Files
OwnCord/docs/deployment.md
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J3vbandClaude Fable 5 88c7a8249a docs(b2-7): trust model, absence proofs, plugin boundary (#1443)
* docs(b2-7): trust model — who can read what (BPR-050/051, C-09 contract)

One document states the operator trust model in plain language and traces
every claim to a code line or test: server-readable text and files and why,
E2EE voice/video/screen with the key-holder and TOFU rules, transport per TLS
mode with desktop pinning and the browser rule, the C-09 preview destination
contract B7 implements, at-rest storage, operator can/cannot, multi-device
sessions, and what beta does not claim. Linked from security.md,
deployment.md, quick-start.md and docs/README.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu

* test(b2-7): absence proofs — no federation/directory routes, outbound host table

TestAbsenceContract_NoFederationDirectoryOrListingRoutes builds the production
router with uploads, voice and GIF on, walks the whole mounted tree with
chi.Walk and fails on any route matching federat|directory|discover|listing.
A floor on the route count and a check that the admin subtree was traversed
keep it from passing vacuously. trust-model.md gains "What OwnCord does not
have" (BPR-040/082/083) and the outbound-host table B6's network capture
checks against.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu

* docs(b2-7): plugin boundary — off twice, compiled out of releases, no API promise

docs/architecture/plugins.md records the experimental WASM boundary (BPR-080/
081, BG-17): disabled by build tag and by config, absent from release.yml and
Dockerfile builds, the HP-2 configuration audit (fresh, upgraded, Docker,
standalone), the beta release-notes wording, what exists today with its limits
and tests, the post-beta plugin candidates that stay in core during beta, and
the core concerns that never move. Linked from architecture/README.md,
architecture/server.md and docs/README.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu

* docs(b2-7): L-08 re-tagged to B10 with the reason; B2-7 evidence block

L-08's remaining gate ("deterministic source build passes") cannot pass in
principle — TinyGo embeds host paths and has no -trimpath — and a compile-only
drift check would need a second Go SDK, TinyGo and Binaryen on every PR for a
subsystem release builds compile out. Re-tagged to B10, which runs the compile
once against the release candidate or closes on the provenance record; the
"no API promise" half is closed by docs/architecture/plugins.md. The plan's
B2-7 evidence block records the four pre-squash SHAs, the absence test's RED
output, the release-build finding, the decision, and the BPR-051 reader
placeholder. CHANGELOG gains a Documentation block.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu

* fix(b2-7): Codex review — TOFU windows disclosed, legacy TOTP, absence test at three boundaries

Two P1 and three P2 from the Codex review of 56f23a36, all verified against
the code. trust-model.md now states the desktop's first-connection TLS TOFU
window and the out-of-band fingerprint check; scopes identity-key pinning to
changes after the first pin, not first contact; discloses that databases from
before TOTP encryption may still hold plaintext secrets and how re-enrolment
fixes that. The absence contract gains two sibling tests — WebSocket wire
types from protocol/schema.json and every koanf key of config.Config (one
allowlisted on-disk path whose presence the test asserts) — and the document
states what the three tests bound. plugins.md corrected: unknown config keys
are warned about and ignored, not rejected. Evidence block records PR #1443
and the review outcome.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu

* fix(b2-7): Codex re-review — desktop first-use window in every TLS mode; tls off is plaintext

The desktop pins the fingerprint it sees on first connection in every
tls.mode (CaptureVerifier, no web-PKI validation on the server connection),
so a public-CA certificate closes the first-use window only for a browser;
the short answer and the pinning list now say so. tls.mode off served
directly is plaintext HTTP with nothing enforcing a proxy; the transport
table row states it. Evidence block records the round-2 outcome.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu

* fix(b2-7): Codex round 3 — E2EE does not survive a hostile operator on first contact; memory cap is server-wide

Identity keys are trusted on first use, so a modified server can deliver an
unpinned peer's first announce with keys the operator holds and the key
holder wraps the room key to it. trust-model.md now scopes E2EE to an
operator who reads, and to a modified server only for peers pinned and
compared out of band beforehand, in every place the stronger claim stood.
plugins.md: the wazero runtime is sized from plugins.max_memory_mb alone;
a manifest's memory value is validated but not applied. Evidence block
records the round.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu

* fix(b2-7): Codex round 4 — transport intro excludes tls off; ipAllowed is not the full C-09 deny-set

The transport section opened with "everything is TLS"; it now excludes
tls.mode off. The C-09 contract cited the server's ipAllowed as the complete
address deny-set; it rejects loopback, private, link-local, unspecified,
multicast and CGN only, so the clause now lists the documentation and
benchmarking ranges the native broker must add and records that widening
ipAllowed is a separate server change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu

* fix(b2-7): Codex round 5 — backups exclude uploads; release-time appimagetool fetch listed

The built-in backup is VACUUM INTO of the SQLite file only; the trust model
and deployment.md now say uploaded files are not in it and upload.storage_dir
needs its own backup. The outbound-host section scopes "no script fetches an
external host" to scripts the server runs and lists the release workflow's
build-time appimagetool download.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu

* fix(b2-7): Codex round 6 — one pin per account, LiveKit media in the host table, quick-start wording

Identity pins are keyed by host and user id, so a peer's second device
overwrites the pin and the first device then mismatches; the document no
longer claims per-device pinning. The outbound-host table gains the
supervised LiveKit subprocess's WebRTC media and scopes the capture contract
to traffic the server initiates. The quick-start cross-link no longer says
voice and video are unreadable by the operator.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 11:49:24 +00:00

22 KiB
Raw Blame History

Deployment Guide

Production deployment guide for OwnCord server on Windows and Linux.

Prerequisites

  • Windows 10+ (x64) or Linux (x64)
  • Go 1.26+ (only if building from source)
  • LiveKit Server binary (only if enabling voice/video) -- see LiveKit Setup
  • Required port: 8443 (OwnCord HTTPS/WebSocket)
  • Additional ports for voice/video: 7880/TCP, 7881/TCP, 50000-60000/UDP
  • Additional port for ACME TLS: 80/TCP

Building from Source

Windows:

cd Server
go build -o chatserver.exe -ldflags "-s -w -X main.version=1.2.0-alpha.4" .

Linux:

cd Server
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o chatserver -ldflags "-s -w -X main.version=1.2.0-alpha.4" .
  • -s -w strips debug info (smaller binary)
  • -X main.version=... embeds the version string
  • CGO_ENABLED=0 produces a fully static binary on Linux

Alternatively, download a pre-built binary from GitHub Releases:

  • Windows: chatserver.exe
  • Linux: chatserver-linux-amd64.tar.gz (extract to get chatserver)

Docker (Linux)

The easiest way to run OwnCord on Linux. Includes the chat server and LiveKit voice/video as separate containers on a shared internal network. The server image is built FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12 and runs as a non-root user (65532), so there is no shell inside the container.

Prerequisites

  • Docker Engine 24+ and Docker Compose v2
  • Ports available: 8443 (chat), 7880-7881 TCP, 50000-60000 UDP (LiveKit media)

Quick Start

cd Server

# 1. Create your secrets file
cp .env.example .env
# Edit .env — set LIVEKIT_API_KEY and LIVEKIT_API_SECRET (secret must be 32+ chars)

# 2. Create your LiveKit config
cp livekit.yaml.example livekit.yaml
# Edit livekit.yaml — set node_ip to your server's public IP, and paste the same key/secret

# 3. Create a minimal config.yaml for OwnCord (server name, TLS, etc.)
# Leave voice.livekit_url and voice.livekit_binary unset — compose injects these via env vars

# 4. Start
docker compose up -d

On first start OwnCord creates its database and writes defaults into /app/data. Navigate to https://<your-ip>:8443/admin to create the Owner account.

config.yaml for Docker

You do not need to set voice.livekit_api_key, voice.livekit_api_secret, or voice.livekit_binary in your config.yaml when using Docker — these are injected via environment variables from .env. Set everything else as normal:

server:
  name: "My OwnCord"
  port: 8443

voice:
  livekit_url: "ws://livekit:7880" # Docker service DNS — do not change
  quality: "medium"

tls:
  mode: "self_signed" # or "acme" / "manual" for production

Data Persistence

The owncord-data Docker volume maps to /app/data inside the container. This holds the SQLite database, TLS certs, uploads, and backups. It persists across container restarts and upgrades.

To back up, use the admin backup endpoint as normal — backups land in /app/data/backups/ which is part of the named volume.

Upgrading

docker compose pull
docker compose up -d

The named volume is preserved — no data loss.

Upgrade the server before the clients. Desktop clients fetch updates from the server they connect to, and the server only offers releases whose protocol epoch it can speak itself (docs/protocol.md, Compatibility). A release that changes the wire protocol therefore reaches your users' clients only once the server runs it; releases that do not change the protocol reach them regardless. A client that is already too old for the server sees "update the client" on its connect screen, with the usual Update Now button.

Pulling the image is the only upgrade path in Docker: the admin panel's in-place "Apply Update & Restart" is refused in container deployments (503 CONTAINER_DEPLOYMENT), because the running binary is image content — a replacement written next to it would die with the container. The shipped image sets OWNCORD_CONTAINER=1 to mark this; operators who bind-mount the server binary into a container and genuinely want in-place self-update can set OWNCORD_CONTAINER=0 to opt back in.

The admin panel's backup restore (and a setup-wizard restart) does work in containers: the server drains and exits cleanly, relying on the container's restart policy to relaunch it. The shipped docker-compose.yml sets restart: unless-stopped, which covers this; if you run the container by hand, pass --restart unless-stopped or the restore leaves the container stopped.

LiveKit in Docker

LiveKit runs as its own container (livekit/livekit-server:v1) and is not managed by OwnCord's companion-process system. Leave voice.livekit_binary unset. See LiveKit Setup — Docker for details.


First Run Behavior

When chatserver.exe starts for the first time:

  1. Config creation -- config.yaml is written to the working directory with defaults
  2. Data directory -- data/ is created (database, certs, uploads, backups)
  3. TLS certificate -- A self-signed certificate is generated at data/cert.pem / data/key.pem
  4. Database migration -- SQLite database is created and all migrations run
  5. Status reset -- All user statuses are set to offline, stale voice states are cleared
  6. Setup wizard -- Navigate to https://localhost:8443/admin to run the first-time setup wizard

The setup wizard creates the Owner account and walks through the basics (server name, port, TLS mode, upload limit, voice, registration and welcome message). Choices are saved for you: live settings go to the database, and startup settings are written into config.yaml — comments and any hand edits in the file are preserved. The wizard also persists the generated LiveKit credentials so voice keeps working across restarts. If the port or TLS mode changed, the server restarts itself once and the wizard shows the new address. "Skip" runs the legacy minimal flow: just the Owner account, everything else on defaults.

Voice works out of the box: with voice.auto_download_livekit enabled (the default in a freshly generated config.yaml, and a toggle in the wizard), the server downloads a pinned livekit-server release from the official LiveKit GitHub releases in the background — verified against the release checksum file — into data/livekit/ and manages the process itself. Operators who run their own LiveKit can turn the toggle off or set voice.livekit_binary.

The server listens on https://0.0.0.0:8443 by default. See Server Configuration for all options.

Running as a Linux Service (systemd)

A crash — a panic under load, the OOM killer, a failed self-update — leaves a bare-metal server down until someone notices, so run the binary under a supervisor. A ready-made unit template ships in the repo at deploy/owncord.service; installation steps are in its header comments. The important choices it encodes:

  • Restart=always — two deliberate exits rely on it: the server exits nonzero (rather than limping along) when its WebSocket dispatch loop dies, and it exits cleanly after an admin-panel self-update, backup restore, or setup-wizard restart, expecting systemd to relaunch it running the swapped binary (the server auto-detects systemd via INVOCATION_ID and hands off this way instead of spawning a child that the unit's cgroup cleanup would kill). systemctl stop still stops it — systemd never auto-restarts an explicitly stopped unit. Update the unit file before applying server updates from the admin panel — it also repairs the update handoff when updating from older OwnCord releases, whose spawned replacement gets reaped by the cgroup cleanup.
  • TimeoutStopSec=35 — the server drains gracefully on SIGTERM with a 30s budget; systemd waits it out before escalating.
  • ReadWritePaths=/opt/owncord under ProtectSystem=strict — the install directory must stay writable or the admin panel's self-update (which renames the new binary into place) breaks.
  • AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE — only needed for tls.mode: acme, which binds :80 for HTTP-01 challenges as a non-root user.

Pair it with the scheduled backups in the admin panel — or an external cron line (see Backup Strategy below) if you prefer driving backups outside the server.

Running as a Windows Service

Option 1: NSSM (Non-Sucking Service Manager)

# Install NSSM (via Chocolatey or download from nssm.cc)
choco install nssm

# Create service
nssm install OwnCord "C:\OwnCord\chatserver.exe"
nssm set OwnCord AppDirectory "C:\OwnCord"
nssm set OwnCord DisplayName "OwnCord Chat Server"
nssm set OwnCord Start SERVICE_AUTO_START

# REQUIRED: tell the server NSSM supervises it. On a self-update/restore the
# server then exits cleanly and NSSM's default AppExit=Restart relaunches it
# with the new binary. (NSSM 2.24 is not auto-detectable, so without this the
# server spawns its own replacement, which races NSSM's relaunch.)
nssm set OwnCord AppEnvironmentExtra OWNCORD_SERVER_RESTART_MODE=supervised

# Manage
nssm start OwnCord
nssm stop OwnCord
nssm restart OwnCord

Option 2: Task Scheduler

  1. Open Task Scheduler, create a new task
  2. Trigger: At startup
  3. Action: Start chatserver.exe
  4. Set "Start in" to the directory containing config.yaml
  5. Check "Run whether user is logged on or not"
  6. Check "Run with highest privileges"

Task Scheduler starts the process but does not supervise it, so leave server.restart_mode on its default (auto resolves to spawn here): on a self-update or restore the server starts its own replacement after draining.

TLS Setup

What each mode means for the people connecting — desktop pinning, what a browser will need, and what the operator can read regardless of TLS — is in trust-model.md.

Self-Signed (default)

Auto-generated on first run. The Tauri client uses TOFU pinning to accept the cert on first connect.

tls:
  mode: "self_signed"

Let's Encrypt (ACME)

Automatic certificate issuance and renewal. Requires port 80 open and a public domain.

tls:
  mode: "acme"
  domain: "chat.example.com"
  acme_cache_dir: "data/acme_certs"

Manual Certificate

Use your own certificate files:

tls:
  mode: "manual"
  cert_file: "path/to/cert.pem"
  key_file: "path/to/key.pem"

TLS Off

Not recommended. For development or when behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy:

tls:
  mode: "off"

Reverse Proxy Topology

OwnCord terminates its own TLS by default and does not require a reverse proxy. If you front it with one anyway (shared host, existing nginx, central cert management), three things matter:

  1. What the proxy can front. Everything on port 8443 — the REST API, the WebSocket at /api/v1/ws, the admin panel, uploads, and LiveKit signaling, which the server already proxies at /livekit/*. You do NOT need to expose LiveKit's port 7880 through your proxy.
  2. What the proxy cannot front. WebRTC media: UDP 5000060000 (and the TCP 7881 fallback) must remain directly reachable on the host running LiveKit. An HTTP reverse proxy never carries this traffic.
  3. Tell OwnCord about the proxy. Set server.trusted_proxies to the proxy's own address(es) (e.g. ["10.0.0.2/32"]) so client IPs come from X-Forwarded-For for rate limiting and the admin IP allowlist. List only the proxy hops, never client networks.

Working nginx snippet:

server {
    listen 443 ssl;
    server_name chat.example.com;
    # ssl_certificate / ssl_certificate_key ...

    location / {
        proxy_pass https://127.0.0.1:8443;   # or http:// with tls.mode: off
        proxy_http_version 1.1;              # required for WebSocket upgrade
        proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
        proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
        proxy_set_header Host $host;
        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
        # Idle chat WebSockets outlive nginx's 60s default read timeout;
        # the client pings every 30s, so 300s has comfortable margin.
        proxy_read_timeout 300s;
        proxy_send_timeout 300s;
        client_max_body_size 100m;           # match upload.max_size_mb
    }
}

Backup Strategy

The built-in backup covers the database only. Uploaded files live under upload.storage_dir and are not in it — back that directory up on the same schedule, or a restore comes back with every attachment missing.

SQLite WAL Considerations

The database uses SQLite WAL mode. Do NOT copy the .db file directly while the server is running -- use the backup endpoint instead.

Admin Backup Endpoint

Endpoint Method Description
/admin/api/backup POST Create a new backup (owner-only)
/admin/api/backups GET List all backups (newest first)
/admin/api/backups/{name} DELETE Delete a backup (owner-only)
/admin/api/backups/{name}/restore POST Restore from backup (owner-only; creates pre-restore safety backup first)

Backups are stored in the configured backup directory (default data/backups/) with timestamps. Point it somewhere safer than the data volume — another disk, or a mount that is shipped off-host (rsync, rclone, a synced folder) — so backups don't share a single point of failure with the live database and uploads:

backup:
  dir: "/mnt/backup-disk/owncord"

Every backup is verified with SQLite's integrity_check right after it is written (a failed backup is removed, never listed), and again before a restore is allowed to overwrite the live database.

Note that a backup runs VACUUM INTO on the database's single write connection: writes queue for the duration (reads keep serving). On a large database, prefer scheduling backups at a low-traffic time of day.

Scheduled Backups

The Backup Schedule (off / daily / weekly) and Retention (days) settings in the admin panel are enforced by the server's maintenance loop (checked every 15 minutes):

  • A scheduled backup is taken when the newest backup on disk is older than the schedule interval — a manual backup resets the clock too.
  • Retention deletes backups older than the configured number of days, but always keeps the newest one, so a stale schedule can never delete your last copy.

External scheduling still works if you prefer it — e.g. Linux cron:

# Nightly at 03:00 via an admin API token
0 3 * * * curl -sk -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $OWNCORD_TOKEN" https://localhost:8443/admin/api/backup

or Windows Task Scheduler with PowerShell:

$headers = @{ "Cookie" = "session=<admin-session-token>" }
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://localhost:8443/admin/api/backup" -Method POST -Headers $headers -SkipCertificateCheck

Restore

Restoring replaces the live database file. A pre-restore safety backup is created automatically. A server restart is recommended after restore.

Monitoring

Health Endpoint

GET /health -- public, no authentication required.

{
  "status": "ok",
  "uptime": 86400,
  "online_users": 12
}

status is a real verdict, not a constant: the server probes its own WebSocket dispatch loop, runs a bounded SELECT 1 against the database, and checks free disk space on the data volume. When any of those fail, the endpoint returns HTTP 503 with "status": "degraded" and a reason field naming the subsystem (hub, database, or disk — no further detail, since the endpoint is unauthenticated). Checks are cached for a few seconds, so polling it aggressively does not multiply database load. Point your uptime monitor or container healthcheck at this endpoint and treat any 503 as actionable.

The server version is deliberately not exposed on this unauthenticated endpoint (anti-fingerprinting hardening).

Metrics Endpoint

GET /api/v1/metrics -- admin IP restricted.

{
  "uptime": "24h0m0s",
  "uptime_seconds": 86400,
  "goroutines": 42,
  "heap_alloc_mb": 15.3,
  "heap_sys_mb": 24.0,
  "num_gc": 150,
  "connected_users": 12,
  "voice_sessions": 3,
  "broadcast_drops": 0,
  "livekit_healthy": true,
  "reconnect_tier_buffer": 120,
  "reconnect_tier_db": 4,
  "reconnect_tier_full": 1,
  "backpressure_queue_disconnects": 0,
  "backpressure_high_fallbacks": 0,
  "backpressure_low_drops": 17,
  "ws_conn_rejects": 0,
  "disk_free_mb": 51200.5,
  "db_writer_wait_count": 3,
  "db_writer_wait_seconds": 0.021,
  "perm_cache_hits": 5120,
  "perm_cache_misses": 84,
  "event_persister": { "persisted": 4021, "dropped": 0, "flushes": 311, "errors": 0 }
}

Signals worth watching as a community grows (see docs/api.md for full field descriptions):

  • broadcast_drops growing at all → the hub-wide broadcast queue overflowed and sequenced events were lost; alert on any growth.
  • db_writer_wait_seconds climbing faster than uptime → requests are queueing on SQLite's single write connection; the write path is saturating.
  • reconnect_tier_full becoming a noticeable share of reconnects → the replay budget is too small for real disconnect gaps.
  • backpressure_queue_disconnects growing → clients are being force-cycled because they drain too slowly (slow links or an overloaded server).

LiveKit Health

GET /api/v1/livekit/health -- checks LiveKit companion process reachability.

Diagnostics

GET /api/v1/diagnostics/connectivity -- connectivity diagnostics for troubleshooting.

Auto-Update

Server

The server checks GitHub Releases for updates:

  • Compares semver versions
  • Results are cached for 1 hour
  • Downloads chatserver.exe with detached Ed25519/minisign signature verification
  • Verifies a signed server-update-manifest.json that binds the binary hash to the release version
  • Cross-checks the binary SHA256 against checksums.sha256

Applying an update then runs in this order: the current binary is rotated to chatserver.exe.old and the verified download takes its place; connected clients get a "restarting in 5s" notice; the server drains completely (HTTP listeners, WebSocket hub, the companion livekit-server, queued event/audit writes, the database and its process lock); and only then does the handoff happen — the server either starts the new binary itself or, under a supervisor (systemd/NSSM/Docker, see server.restart_mode in Server Configuration), exits cleanly so the supervisor relaunches it. Because the old process is fully gone before the new one starts, the successor boots with no port or database-lock contention.

Set github.token in config for higher API rate limits (5000/hr vs 60/hr unauthenticated).

Client

The Tauri client uses NSIS installer updates:

  • Server exposes client update assets from GitHub Releases
  • Ed25519 signature verification before applying

Firewall and Ports

Port Protocol Purpose
8443 TCP HTTPS server (configurable via server.port)
80 TCP ACME HTTP-01 challenge (only if tls.mode: acme)
7880 TCP LiveKit server (WebSocket signaling)
7881 TCP LiveKit server (RTC/TURN over TCP)
50000-60000 UDP LiveKit WebRTC media (ICE candidates)

For remote access, see the Port Forwarding Guide or Tailscale Guide.

Hardening Checklist

  • Change default admin password -- create a strong Owner password during setup
  • Set admin_allowed_cidrs -- restrict admin access to specific IPs if needed
  • Enable TLS -- use acme or manual mode; avoid off in production
  • Set allowed_origins -- restrict WebSocket origins to your domain
  • Set trusted_proxies -- configure if behind a reverse proxy
  • Set stable voice credentials -- set livekit_api_key and livekit_api_secret to avoid token breakage on restart
  • Set voice.node_ip -- required for remote users behind NAT
  • Review upload limits -- adjust upload.max_size_mb for your use case
  • Configure GitHub token -- optional, for reliable update checks
  • Schedule backups -- use the admin backup endpoint on a cron schedule
  • Monitor health -- poll /health for uptime monitoring

Background Maintenance

The server runs a maintenance loop every 15 minutes that:

  • Purges expired user sessions
  • Deletes orphaned file attachments (uploaded but never linked to a message, older than 1 hour)
  • Uses a circuit breaker (pauses after 5 consecutive failures)

Graceful Shutdown

The server handles Ctrl+C (SIGINT) and SIGTERM:

  1. Stops accepting new connections
  2. Closes all WebSocket connections and voice rooms
  3. Drains HTTP connections with a 30-second timeout
  4. Stops the maintenance loop
  5. Closes the database

See Also