Files
OwnCord/Server/admin/handlers_tokens.go
T
Claude 7a4e5dc357 refactor: rename the Go module to github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server (RL-13)
`Server/go.mod` declared `github.com/owncord/server` while the public
repository is `github.com/J3vb/OwnCord`. Nothing resolves that path — there is
no `owncord` GitHub org and no vanity-import host serving go-import metadata
for it — so every import line in the tree named a location that does not
exist. It compiles because a main module's own path is never fetched, which is
exactly why it went unnoticed.

The obvious fix — an AST-aware import rewriter (`gomvpkg`, `go mod edit`) —
is wrong here, and provably so. Six of the 722 occurrences are not imports at
all: `api/main_test.go:20` (a goleak `IgnoreTopFunction` pattern),
`telemetry/metrics.go:17-19` (three OTel instrumentation-scope names),
`invariants/syncutil_locks.go:73` (a diagnostic message), and
`invariants/syncutil_locks_test.go:56` (an import line inside a raw-string Go
fixture). An import rewriter touches none of them, and the compiler cannot
see any of them either.

Done as one scripted substitution over `git ls-files`, anchored on the full
`github.com/owncord/server` string. The anchor matters: `owncord-server` is a
different identifier — the OTel `service.name` (`config/config.go`,
`telemetry/telemetry_otel.go`) and the GHCR image name
(`.github/workflows/release.yml`, `docker-compose.yml`) — and a looser pattern
would have moved it. It is untouched: 10 occurrences across 9 files, before
and after.

350 files, 728 insertions, 728 deletions. 722 occurrences in 344 Go files,
plus `go.mod:1`, the `sed` at `Makefile:67`, `Server/CLAUDE.md:3`,
`docs/architecture/server.md:5`, and the ledger pair
(`findings-ledger.json:3758` plus a `render-ledger.mjs` re-render of
`FINDINGS.md`). Zero in any workflow, zero in the Dockerfile, zero in
`Server/.golangci.yml` (no `local-prefixes`, `gci`, `importas` or `depguard`
rule keys on the module path, so import grouping is not configured anywhere).

The plan's blast-radius estimate missed one thing, and it is the one that
would have gone red: **gofmt**. `J` (0x4A) sorts before every lowercase
letter, so in the 36 files where a module-local import shares a contiguous
group with a third-party one, the module's imports must move above
`github.com/go-chi/...`. `gofmt -l` was clean before the substitution and
listed exactly 36 files after it; `gofmt -w` on those 36 restores it to
clean. `gofmt` is an enforced gate — the `formatters` block in
`Server/.golangci.yml`, which is S-05 — so a substitution-only commit fails
Lint.

Verified: both directions, and the line accounting is exact. Every added line
in this diff contains the new module path (728) and every removed line
contains the old one (728); the count of changed lines containing neither is
**zero**, so the gofmt re-sort moved module-path lines only and touched no
third-party import. The residual check
(`git ls-files -z | xargs -0 grep -n 'github\.com/owncord/server'`) returns
exactly two hits, both deliberately out of scope: the RL-13 row in
`docs/audit-2026-08-23-repository-layout.md` and the measurement row in this
phase's own plan. The compiler-invisible half was proven by reverting *only*
`api/main_test.go:20` to the old path on the otherwise-renamed tree:
`go build ./...` and `go vet ./api/` both still pass — they see nothing wrong
— while `go test ./api/` FAILS, because the runtime function name now carries
the new path and goleak stops ignoring `ws.(*Hub).Run.func1`. Restoring the
line makes it pass. `go.sum` is byte-identical (no `go mod tidy` was run and
none was needed). All four build-tag variants compile; `go vet ./...`,
`go vet -tags otel,wazero ./...` and `go vet -tags deadlock ./...` pass;
`go test -race ./...` is 16/16 packages green; `go test -tags deadlock ./...`
passes; the tag-gated `./plugin/...` (wazero) and `./telemetry/...` (otel)
runs pass. `golangci-lint` v2.11.3 — the pinned CI version, rebuilt locally
against Go 1.26 because the packaged binary cannot load a 1.26 config —
reports **0 issues**. `go run ./cmd/genprotocol` leaves
`git diff --exit-code ws/message_types.go ../Client/src/lib/protocolTypes.ts`
clean, so the rename does not reach the generated protocol constants.
`npx prettier --check .` and `node .superpowers/render-ledger.mjs --check`
pass.

Not included: `docs/audit-2026-08-23-repository-layout.md` and
`docs/plans/b1-repository-foundation-2026-08-25.md` keep the old path — they
are the audit row and the measurement that motivated this change, and
rewriting them would erase the record of what was measured. They are why the
residual check needs a two-path allowance rather than being empty; that
allowance is stated above rather than hidden in a pathspec.
`telemetry/metrics.go:19` declares `scopeVoice` for a `Server/voice` package
that does not exist; the substitution carried the dead path forward verbatim
as `github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/voice` rather than fixing it, because
correcting a real observability bug inside a mechanical rename would hide it
in a 350-file diff. It needs its own item. No `go.work`, no second module,
and no vanity-import host was set up — the new path resolves against the real
repository, but nothing imports this module as a library, so `go get`
reachability was not exercised either way.

Refs RL-13, L-12
2026-08-26 20:23:49 +00:00

137 lines
4.8 KiB
Go

package admin
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/auth"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/db"
)
// ─── API Token Handlers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
//
// These are the HTTP-panel equivalent of `server token create|list|revoke`
// (token_cli.go). They wrap the same db.*APIToken calls, so behaviour stays in
// sync with the CLI. All three routes are Owner-gated in api.go: minting a
// long-lived bearer credential over the network is the one admin action that,
// via a hijacked session, would outlive a password change and bulk logout
// (API tokens deliberately live outside the session table), so it stays behind
// the Owner role rather than the broad ADMINISTRATOR bit.
func handleListAPITokens(database *db.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
tokens, err := database.ListAPITokens(r.Context())
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to list tokens")
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, tokens)
}
}
// createTokenRequest is the JSON body for POST /admin/api/tokens. Username empty
// binds the token to the owner account (the CLI default); ExpiresHours 0 means
// never expires.
type createTokenRequest struct {
Label string `json:"label"`
Username string `json:"username"`
ExpiresHours int `json:"expires_hours"`
}
// createTokenResponse carries the raw token — shown exactly once, never
// recoverable — plus enough context for the UI to display what was minted.
type createTokenResponse struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Token string `json:"token"`
Label string `json:"label"`
User string `json:"user"`
}
func handleCreateAPIToken(database *db.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var req createTokenRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", "invalid request body")
return
}
req.Label = strings.TrimSpace(req.Label)
if req.Label == "" {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", "label is required")
return
}
// expires_hours=0 means "never expires" (see createTokenRequest doc).
// Negatives must not fall into that same nil-expiresAt branch, and the
// upper bound keeps time.Duration(hours)*time.Hour from overflowing
// int64 nanoseconds into a past timestamp. 87600h = 10 years.
if req.ExpiresHours < 0 || req.ExpiresHours > 24*365*10 {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", "expires_hours must be between 0 and 87600")
return
}
var user *db.User
var err error
if req.Username != "" {
user, err = database.GetUserByUsername(r.Context(), req.Username)
} else {
user, err = database.GetOwnerUser(r.Context())
}
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to look up user")
return
}
if user == nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "NOT_FOUND", "user not found")
return
}
raw, err := auth.GenerateToken()
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to generate token")
return
}
var expiresAt *time.Time
if req.ExpiresHours > 0 {
t := time.Now().Add(time.Duration(req.ExpiresHours) * time.Hour)
expiresAt = &t
}
id, err := database.CreateAPIToken(r.Context(), user.ID, auth.HashToken(raw), req.Label, expiresAt)
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to create token")
return
}
actor := actorFromContext(r)
slog.Info("api token created", "actor_id", actor, "token_id", id, "label", req.Label, "bound_user", user.Username)
db.WriteAudit(context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()), database, actor, "api_token_create", "api_token", id, req.Label)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, createTokenResponse{ID: id, Token: raw, Label: req.Label, User: user.Username})
}
}
func handleRevokeAPIToken(database *db.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
id, err := pathInt64(r, "id")
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", "invalid token id")
return
}
affected, err := database.RevokeAPIToken(r.Context(), id)
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to revoke token")
return
}
if affected == 0 {
writeErr(w, http.StatusNotFound, "NOT_FOUND", "no active token with that id")
return
}
actor := actorFromContext(r)
slog.Warn("api token revoked", "actor_id", actor, "token_id", id)
db.WriteAudit(context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()), database, actor, "api_token_revoke", "api_token", id, "")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
}