Files
OwnCord/Server/api/profile_handler.go
T
J3vbandClaude Opus 4.8 d35de4ca0a fix: integrate logging hardening with rebased main (F3 + tauri plugins)
Rebasing onto post-F3 main surfaced two spots the auto-merge left inconsistent:
- profile_handler UpdateIdentityKey path: thread ctx into the writeServiceError
  call (the signature gained a context param in the server logging change)
- identity-pin store lookup: drop a needless borrow flagged by clippy

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 11:29:21 +02:00

363 lines
12 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
"github.com/owncord/server/db"
"github.com/owncord/server/service"
)
// ─── Request / Response types ────────────────────────────────────────────────
// updateProfileRequest is the JSON body for PATCH /api/v1/users/me.
// identity_public_key, when present, publishes the client's long-term E2EE
// identity public key (F3 voice E2EE TOFU); omitted = leave unchanged.
type updateProfileRequest struct {
Username string `json:"username"`
Avatar *string `json:"avatar"`
IdentityPublicKey *string `json:"identity_public_key"`
}
// changePasswordRequest is the JSON body for PUT /api/v1/users/me/password.
type changePasswordRequest struct {
OldPassword string `json:"old_password"`
NewPassword string `json:"new_password"`
}
// sessionResponse is the JSON shape for a single session in list responses.
type sessionResponse struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Device string `json:"device"`
IP string `json:"ip"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
LastUsed string `json:"last_used"`
IsCurrent bool `json:"is_current"`
}
// sessionsListResponse is the JSON envelope for GET /api/v1/users/me/sessions.
type sessionsListResponse struct {
Sessions []sessionResponse `json:"sessions"`
}
// ─── Route mounting ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// ProfileBroadcaster is the interface the profile handler uses to notify
// connected WebSocket clients about profile changes.
type ProfileBroadcaster interface {
BroadcastUserUpdate(userID int64, username string, avatar *string, identityPublicKey *string)
}
// MountProfileRoutes registers user profile management endpoints.
// All routes require authentication. trustedProxies is used for rate limiting.
func MountProfileRoutes(r chi.Router, database *db.DB, svc *service.Services, limiter *auth.RateLimiter, trustedProxies []string, broadcaster ProfileBroadcaster) {
r.Route("/api/v1/users/me", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(AuthMiddleware(database))
r.With(RateLimitMiddleware(limiter, profileUpdateRateLimitPerMinute, time.Minute, trustedProxies)).
Patch("/", handleUpdateProfile(svc, broadcaster))
r.With(RateLimitMiddleware(limiter, profilePasswordRateLimitPerMinute, time.Minute, trustedProxies)).
Put("/password", handleChangePassword(svc, limiter))
r.Get("/sessions", handleListSessions(svc))
r.Delete("/sessions/{id}", handleRevokeSession(svc))
})
}
// ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// validateIdentityKey checks that key is non-empty, at most 128 characters and
// valid standard-alphabet base64 (padded or unpadded) — the same posture as
// the WS voice_e2ee_announce public_key validation.
func validateIdentityKey(key string) error {
if key == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("identity_public_key must not be empty")
}
if len(key) > 128 {
return fmt.Errorf("identity_public_key too large (max 128 characters)")
}
if _, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(key); err == nil {
return nil
}
if _, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(key); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("identity_public_key is not valid base64")
}
return nil
}
// validateAvatarURL checks that avatar is either empty or a valid https:// URL
// no longer than maxAvatarURLLen characters.
func validateAvatarURL(avatar string) error {
if avatar == "" {
return nil
}
if len(avatar) > maxAvatarURLLen {
return fmt.Errorf("avatar URL too long (max %d characters)", maxAvatarURLLen)
}
parsed, err := url.Parse(avatar)
if err != nil || parsed.Scheme != "https" || parsed.Host == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("avatar URL must use https://")
}
return nil
}
// ─── Handlers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// handleUpdateProfile processes PATCH /api/v1/users/me.
func handleUpdateProfile(svc *service.Services, broadcaster ProfileBroadcaster) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if !ok || user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "not authenticated",
})
return
}
var req updateProfileRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: "malformed request body",
})
return
}
req.Username = strings.TrimSpace(sanitizer.Sanitize(req.Username))
if req.Username == "" {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: "username is required",
})
return
}
if err := auth.ValidateUsername(req.Username); err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: err.Error(),
})
return
}
// Sanitize and validate avatar if provided.
if req.Avatar != nil {
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(sanitizer.Sanitize(*req.Avatar))
if err := validateAvatarURL(trimmed); err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: err.Error(),
})
return
}
req.Avatar = &trimmed
}
// Validate the identity key before any write so the request is
// all-or-nothing.
if req.IdentityPublicKey != nil {
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(*req.IdentityPublicKey)
if err := validateIdentityKey(trimmed); err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: err.Error(),
})
return
}
req.IdentityPublicKey = &trimmed
}
updated, err := svc.Users.UpdateProfile(r.Context(), user.ID, req.Username, req.Avatar)
if err != nil {
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
return
}
if req.IdentityPublicKey != nil {
updated, err = svc.Users.UpdateIdentityKey(r.Context(), user.ID, *req.IdentityPublicKey)
if err != nil {
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
return
}
}
// Broadcast profile change to all connected WebSocket clients.
if broadcaster != nil {
broadcaster.BroadcastUserUpdate(updated.ID, updated.Username, updated.Avatar, updated.IdentityPublicKey)
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, toUserResponse(updated))
}
}
// handleChangePassword processes PUT /api/v1/users/me/password.
func handleChangePassword(svc *service.Services, limiter *auth.RateLimiter) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if !ok || user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "not authenticated",
})
return
}
// BUG-111: Per-user lockout to prevent password brute-force via stolen session.
lockKey := fmt.Sprintf("pw_confirm_lock:%d", user.ID)
if limiter.IsLockedOut(lockKey) {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, errorResponse{
Error: "RATE_LIMITED", Message: "too many failed attempts, try again later",
})
return
}
var req changePasswordRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: "malformed request body",
})
return
}
if req.OldPassword == "" || req.NewPassword == "" {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: "old_password and new_password are required",
})
return
}
// Verify old password using constant-time bcrypt comparison.
failKey := fmt.Sprintf("pw_confirm_fail:%d", user.ID)
if !auth.CheckPassword(user.PasswordHash, req.OldPassword) {
if !limiter.Allow(failKey, pwConfirmFailureThreshold, pwConfirmFailureWindow) {
limiter.Lockout(r.Context(), lockKey, pwConfirmLockoutDuration)
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, errorResponse{
Error: "FORBIDDEN", Message: "incorrect password",
})
return
}
limiter.Reset(r.Context(), failKey)
// Reject same old/new password.
if req.OldPassword == req.NewPassword {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: "new password must be different from old password",
})
return
}
// Validate new password strength.
if err := auth.ValidatePasswordStrength(req.NewPassword); err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "INVALID_INPUT", Message: err.Error(),
})
return
}
// Hash new password.
hash, err := auth.HashPassword(req.NewPassword)
if err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errorResponse{
Error: "INTERNAL_ERROR", Message: "failed to process password change",
})
return
}
// Delegate to service for password update + session revocation.
sess, _ := r.Context().Value(SessionKey).(*db.Session)
keepSessionID := int64(0)
if sess != nil {
keepSessionID = sess.ID
}
res, err := svc.Users.ChangePassword(r.Context(), user.ID, hash, keepSessionID)
if err != nil {
// Only reachable when the password itself failed to commit.
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
return
}
if res.RevokeFailed {
// Partial success: the password IS changed; only revoking the
// other sessions failed. A 5xx here would tell the user to retry
// with a password that no longer works.
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
"warning": "password changed, but other sessions could not be revoked; revoke them from the sessions list",
"sessions_revoked": res.SessionsRevoked,
})
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
}
// handleListSessions processes GET /api/v1/users/me/sessions.
func handleListSessions(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if !ok || user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "not authenticated",
})
return
}
sess, ok := r.Context().Value(SessionKey).(*db.Session)
if !ok || sess == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "not authenticated",
})
return
}
sessions, err := svc.Users.ListSessions(r.Context(), user.ID)
if err != nil {
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
return
}
resp := sessionsListResponse{
Sessions: make([]sessionResponse, 0, len(sessions)),
}
for _, s := range sessions {
resp.Sessions = append(resp.Sessions, sessionResponse{
ID: s.ID,
Device: s.Device,
IP: s.IP,
CreatedAt: s.CreatedAt,
LastUsed: s.LastUsed,
IsCurrent: s.ID == sess.ID,
})
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
}
// handleRevokeSession processes DELETE /api/v1/users/me/sessions/{id}.
func handleRevokeSession(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if !ok || user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "not authenticated",
})
return
}
sessionID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
if err := svc.Users.RevokeSession(r.Context(), user.ID, sessionID); err != nil {
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
}