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* docs(b2-6): enumerate the security-sensitive mutations and their audit coverage
Step 1 of B2-6: the mutation inventory crossed with the 43 non-test
Audit( call sites at 67fdd18d, recorded in the plan's evidence block.
Invite create/revoke (S-02) and plugin install/uninstall have no audit
row; no timeout mutation exists (kick is force_logout / voice_mod_kick).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu
* added new doc
* docs(audit): update changelog and security documentation to include admin panel actions in audit log
* feat(b2-6): audit every security-sensitive mutation, invite and plugin rows first (S-02)
Step 2 of B2-6. TestAuditCoverage_* in service, api and admin drive each
mutation from the plan's inventory against a fake db.AuditStore
(Server/db/audittest) and assert the expected action arrives. Red before
this commit on exactly four rows: invite_create, invite_revoke,
plugin_install, plugin_uninstall.
- InviteService writes invite_create / invite_revoke naming the invite by
id, never by code; RevokeInvite now takes the actor, threaded from the
handler. A failed revoke writes nothing (test).
- The plugin admin handler takes a db.Auditor and writes plugin_install /
plugin_uninstall against the RequireAdminAuth principal
(admin.ActorIDFromContext, exported for that).
- docs/security.md lists the four new actions; CHANGELOG under Unreleased.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu
* test(b2-6): denylist over the recorded audit detail corpus
Step 3 of B2-6. Each TestAuditCoverage_* table now ends with a subtest
that runs audittest.AssertSafeDetails over every entry its rows recorded:
a shape denylist (bcrypt/argon2 hashes, password=/token=/secret=/
recovery-code key-value leaks, otpauth URIs, Bearer credentials) plus the
fixture's own secrets (raw tokens, passwords and hashes, TOTP secrets and
codes, invite codes, message bodies). audittest_test.go proves each class
bites and that ordinary details pass. Zero hits on the corpus at HEAD, so
no call site needed changing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu
* docs(b2-6): record pre-squash SHAs, red/green and denylist evidence
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu
* fix(b2-6): audit committed invites on a canceled request; 404 unknown plugin uninstall
Codex P2s on #1441, both test-first:
- CreateInvite read the invite back on the request context, so a cancel
after the insert committed returned an error and skipped invite_create.
The read-back and audit now run on context.WithoutCancel, like the
password-change tail. TestCreateInvite_AuditSurvivesCanceledLookup.
- Registry.UninstallPlugin is idempotent on an unknown id, so the handler
wrote plugin_uninstall for plugins that never existed. It now checks the
row first: 404 and no audit. TestPluginsHandlerUninstallUnknownID.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu
* docs(b2-6): record the Codex review outcome on #1441
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rg9QQWVN3E5UUgBD2dydtu
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
138 lines
3.8 KiB
Go
138 lines
3.8 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/db"
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"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/permissions"
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"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/service"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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)
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// createInviteRequest is the JSON body for POST /api/v1/invites.
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type createInviteRequest struct {
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MaxUses int `json:"max_uses"`
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ExpiresInHours int `json:"expires_in_hours"`
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}
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// inviteResponse is the API shape for an invite.
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type inviteResponse struct {
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ID int64 `json:"id"`
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Code string `json:"code"`
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MaxUses *int `json:"max_uses"`
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Uses int `json:"uses"`
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ExpiresAt *string `json:"expires_at"`
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Revoked bool `json:"revoked"`
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CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
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}
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// MountInviteRoutes registers invite endpoints on the given router.
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// All routes require authentication and MANAGE_INVITES permission.
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func MountInviteRoutes(r chi.Router, database *db.DB, svc *service.Services) {
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r.Route("/api/v1/invites", func(r chi.Router) {
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r.Use(AuthMiddleware(database))
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r.Use(RequirePermission(permissions.ManageInvites))
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r.Post("/", handleCreateInvite(svc))
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r.Get("/", handleListInvites(svc))
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r.Delete("/{code}", handleRevokeInvite(svc))
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})
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}
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// handleCreateInvite processes POST /api/v1/invites.
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func handleCreateInvite(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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var req createInviteRequest
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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if err != io.EOF {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
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Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "malformed JSON body",
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})
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return
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}
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req = createInviteRequest{}
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}
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user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
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if !ok || user == nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
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Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "not authenticated",
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})
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return
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}
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// H-4: Cap invite expiration to 30 days.
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if req.ExpiresInHours > service.MaxInviteExpiryHours() {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
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Error: "BAD_REQUEST",
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Message: fmt.Sprintf("expires_in_hours cannot exceed %d (30 days)", service.MaxInviteExpiryHours()),
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})
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return
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}
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inv, err := svc.Invites.CreateInvite(r.Context(), user.ID, req.MaxUses, req.ExpiresInHours)
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if err != nil {
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writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, toInviteResponse(inv))
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}
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}
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// handleListInvites processes GET /api/v1/invites.
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func handleListInvites(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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invites, err := svc.Invites.ListInvites(r.Context())
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if err != nil {
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writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
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return
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}
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resp := make([]inviteResponse, 0, len(invites))
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for _, inv := range invites {
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resp = append(resp, toInviteResponse(inv))
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
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}
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}
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// handleRevokeInvite processes DELETE /api/v1/invites/:code.
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func handleRevokeInvite(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
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if !ok || user == nil {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
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Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "not authenticated",
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})
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return
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}
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code := chi.URLParam(r, "code")
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if err := svc.Invites.RevokeInvite(r.Context(), user.ID, code); err != nil {
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writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
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return
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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}
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// toInviteResponse converts a db.Invite to the API response shape.
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func toInviteResponse(inv *db.Invite) inviteResponse {
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var maxUses *int
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if inv.MaxUses != nil {
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v := *inv.MaxUses
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maxUses = &v
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}
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return inviteResponse{
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ID: inv.ID,
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Code: inv.Code,
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MaxUses: maxUses,
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Uses: inv.Uses,
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ExpiresAt: inv.ExpiresAt,
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Revoked: inv.Revoked,
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CreatedAt: inv.CreatedAt,
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}
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}
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