mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
synced 2026-09-03 03:50:00 +03:00
Fixes all 109 golangci-lint findings (106 contextcheck, 1 gocritic,
2 gosec) that accumulated after D2 wired dbgen (whose queries take ctx)
under ctx-less db.DB wrappers while CI lint was quota-dead. No nolint
comments added; every finding fixed by genuinely threading context.
- db: all 138 hand-written db.DB methods take ctx first; the dbCtx()
Background shim is deleted; raw Query/QueryRow/Exec/Begin use their
Context variants; the four redundant ctx-less passthroughs removed.
db.Auditor/WriteAudit gain ctx.
- Seams: permissions.Checker (DB iface, HasChannelPerm,
RequireChannelAccess) and the service.Store interface mirror the new
signatures (ws.EventStore and plugin.PluginStore already did).
- Callers: api/admin handlers use r.Context(); ws per-message paths use
the connection ctx via DispatchV2; hub loops and startup wiring use
context.Background(); service methods thread ctx where they have one
and Background where no ctx exists. Public service surface reached by
ctx-holding chains (PermissionService.HasChannelPerm/GetRoleForUser/
RequireChannelAccess, message/dm/block/invite/profile methods) is now
ctx-first.
- Detached (context.WithoutCancel) where cancellation would break an
invariant, found by a 3-lens adversarial review of the diff:
* voice-leave background retries (a dead webhook/connection ctx killed
retry 2 before it ran, leaving ghost capacity-holding voice rows)
* rollbackVoiceJoin's compensating delete (its trigger IS the cancel)
* post-2FA-change DeleteOtherSessions and logout DeleteSession (the
security tail of a committed change must not die with the request)
* all api/ws audit writes (a banned user could suppress their own
login_blocked_banned row by aborting the request mid-bcrypt)
* admin backup VACUUM INTO (an interrupt left a truncated .db that
the backup list presented as restorable)
* post-commit message/edit refetches (a committed message must still
fan out when the sender disconnects)
* hub settings-cache refresh (one dead connection could pin stale
values for the 30s TTL)
- gocritic rangeValCopy fixed (index iteration); gosec G306 excluded in
config with justification (generated source must stay world-readable)
instead of flipping genprotocol output to 0o600.
Verified: gofmt/vet, all four build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock
pass, full -race pass, golangci-lint 0 issues uncapped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
94 lines
3.2 KiB
Go
94 lines
3.2 KiB
Go
package admin
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import (
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"context"
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"net/http"
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"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
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"github.com/owncord/server/db"
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"github.com/owncord/server/permissions"
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)
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// ─── Middleware ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// RequireAdminAuth is the exported form of adminAuthMiddleware. External
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// packages (e.g. api/router.go for the plugin admin handler) reuse it so the
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// session/permission gate stays in one place.
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func RequireAdminAuth(database *db.DB) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return adminAuthMiddleware(database)
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}
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// adminAuthMiddleware validates the Bearer token and requires ADMINISTRATOR.
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// On success it stores the *db.User and *db.Session in the request context so
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// downstream handlers can retrieve them without re-querying the database.
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func adminAuthMiddleware(database *db.DB) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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token, ok := auth.ExtractBearerToken(r)
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if !ok {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "missing or invalid authorization header")
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return
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}
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hash := auth.HashToken(token)
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sess, err := database.GetSessionByTokenHash(r.Context(), hash)
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if err != nil || sess == nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "invalid or expired session")
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return
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}
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if auth.IsSessionExpired(sess.ExpiresAt) {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "session has expired")
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return
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}
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user, err := database.GetUserByID(r.Context(), sess.UserID)
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if err != nil || user == nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "user not found")
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return
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}
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role, err := database.GetRoleByID(r.Context(), user.RoleID)
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if err != nil || role == nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "role not found")
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return
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}
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if !permissions.HasAdmin(role.Permissions) {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "administrator permission required")
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return
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}
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ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), adminUserKey, user)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, adminSessionKey, sess)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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})
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}
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}
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// ownerOnlyMiddleware wraps a handler to require Owner role (position == 100).
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// It reads the user from context (set by adminAuthMiddleware) rather than
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// re-authenticating, avoiding redundant DB queries and session-expiry gaps.
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func ownerOnlyMiddleware(database *db.DB, next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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user, ok := r.Context().Value(adminUserKey).(*db.User)
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if !ok || user == nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "not authenticated")
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return
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}
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role, err := database.GetRoleByID(r.Context(), user.RoleID)
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if err != nil || role == nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "role not found")
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return
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}
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if role.Position < permissions.OwnerRolePosition {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "owner role required")
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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