Files
OwnCord/Server/db/models.go
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J3vbandClaude Fable 5 f5faf82a60 infra: observability, backups, guardrails, and deployment hardening (#1376)
* docs: add infrastructure roadmap plan

Records the verified recommendations from an infrastructure review in three
tracks: raising the single-instance ceiling, cheap seams for a possible
multi-instance future, and ops hygiene. Includes explicit anti-recommendations
and sequencing. Security-sensitive detail is intentionally excluded per
docs/security.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* feat(server): real health checks and saturation metrics

/api/v1/metrics now exposes signals that were already computed in memory but
never surfaced: reconnect replay tier hits, event-persister counters, SQLite
writer-pool wait stats, aggregate per-client backpressure counters (including
previously invisible low-priority drops), and permission-cache hit/miss.

/health now returns a real verdict: hub dispatch-loop liveness, a bounded
database ping, and a free-disk check, returning 503 with a subsystem reason
when degraded. Checks are cached so the unauthenticated endpoint cannot
amplify load. The hub's panic breaker now exits the process so a supervisor
can restart it, instead of leaving broadcast delivery silently dead while
clients still appear online.

OTel instruments that were declared but never recorded are now wired
(ws_active_connections, ws_broadcast_latency_seconds, ws_messages_total,
ws_events_dropped_total, voice gauges) or removed (db_query_duration_seconds).
Also corrects the docs/api.md description of broadcast_drops, which counts
hub-queue overflow, not client send-queue overflow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* feat(server): implement scheduled backups, retention, and backup verification

The backup_schedule and backup_retention settings have existed in the admin
panel and API since the initial schema but were never read by any code. The
15-minute maintenance loop now enforces them: a scheduled backup is taken
when the newest backup on disk is older than the schedule interval (manual
backups reset the clock), and retention prunes backups older than the
configured days while always keeping the newest one.

Backups are now verified with PRAGMA integrity_check immediately after
VACUUM INTO (a failed backup is removed rather than listed as restorable)
and again before a restore may overwrite the live database. A failed VACUUM
INTO also cleans up its partial output file — but never a pre-existing one.

The backup directory is configurable via a new backup.dir key (default
data/backups) so operators can point backups at another disk or an off-host
mount, mirroring the SetDatabasePath plumb.

Restore-handler tests now use real SQLite fixtures (the integrity gate
correctly refuses text files) with the mid-copy failure injected through a
test-only copy hook. Also adds audited gosec suppressions to the Windows
disk-free syscall added in the previous commit, which the Windows lint leg
flagged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* feat(server): capacity and failure-mode guardrails

- server.max_ws_connections: optional cap on concurrent WebSocket clients,
  checked before the upgrade with a 503 + Retry-After; rejections are counted
  and exposed as ws_conn_rejects in /api/v1/metrics.
- Single-process database lock: an OS-level advisory lock (flock / exclusive
  handle) beside the SQLite file makes a second server process fail fast with
  a clear message instead of silently fighting the first over process-local
  state. A bounded retry covers the self-update/restore restart handoff, and
  the lock mechanism failing (e.g. network filesystems) only warns.
- Disk-space awareness: boot-time warnings for the data and backup volumes,
  plus a disk_free_mb metrics field, via a small cross-platform diskutil
  package (already used by /health).
- Upload storage failures: storage.Save now marks server-side filesystem
  failures with a sentinel (storage.ErrIO); handlers return 507 for those
  instead of blaming the client with a 400, and the emoji route stops echoing
  raw storage errors (which embed absolute paths) into responses.
- Unknown config keys now warn at startup — a typo like admin_alowed_cidrs
  previously kept the default silently while the operator believed the
  setting changed. Never fatal: newer servers tolerate older configs.
- Admin settings honesty: the three stored-but-inert settings (server_icon,
  max_upload_bytes, voice_quality) are shown read-only with a note pointing
  at the real config.yaml keys, instead of pretending to apply.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* perf(db): write-path efficiency and capacity knobs

- channel_focus/mark_read now skip the read-state UPSERT when the stored row
  already matches (same last_message_id, no mentions) — refocus events fire
  at up to 10/s/user and every no-op write still occupied the single SQLite
  writer connection. The extra existence check runs on the reader pool, which
  doesn't serialize. Same shape as the session-touch throttle.
- DeleteExpiredSessions is now sargable: migration 031 normalizes legacy
  expiry formats to the RFC3339-Z layout the server writes and indexes
  expires_at, replacing the strftime full-table scan that ran on the writer
  every 15 minutes.
- Boot-time ANALYZE runs only when a migration actually applied; unchanged
  schemas get the cheap PRAGMA optimize instead (which also covers
  crash-restarts that never reached the shutdown optimize).
- The read/write SQL router gets a table-driven test with explicit expected
  values (INSERT ... RETURNING must hit the writer despite being :one).
- New knobs, all defaulting to current behavior: database.max_readers,
  security.auth_rate_limit_multiplier (for shared-NAT communities),
  event_persistence.replay_ring_size and replay_cold_limit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* fix(server): shutdown lifecycle ordering

- The event pruner and maintenance loop are now joined (bounded) before the
  database closes: bgCtx cancellation used to run AFTER database.Close via
  LIFO defers, contradicting its own comment, and neither goroutine was ever
  waited on — a mid-tick scheduled backup or prune could still hold the
  writer while the pool tore down. StartEventPruner returns a done channel
  with the same join contract EventPersister.Stop already had.
- srv.Shutdown now runs before hub.GracefulStop, so in-flight HTTP handlers'
  broadcasts still reach a live hub and the event persister instead of
  vanishing from the replay/event store across a restart. Shutdown does not
  wait on hijacked WebSocket connections, so the swap adds no delay.
- GracefulStopContext threads the 30s shutdown budget into the hub: the 5s
  client-notice window (matching the countdown clients are shown) ends early
  when the budget expires, and is skipped entirely when nobody is connected —
  early-return startup paths and idle servers no longer sleep 5s for an
  audience of zero.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* build(deploy): systemd unit, compose hardening, boot-smoked releases, CI polish

- deploy/owncord.service: hardened systemd unit template with the two
  verified caveats encoded (install dir stays writable for self-update under
  ProtectSystem=strict; CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE for ACME's :80), plus a
  'Linux (systemd)' deployment docs section — the Linux service story was
  previously 'Docker or nothing'.
- New 'Reverse Proxy Topology' docs section with a working nginx snippet and
  the correct signaling-vs-media distinction: /livekit/* is already proxied
  by the server, only WebRTC media ports must be directly reachable.
- docker-compose: log rotation, commented resource limits, and a healthcheck
  backed by a new 'chatserver healthcheck' subcommand (the distroless image
  has no shell) that probes /health without config side effects.
- release.yml: a concurrency group (queue, never cancel), and boot-smoke
  gates — the freshly built server binaries and the Docker image are cold
  booted and probed healthy BEFORE anything is signed or pushed. The release
  feed drives signed self-updates, so a binary that compiles but dies on
  boot previously would have shipped itself to every auto-updating instance.
- ci.yml: client-check/client-tests move to ubuntu with the reasoning
  recorded (no win32 code paths, LF enforced repo-wide); admin-e2e gets a
  written graduation criterion instead of an open-ended non-blocking status.
- docs: Tailscale guide notes the CGNAT range vs the default admin CIDRs;
  architecture overview records presence/voice state as the fifth
  single-instance blocker and the macOS client scope decision.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* perf(server): measured load tooling, narrowed invalidation, presence coalescing, storage and CIDR seams

- Fix scripts/k6/ws-load.js against the real wire protocol: envelope-wrapped
  frames, correct message types (typing_start, presence_update), the correct
  /api/v1/ws path, and thresholds that fail a run where nobody authenticated
  or went ready — the script had drifted to pre-envelope framing and reported
  100% green while every auth failed on the first frame. A new
  workflow_dispatch-only load-baseline workflow boots a real server, seeds
  users through the setup/invite APIs, runs the script, and uploads the k6
  summary plus a metrics snapshot for before/after comparison.
- Role-scoped channel-override changes now evict only the affected role's
  members from the permission cache (fail-safe: unreadable member list still
  flushes everything). InvalidateAll here repopulated every connected user —
  two reads each — synchronously inside the admin request via
  RefreshChannelVisibility, a stampede that scaled with total population
  rather than the role's size. Same pattern the per-user override endpoints
  already used.
- Connect/disconnect presence broadcasts now pass through a 300ms latest-wins
  coalescer (QueuePresence): each un-coalesced presence change is a sequenced
  global broadcast (an O(clients) fan-out under seqMu), so a reconnect storm
  fired O(users) of them from the connect critical path. A flap inside the
  window collapses to its final state; the wire format, seq ordering, and
  replay behaviour are unchanged, and the delivery path (BroadcastPresence)
  is untouched.
- Storage seam: api handlers now consume a FileStore interface (consumer-side,
  same pattern as service.Store) with Open returning a seekable storage.File —
  writing down the contract (range-request seeks included) an alternative
  backend would have to meet, without building one.
- The metrics surfaces and the LiveKit webhook/health endpoints get their own
  allowlist keys (metrics_allowed_cidrs, livekit_webhook_allowed_cidrs, both
  defaulting to admin_allowed_cidrs), so a central Prometheus scraper or an
  externally-hosted LiveKit no longer requires widening the admin panel's
  perimeter. Startup now also warns when admin_allowed_cidrs is customized
  while trusted_proxies is empty — behind a proxy or container network the
  check would otherwise compare the proxy's private address, not the client's.
- The container healthcheck probe now PINS the server's own certificate from
  disk (VerifyConnection, exact-match) instead of skipping TLS verification,
  addressing the CodeQL finding on the previous commit; WebPKI verification
  is used when no local cert exists (ACME).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* fix(server): address self-review findings on the hardening branch

Seven fixes from a high-effort review of the full branch diff:

- healthcheck CLI now works under tls.mode acme: it overrides ServerName
  with the configured domain for WebPKI verification instead of pinning a
  cert that doesn't exist (or is stale) in that mode. Previously an ACME
  deployment's container healthcheck failed forever.
- /health pings the READER pool (new db.PingRead): the writer ping queued
  behind a scheduled backup's VACUUM INTO and reported the server degraded
  for the whole backup — which an autoheal watchdog would turn into a
  nightly mid-backup restart.
- /health runs its cached checks under context.WithoutCancel so a probe
  that disconnects mid-request cannot poison the shared cache with a false
  degraded verdict for the next 5 seconds.
- The token CLI uses a new db.OpenShared that skips the single-process
  lock: minting a token against a running server is safe under WAL and was
  a documented workflow the lock had broken.
- The per-user TOTP failure cap is no longer scaled by
  security.auth_rate_limit_multiplier — that knob exists for per-IP limits;
  scaling the only cross-IP brute-force defence multiplied an attacker's
  distributed guess budget. Mirrors the unscaled per-user login threshold.
- A direct presence_update now drops the user's queued entry in the
  connect/disconnect coalescer, so a stale connect-time presence can no
  longer flush 300ms later over the user's fresher chosen status.
- The scheduled-backup filename collision loop breaks on any stat error
  and bounds its suffix probing, instead of spinning the maintenance
  goroutine forever on a persistent EACCES.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* test(admin): real SQLite fixture for the merged Close-failure restore test

TestHandleRestoreBackup_RestartsWhenCloseFails arrived from main (#1375)
with a plain-text backup fixture; this branch's restore handler verifies
backups with integrity_check before touching the live database, so the text
fixture was (correctly) refused with 400 before the Close-failure branch
under test was reached. Use a real backup via BackupToSafe, matching the
other restore tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 20:50:47 +02:00

311 lines
10 KiB
Go

package db
import "time"
// User represents a row in the users table.
type User struct {
ID int64
Username string
PasswordHash string `json:"-"`
Avatar *string
RoleID int64
TOTPSecret *string `json:"-"`
Status string
CreatedAt string
LastSeen *string
Banned bool
BanReason *string
BanExpires *string
// IdentityPublicKey is the long-term E2EE identity public key (base64,
// ECDSA P-256) used for TOFU pinning of voice E2EE announces. Nil = not
// published (legacy client).
IdentityPublicKey *string
// DisplayName is the optional nickname shown instead of Username. Nil =
// unset, and every renderer falls back to Username. Mentions still resolve
// against Username alone — it is the unique key.
DisplayName *string
// About is the optional profile bio shown in the profile popup. Nil = unset.
About *string
// CustomStatus is the optional free-text status line shown under the name.
// Nil = unset. Set over the WebSocket presence path and cleared on logout.
CustomStatus *string
}
// EffectiveDisplayName returns the name to render for the user: the display
// name when set and non-empty, the username otherwise. Every payload builder
// goes through this so the fallback cannot be spelled three different ways.
func (u *User) EffectiveDisplayName() string {
if u == nil {
return ""
}
if u.DisplayName != nil && *u.DisplayName != "" {
return *u.DisplayName
}
return u.Username
}
// Session represents a row in the sessions table.
type Session struct {
ID int64
UserID int64
TokenHash string `json:"-"`
Device string
IP string
CreatedAt string
LastUsed string
ExpiresAt string
}
// APIToken represents a row in the api_tokens table — a long-lived, revocable
// bearer token that authenticates as UserID with that user's role/permissions.
// Raw tokens are never stored; TokenHash is the SHA-256 hex, like Session.
type APIToken struct {
ID int64
UserID int64
TokenHash string `json:"-"`
Label string
CreatedAt string
LastUsed *string
ExpiresAt *string // nil = never expires
RevokedAt *string // nil = active
}
// APITokenListItem is one row of the admin/CLI token listing. It carries the
// owning user's name for display and deliberately omits the hash.
type APITokenListItem struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
UserID int64 `json:"user_id"`
Username string `json:"username"`
Label string `json:"label"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
LastUsed *string `json:"last_used"`
ExpiresAt *string `json:"expires_at"`
RevokedAt *string `json:"revoked_at"`
}
// Invite represents a row in the invites table.
type Invite struct {
ID int64
Code string
CreatedBy int64
Uses int
MaxUses *int
ExpiresAt *string
Revoked bool
CreatedAt string
}
// Role represents a row in the roles table.
type Role struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Color *string `json:"color"`
Permissions int64 `json:"permissions"`
Position int `json:"position"`
IsDefault bool `json:"is_default"`
}
// Channel represents a row in the channels table.
type Channel struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Type string `json:"type"`
Category string `json:"category"`
Topic string `json:"topic"`
Position int `json:"position"`
SlowMode int `json:"slow_mode"`
Archived bool `json:"archived"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
VoiceMaxUsers int `json:"voice_max_users"`
VoiceQuality *string `json:"voice_quality,omitempty"`
MixingThreshold *int `json:"mixing_threshold,omitempty"`
VoiceMaxVideo int `json:"voice_max_video"`
// NSFW marks the channel as possibly carrying sensitive content. It is
// metadata only: the server stores, ships and audits it but imposes no
// content behaviour of its own (see migration 025). Clients decide what
// to do with it — the desktop client shows a per-session age gate.
NSFW bool `json:"nsfw"`
}
// Message represents a row in the messages table.
type Message struct {
ID int64
ChannelID int64
UserID int64
Content string
ReplyTo *int64
EditedAt *string
Deleted bool
Pinned bool
Timestamp string
// MentionsEveryone is set when the message resolved an @everyone or @here
// token and the author held MENTION_EVERYONE. Per-user mentions live in
// message_mentions.
MentionsEveryone bool
}
// MessageWithUser joins a Message with the author's public fields.
type MessageWithUser struct {
Message
Username string
Avatar *string
}
// ReactionCount is an aggregated reaction count for a single emoji.
type ReactionCount struct {
Emoji string
Count int
MeReacted bool
}
// MessageSearchResult is a row returned by the FTS5 message search.
type MessageSearchResult struct {
MessageID int64 `json:"message_id"`
ChannelID int64 `json:"channel_id"`
ChannelName string `json:"channel_name"`
User UserPublic `json:"user"`
Content string `json:"content"`
Timestamp string `json:"timestamp"`
Mentions []int64 `json:"mentions"`
MentionsEveryone bool `json:"mentions_everyone"`
}
// UserPublic is the public-facing user shape for API responses.
type UserPublic struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Username string `json:"username"`
Avatar *string `json:"avatar,omitempty"`
}
// MessageAPIResponse matches the API.md shape for GET /channels/{id}/messages.
type MessageAPIResponse struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
ChannelID int64 `json:"channel_id"`
User UserPublic `json:"user"`
Content string `json:"content"`
ReplyTo *int64 `json:"reply_to"`
Attachments []AttachmentInfo `json:"attachments"`
Reactions []ReactionInfo `json:"reactions"`
Pinned bool `json:"pinned"`
EditedAt *string `json:"edited_at"`
Deleted bool `json:"deleted"`
Timestamp string `json:"timestamp"`
// Mentions is the resolved user ids the message mentions (never nil);
// MentionsEveryone reports an authorized @everyone/@here.
Mentions []int64 `json:"mentions"`
MentionsEveryone bool `json:"mentions_everyone"`
}
// AttachmentInfo is the attachment shape in API responses.
type AttachmentInfo struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Filename string `json:"filename"`
Size int64 `json:"size"`
Mime string `json:"mime"`
URL string `json:"url"`
Width *int `json:"width,omitempty"`
Height *int `json:"height,omitempty"`
}
// ReactionInfo is the reaction shape in API responses.
type ReactionInfo struct {
Emoji string `json:"emoji"`
Count int `json:"count"`
Me bool `json:"me"`
}
// ReactionUser is one reactor in the who-reacted list returned by
// GET /channels/{id}/messages/{messageId}/reactions/{emoji}/users. Avatar is a
// plain string ("" = none) rather than UserPublic's pointer: the tooltip that
// consumes this never distinguishes null from empty.
type ReactionUser struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Username string `json:"username"`
Avatar string `json:"avatar"`
}
// VoiceState represents a row in the voice_states table.
// It tracks which voice channel a user is in and their current audio state.
//
// ServerMuted/ServerDeafened are moderator-imposed and, unlike Muted/Deafened,
// the user cannot clear them: while set, their own voice_mute/voice_deafen
// unmute attempts are refused. They are scoped to the voice session — the row
// is deleted on leave — but survive a channel switch.
type VoiceState struct {
UserID int64 `json:"user_id"`
ChannelID int64 `json:"channel_id"`
Username string `json:"username"`
Muted bool `json:"muted"`
Deafened bool `json:"deafened"`
Speaking bool `json:"speaking"`
Camera bool `json:"camera"`
Screenshare bool `json:"screenshare"`
ServerMuted bool `json:"server_muted"`
ServerDeafened bool `json:"server_deafened"`
JoinedAt string `json:"-"`
}
// ChannelUnread holds per-user unread data for a single channel.
type ChannelUnread struct {
LastMessageID int64 `json:"last_message_id"`
UnreadCount int `json:"unread_count"`
// MentionCount is read_states.mention_count: unread messages that mention
// this user directly or via an authorized @everyone/@here. Zeroed by
// channel_focus, never advanced by an edit.
MentionCount int `json:"mention_count"`
}
// ServerStats contains aggregate counts for the admin dashboard.
type ServerStats struct {
UserCount int64 `json:"user_count"`
MessageCount int64 `json:"message_count"`
ChannelCount int64 `json:"channel_count"`
InviteCount int64 `json:"invite_count"`
DBSizeBytes int64 `json:"db_size_bytes"`
OnlineCount int `json:"online_count"`
}
// UserWithRole extends User with the name of the user's role.
type UserWithRole struct {
User
RoleName string `json:"role_name"`
}
// AuditEntry represents a single row from the audit_log table joined with the
// actor's username.
type AuditEntry struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
ActorID int64 `json:"actor_id"`
ActorName string `json:"actor_name"`
Action string `json:"action"`
TargetType string `json:"target_type"`
TargetID int64 `json:"target_id"`
Detail string `json:"detail"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
}
// Emoji represents a row in the emoji table: one server-wide custom emoji.
//
// StoredAs is the storage-layer UUID the image bytes live under (the table's
// legacy column name is `filename`); it is never shown to a user and never
// derived from anything the uploader sent. Shortcode is always lowercase --
// the only spelling the validator admits -- which is what makes the table's
// plain UNIQUE index a case-insensitive one.
type Emoji struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Shortcode string `json:"shortcode"`
StoredAs string `json:"-"`
MimeType string `json:"-"`
UploadedBy int64 `json:"uploaded_by"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
}
// sessionTTL is the duration a session remains valid after creation.
const sessionTTL = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
// sessionTimeLayout is the storage format for sessions.expires_at (and the
// other RFC3339-UTC expiry columns). DeleteExpiredSessions compares these as
// plain text against an index, so every writer and the sweep's cutoff must
// use exactly this layout.
const sessionTimeLayout = "2006-01-02T15:04:05Z"