OwnCord/Server/api/emoji_handler.go

package api

import (
	"bytes"
	"context"
	"encoding/binary"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"image"
	_ "image/gif"  // register the GIF decoder for image.DecodeConfig
	_ "image/jpeg" // register the JPEG decoder for image.DecodeConfig
	_ "image/png"  // register the PNG decoder for image.DecodeConfig
	"io"
	"log/slog"
	"net/http"
	"strconv"
	"time"

	"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/auth"
	"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/db"
	"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/service"
	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
	"github.com/google/uuid"
)

// EmojiBroadcaster is the slice of the hub the emoji routes need: after every
// mutation the full set is pushed to every connected client so pickers,
// message rendering and reaction pills converge without a reconnect.
type EmojiBroadcaster interface {
	BroadcastEmojiUpdate(list []*db.Emoji)
}

// emojiResponse is the JSON shape of one emoji in GET/POST /api/v1/emoji.
// Deliberately not db.Emoji: the storage id and sniffed mime type are
// server-side details, and `url` is what a client actually needs.
type emojiResponse struct {
	ID        int64  `json:"id"`
	Shortcode string `json:"shortcode"`
	URL       string `json:"url"`
}

func toEmojiResponse(e *db.Emoji) emojiResponse {
	return emojiResponse{ID: e.ID, Shortcode: e.Shortcode, URL: service.EmojiImageURL(e.ID)}
}

func toEmojiResponses(list []*db.Emoji) []emojiResponse {
	out := make([]emojiResponse, 0, len(list))
	for _, e := range list {
		if e == nil {
			continue
		}
		out = append(out, toEmojiResponse(e))
	}
	return out
}

// allowedEmojiMIME is the set of image types an emoji may be, matched against
// the type sniffed from the file's own bytes. SVG is absent on purpose: it is
// markup with script and external-fetch capability, which is exactly what
// isUnsafeInlineMIME forces to a download on the attachment route -- an emoji
// is by definition rendered inline, so the format simply cannot be allowed.
var allowedEmojiMIME = map[string]bool{
	"image/png":  true,
	"image/jpeg": true,
	"image/gif":  true,
	"image/webp": true,
}

// MountEmojiRoutes registers the custom-emoji endpoints.
//
// Every route requires authentication: reading the set is ungated beyond that
// (emoji are server-wide and every member renders them), while POST and DELETE
// are gated on MANAGE_SERVER inside EmojiService. The image route is
// authenticated rather than public so an emoji cannot be used as an
// unauthenticated tracking pixel hosted on someone else's server.
func MountEmojiRoutes(r chi.Router, database *db.DB, svc *service.Services, store FileStore, limiter *auth.RateLimiter, broadcaster EmojiBroadcaster) {
	r.Route("/api/v1/emoji", func(r chi.Router) {
		r.Use(AuthMiddleware(database))
		r.Get("/", handleListEmoji(svc))
		r.Get("/{id}/image", handleServeEmojiImage(svc, store))
		r.With(MaxBodySize(emojiMaxBodySize)).
			Post("/", handleCreateEmoji(svc, store, limiter, broadcaster))
		r.Delete("/{id}", handleDeleteEmoji(svc, store, broadcaster))
	})
}

func handleListEmoji(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		list, err := svc.Emoji.List(r.Context())
		if err != nil {
			writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
			return
		}
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, toEmojiResponses(list))
	}
}

// handleCreateEmoji processes POST /api/v1/emoji (multipart: `file` + `shortcode`).
//
// Order matters here. The permission gate runs BEFORE the multipart parse, so a
// member without MANAGE_SERVER cannot make the server spool a body to disk; the
// shortcode is validated next, so a malformed name costs nothing either; only
// then are the bytes read, sniffed, measured and stored.
func handleCreateEmoji(svc *service.Services, store FileStore, limiter *auth.RateLimiter, broadcaster EmojiBroadcaster) http.HandlerFunc {
	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
		if !ok || user == nil {
			writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
				Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "not authenticated",
			})
			return
		}

		if err := svc.Emoji.RequireManage(r.Context(), user.ID); err != nil {
			writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
			return
		}

		if limiter != nil && !limiter.Allow(auth.Key("emoji_upload", user.ID), emojiUploadRateLimitPerMinute, time.Minute) {
			writeJSON(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, errorResponse{
				Error: "RATE_LIMITED", Message: "emoji upload rate limit exceeded, try again later",
			})
			return
		}

		// Bound the body before the multipart parser touches it. The route also
		// carries MaxBodySize, but a handler that parses a form has to state
		// its own limit — the parser is what turns an unbounded body into heap.
		r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, emojiMaxBodySize)

		if err := r.ParseMultipartForm(emojiMultipartMemoryLimit); err != nil {
			writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
				Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "invalid multipart form",
			})
			return
		}

		shortcode, err := service.ValidateShortcode(r.FormValue("shortcode"))
		if err != nil {
			writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
			return
		}

		raw, mimeType, readOK := readEmojiUpload(w, r)
		if !readOK {
			return
		}

		storedAs := uuid.New().String()
		if _, saveErr := store.Save(storedAs, bytes.NewReader(raw)); saveErr != nil {
			// writeStorageSaveError also stops echoing raw storage errors
			// (which embed absolute paths) into the response body.
			writeStorageSaveError(w, saveErr, "emoji upload")
			return
		}

		created, err := svc.Emoji.Create(r.Context(), user.ID, shortcode, storedAs, mimeType)
		if err != nil {
			// The row never landed, so the file is an orphan — unlink it.
			if delErr := store.Delete(storedAs); delErr != nil {
				slog.Error("failed to clean up orphaned emoji file", "stored_as", storedAs, "error", delErr)
			}
			writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
			return
		}

		broadcastEmojiSet(r.Context(), svc, broadcaster)
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, toEmojiResponse(created))
	}
}

// readEmojiUpload pulls the uploaded file out of the already-parsed multipart
// form and enforces every property of the bytes themselves: the size cap, the
// sniffed MIME type and the sniffed pixel dimensions. It writes the refusal
// itself, so a false third result means the response is already complete.
func readEmojiUpload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) ([]byte, string, bool) {
	file, _, err := r.FormFile("file")
	if err != nil {
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
			Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "missing file field",
		})
		return nil, "", false
	}
	defer file.Close() //nolint:errcheck

	// Read at most one byte past the cap so "exactly at the limit" passes
	// and "one byte over" is caught, without buffering an unbounded body.
	raw, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(file, maxEmojiFileBytes+1))
	if err != nil {
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
			Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "failed to read uploaded file",
		})
		return nil, "", false
	}
	if int64(len(raw)) > maxEmojiFileBytes {
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
			Error:   "BAD_REQUEST",
			Message: fmt.Sprintf("emoji must be at most %d KB", maxEmojiFileBytes>>10),
		})
		return nil, "", false
	}

	mimeType := http.DetectContentType(raw)
	if !allowedEmojiMIME[mimeType] {
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
			Error:   "BAD_REQUEST",
			Message: "emoji must be a PNG, JPEG, GIF or WebP image",
		})
		return nil, "", false
	}

	width, height, err := imageDimensions(raw, mimeType)
	if err != nil {
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
			Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "could not read image dimensions",
		})
		return nil, "", false
	}
	// Re-check the sniffed dimensions rather than trusting anything the
	// client said about the image: the cap is what keeps an "emoji" from
	// being a full-size picture inlined into every message that names it.
	if width <= 0 || height <= 0 || width > maxEmojiDimension || height > maxEmojiDimension {
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
			Error:   "BAD_REQUEST",
			Message: fmt.Sprintf("emoji must be at most %dx%d pixels (got %dx%d)", maxEmojiDimension, maxEmojiDimension, width, height),
		})
		return nil, "", false
	}

	return raw, mimeType, true
}

func handleDeleteEmoji(svc *service.Services, store FileStore, broadcaster EmojiBroadcaster) http.HandlerFunc {
	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
		if !ok || user == nil {
			writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
				Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "not authenticated",
			})
			return
		}
		id, err := strconv.ParseInt(chi.URLParam(r, "id"), 10, 64)
		if err != nil || id <= 0 {
			writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
				Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "invalid emoji id",
			})
			return
		}

		removed, err := svc.Emoji.Delete(r.Context(), user.ID, id)
		if err != nil {
			writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
			return
		}
		// The row is already gone, so a failed unlink leaves an orphaned blob,
		// not a broken emoji — log it rather than failing a successful delete.
		if delErr := store.Delete(removed.StoredAs); delErr != nil {
			slog.Warn("failed to remove emoji file", "stored_as", removed.StoredAs, "error", delErr)
		}

		broadcastEmojiSet(r.Context(), svc, broadcaster)
		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
	}
}

// broadcastEmojiSet re-reads the set and pushes it to every client. A failure
// here is logged and swallowed: the mutation itself already succeeded, and the
// caller's own response carries the change.
//
// Called after the mutation has already committed, so the caller's request
// context may be canceled by the time this runs (client aborted, deadline
// fired) -- context.WithoutCancel detaches the re-read from that, matching
// the pattern service/emoji.go already uses for its post-commit audit write.
func broadcastEmojiSet(ctx context.Context, svc *service.Services, broadcaster EmojiBroadcaster) {
	if broadcaster == nil {
		return
	}
	list, err := svc.Emoji.List(context.WithoutCancel(ctx))
	if err != nil {
		slog.Error("failed to load emoji for broadcast", "error", err)
		return
	}
	broadcaster.BroadcastEmojiUpdate(list)
}

// handleServeEmojiImage serves the stored bytes of one emoji.
//
// Unlike /api/v1/files/{id} there is no per-channel ACL to apply: an emoji is
// server-wide by construction, so authentication is the whole check. The
// response is immutable for the id's lifetime (an emoji's bytes never change
// — a replacement is a new row), which is what lets it be cached hard.
func handleServeEmojiImage(svc *service.Services, store FileStore) http.HandlerFunc {
	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		id, err := strconv.ParseInt(chi.URLParam(r, "id"), 10, 64)
		if err != nil || id <= 0 {
			http.NotFound(w, r)
			return
		}
		e, err := svc.Emoji.Get(r.Context(), id)
		if err != nil {
			if errors.Is(err, service.ErrNotFound) {
				http.NotFound(w, r)
				return
			}
			writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
			return
		}
		f, err := store.Open(e.StoredAs)
		if err != nil {
			http.NotFound(w, r)
			return
		}
		defer f.Close() //nolint:errcheck

		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", e.MimeType)
		w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
		w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", "inline")
		// Private (it needed a session to fetch) but immutable, so a client may
		// keep it for a day rather than re-fetching it for every message.
		w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "private, max-age=86400, immutable")

		var modTime time.Time
		if info, statErr := f.Stat(); statErr == nil {
			modTime = info.ModTime()
		}
		http.ServeContent(w, r, e.Shortcode, modTime, f)
	}
}

// ─── Dimension extraction ────────────────────────────────────────────────────

// imageDimensions returns the pixel size of an image already known to be one of
// the allowed types. PNG/JPEG/GIF go through image.DecodeConfig; WebP has no
// decoder in the standard library and none is vendored, so its header is read
// directly — which is all that is wanted here anyway, since decoding a whole
// frame just to learn its size is work the cap exists to avoid.
//
// Shared by the emoji and avatar upload routes: both refuse an image too big
// for the surface it renders on, and both have to answer the same question
// about the same four formats.
func imageDimensions(raw []byte, mimeType string) (width, height int, err error) {
	if mimeType == "image/webp" {
		width, height, err = webpDimensions(raw)
	} else {
		var cfg image.Config
		cfg, _, err = image.DecodeConfig(bytes.NewReader(raw))
		if err != nil {
			return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("decoding image config: %w", err)
		}
		width, height = cfg.Width, cfg.Height
	}
	if err != nil {
		return 0, 0, err
	}
	// Both callers treat a non-error return as trustworthy enough to compare
	// straight against their pixel cap. A width or height of zero is not a
	// "small" image, it is a decoder -- Go's own GIF DecodeConfig happily
	// reports height=0 for a malformed logical screen descriptor -- accepting
	// a degenerate header as valid. Rejecting it here means the invariant
	// holds even for a caller that forgets to re-check, instead of relying on
	// every call site getting its own bounds check right.
	if width <= 0 || height <= 0 {
		return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("decoding image config: non-positive dimensions %dx%d", width, height)
	}
	return width, height, nil
}

// errBadWebP is returned for any WebP whose header does not parse; the caller
// turns it into the same 400 a corrupt PNG gets.
var errBadWebP = errors.New("malformed WebP header")

// webpDimensions reads the canvas size out of a RIFF/WEBP container. All three
// chunk flavours are handled: VP8 (lossy), VP8L (lossless) and VP8X (extended,
// which is what an animated or alpha WebP uses).
func webpDimensions(raw []byte) (width, height int, err error) {
	// 12-byte RIFF header + at least a 4-byte chunk fourcc.
	if len(raw) < 16 || string(raw[0:4]) != "RIFF" || string(raw[8:12]) != "WEBP" {
		return 0, 0, errBadWebP
	}
	switch string(raw[12:16]) {
	case "VP8 ":
		// Chunk payload starts at 20; the keyframe start code sits 3 bytes in,
		// followed by two 14-bit dimensions (the top 2 bits are a scale field).
		if len(raw) < 30 {
			return 0, 0, errBadWebP
		}
		if raw[23] != 0x9d || raw[24] != 0x01 || raw[25] != 0x2a {
			return 0, 0, errBadWebP
		}
		w := int(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(raw[26:28]) & 0x3FFF)
		h := int(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(raw[28:30]) & 0x3FFF)
		// Unlike VP8L/VP8X (which store size-1, so they can never encode
		// zero), the VP8 keyframe stores the size directly: an all-zero
		// dimension field is a validly-shaped but degenerate header, not a
		// real 0x0 canvas. Reject it here rather than reporting "success"
		// with a size no image actually has.
		if w == 0 || h == 0 {
			return 0, 0, errBadWebP
		}
		return w, h, nil
	case "VP8L":
		// Payload starts at 20 with a 0x2F signature byte, then a packed
		// 14+14-bit (width-1, height-1) pair.
		if len(raw) < 25 || raw[20] != 0x2F {
			return 0, 0, errBadWebP
		}
		bits := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(raw[21:25])
		w := int(bits&0x3FFF) + 1
		h := int((bits>>14)&0x3FFF) + 1
		return w, h, nil
	case "VP8X":
		// Payload starts at 20: flags byte, 3 reserved bytes, then canvas
		// width-1 and height-1 as 24-bit little-endian values.
		if len(raw) < 30 {
			return 0, 0, errBadWebP
		}
		w := int(uint32(raw[24]) | uint32(raw[25])<<8 | uint32(raw[26])<<16)
		h := int(uint32(raw[27]) | uint32(raw[28])<<8 | uint32(raw[29])<<16)
		return w + 1, h + 1, nil
	default:
		return 0, 0, errBadWebP
	}
}