Files
OwnCord/Server/api/channel_handler.go
T
Claude 7a4e5dc357 refactor: rename the Go module to github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server (RL-13)
`Server/go.mod` declared `github.com/owncord/server` while the public
repository is `github.com/J3vb/OwnCord`. Nothing resolves that path — there is
no `owncord` GitHub org and no vanity-import host serving go-import metadata
for it — so every import line in the tree named a location that does not
exist. It compiles because a main module's own path is never fetched, which is
exactly why it went unnoticed.

The obvious fix — an AST-aware import rewriter (`gomvpkg`, `go mod edit`) —
is wrong here, and provably so. Six of the 722 occurrences are not imports at
all: `api/main_test.go:20` (a goleak `IgnoreTopFunction` pattern),
`telemetry/metrics.go:17-19` (three OTel instrumentation-scope names),
`invariants/syncutil_locks.go:73` (a diagnostic message), and
`invariants/syncutil_locks_test.go:56` (an import line inside a raw-string Go
fixture). An import rewriter touches none of them, and the compiler cannot
see any of them either.

Done as one scripted substitution over `git ls-files`, anchored on the full
`github.com/owncord/server` string. The anchor matters: `owncord-server` is a
different identifier — the OTel `service.name` (`config/config.go`,
`telemetry/telemetry_otel.go`) and the GHCR image name
(`.github/workflows/release.yml`, `docker-compose.yml`) — and a looser pattern
would have moved it. It is untouched: 10 occurrences across 9 files, before
and after.

350 files, 728 insertions, 728 deletions. 722 occurrences in 344 Go files,
plus `go.mod:1`, the `sed` at `Makefile:67`, `Server/CLAUDE.md:3`,
`docs/architecture/server.md:5`, and the ledger pair
(`findings-ledger.json:3758` plus a `render-ledger.mjs` re-render of
`FINDINGS.md`). Zero in any workflow, zero in the Dockerfile, zero in
`Server/.golangci.yml` (no `local-prefixes`, `gci`, `importas` or `depguard`
rule keys on the module path, so import grouping is not configured anywhere).

The plan's blast-radius estimate missed one thing, and it is the one that
would have gone red: **gofmt**. `J` (0x4A) sorts before every lowercase
letter, so in the 36 files where a module-local import shares a contiguous
group with a third-party one, the module's imports must move above
`github.com/go-chi/...`. `gofmt -l` was clean before the substitution and
listed exactly 36 files after it; `gofmt -w` on those 36 restores it to
clean. `gofmt` is an enforced gate — the `formatters` block in
`Server/.golangci.yml`, which is S-05 — so a substitution-only commit fails
Lint.

Verified: both directions, and the line accounting is exact. Every added line
in this diff contains the new module path (728) and every removed line
contains the old one (728); the count of changed lines containing neither is
**zero**, so the gofmt re-sort moved module-path lines only and touched no
third-party import. The residual check
(`git ls-files -z | xargs -0 grep -n 'github\.com/owncord/server'`) returns
exactly two hits, both deliberately out of scope: the RL-13 row in
`docs/audit-2026-08-23-repository-layout.md` and the measurement row in this
phase's own plan. The compiler-invisible half was proven by reverting *only*
`api/main_test.go:20` to the old path on the otherwise-renamed tree:
`go build ./...` and `go vet ./api/` both still pass — they see nothing wrong
— while `go test ./api/` FAILS, because the runtime function name now carries
the new path and goleak stops ignoring `ws.(*Hub).Run.func1`. Restoring the
line makes it pass. `go.sum` is byte-identical (no `go mod tidy` was run and
none was needed). All four build-tag variants compile; `go vet ./...`,
`go vet -tags otel,wazero ./...` and `go vet -tags deadlock ./...` pass;
`go test -race ./...` is 16/16 packages green; `go test -tags deadlock ./...`
passes; the tag-gated `./plugin/...` (wazero) and `./telemetry/...` (otel)
runs pass. `golangci-lint` v2.11.3 — the pinned CI version, rebuilt locally
against Go 1.26 because the packaged binary cannot load a 1.26 config —
reports **0 issues**. `go run ./cmd/genprotocol` leaves
`git diff --exit-code ws/message_types.go ../Client/src/lib/protocolTypes.ts`
clean, so the rename does not reach the generated protocol constants.
`npx prettier --check .` and `node .superpowers/render-ledger.mjs --check`
pass.

Not included: `docs/audit-2026-08-23-repository-layout.md` and
`docs/plans/b1-repository-foundation-2026-08-25.md` keep the old path — they
are the audit row and the measurement that motivated this change, and
rewriting them would erase the record of what was measured. They are why the
residual check needs a two-path allowance rather than being empty; that
allowance is stated above rather than hidden in a pathspec.
`telemetry/metrics.go:19` declares `scopeVoice` for a `Server/voice` package
that does not exist; the substitution carried the dead path forward verbatim
as `github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/voice` rather than fixing it, because
correcting a real observability bug inside a mechanical rename would hide it
in a 350-file diff. It needs its own item. No `go.work`, no second module,
and no vanity-import host was set up — the new path resolves against the real
repository, but nothing imports this module as a library, so `go get`
reachability was not exercised either way.

Refs RL-13, L-12
2026-08-26 20:23:49 +00:00

461 lines
14 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/auth"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/db"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/service"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
)
const (
defaultMessageLimit = 50
maxMessageLimit = 100
)
func isInvalidSearchQueryError(err error) bool {
if err == nil {
return false
}
msg := strings.ToLower(err.Error())
return strings.Contains(msg, "fts5") ||
strings.Contains(msg, "unterminated string") ||
strings.Contains(msg, "malformed") ||
strings.Contains(msg, "syntax error")
}
func searchRateLimitMiddleware(limiter *auth.RateLimiter, limit int, window time.Duration, trustedProxies []string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
proxyNets := parseCIDRList(trustedProxies) // W3-3a: parse once at construction
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ip := clientIPWithProxies(r, proxyNets)
if !limiter.Allow("search:"+ip, limit, window) {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", strconv.Itoa(int(window.Seconds())))
writeJSON(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, errorResponse{
Error: "RATE_LIMITED",
Message: "too many requests, please slow down",
})
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// PurgeBroadcaster is the interface needed to fan a bulk delete out over
// WebSocket from a REST handler. Satisfied by *ws.Hub.
type PurgeBroadcaster interface {
BroadcastChatBulkDeleted(channelID int64, messageIDs []int64)
}
// MountChannelRoutes registers all channel-related routes onto r.
// All routes require authentication. The limiter is used to rate-limit
// expensive endpoints like search. broadcaster may be nil, in which case a
// purge still commits but no chat_bulk_deleted event is emitted.
func MountChannelRoutes(r chi.Router, database *db.DB, svc *service.Services, limiter *auth.RateLimiter, trustedProxies []string, broadcaster PurgeBroadcaster) {
r.Route("/api/v1/channels", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(AuthMiddleware(database))
r.Get("/", handleListChannels(svc))
r.Get("/{id}/messages", handleGetMessages(svc))
r.Get("/{id}/messages/around/{messageId}", handleGetMessagesAround(svc))
r.Post("/{id}/messages/purge", handlePurgeMessages(svc, broadcaster))
r.Get("/{id}/messages/{messageId}/reactions/{emoji}/users", handleGetReactionUsers(svc))
r.Get("/{id}/pins", handleGetPins(svc))
r.Post("/{id}/pins/{messageId}", handleSetPinned(svc, true))
r.Delete("/{id}/pins/{messageId}", handleSetPinned(svc, false))
})
r.With(
AuthMiddleware(database),
searchRateLimitMiddleware(limiter, searchRateLimitPerMinute, time.Minute, trustedProxies),
).Get("/api/v1/search", handleSearch(svc))
}
// handleListChannels returns all channels the authenticated user can see.
func handleListChannels(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
user, _ := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
})
return
}
channels, err := svc.Channels.ListVisibleChannels(r.Context(), user.ID)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("handleListChannels", "err", err)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errorResponse{
Error: "INTERNAL_ERROR", Message: "failed to list channels",
})
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, channels)
}
}
// handleGetMessages returns paginated messages for a channel.
func handleGetMessages(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
channelID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
user, _ := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
})
return
}
before := int64(0)
if raw := r.URL.Query().Get("before"); raw != "" {
v, parseErr := strconv.ParseInt(raw, 10, 64)
if parseErr != nil || v < 0 {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "before must be a non-negative integer",
})
return
}
before = v
}
limit, ok := parseLimitParam(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
msgs, hasMore, err := svc.Messages.GetMessages(r.Context(), user.ID, channelID, before, limit)
if err != nil {
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
return
}
type response struct {
Messages []db.MessageAPIResponse `json:"messages"`
HasMore bool `json:"has_more"`
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, response{Messages: msgs, HasMore: hasMore})
}
}
// handleGetMessagesAround returns the window of messages centred on a message,
// oldest-first. Used to jump to a message (search hit, pinned entry, reply
// reference, permalink) that is not in the client's loaded history.
func handleGetMessagesAround(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
channelID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
messageID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "messageId")
if !ok {
return
}
user, _ := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
})
return
}
limit, ok := parseLimitParam(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
window, err := svc.Messages.GetMessagesAround(r.Context(), user.ID, channelID, messageID, limit)
if err != nil {
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, window)
}
}
// handleGetReactionUsers returns the users who reacted to a message with a
// given emoji, capped server-side at 100. The emoji arrives percent-encoded in
// the path; chi routes on RawPath when it differs from Path, so the param must
// be unescaped here rather than taken verbatim.
func handleGetReactionUsers(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
channelID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
messageID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "messageId")
if !ok {
return
}
user, _ := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
})
return
}
emoji := chi.URLParam(r, "emoji")
if decoded, decErr := url.PathUnescape(emoji); decErr == nil {
emoji = decoded
}
users, err := svc.Messages.GetReactionUsers(r.Context(), user.ID, channelID, messageID, emoji)
if err != nil {
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
return
}
type response struct {
Users []db.ReactionUser `json:"users"`
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, response{Users: users})
}
}
// purgeRequest is the JSON body for POST /api/v1/channels/{id}/messages/purge.
// Before is optional; 0 means "start from the newest message".
type purgeRequest struct {
Limit int `json:"limit"`
Before int64 `json:"before"`
}
// purgeResponse reports what the purge actually deleted, which can be fewer
// than Limit rows when the channel holds less history.
type purgeResponse struct {
ChannelID int64 `json:"channel_id"`
IDs []int64 `json:"ids"`
Count int `json:"count"`
}
// handlePurgeMessages bulk soft-deletes the newest messages in a channel and
// broadcasts a single chat_bulk_deleted event.
func handlePurgeMessages(svc *service.Services, broadcaster PurgeBroadcaster) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
channelID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
user, _ := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
})
return
}
var req purgeRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "invalid request body",
})
return
}
result, err := svc.Messages.PurgeMessages(r.Context(), user.ID, channelID, req.Limit, req.Before)
if err != nil {
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
return
}
// A purge that matched nothing is still a success, but there is no
// state change to announce.
if broadcaster != nil && len(result.MessageIDs) > 0 {
broadcaster.BroadcastChatBulkDeleted(result.ChannelID, result.MessageIDs)
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, purgeResponse{
ChannelID: result.ChannelID,
IDs: result.MessageIDs,
Count: len(result.MessageIDs),
})
}
}
// handleSearch performs a full-text search across messages.
func handleSearch(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
q := r.URL.Query().Get("q")
if q == "" {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "query parameter 'q' is required",
})
return
}
user, _ := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
})
return
}
var channelID *int64
if raw := r.URL.Query().Get("channel_id"); raw != "" {
v, parseErr := strconv.ParseInt(raw, 10, 64)
if parseErr != nil || v <= 0 {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "channel_id must be a positive integer",
})
return
}
channelID = &v
}
limit, ok := parseLimitParam(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
results, err := svc.Messages.SearchMessages(r.Context(), user.ID, q, channelID, limit)
if err != nil {
if isInvalidSearchQueryError(err) {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "invalid search query",
})
return
}
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
return
}
if results == nil {
results = []db.MessageSearchResult{}
}
type response struct {
Results []db.MessageSearchResult `json:"results"`
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, response{Results: results})
}
}
// handleGetPins returns all pinned messages for a channel.
func handleGetPins(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
channelID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
user, _ := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
})
return
}
msgs, err := svc.Messages.GetPinnedMessages(r.Context(), user.ID, channelID)
if err != nil {
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
return
}
type response struct {
Messages []db.MessageAPIResponse `json:"messages"`
HasMore bool `json:"has_more"`
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, response{Messages: msgs, HasMore: false})
}
}
// handleSetPinned pins or unpins a message in a channel.
func handleSetPinned(svc *service.Services, pinned bool) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
channelID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
messageID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "messageId")
if !ok {
return
}
user, _ := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
})
return
}
if err := svc.Messages.SetMessagePinned(r.Context(), user.ID, channelID, messageID, pinned); err != nil {
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
}
// writeServiceError maps a service-layer error to an HTTP response.
func writeServiceError(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrRateLimited):
writeJSON(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, errorResponse{Error: "RATE_LIMITED", Message: err.Error()})
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrBadRequest):
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: err.Error()})
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrNotFound):
writeJSON(w, http.StatusNotFound, errorResponse{Error: "NOT_FOUND", Message: err.Error()})
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrForbidden), errors.Is(err, service.ErrBlocked):
writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, errorResponse{Error: "FORBIDDEN", Message: err.Error()})
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrConflict):
writeJSON(w, http.StatusConflict, errorResponse{Error: "CONFLICT", Message: err.Error()})
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrInternal):
// ErrorContext so the enriching handler attaches req_id/trace_id,
// linking this 500 to its request log line and trace.
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "service error", "error", err)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errorResponse{Error: "INTERNAL_ERROR", Message: "an internal error occurred"})
default:
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "service error", "error", err)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errorResponse{Error: "INTERNAL_ERROR", Message: "internal error"})
}
}
// parseLimitParam reads the shared `limit` query parameter, defaulting to
// defaultMessageLimit and clamping at maxMessageLimit. Writes a 400 response
// and returns false when the value is present but not a positive integer.
func parseLimitParam(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (int, bool) {
raw := r.URL.Query().Get("limit")
if raw == "" {
return defaultMessageLimit, true
}
v, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
if err != nil || v < 1 {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "limit must be a positive integer",
})
return 0, false
}
return min(v, maxMessageLimit), true
}
// parseIDParam extracts and validates a chi URL param as int64.
// Writes a 400 response and returns false on failure.
func parseIDParam(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, param string) (int64, bool) {
raw := chi.URLParam(r, param)
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(raw, 10, 64)
if err != nil || id <= 0 {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "BAD_REQUEST",
Message: param + " must be a positive integer",
})
return 0, false
}
return id, true
}