mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
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Fixes all 109 golangci-lint findings (106 contextcheck, 1 gocritic,
2 gosec) that accumulated after D2 wired dbgen (whose queries take ctx)
under ctx-less db.DB wrappers while CI lint was quota-dead. No nolint
comments added; every finding fixed by genuinely threading context.
- db: all 138 hand-written db.DB methods take ctx first; the dbCtx()
Background shim is deleted; raw Query/QueryRow/Exec/Begin use their
Context variants; the four redundant ctx-less passthroughs removed.
db.Auditor/WriteAudit gain ctx.
- Seams: permissions.Checker (DB iface, HasChannelPerm,
RequireChannelAccess) and the service.Store interface mirror the new
signatures (ws.EventStore and plugin.PluginStore already did).
- Callers: api/admin handlers use r.Context(); ws per-message paths use
the connection ctx via DispatchV2; hub loops and startup wiring use
context.Background(); service methods thread ctx where they have one
and Background where no ctx exists. Public service surface reached by
ctx-holding chains (PermissionService.HasChannelPerm/GetRoleForUser/
RequireChannelAccess, message/dm/block/invite/profile methods) is now
ctx-first.
- Detached (context.WithoutCancel) where cancellation would break an
invariant, found by a 3-lens adversarial review of the diff:
* voice-leave background retries (a dead webhook/connection ctx killed
retry 2 before it ran, leaving ghost capacity-holding voice rows)
* rollbackVoiceJoin's compensating delete (its trigger IS the cancel)
* post-2FA-change DeleteOtherSessions and logout DeleteSession (the
security tail of a committed change must not die with the request)
* all api/ws audit writes (a banned user could suppress their own
login_blocked_banned row by aborting the request mid-bcrypt)
* admin backup VACUUM INTO (an interrupt left a truncated .db that
the backup list presented as restorable)
* post-commit message/edit refetches (a committed message must still
fan out when the sender disconnects)
* hub settings-cache refresh (one dead connection could pin stale
values for the 30s TTL)
- gocritic rangeValCopy fixed (index iteration); gosec G306 excluded in
config with justification (generated source must stay world-readable)
instead of flipping genprotocol output to 0o600.
Verified: gofmt/vet, all four build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock
pass, full -race pass, golangci-lint 0 issues uncapped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
36 lines
1.4 KiB
Go
36 lines
1.4 KiB
Go
package db
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import (
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"context"
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"log/slog"
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)
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// Auditor is the minimal audit-write surface WriteAudit needs. *DB satisfies
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// it directly, and the service layer's Store interface does too, so every
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// caller — api, admin, ws, service — can route its audit writes through this
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// one helper regardless of whether it holds a *DB or a narrower interface.
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type Auditor interface {
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LogAudit(ctx context.Context, actorID int64, action, targetType string, targetID int64, detail string) error
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}
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// WriteAudit records an audit entry best-effort.
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//
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// Per the D8 policy decision (docs/plans/audit-2026-07-19-decisions.md), audit
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// writes stay best-effort: a LogAudit failure must never fail or abort the
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// caller's request. But a failed write must never be silently discarded
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// either — this helper logs it with the actor/action/target context so the
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// gap is visible in the logs. The detail string is intentionally not logged;
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// it can carry request-specific or sensitive text and the structured fields
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// already identify what was attempted.
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func WriteAudit(ctx context.Context, a Auditor, actorID int64, action, targetType string, targetID int64, detail string) {
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if err := a.LogAudit(ctx, actorID, action, targetType, targetID, detail); err != nil {
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slog.Error("audit log write failed",
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"action", action,
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"actor_id", actorID,
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"target_type", targetType,
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"target_id", targetID,
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"error", err,
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)
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}
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}
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