Files
OwnCord/Server/db/audit.go
T
J3vbandClaude Fable 5 6afa9e974c refactor(server): thread context.Context through the db layer and all callers
Fixes all 109 golangci-lint findings (106 contextcheck, 1 gocritic,
2 gosec) that accumulated after D2 wired dbgen (whose queries take ctx)
under ctx-less db.DB wrappers while CI lint was quota-dead. No nolint
comments added; every finding fixed by genuinely threading context.

- db: all 138 hand-written db.DB methods take ctx first; the dbCtx()
  Background shim is deleted; raw Query/QueryRow/Exec/Begin use their
  Context variants; the four redundant ctx-less passthroughs removed.
  db.Auditor/WriteAudit gain ctx.
- Seams: permissions.Checker (DB iface, HasChannelPerm,
  RequireChannelAccess) and the service.Store interface mirror the new
  signatures (ws.EventStore and plugin.PluginStore already did).
- Callers: api/admin handlers use r.Context(); ws per-message paths use
  the connection ctx via DispatchV2; hub loops and startup wiring use
  context.Background(); service methods thread ctx where they have one
  and Background where no ctx exists. Public service surface reached by
  ctx-holding chains (PermissionService.HasChannelPerm/GetRoleForUser/
  RequireChannelAccess, message/dm/block/invite/profile methods) is now
  ctx-first.
- Detached (context.WithoutCancel) where cancellation would break an
  invariant, found by a 3-lens adversarial review of the diff:
  * voice-leave background retries (a dead webhook/connection ctx killed
    retry 2 before it ran, leaving ghost capacity-holding voice rows)
  * rollbackVoiceJoin's compensating delete (its trigger IS the cancel)
  * post-2FA-change DeleteOtherSessions and logout DeleteSession (the
    security tail of a committed change must not die with the request)
  * all api/ws audit writes (a banned user could suppress their own
    login_blocked_banned row by aborting the request mid-bcrypt)
  * admin backup VACUUM INTO (an interrupt left a truncated .db that
    the backup list presented as restorable)
  * post-commit message/edit refetches (a committed message must still
    fan out when the sender disconnects)
  * hub settings-cache refresh (one dead connection could pin stale
    values for the 30s TTL)
- gocritic rangeValCopy fixed (index iteration); gosec G306 excluded in
  config with justification (generated source must stay world-readable)
  instead of flipping genprotocol output to 0o600.

Verified: gofmt/vet, all four build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock
pass, full -race pass, golangci-lint 0 issues uncapped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 17:03:52 +02:00

36 lines
1.4 KiB
Go

package db
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
)
// Auditor is the minimal audit-write surface WriteAudit needs. *DB satisfies
// it directly, and the service layer's Store interface does too, so every
// caller — api, admin, ws, service — can route its audit writes through this
// one helper regardless of whether it holds a *DB or a narrower interface.
type Auditor interface {
LogAudit(ctx context.Context, actorID int64, action, targetType string, targetID int64, detail string) error
}
// WriteAudit records an audit entry best-effort.
//
// Per the D8 policy decision (docs/plans/audit-2026-07-19-decisions.md), audit
// writes stay best-effort: a LogAudit failure must never fail or abort the
// caller's request. But a failed write must never be silently discarded
// either — this helper logs it with the actor/action/target context so the
// gap is visible in the logs. The detail string is intentionally not logged;
// it can carry request-specific or sensitive text and the structured fields
// already identify what was attempted.
func WriteAudit(ctx context.Context, a Auditor, actorID int64, action, targetType string, targetID int64, detail string) {
if err := a.LogAudit(ctx, actorID, action, targetType, targetID, detail); err != nil {
slog.Error("audit log write failed",
"action", action,
"actor_id", actorID,
"target_type", targetType,
"target_id", targetID,
"error", err,
)
}
}