mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
synced 2026-09-03 03:50:00 +03:00
Applies fixes for 20 adversarially-verified findings from a whole-codebase security review (server side). All Go build-tag variants build, `go vet` is clean, and the suite passes (the sole failing test, ws TestEmitEvents, is a pre-existing nil-harness failure unrelated to these changes). High severity: - auth: close TOCTOU in TOTP verify rate-limit by recording each attempt atomically up-front (was Check-then-Allow), restoring the per-user brute-force cap. - plugin: enforce the CPU/time budget on every WASM guest call via a WithTimeout context (WithCloseOnContextDone interrupts runaways); the configured budget was previously parsed but never applied. - api/waf: inspect request bodies for chunked (ContentLength==-1) requests so the SQLi/XSS/RCE body rules can no longer be bypassed. - ws: rate-limit voice_join/voice_leave and voice_e2ee announce/offer, which fan out to every participant and could force mass disconnects. Medium severity: - api: run bcrypt on the unknown-user login path (no || short-circuit) to remove the timing-based username-enumeration oracle. - ws: verify LiveKit webhooks via the SDK receiver so the signature is bound to the body hash (kills forgery/replay). - authz: require READ_MESSAGES for reactions and for plugin-command broadcasts; route the latter through RequireChannelAccess. - api: cache the client-update signature fetch and rate-limit the endpoint. - service: propagate DeleteOtherSessions failure from ChangePassword instead of silently reporting success. - api: trust the rightmost non-proxy X-Forwarded-For entry, not the client-controllable leftmost one. - plugin: route auto-registered commands through the conflict-checked RegisterCommand; pin the DNS-validated IP for host_http dials (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU). - api: mark access-controlled downloads private/no-cache + Vary: Origin. Low severity: - auth: fail closed when a fully-shaped TOTP ciphertext fails GCM auth (was returning the ciphertext as plaintext). - api: apply the livekit-proxy path allowlist to WebSocket upgrades too. - service: verify attachment ownership before linking (IDOR). - admin: bound the bootstrap setup invite (5 uses / 24h); re-verify the update binary hash immediately before rename+spawn (TOCTOU). - service: require BanMembers + role hierarchy for moderation ban/unban. chore: stop tracking the stray Server/owncord-server.exe build artifact. Test infra: add uploader_id to the hand-rolled ws test attachment schemas and make MemStore.GetAttachmentByID a no-op lookup, matching production/DB behavior. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
246 lines
8.8 KiB
Go
246 lines
8.8 KiB
Go
package ws
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"github.com/livekit/protocol/auth"
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"github.com/livekit/protocol/livekit"
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"github.com/livekit/protocol/webhook"
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)
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// webhookMaxBodyBytes bounds the webhook request body to prevent unbounded
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// reads from an unauthenticated caller.
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const webhookMaxBodyBytes = 64 * 1024
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// NewLiveKitWebhookHandler returns an HTTP handler that processes LiveKit
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// webhook events. It synchronises LiveKit room state back into OwnCord's
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// voice_states DB — primarily for crash recovery when a participant
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// disconnects from LiveKit without sending a WS voice_leave.
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//
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// Speaker detection is handled client-side via LiveKit's
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// RoomEvent.ActiveSpeakersChanged (lower latency than webhooks).
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func (h *Hub) NewLiveKitWebhookHandler(apiKey, apiSecret string) http.HandlerFunc {
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// The SDK receiver verifies the token signature AND that the token's sha256
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// claim matches the request body hash, binding verification to the body so
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// a captured token cannot be replayed against a forged payload.
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provider := auth.NewSimpleKeyProvider(apiKey, apiSecret)
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Check Authorization header BEFORE reading the body to avoid
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// allocating memory for unauthenticated requests.
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if r.Header.Get("Authorization") == "" {
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slog.Warn("livekit webhook: missing Authorization header")
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http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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// Bound the body before the SDK reads it (ReceiveWebhookEvent uses an
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// unbounded io.ReadAll internally).
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r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, webhookMaxBodyBytes)
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// ReceiveWebhookEvent verifies the JWT signature, the token's body-hash
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// claim, and the exp/nbf claims, then parses the payload. This replaces
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// the previous manual ParseAPIToken/Verify sequence, which was not bound
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// to the request body (forgery/replay).
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event, err := webhook.ReceiveWebhookEvent(r, provider)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("livekit webhook: verification failed", "error", err)
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http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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slog.Info("livekit webhook received",
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"event", event.Event,
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"room", event.GetRoom().GetName(),
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"participant", event.GetParticipant().GetIdentity(),
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)
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switch event.Event {
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case "participant_joined":
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h.handleWebhookParticipantJoined(r.Context(), event)
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case "participant_left":
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h.handleWebhookParticipantLeft(r.Context(), event)
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default:
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slog.Debug("livekit webhook: unhandled event", "event", event.Event)
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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}
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}
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// parseParticipantIdentity extracts a user ID and optional join token from a
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// LiveKit participant identity formatted as "user-{id}" or
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// "user-{id}:{joinToken}".
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func parseParticipantIdentity(identity string) (int64, string, error) {
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if !strings.HasPrefix(identity, "user-") {
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return 0, "", fmt.Errorf("invalid identity format: %s", identity)
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}
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body := identity[5:]
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idPart, joinToken, _ := strings.Cut(body, ":")
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userID, err := strconv.ParseInt(idPart, 10, 64)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, "", err
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}
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return userID, joinToken, nil
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}
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// parseIdentity extracts a user ID from a LiveKit participant identity.
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func parseIdentity(identity string) (int64, error) {
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userID, _, err := parseParticipantIdentity(identity)
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return userID, err
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}
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// parseRoomChannelID extracts a channel ID from a LiveKit room name
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// formatted as "channel-{id}".
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func parseRoomChannelID(roomName string) (int64, error) {
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if !strings.HasPrefix(roomName, "channel-") {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid room name format: %s", roomName)
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}
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return strconv.ParseInt(roomName[8:], 10, 64)
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}
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func (h *Hub) handleWebhookParticipantJoined(_ context.Context, event *livekit.WebhookEvent) {
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p := event.GetParticipant()
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room := event.GetRoom()
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if p == nil || room == nil {
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return
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}
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userID, joinToken, err := parseParticipantIdentity(p.Identity)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("livekit webhook: participant_joined bad identity",
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"identity", p.Identity, "error", err)
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return
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}
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channelID, err := parseRoomChannelID(room.Name)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("livekit webhook: participant_joined bad room",
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"room", room.Name, "error", err)
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return
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}
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slog.Info("livekit webhook: participant joined",
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"user_id", userID,
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"channel_id", channelID,
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"room", room.Name)
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// Validate that the participant has a matching voice_states row (BUG-127).
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// A replayed token from a previous session will not have a matching row,
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// so we remove the rogue participant from LiveKit.
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if h.db != nil {
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state, stateErr := h.db.GetVoiceState(userID)
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if stateErr != nil || state == nil || state.ChannelID != channelID {
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slog.Warn("livekit webhook: rogue participant_joined — no matching voice state, removing",
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"user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
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if h.livekit != nil {
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if rmErr := h.livekit.RemoveParticipant(channelID, userID, joinToken); rmErr != nil { //nolint:contextcheck // RemoveParticipant manages its own timeout context
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slog.Error("livekit webhook: failed to remove rogue participant",
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"error", rmErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
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}
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}
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return
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}
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// Verify join token matches to prevent token replay from old sessions.
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if joinToken != "" && state.JoinedAt != joinToken {
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slog.Warn("livekit webhook: stale join token on participant_joined, removing",
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"user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID,
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"expected_token", state.JoinedAt, "got_token", joinToken)
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if h.livekit != nil {
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if rmErr := h.livekit.RemoveParticipant(channelID, userID, joinToken); rmErr != nil { //nolint:contextcheck // RemoveParticipant manages its own timeout context
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slog.Error("livekit webhook: failed to remove stale participant",
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"error", rmErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
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}
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}
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return
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}
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}
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}
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func (h *Hub) handleWebhookParticipantLeft(ctx context.Context, event *livekit.WebhookEvent) {
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p := event.GetParticipant()
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room := event.GetRoom()
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if p == nil || room == nil {
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return
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}
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userID, joinToken, err := parseParticipantIdentity(p.Identity)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("livekit webhook: participant_left bad identity",
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"identity", p.Identity, "error", err)
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return
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}
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channelID, err := parseRoomChannelID(room.Name)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("livekit webhook: participant_left bad room",
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"room", room.Name, "error", err)
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return
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}
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slog.Info("livekit webhook: participant left",
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"user_id", userID,
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"channel_id", channelID)
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// Clean up voice state if the user disconnected from LiveKit
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// without sending a WS voice_leave (e.g. crash, network loss, F5 reload).
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h.mu.RLock()
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c, exists := h.clients[userID]
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h.mu.RUnlock()
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if exists {
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currentChID, currentJoinToken := c.getVoiceState()
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if currentChID == channelID && currentJoinToken != "" && currentJoinToken == joinToken {
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// Double-check voice state to guard against a concurrent voice_join
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// that updated the state between the read above and clearVoiceState (L8).
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if reChID, reJT := c.getVoiceState(); reChID == channelID && reJT == joinToken {
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c.clearVoiceState()
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if h.db != nil {
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if err := leaveVoiceChannelWithRetry(ctx, h, userID, channelID, joinToken); err != nil {
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slog.Error("livekit webhook: LeaveVoiceChannel exhausted retries",
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"error", err, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
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}
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}
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h.BroadcastToAll(buildVoiceLeave(channelID, userID))
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slog.Info("livekit webhook: cleaned up stale voice state",
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"user_id", userID,
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"channel_id", channelID)
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}
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} else if h.db != nil {
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// Client has voiceChID=0 or moved to a different channel (e.g.
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// after F5 reload), or this webhook is for an older join instance.
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deleted, dbErr := h.db.LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch(userID, channelID, joinToken)
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if dbErr != nil {
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slog.Error("livekit webhook: LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch failed (stale DB row)",
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"error", dbErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
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} else if deleted {
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h.BroadcastToAll(buildVoiceLeave(channelID, userID))
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slog.Info("livekit webhook: cleaned stale DB voice row after reconnect",
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"user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
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}
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}
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} else if h.db != nil {
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// Client already disconnected from WS — use channel-conditional delete
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// to avoid wiping a newer row if the user reconnected and rejoined.
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deleted, dbErr := h.db.LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch(userID, channelID, joinToken)
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if dbErr != nil {
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slog.Error("livekit webhook: LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch failed (client gone)",
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"error", dbErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
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} else if deleted {
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h.BroadcastToAll(buildVoiceLeave(channelID, userID))
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}
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}
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}
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// MountWebhookRoute is a helper for the router to mount the webhook endpoint.
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func MountWebhookRoute(h *Hub, apiKey, apiSecret string) http.HandlerFunc {
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return h.NewLiveKitWebhookHandler(apiKey, apiSecret)
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}
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