mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
synced 2026-09-03 03:50:00 +03:00
Fixes all 109 golangci-lint findings (106 contextcheck, 1 gocritic,
2 gosec) that accumulated after D2 wired dbgen (whose queries take ctx)
under ctx-less db.DB wrappers while CI lint was quota-dead. No nolint
comments added; every finding fixed by genuinely threading context.
- db: all 138 hand-written db.DB methods take ctx first; the dbCtx()
Background shim is deleted; raw Query/QueryRow/Exec/Begin use their
Context variants; the four redundant ctx-less passthroughs removed.
db.Auditor/WriteAudit gain ctx.
- Seams: permissions.Checker (DB iface, HasChannelPerm,
RequireChannelAccess) and the service.Store interface mirror the new
signatures (ws.EventStore and plugin.PluginStore already did).
- Callers: api/admin handlers use r.Context(); ws per-message paths use
the connection ctx via DispatchV2; hub loops and startup wiring use
context.Background(); service methods thread ctx where they have one
and Background where no ctx exists. Public service surface reached by
ctx-holding chains (PermissionService.HasChannelPerm/GetRoleForUser/
RequireChannelAccess, message/dm/block/invite/profile methods) is now
ctx-first.
- Detached (context.WithoutCancel) where cancellation would break an
invariant, found by a 3-lens adversarial review of the diff:
* voice-leave background retries (a dead webhook/connection ctx killed
retry 2 before it ran, leaving ghost capacity-holding voice rows)
* rollbackVoiceJoin's compensating delete (its trigger IS the cancel)
* post-2FA-change DeleteOtherSessions and logout DeleteSession (the
security tail of a committed change must not die with the request)
* all api/ws audit writes (a banned user could suppress their own
login_blocked_banned row by aborting the request mid-bcrypt)
* admin backup VACUUM INTO (an interrupt left a truncated .db that
the backup list presented as restorable)
* post-commit message/edit refetches (a committed message must still
fan out when the sender disconnects)
* hub settings-cache refresh (one dead connection could pin stale
values for the 30s TTL)
- gocritic rangeValCopy fixed (index iteration); gosec G306 excluded in
config with justification (generated source must stay world-readable)
instead of flipping genprotocol output to 0o600.
Verified: gofmt/vet, all four build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock
pass, full -race pass, golangci-lint 0 issues uncapped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
179 lines
6.0 KiB
Go
179 lines
6.0 KiB
Go
package admin
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"log/slog"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/microcosm-cc/bluemonday"
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"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
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"github.com/owncord/server/db"
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)
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// setupSanitizer strips all HTML from user input during setup.
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var setupSanitizer = bluemonday.StrictPolicy()
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// ownerRoleID is the role ID assigned to the first user (Owner).
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const ownerRoleID = 1
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// setupStatusResponse is the JSON shape returned by GET /api/setup/status.
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type setupStatusResponse struct {
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NeedsSetup bool `json:"needs_setup"`
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}
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// setupRequest is the JSON body for POST /api/setup.
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type setupRequest struct {
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Username string `json:"username"`
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Password string `json:"password"`
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}
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// setupResponse is the JSON shape returned on successful setup.
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type setupResponse struct {
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Token string `json:"token"`
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UserID int64 `json:"user_id"`
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Username string `json:"username"`
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InviteCode string `json:"invite_code"`
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}
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// handleSetupStatus returns whether initial setup is needed (no users exist).
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func handleSetupStatus(database *db.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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count, err := database.UserCount(r.Context())
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to check user count")
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, setupStatusResponse{NeedsSetup: count == 0})
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}
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}
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// handleSetup creates the first owner account. It only works when no users
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// exist in the database, preventing abuse after initial setup.
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func handleSetup(database *db.DB, limiter *auth.RateLimiter, allowedOrigins []string) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// CSRF protection: reject cross-origin requests (BUG-097).
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// If Origin is present and doesn't match allowed origins, deny.
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// No Origin header = same-origin or non-browser client (allow).
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if origin := r.Header.Get("Origin"); origin != "" {
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if !isSetupOriginAllowed(origin, allowedOrigins) {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "cross-origin setup request blocked")
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return
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}
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}
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// Rate limit: 5 attempts per minute per IP.
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// Strip the port so that different source ports from the same IP
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// are correctly grouped under a single rate-limit bucket.
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
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if err != nil {
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host = r.RemoteAddr
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}
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setupKey := "setup:" + host
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if !limiter.Allow(setupKey, 5, time.Minute) {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "RATE_LIMITED", "too many setup attempts, try again later")
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return
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}
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var req setupRequest
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", "invalid request body")
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return
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}
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req.Username = strings.TrimSpace(setupSanitizer.Sanitize(req.Username))
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if req.Username == "" || req.Password == "" {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", "username and password are required")
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return
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}
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// Validate username format (length, no control/invisible chars).
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if err := auth.ValidateUsername(req.Username); err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", err.Error())
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return
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}
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if err := auth.ValidatePasswordStrength(req.Password); err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", err.Error())
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return
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}
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// Hash the password.
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hash, err := auth.HashPassword(req.Password)
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to hash password")
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return
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}
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// Atomically check no users exist and create the owner (BUG-119).
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// This closes the TOCTOU race between UserCount() and CreateUser().
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uid, err := database.CreateOwnerIfEmpty(r.Context(), req.Username, hash, ownerRoleID)
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if errors.Is(err, db.ErrConflict) {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "setup has already been completed")
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return
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}
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to create user")
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return
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}
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// Issue a session token so the user is immediately logged in.
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token, err := auth.GenerateToken()
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to generate session token")
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return
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}
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device := r.Header.Get("User-Agent")
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const maxDeviceLen = 512
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if len(device) > maxDeviceLen {
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device = device[:maxDeviceLen]
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}
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if _, err := database.CreateSession(r.Context(), uid, auth.HashToken(token), device, host); err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to create session")
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return
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}
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// Create default channels under canonical categories.
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_, _ = database.CreateChannel(r.Context(), "general", "text", "Text Channels", "Welcome to the server!", 0)
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_, _ = database.CreateChannel(r.Context(), "General", "voice", "Voice Channels", "", 0)
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// Generate a bootstrap invite code so the owner can invite others.
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// Bound it (5 uses / 24h) rather than minting an unlimited, non-expiring
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// invite — the owner can create fresh invites once logged in.
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bootstrapInviteExpiry := time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour)
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inviteCode, err := database.CreateInvite(r.Context(), uid, 5, &bootstrapInviteExpiry)
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to generate invite code")
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return
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}
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slog.Info("server setup completed", "owner", req.Username, "user_id", uid)
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db.WriteAudit(context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()), database, uid, "server_setup", "server", 0,
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"initial setup: owner account created, default channel and invite generated")
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, setupResponse{
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Token: token,
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UserID: uid,
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Username: req.Username,
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InviteCode: inviteCode,
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})
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}
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}
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// isSetupOriginAllowed checks if the given origin is permitted by the
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// configured allowed_origins list. Wildcard "*" allows any origin.
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// An empty list denies all cross-origin requests (safe default).
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func isSetupOriginAllowed(origin string, allowed []string) bool {
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for _, a := range allowed {
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if a == "*" || strings.EqualFold(a, origin) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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