* docs(b3): Codex round 1 — keep the main-PR Docker term, checkout dev on schedule, profile numbers, hub built in api.NewRouter P1: the Docker verify condition keeps ref_name/base_ref main and adds the schedule term. P2: scheduled runs check out dev explicitly (the workflow file comes from main). P2: the alpha profile's dimensions are defined in the plan, not borrowed from load-baseline.yml (which has only users=100). P2: ws.NewHub is called in api/router.go:106 with setters split across router.go and main.go, so B3-4 follows B3-3, which moves construction into internal/app. Also: plan-index row and roadmap slice line for B3. * feat(b3-0): boundary inventory — dbinventory tool, db-import-boundary rule, server-boundaries.md 51 production files outside db/ and service/ import db (ws 17, admin 16, api 12, auth 2, root 2, cmd/seed 1, plugin 1); 14 are type-only. Each has a disposition (move 28 / adapter 17 / boundary 6) and, for moves, a target family, held in invariants.DBImportAllow so the generated document and the gate cannot drift. The rule fails any new importer without a row; the live test fails any stale row. Hub lifecycle (setters, locks, defer stack) and the auth before-graph are inventoried for B3-2/B3-3/B3-4. Closes the B3 entry gate's third item. * fix(b3-0): dbinventory exempts only top-level db/ and service/ (Codex P2) Skipping by directory name let a nested api/service/ escape the inventory while the rule would still catch it; the walker now exempts by root-relative path, with a test over a synthetic tree.
6.2 KiB
Server Architecture
Verified against: commit 5630aa1, 2026-08-04
Single Go binary (github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server, Go 1.26). Pure-Go SQLite
(modernc.org/sqlite, no CGO), chi router, github.com/coder/websocket,
LiveKit for voice, Wazero for plugins (build-tag gated), optional OpenTelemetry
(-tags otel). Roughly 42k LOC of production code and 71k LOC of tests.
D2 — Package map
Which of these packages may import db, and what every file above the domain
layer does with it, is inventoried in
server-boundaries.md (B3-0) and enforced by the
db-import-boundary rule in Server/invariants/.
flowchart TB
subgraph entry ["Process entry"]
MAIN["main.go<br/>config, TLS, DB open+migrate,<br/>signal handling, maintenance loop"]
end
subgraph http ["HTTP layer"]
API["api<br/>router, middleware, REST handlers,<br/>WAF, LiveKit proxy, uploads"]
ADMIN["admin<br/>embedded SPA + admin REST,<br/>SSE log stream"]
end
subgraph realtime ["Real-time"]
WS["ws<br/>Hub, pub/sub, replay,<br/>typed command dispatch, LiveKit, E2EE relay"]
end
subgraph domain ["Domain"]
SVC["service<br/>Message/Channel/Permission/User/<br/>DM/Invite/Block/Moderation/Voice"]
PERM["permissions<br/>bitfield + Checker"]
PLUGIN["plugin<br/>wazero runtime, registry,<br/>manifest, host APIs"]
end
subgraph data ["Data"]
DB[("db<br/>query methods (sqlc-backed),<br/>migration runner, models")]
DBGEN["db/dbgen<br/>sqlc-generated queries"]
MIG["migrations<br/>001–028 embedded SQL"]
end
subgraph support ["Support"]
AUTH["auth<br/>bcrypt, tokens, TOTP,<br/>rate limiting, TLS"]
CFG["config<br/>koanf: defaults→YAML→env"]
STORAGE["storage<br/>upload files on disk"]
TEL["telemetry<br/>OTel (no-op default)"]
UPD["updater<br/>minisign-verified self-update"]
end
MAIN --> CFG
MAIN --> API
MAIN --> DB
API --> ADMIN
API --> WS
API --> SVC
API --> AUTH
API --> STORAGE
API --> UPD
API --> PLUGIN
SVC --> DB
SVC --> PERM
DB --> DBGEN
DB --> MIG
WS --> SVC
WS --> PLUGIN
%% Residual layering seam (dashed): raw *db.DB used above the service layer
API -.->|"handlers take *db.DB directly"| DB
ADMIN -.->|"raw *db.DB"| DB
What this shows. The layering is api → service → db (D3 removed the former
store seam). The service layer depends on a narrow service.Store interface
that *db.DB satisfies; ws and plugin depend on their own small interfaces
(ws.EventStore, plugin.PluginStore) the same way. The db package's query
methods delegate to the sqlc-generated db/dbgen code (D2), so sqlc is now the
type-checked query layer rather than dead generated code. Two dashed edges mark
the residual seam: many REST handlers still receive a raw *db.DB alongside
svc, and the admin package operates on *db.DB almost exclusively —
consolidating those behind the service layer is the remaining work (audit
A-2026-07-06 — resolved for the store seam itself; the residual consolidation
is its backlog item 12). See data-model.md.
api.NewRouter (Server/api/router.go) is the composition root: it constructs
the rate limiter, TOTP key, storage, service.New, the ws.Hub, the LiveKit
client/subprocess, the updater, the admin handler, and the plugin admin handler;
spawns background goroutines; and mounts all routes. main.go performs only
process-level wiring (config, TLS, DB, event persistence, HTTP server,
shutdown).
The plugin package is experimental and compiled out of release binaries;
plugins.md records that boundary — what exists, what carries no
promise, and which core concerns will never move behind it.
Source of truth: Server/main.go, Server/api/router.go, package import
graph (go list -deps), Server/service/datastore.go, sqlc.yaml.
D3 — REST request lifecycle
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant C as Client
participant MW as Global middleware<br/>(api/router.go)
participant RT as Route mount<br/>(Mount*Routes)
participant H as Handler
participant S as service.*
participant ST as service.Store<br/>(*db.DB)
participant DB as SQLite
C->>MW: HTTPS request
Note over MW: RequestID → Recoverer → requestLogger<br/>→ telemetry → SecurityHeadersWithTLS<br/>→ MaxBodySizeUnless(uploads exempt)<br/>→ optional Coraza WAF
MW->>RT: routed by chi
Note over RT: AuthMiddleware(database)<br/>+ per-route rate limits<br/>+ RequirePermission(...) where mounted
RT->>H: authenticated request
H->>S: domain call (svc.Messages, svc.Permissions, …)
S->>ST: narrow Store interface method
ST->>DB: SQL (db.DB query method → sqlc dbgen)
DB-->>C: JSON response (errorResponse envelope on failure)
rect rgba(200,120,120,0.15)
Note over H,DB: Deviation — auth routes: MountAuthRoutes(r, database, …)<br/>bypasses the service layer and queries *db.DB directly.<br/>Admin REST (Server/admin) does the same behind<br/>AdminIPRestrict + RequireAdminAuth.
end
What this shows. The global chain is assembled in NewRouter; note that
chi's middleware.RealIP is deliberately omitted — client IP is resolved via
clientIPWithProxies against configured trusted proxies instead, so spoofed
X-Real-IP/X-Forwarded-For headers are not trusted by default. Authentication
is bearer-token (SHA-256-hashed opaque tokens); authorization is enforced at two
deliberate scopes (D13): RequirePermission middleware gates the two
channel-less routes on server-wide role permissions via
permissions.HasServerPerm (channel overrides deliberately not consulted — a
per-channel allow must never open a server-wide gate), while anything
channel-scoped is checked in the service layer through svc.Permissions /
permissions.Checker, which resolves overrides and fails closed if they cannot
be fetched. The shaded region marks the two documented bypass paths of the
domain layer.
Source of truth: Server/api/router.go, Server/api/middleware.go,
Server/api/auth_handler.go, Server/admin/middleware.go,
Server/permissions/, Server/service/.