Files
OwnCord/Server/auth/totp_encrypt.go
T
J3vbandClaude Opus 4.8 7b178ff30b fix(security): harden server against verified code-review findings
Applies fixes for 20 adversarially-verified findings from a whole-codebase
security review (server side). All Go build-tag variants build, `go vet` is
clean, and the suite passes (the sole failing test, ws TestEmitEvents, is a
pre-existing nil-harness failure unrelated to these changes).

High severity:
- auth: close TOCTOU in TOTP verify rate-limit by recording each attempt
  atomically up-front (was Check-then-Allow), restoring the per-user
  brute-force cap.
- plugin: enforce the CPU/time budget on every WASM guest call via a
  WithTimeout context (WithCloseOnContextDone interrupts runaways); the
  configured budget was previously parsed but never applied.
- api/waf: inspect request bodies for chunked (ContentLength==-1) requests
  so the SQLi/XSS/RCE body rules can no longer be bypassed.
- ws: rate-limit voice_join/voice_leave and voice_e2ee announce/offer, which
  fan out to every participant and could force mass disconnects.

Medium severity:
- api: run bcrypt on the unknown-user login path (no || short-circuit) to
  remove the timing-based username-enumeration oracle.
- ws: verify LiveKit webhooks via the SDK receiver so the signature is bound
  to the body hash (kills forgery/replay).
- authz: require READ_MESSAGES for reactions and for plugin-command
  broadcasts; route the latter through RequireChannelAccess.
- api: cache the client-update signature fetch and rate-limit the endpoint.
- service: propagate DeleteOtherSessions failure from ChangePassword instead
  of silently reporting success.
- api: trust the rightmost non-proxy X-Forwarded-For entry, not the
  client-controllable leftmost one.
- plugin: route auto-registered commands through the conflict-checked
  RegisterCommand; pin the DNS-validated IP for host_http dials
  (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU).
- api: mark access-controlled downloads private/no-cache + Vary: Origin.

Low severity:
- auth: fail closed when a fully-shaped TOTP ciphertext fails GCM auth
  (was returning the ciphertext as plaintext).
- api: apply the livekit-proxy path allowlist to WebSocket upgrades too.
- service: verify attachment ownership before linking (IDOR).
- admin: bound the bootstrap setup invite (5 uses / 24h); re-verify the
  update binary hash immediately before rename+spawn (TOCTOU).
- service: require BanMembers + role hierarchy for moderation ban/unban.

chore: stop tracking the stray Server/owncord-server.exe build artifact.

Test infra: add uploader_id to the hand-rolled ws test attachment schemas and
make MemStore.GetAttachmentByID a no-op lookup, matching production/DB behavior.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 21:08:54 +02:00

153 lines
5.2 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
)
const (
// totpKeyBytes is the required length for the AES-256 encryption key.
totpKeyBytes = 32
// minEncryptedHexLen is the minimum hex-encoded length of a valid
// nonce+ciphertext (12-byte nonce + at least 16-byte GCM tag = 28 bytes
// = 56 hex chars).
minEncryptedHexLen = 56
)
// LoadOrGenerateTOTPKey returns a 32-byte AES-256 key for TOTP secret
// encryption. It checks (in order):
// 1. OWNCORD_TOTP_KEY environment variable (hex-encoded 32 bytes)
// 2. dataDir/totp.key file
// 3. Auto-generates a random key, writes it to dataDir/totp.key, and logs a warning
func LoadOrGenerateTOTPKey(dataDir string) ([]byte, error) {
// 1. Check environment variable.
if envKey := os.Getenv("OWNCORD_TOTP_KEY"); envKey != "" {
key, err := hex.DecodeString(envKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("OWNCORD_TOTP_KEY is not valid hex: %w", err)
}
if len(key) != totpKeyBytes {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("OWNCORD_TOTP_KEY must be exactly %d bytes (got %d)", totpKeyBytes, len(key))
}
slog.Info("loaded TOTP encryption key from OWNCORD_TOTP_KEY environment variable")
return key, nil
}
// 2. Check key file on disk.
keyPath := filepath.Join(dataDir, "totp.key")
if data, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath); err == nil {
key, decErr := hex.DecodeString(string(data))
if decErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("totp.key contains invalid hex: %w", decErr)
}
if len(key) != totpKeyBytes {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("totp.key must contain exactly %d bytes (got %d)", totpKeyBytes, len(key))
}
slog.Info("loaded TOTP encryption key from file", "path", keyPath)
return key, nil
}
// 3. Auto-generate a new key.
key := make([]byte, totpKeyBytes)
if _, err := rand.Read(key); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("generating TOTP encryption key: %w", err)
}
// Ensure the data directory exists.
if err := os.MkdirAll(dataDir, 0o700); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating data directory for totp.key: %w", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(keyPath, []byte(hex.EncodeToString(key)), 0o600); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("writing totp.key: %w", err)
}
slog.Warn("auto-generated TOTP encryption key and saved to disk; "+
"set OWNCORD_TOTP_KEY env var for production deployments",
"path", keyPath)
return key, nil
}
// EncryptTOTPSecret encrypts a plaintext TOTP secret using AES-256-GCM.
// Returns a hex-encoded string of nonce+ciphertext.
func EncryptTOTPSecret(key []byte, plaintext string) (string, error) {
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("creating AES cipher: %w", err)
}
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("creating GCM: %w", err)
}
nonce := make([]byte, gcm.NonceSize())
if _, err := rand.Read(nonce); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("generating nonce: %w", err)
}
ciphertext := gcm.Seal(nonce, nonce, []byte(plaintext), nil)
return hex.EncodeToString(ciphertext), nil
}
// DecryptTOTPSecret decrypts a hex-encoded AES-256-GCM ciphertext back to the
// plaintext TOTP secret. For backwards compatibility, if the value does not
// look like valid encrypted data (not valid hex, or too short for
// nonce+tag), it is returned as-is so that existing unencrypted secrets
// continue to work.
func DecryptTOTPSecret(key []byte, ciphertext string) (string, error) {
// Backwards compatibility: if it doesn't look encrypted, return as-is.
// M-4: Log a warning so operators can detect unencrypted TOTP secrets
// and migrate them (e.g. after key rotation or initial setup).
if len(ciphertext) < minEncryptedHexLen {
slog.Warn("TOTP secret returned as plaintext (too short for encrypted format) — consider encrypting legacy secrets")
return ciphertext, nil
}
data, err := hex.DecodeString(ciphertext)
if err != nil {
// Not valid hex -- treat as unencrypted plaintext (backwards compat).
slog.Warn("TOTP secret returned as plaintext (not valid hex) — consider encrypting legacy secrets")
return ciphertext, nil //nolint:nilerr
}
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("creating AES cipher: %w", err)
}
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("creating GCM: %w", err)
}
nonceSize := gcm.NonceSize()
if len(data) < nonceSize+gcm.Overhead() {
// Too short to be valid encrypted data -- return as plaintext.
slog.Warn("TOTP secret returned as plaintext (data too short for nonce+tag)")
return ciphertext, nil
}
nonce, sealed := data[:nonceSize], data[nonceSize:]
plaintext, err := gcm.Open(nil, nonce, sealed, nil)
if err != nil {
// The value has the full encrypted shape (valid hex, long enough for
// nonce+tag) but GCM authentication failed. That is a real error — a
// wrong TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY or a tampered/corrupted ciphertext — not a
// legacy plaintext secret (those are caught by the not-hex and
// too-short branches above). Fail CLOSED: returning the ciphertext as
// if it were the secret would silently mask key misconfiguration.
slog.Error("TOTP secret decryption failed — check TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY", "error", err)
return "", fmt.Errorf("decrypting TOTP secret: %w", err)
}
return string(plaintext), nil
}