowercase letter, so in the 36 files where a module-local import shares a contiguous group with a third-party one, the module's imports must move above `github.com/go-chi/...`. `gofmt -l` was clean before the substitution and listed exactly 36 files after it; `gofmt -w` on those 36 restores it to clean. `gofmt` is an enforced gate — the `formatters` block in `Server/.golangci.yml`, which is S-05 — so a substitution-only commit fails Lint. Verified: both directions, and the line accounting is exact. Every added line in this diff contains the new module path (728) and every removed line contains the old one (728); the count of changed lines containing neither is **zero**, so the gofmt re-sort moved module-path lines only and touched no third-party import. The residual check (`git ls-files -z | xargs -0 grep -n 'github\.com/owncord/server'`) returns exactly two hits, both deliberately out of scope: the RL-13 row in `docs/audit-2026-08-23-repository-layout.md` and the measurement row in this phase's own plan. The compiler-invisible half was proven by reverting *only* `api/main_test.go:20` to the old path on the otherwise-renamed tree: `go build ./...` and `go vet ./api/` both still pass — they see nothing wrong — while `go test ./api/` FAILS, because the runtime function name now carries the new path and goleak stops ignoring `ws.(*Hub).Run.func1`. Restoring the line makes it pass. `go.sum` is byte-identical (no `go mod tidy` was run and none was needed). All four build-tag variants compile; `go vet ./...`, `go vet -tags otel,wazero ./...` and `go vet -tags deadlock ./...` pass; `go test -race ./...` is 16/16 packages green; `go test -tags deadlock ./...` passes; the tag-gated `./plugin/...` (wazero) and `./telemetry/...` (otel) runs pass. `golangci-lint` v2.11.3 — the pinned CI version, rebuilt locally against Go 1.26 because the packaged binary cannot load a 1.26 config — reports **0 issues**. `go run ./cmd/genprotocol` leaves `git diff --exit-code ws/message_types.go ../Client/src/lib/protocolTypes.ts` clean, so the rename does not reach the generated protocol constants. `npx prettier --check .` and `node .superpowers/render-ledger.mjs --check` pass. Not included: `docs/audit-2026-08-23-repository-layout.md` and `docs/plans/b1-repository-foundation-2026-08-25.md` keep the old path — they are the audit row and the measurement that motivated this change, and rewriting them would erase the record of what was measured. They are why the residual check needs a two-path allowance rather than being empty; that allowance is stated above rather than hidden in a pathspec. `telemetry/metrics.go:19` declares `scopeVoice` for a `Server/voice` package that does not exist; the substitution carried the dead path forward verbatim as `github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/voice` rather than fixing it, because correcting a real observability bug inside a mechanical rename would hide it in a 350-file diff. It needs its own item. No `go.work`, no second module, and no vanity-import host was set up — the new path resolves against the real repository, but nothing imports this module as a library, so `go get` reachability was not exercised either way. Refs RL-13, L-12
185 lines
9.0 KiB
Go
185 lines
9.0 KiB
Go
package admin
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import (
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"net/http"
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"time"
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"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/auth"
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"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/db"
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"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/permissions"
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"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/service"
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"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/updater"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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)
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// setupLimiterReapInterval and setupLimiterReapMaxWindow control how often
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// the setup endpoint's dedicated rate limiter reaps stale window entries.
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// Vars, not consts, so tests can shrink them instead of waiting on the real
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// interval (see export_test.go).
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var (
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setupLimiterReapInterval = 5 * time.Minute
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setupLimiterReapMaxWindow = 15 * time.Minute
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)
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// setupLimiterHook, when non-nil, receives the *auth.RateLimiter NewAdminAPI
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// creates for the /setup endpoint. Test-only seam: NewAdminAPI returns only
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// an http.Handler, so tests otherwise have no way to reach that limiter to
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// verify it gets reaped.
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var setupLimiterHook func(*auth.RateLimiter)
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// startSetupLimiterReap keeps rl's window map bounded for the life of the
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// process. Every distinct source IP that ever hits POST /setup leaves an
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// entry that Allow itself only prunes on a repeat call from that same key —
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// a one-shot caller's entry sits forever unless something sweeps the whole
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// map. api/router.go reaps its own limiter with RateLimiter.StartCleanup, a
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// goroutine parked in a ticker select until a stop channel closes — but
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// NewAdminAPI has no shutdown hook and is called directly by ~180 tests that
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// never capture one, so a parked goroutine here would leak under every
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// test's goleak check. time.AfterFunc self-rescheduling avoids that: between
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// fires there is no live goroutine, only a runtime timer, so nothing needs
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// to stop it.
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func startSetupLimiterReap(rl *auth.RateLimiter) {
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// Capture the timing once, synchronously, on the caller's goroutine.
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// The rescheduled AfterFunc callbacks below must never re-read the
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// package vars themselves: those callbacks run on their own goroutine
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// indefinitely (nothing stops the chain), so a later test's
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// SetSetupLimiterReapTiming restoring the vars on its own goroutine
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// would otherwise race an in-flight reap here.
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interval, maxWindow := setupLimiterReapInterval, setupLimiterReapMaxWindow
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var reap func()
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reap = func() {
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rl.Cleanup(maxWindow)
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time.AfterFunc(interval, reap)
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}
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time.AfterFunc(interval, reap)
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}
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// ─── NewAdminAPI ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// NewAdminAPI returns a chi router with all /admin/api/* routes. All routes
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// except the unauthenticated setup endpoints are protected by
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// adminAuthMiddleware, which admits any role holding a bit of
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// permissions.AdminPerimeter; route groups then require the specific bit
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// (requirePerm) or the Owner role (ownerOnlyMiddleware).
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//
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// The optional trailing SetupOptions enables the first-run wizard's
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// config.yaml write-back and restart; without it the setup endpoints keep
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// their legacy account-only behaviour (the case in most tests).
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func NewAdminAPI(database *db.DB, version string, hub HubBroadcaster, u *updater.Updater, logBuf *RingBuffer, allowedOrigins []string, permInvalidator PermissionInvalidator, mod *service.ModerationService, roles *service.RoleService, opts ...SetupOptions) http.Handler {
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r := chi.NewRouter()
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var setupOpts SetupOptions
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if len(opts) > 0 {
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setupOpts = opts[0]
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}
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// Setup endpoints — unauthenticated, only functional when no users exist.
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setupLimiter := auth.NewRateLimiter()
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if setupLimiterHook != nil {
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setupLimiterHook(setupLimiter)
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}
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startSetupLimiterReap(setupLimiter)
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r.Get("/setup/status", handleSetupStatus(database, setupOpts))
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r.Post("/setup", handleSetup(database, setupLimiter, allowedOrigins, hub, setupOpts))
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// SSE log stream — auth is via a single-use ticket from POST /logs/ticket.
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// EventSource cannot send Authorization headers, so the client first
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// obtains a short-lived ticket via the authenticated ticket endpoint,
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// then passes it as ?ticket= to the SSE stream.
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if logBuf != nil {
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r.Get("/logs/stream", handleLogStream(database, logBuf))
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}
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// All remaining routes require authentication plus at least one
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// moderation-capable bit (permissions.AdminPerimeter). Route groups that
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// map onto a specific bit re-check it with requirePerm; the rest
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// (stats, users list, me) are perimeter-level.
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r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
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r.Use(adminAuthMiddleware(database))
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// Log stream ticket — issues a single-use, 30s TTL ticket for SSE auth.
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// ADMINISTRATOR-gated to match handleLogStream's own re-check: server
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// logs are not scoped to any narrower moderation bit.
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r.With(requirePerm(permissions.Administrator)).
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Post("/logs/ticket", handleLogTicket(database))
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r.Get("/stats", handleGetStats(database, hub))
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r.Get("/me", handleGetMe())
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r.Get("/users", handleListUsers(database))
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// Ban/unban and role change are authorized inside ModerationService
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// (BAN_MEMBERS / MANAGE_ROLES + hierarchy), so the route itself stays
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// perimeter-level — a moderator with only BAN_MEMBERS must reach it.
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r.Patch("/users/{id}", handlePatchUser(database, hub, permInvalidator, mod))
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r.With(requirePerm(permissions.KickMembers)).
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Delete("/users/{id}/sessions", handleForceLogout(mod))
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r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
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r.Use(requirePerm(permissions.ManageChannels))
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r.Get("/channels", handleListChannels(database))
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r.Post("/channels", handleCreateChannel(database, hub))
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r.Patch("/channels/{id}", handlePatchChannel(database, hub))
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r.Delete("/channels/{id}", handleDeleteChannel(database, hub))
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r.Get("/channels/{id}/permissions", handleGetChannelPermissions(database))
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r.Put("/channels/{id}/permissions/{roleId}", handlePutChannelPermission(database, hub, permInvalidator))
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r.Delete("/channels/{id}/permissions/{roleId}", handleDeleteChannelPermission(database, hub, permInvalidator))
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// Per-user overrides — the last layer of the resolution order,
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// gated on the same MANAGE_CHANNELS bit as the role layer.
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r.Put("/channels/{id}/user-permissions/{userId}", handlePutChannelUserPermission(database, hub, permInvalidator))
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r.Delete("/channels/{id}/user-permissions/{userId}", handleDeleteChannelUserPermission(database, hub, permInvalidator))
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})
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// Role CRUD. MANAGE_ROLES gates the group; RoleService additionally
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// enforces the hierarchy (manage only roles below your own position,
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// never grant a bit your role lacks) and refuses to delete the Owner
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// or the default role.
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r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
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r.Use(requirePerm(permissions.ManageRoles))
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r.Get("/roles", handleListRoles(roles))
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r.Post("/roles", handleCreateRole(database, hub, roles))
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// Registered before /roles/{id} so "reorder" is never parsed as an id.
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r.Patch("/roles/reorder", handleReorderRoles(hub, permInvalidator, roles))
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r.Patch("/roles/{id}", handlePatchRole(database, hub, permInvalidator, roles))
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r.Delete("/roles/{id}", handleDeleteRole(database, hub, permInvalidator, roles))
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})
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r.With(requirePerm(permissions.ViewAuditLog)).
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Get("/audit-log", handleGetAuditLog(database))
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// API tokens — Owner-only. Minting a network-reachable, revocation-
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// surviving bearer credential is gated like backups/updates.
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r.Get("/tokens", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleListAPITokens(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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r.Post("/tokens", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleCreateAPIToken(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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r.Delete("/tokens/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleRevokeAPIToken(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
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r.Use(requirePerm(permissions.ManageServer))
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r.Get("/settings", handleGetSettings(database))
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r.Patch("/settings", handlePatchSettings(database))
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})
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r.Post("/backup", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleBackup(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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r.Get("/backups", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleListBackups()).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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r.Delete("/backups/{name}", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleDeleteBackup(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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r.Post("/backups/{name}/restore", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleRestoreBackup(database, hub)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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r.Get("/updates", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleCheckUpdate(u)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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r.Post("/updates/apply", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(database, handleApplyUpdate(u, hub, version)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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})
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return r
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}
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