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* refactor(ws): split handleVoiceJoin into cohesive join-stage helpers handleVoiceJoin was 130 statements / cyclomatic 59 / nestif 11, breaking all three complexity budgets at once. Split along the stage boundaries the doc comment already described: precheck, leave-current, persist, restore moderator flags, grant token, complete. The publish-permission derivation becomes its own helper because it is the one branch-heavy block inside the token grant. Pure move: every statement is preserved verbatim. The only edits are bare `return`s becoming the typed returns of their new helper, `c.userID` becoming the `userID` parameter inside voiceJoinPublishPerms, and voiceJoinComplete re-reading `ch.VoiceMaxUsers` instead of receiving it — `ch` is never mutated, so the value is identical. Verified by normalising both revisions of the region to sorted, comment- and whitespace-stripped statements and diffing: the only deltas are the ones listed above. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: collapse the three duplicated sibling pairs dupl flagged three pairs of adjacent near-identical functions. Each pair is now one parameterised implementation plus two thin, still-greppable wrappers. - ws/voice_controls.go: handleVoiceMuteV2 / handleVoiceDeafenV2 share voiceSelfToggleV2; handleVoiceCameraV2 / handleVoiceScreenshareV2 share voiceStreamToggleV2. Camera and screenshare drawing from one voice_max_video budget (OC-0023) was a bug caused by exactly this duplication drifting, so one body is the point, not a side effect. - db/mention_queries.go: ListMentionTargetsByRoles / ListMentionTargetsByUserIDs share listMentionTargets. The matched column is a closed named type (mentionTargetColumn) rather than a bare string, so the value interpolated into the SELECT cannot become caller-supplied. Behaviour is unchanged: every rate-limit key, error code, error string, slog message and slog key is preserved verbatim, including the two "failed to update <kind> state" messages, which are now assembled the same way enableVideoSlot already assembled them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): extract readEmojiUpload from handleCreateEmoji handleCreateEmoji was 101 lines against a 100-line budget. The upload-bytes stage — pull the file out of the parsed form, cap its size, sniff its MIME type and sniff its dimensions — is the one self-contained block in it, and it already wrote its own refusals, so it moves out whole as readEmojiUpload. The permission-before-parse ordering the doc comment calls out is unchanged; so is every error string. file.Close() now runs when the helper returns rather than when the handler does, which is strictly earlier and unobservable: the bytes are already copied into raw and nothing else touches the handle. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: extract one cohesive block from three single-budget offenders Each of these was over exactly one budget, so each gets exactly one extraction rather than a restructure: - api/totp_handler.go handleVerifyTOTP (102 lines / 100): the block that resolves the user behind the partial-auth challenge and decrypts their TOTP secret becomes totpChallengeSecret. The ban-inside-the-partial-window check moves with it. - service/message_reactions.go handleReaction (cyclop 21 / 20): the whole authorisation chain — channel lookup, archived gate, DM participant and block checks, non-DM permission check — becomes reactionAudience, which also returns the DM fan-out audience it already resolved. Check order is unchanged and load-bearing. - db/admin_queries.go BackupToSafe (cyclop 21 / 20): the character allowlist loop and the SQL-comment rejection become validateBackupPathChars. That loop alone was most of the branch count. No error string, no check and no ordering changed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(plugin): split InstallFromZip into staged install helpers 104 statements / cyclomatic 44 / nestif 12. Split along the stages the code already had: installZipExtract (the per-entry write loop, with installZipEntryDest holding the mode/symlink/zip-slip guard chain and installZipWriteEntry the size-capped copy), installZipStagedManifest, installZipPromote, and installZipReactivate for the :399 nested block. Every zip-slip, symlink, entry-mode and uncompressed-size check is preserved in the same order relative to the writes it guards. The 19 inline `cleanup(); return` sites collapse to 4 in the orchestrator, one per stage, because each helper now returns an error instead of unwinding itself — the staging directory is still removed on exactly the same set of failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): split newWAFMiddleware into engine build and per-phase helpers 184 lines / cyclomatic 38, and the request-body block at :382 was the worst nested site in the tree at nestif 17. Engine construction moves out of the closure (wafInlineEngine, wafCRSEngine — the Coraza directive string is lifted verbatim), and each request phase becomes its own helper: wafInlineRequestHeaders, wafCRSRequestHeaders (including the Host/Transfer-Encoding re-add for CRS 920280), wafFeedCRSBody and wafInspectRequestBody, which is the old :382 block. The three `handleWAFInterruption(w, it); return` sites inside the body block become one: the helper now returns the interruption and the orchestrator handles it. No statement runs between the two points on either side, so the verdict is honoured identically — in particular a CRS body interruption still returns without replacing r.Body. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(service): split SendMessage and lift EditMessage's access check SendMessage was 79 statements / cyclomatic 35 with an 11-deep nested attachment block at :101; EditMessage was one point over cyclop. SendMessage becomes sendMessagePrecheck (permission and DM-block gates, content sanitisation), sendMessageLinkAttachments (the :101 block: attachment ownership, claim and link) and sendMessageDMSideEffects. EditMessage gets editMessageCheckAccess and nothing else — one budget over earns one extraction. The sanitizeContent fixpoint and the attachment ownership check are unchanged, as is the order of every gate. The DM side effects run behind `isDM && !s.sendMessageDMSideEffects(...)`, so a non-DM never enters them; inside, only the GetDMParticipantIDs failure returns false, matching the one error the original early-returned on. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(admin): split handlePatchUser into per-field apply helpers 106 lines / cyclomatic 29, with the ban block at :154 nested 9 deep. Each optional field of the partial edit becomes its own helper — patchUserPrecheck, patchUserAuthorizeRole, patchUserApplyBan (the :154 block, including the session disconnect and the broadcast) and patchUserApplyRole. Each returns a bool meaning "keep going"; none of them writes a success response, so the single response site in the orchestrator is unchanged. Field application order, the permission-cache invalidation on a role change and the disconnect-and-broadcast on a ban are all preserved, as are the three fail-closed `mod == nil` guards, which now sit at the top of their own helper and still fire on exactly the same conditions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(admin): split handleSetup into first-run setup stages 143 lines / cyclomatic 30, with the optional-wizard block at :219 sitting exactly on the nestif threshold. Split into the stages the endpoint already had: request gating (rate limit and origin check, which run before any auth exists on a fresh server), owner account creation, and the wizard application that was the :219 block. Every gate in front of the handler is a security control on an unauthenticated endpoint; none moved relative to the work it protects. setup_wizard.go is untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: split run() into named bootstrap and shutdown steps 131 statements / cyclomatic 57, with the executable-path fallback at :126 nested 9 deep. The five anonymous `defer func(){...}()` blocks become named functions — telemetryStop, runClosePlugins, runStopEventPersistence, runStopAuditWriter, maintenanceStop — and the bootstrap stages move out likewise. Every defer is still registered in run() itself, at the same point in the sequence, so the LIFO teardown order is unchanged; that order is documented in the surrounding comments and is load-bearing (the audit-writer stop must follow database.Close's registration, the event-persistence stop must precede it). runStopEventPersistence is now registered unconditionally with a nil persister meaning "disabled", where the old code registered its defer inside the enabled branch — a no-op occupying that slot cannot change the relative order of the others. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(ws): split handleReconnect into resume stages 77 statements / cyclomatic 41, plus the replay block at :199 and, in handleFreshConnect, the voice-state restore at :622. handleReconnect becomes reconnectPrecheck, reconnectSelectReplay (with reconnectVetColdTail for the cold-tier gap check), reconnectRegister and reconnectWriteReplay. handleFreshConnect's stale-voice cleanup moves to its own helper, where the `if h.livekit != nil` wrapper becomes a guard clause — that block was the tail of its scope, so returning early and falling off the end are the same. The parts that carry the invariants are moved verbatim: reconnectRegister still takes h.seqMu, still calls registerNow inside that same critical section (BUG-123 / OC-0206), still unlocks on every exit, and still emits the "full" tier counter and telemetry on each of its three re-check failures. handleReconnect's two-boolean contract is unchanged — the collapsed `return false, false` sites are all fall-through-to-full-ready, and the single `return true, false` is still the handshake-write-failure path whose teardown already ran (OC-0051). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(server): fold in the adversarial review of the complexity refactors Eleven skeptic passes over the refactor commits on this branch found no blocker and no major — behaviour is preserved throughout. They did find comment and accuracy defects worth correcting: - db/mention_queries.go: the mentionTargetColumn rationale claimed the named type made the interpolated column "only ever one of the two constants". A Go named type is not closed, so that is a convention the type makes visible, not one it enforces. Reworded, gosec justification included. - ws/voice_controls.go: the dupl collapse generalised away three specifics — that a server deafen is the moderator's to lift (now on the serverDeafen field), the concrete voice_states.camera / voice_states.screenshare column names, and the half of the OC-0023 rationale about neither stream kind hiding from the other's count. All three restored. - ws/voice_join.go: `maxUsers := ch.VoiceMaxUsers` had been hoisted to the top of voiceJoinComplete, moving a read across the tail supersession guard. The read is inert, but it was the one statement in that commit whose position relative to a security guard changed; it now sits at its use, as before. - ws/*_test.go: three test comments cited voice_join.go line numbers that the split invalidated. They now cite the helper by name instead. - service/message_reactions.go: reactionAudience's doc claimed to enforce "every gate on reacting"; it enforces the channel-scoped ones, and the doc now says which gates stay with the caller. - api/emoji_handler.go: the readEmojiUpload call reused the outer `ok` from the auth check by assignment; it gets its own readOK. - admin/setup_handler.go: a moved comment kept a "the response above" deictic that no longer had a response above it. No behaviour change. Build, vet, full tests and -race on five packages green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(ws): clear the remaining complexity budgets across the hub Eight files, thirteen findings. Each function is split at the stages it already had; no branch is reordered, merged or inverted. - handlers.go handleMessage (cyclop 28, 88 stmts): session re-check, frame decode and result application become handleMessageSessionRecheck, handleMessageDecode and handleMessageApply. The V2 constructor lookup -> DispatchV2 -> Result resolution order is untouched. - serve_ready.go buildReady (cyclop 26, 61 stmts): the per-section fetches split out, readyChannelPayloads among them. Every visibility predicate is preserved verbatim — this is the payload that decides what a client may see. - serve_pumps.go writePump (cyclop 31): writePumpWrite, writePumpDeliver, writePumpDrainChannel and writePumpDrainAndClose. Every channel receive stays in the same select statement, so scheduling is unchanged. - hub_sweep.go sweepStaleVoiceStates (cyclop 22, 56 stmts): the staleness predicate, the hub-lock ordering and the position of the race hook are all as they were — handleVoiceJoin's BUG-088 ordering depends on them. - hub_broadcast.go channelReadAudienceImpl and RefreshChannelVisibility (cyclop 22 each, 57 stmts): channelReadAudienceDM and refreshChannelVisibilityCanSend. The audience predicate is the OC-0090 group-DM leak surface, so it is extracted, never simplified. - livekit_webhook.go (nestif 13 and 14): webhookJoinedEnforceVoiceState, webhookLeftCleanupClient and webhookLeftFinishLeave. DB delete still precedes broadcast on every path. - livekit_download.go EnsureLiveKitBinary (52 stmts): one extraction, ensureLiveKitStageBinary, keeping every archive path check intact. - voice_moderation.go (nestif 8): voiceModDeafenRollback. The persisted server_muted flag remains the authority. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): clear the remaining complexity budgets across the HTTP layer - router.go NewRouter (cyclop 28, 84 stmts): split by wiring concern into routerTOTPKey, routerHealthDeps, routerMiddleware, routerUploadRoutes, routerPluginWiring, routerVoiceRoutes and routerMetricsRoutes. Middleware ORDER is a security property (auth before handler, WAF before body parse, rate limit before work) and is unchanged; the returned cleanup func still closes over and releases everything it did before. - auth_handler.go handleRegister (133 lines) and handleLogin (cyclop 21, 152 lines): registerPolicyGate, registerReadRequest, loginReadRequest and loginAuthenticate. The always-compare posture, every rate-limit key, every counter reset and the ban-check-versus-password-compare order are all preserved — including loginUserFailureThreshold staying unscaled by scaledAuthLimit, which is deliberate and commented. - upload_handler.go handleServeFile (cyclop 31, 128 lines): serveFileResolve and serveFileAuthorize. Every header this sets — Content-Disposition included, which is what stops a stored file being served as active content — is still set with the same value in the same circumstances. - profile_handler.go handleUploadAvatar (120 lines): avatarUploadReadImage, mirroring readEmojiUpload in shape but with the avatar caps and MIME set. The two deliberately do not share a helper. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: clear the last complexity budgets in db and admin - db/account.go DeleteAccount (cyclop 28, 55 stmts): grouped by subsystem into deleteAccountAdminGuard, deleteAccountDMChannels and deleteAccountCloseDMChannels, each taking the same transaction. The transaction boundary, the delete ORDER (which foreign keys depend on) and the rollback path are unchanged. - admin/logstream.go handleLogStream (cyclop 24): logStreamAuthorize. Flush cadence, heartbeat and disconnect detection untouched. - admin/setup_wizard.go validateWizard (cyclop 23): grouped by section into wizardValidateIdentity, wizardValidateNetwork and wizardValidateMedia. Every message and bound is unchanged — this is the first input-validation boundary on a fresh server, before any auth exists. With this the tree is at zero: golangci-lint run reports 0 issues against the budgets set in #1384 (funlen 100/50, cyclop 20, nestif 8, dupl 150), with no //nolint and no exclusion added anywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
332 lines
13 KiB
Go
332 lines
13 KiB
Go
package ws
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"github.com/livekit/protocol/auth"
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"github.com/livekit/protocol/livekit"
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"github.com/livekit/protocol/webhook"
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)
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// webhookMaxBodyBytes bounds the webhook request body to prevent unbounded
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// reads from an unauthenticated caller.
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const webhookMaxBodyBytes = 64 * 1024
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// NewLiveKitWebhookHandler returns an HTTP handler that processes LiveKit
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// webhook events. It synchronises LiveKit room state back into OwnCord's
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// voice_states DB — primarily for crash recovery when a participant
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// disconnects from LiveKit without sending a WS voice_leave.
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//
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// Speaker detection is handled client-side via LiveKit's
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// RoomEvent.ActiveSpeakersChanged (lower latency than webhooks).
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func (h *Hub) NewLiveKitWebhookHandler(apiKey, apiSecret string) http.HandlerFunc {
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// The SDK receiver verifies the token signature AND that the token's sha256
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// claim matches the request body hash, binding verification to the body so
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// a captured token cannot be replayed against a forged payload.
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provider := auth.NewSimpleKeyProvider(apiKey, apiSecret)
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Check Authorization header BEFORE reading the body to avoid
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// allocating memory for unauthenticated requests.
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if r.Header.Get("Authorization") == "" {
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slog.Warn("livekit webhook: missing Authorization header")
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http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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// Bound the body before the SDK reads it (ReceiveWebhookEvent uses an
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// unbounded io.ReadAll internally).
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r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, webhookMaxBodyBytes)
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// ReceiveWebhookEvent verifies the JWT signature, the token's body-hash
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// claim, and the exp/nbf claims, then parses the payload. This replaces
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// the previous manual ParseAPIToken/Verify sequence, which was not bound
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// to the request body (forgery/replay).
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event, err := webhook.ReceiveWebhookEvent(r, provider)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("livekit webhook: verification failed", "error", err)
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http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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slog.Info("livekit webhook received",
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"event", event.Event,
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"room", event.GetRoom().GetName(),
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"participant", event.GetParticipant().GetIdentity(),
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)
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switch event.Event {
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case "participant_joined":
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h.handleWebhookParticipantJoined(r.Context(), event)
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case "participant_left":
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h.handleWebhookParticipantLeft(r.Context(), event)
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default:
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slog.Debug("livekit webhook: unhandled event", "event", event.Event)
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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}
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}
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// parseParticipantIdentity extracts a user ID and optional join token from a
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// LiveKit participant identity formatted as "user-{id}" or
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// "user-{id}:{joinToken}".
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func parseParticipantIdentity(identity string) (int64, string, error) {
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if !strings.HasPrefix(identity, "user-") {
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return 0, "", fmt.Errorf("invalid identity format: %s", identity)
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}
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body := identity[5:]
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idPart, joinToken, _ := strings.Cut(body, ":")
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userID, err := strconv.ParseInt(idPart, 10, 64)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, "", err
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}
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return userID, joinToken, nil
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}
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// parseRoomChannelID extracts a channel ID from a LiveKit room name
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// formatted as "channel-{id}".
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func parseRoomChannelID(roomName string) (int64, error) {
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if !strings.HasPrefix(roomName, "channel-") {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid room name format: %s", roomName)
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}
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return strconv.ParseInt(roomName[8:], 10, 64)
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}
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func (h *Hub) handleWebhookParticipantJoined(ctx context.Context, event *livekit.WebhookEvent) {
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// Detach from the triggering HTTP request before doing any cleanup work,
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// mirroring every sibling teardown path (readPump's defer and
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// unregisterFailedHandshake use context.WithoutCancel in serve.go /
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// serve_pumps.go, rollbackVoiceJoin uses it in voice_join.go, the hub
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// sweeps use context.Background in hub_sweep.go). Without this, a webhook
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// sender (LiveKit) that hangs up mid-request cancels r.Context(), and the
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// rogue-participant GetVoiceState/RemoveParticipant calls below would
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// either wrongly skip (treating a cancelled read as a transient error, ok)
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// or fail outright instead of completing the eviction.
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ctx = context.WithoutCancel(ctx)
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p := event.GetParticipant()
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room := event.GetRoom()
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if p == nil || room == nil {
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return
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}
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userID, joinToken, err := parseParticipantIdentity(p.Identity)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("livekit webhook: participant_joined bad identity",
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"identity", p.Identity, "error", err)
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return
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}
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channelID, err := parseRoomChannelID(room.Name)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("livekit webhook: participant_joined bad room",
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"room", room.Name, "error", err)
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return
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}
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slog.Info("livekit webhook: participant joined",
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"user_id", userID,
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"channel_id", channelID,
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"room", room.Name)
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// Validate that the participant has a matching voice_states row (BUG-127).
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// A replayed token from a previous session will not have a matching row,
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// so we remove the rogue participant from LiveKit.
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if h.db != nil {
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h.webhookJoinedEnforceVoiceState(ctx, userID, channelID, joinToken)
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}
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}
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// webhookJoinedEnforceVoiceState is the voice_states reconciliation stage of
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// handleWebhookParticipantJoined: it matches the joining participant against
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// their DB row and removes them from the SFU when the row is missing, points
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// at another channel, or carries a different join token. Callers guarantee
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// h.db != nil.
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func (h *Hub) webhookJoinedEnforceVoiceState(ctx context.Context, userID, channelID int64, joinToken string) {
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state, stateErr := h.db.GetVoiceState(ctx, userID)
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if stateErr != nil {
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// A transient read failure (I/O error, lock contention, a
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// maintenance window) is not proof of a rogue participant —
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// treating it as one would eject a legitimate participant from
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// the SFU on a single bad read. Mirrors sweepStaleVoiceStates'
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// hasChannelPermChecked guard: skip and let the participant be;
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// a later webhook retry or sweep tick resolves it.
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slog.Error("livekit webhook: GetVoiceState failed, skipping rogue-participant check",
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"error", stateErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
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return
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}
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if state == nil || state.ChannelID != channelID {
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slog.Warn("livekit webhook: rogue participant_joined — no matching voice state, removing",
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"user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
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if h.livekit != nil {
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if rmErr := h.livekit.RemoveParticipant(ctx, channelID, userID, joinToken); rmErr != nil {
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slog.Error("livekit webhook: failed to remove rogue participant",
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"error", rmErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
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}
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}
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return
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}
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// Verify join token matches to prevent token replay from old sessions.
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if joinToken != "" && state.JoinedAt != joinToken {
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slog.Warn("livekit webhook: stale join token on participant_joined, removing",
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"user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID,
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"expected_token", state.JoinedAt, "got_token", joinToken)
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if h.livekit != nil {
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if rmErr := h.livekit.RemoveParticipant(ctx, channelID, userID, joinToken); rmErr != nil {
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slog.Error("livekit webhook: failed to remove stale participant",
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"error", rmErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
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}
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}
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return
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}
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}
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func (h *Hub) handleWebhookParticipantLeft(ctx context.Context, event *livekit.WebhookEvent) {
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// Detach from the triggering HTTP request before doing any cleanup work
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// (OC-0018), mirroring every sibling teardown path (readPump's defer and
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// unregisterFailedHandshake use context.WithoutCancel in serve.go /
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// serve_pumps.go, rollbackVoiceJoin uses it in voice_join.go, the hub
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// sweeps use context.Background in hub_sweep.go). Without this, a webhook
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// sender (LiveKit) that hangs up mid-request cancels r.Context(), which
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// makes channelReadAudience's GetChannel call fail and fail closed to an
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// empty audience (hub_broadcast.go) — silently dropping the voice_leave
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// for anyone who has READ_MESSAGES on the channel but is not currently in
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// the room. Unlike the DB row, no sweep ever re-emits that missed
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// broadcast. The same cancellation would also make both
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// LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch branches below fail on their synchronous first
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// attempt.
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ctx = context.WithoutCancel(ctx)
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p := event.GetParticipant()
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room := event.GetRoom()
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if p == nil || room == nil {
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return
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}
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userID, joinToken, err := parseParticipantIdentity(p.Identity)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("livekit webhook: participant_left bad identity",
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"identity", p.Identity, "error", err)
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return
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}
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channelID, err := parseRoomChannelID(room.Name)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("livekit webhook: participant_left bad room",
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"room", room.Name, "error", err)
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return
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}
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slog.Info("livekit webhook: participant left",
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"user_id", userID,
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"channel_id", channelID)
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// Clean up voice state if the user disconnected from LiveKit
|
|
// without sending a WS voice_leave (e.g. crash, network loss, F5 reload).
|
|
h.mu.RLock()
|
|
c, exists := h.clients[userID]
|
|
h.mu.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
if exists {
|
|
h.webhookLeftCleanupClient(ctx, c, userID, channelID, joinToken)
|
|
} else if h.db != nil {
|
|
// Client already disconnected from WS — use channel-conditional delete
|
|
// to avoid wiping a newer row if the user reconnected and rejoined.
|
|
deleted, dbErr := h.db.LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch(ctx, userID, channelID, joinToken)
|
|
if dbErr != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("livekit webhook: LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch failed (client gone)",
|
|
"error", dbErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
|
|
} else if deleted {
|
|
h.broadcastVoiceEvent(ctx, channelID, buildVoiceLeave(channelID, userID))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// webhookLeftCleanupClient is the still-connected-client stage of
|
|
// handleWebhookParticipantLeft: it compare-and-clears the client's voice
|
|
// fields for this exact join instance, then either finishes the leave or, when
|
|
// the client has already moved on, clears the stale DB row.
|
|
func (h *Hub) webhookLeftCleanupClient(ctx context.Context, c *Client, userID, channelID int64, joinToken string) {
|
|
// Atomic compare-and-clear under c.voiceMu, replacing the previous
|
|
// read-then-read-then-clear: two independent unlocked getVoiceState
|
|
// snapshots followed by an unconditional clearVoiceState is not a
|
|
// guard at all — no lock spans the second read and the clear, so a
|
|
// voice_join committed on the readPump goroutine in between (a
|
|
// channel switch, or a same-channel rejoin with a fresh token) is
|
|
// wiped out from under the new session, dropping its VoiceTopic
|
|
// subscription along with it. client.go's clearVoiceStateIfMatch
|
|
// only compares the channel, not the token, so it would still be
|
|
// fooled by a same-channel rejoin — this compares both, inlined here
|
|
// via direct field access (same package as client.go) under the
|
|
// client's own voiceMu.
|
|
c.voiceMu.Lock()
|
|
matched := c.voiceChID == channelID && c.voiceJoinToken != "" && c.voiceJoinToken == joinToken
|
|
if matched {
|
|
c.voiceChID = 0
|
|
c.voiceJoinToken = ""
|
|
c.e2eePubKey = ""
|
|
c.e2eeSignature = ""
|
|
}
|
|
c.voiceMu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
if matched {
|
|
h.webhookLeftFinishLeave(ctx, c, userID, channelID, joinToken)
|
|
} else if h.db != nil {
|
|
// Client has voiceChID=0 or moved to a different channel (e.g.
|
|
// after F5 reload), or this webhook is for an older join instance.
|
|
deleted, dbErr := h.db.LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch(ctx, userID, channelID, joinToken)
|
|
if dbErr != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("livekit webhook: LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch failed (stale DB row)",
|
|
"error", dbErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
|
|
} else if deleted {
|
|
h.broadcastVoiceEvent(ctx, channelID, buildVoiceLeave(channelID, userID))
|
|
slog.Info("livekit webhook: cleaned stale DB voice row after reconnect",
|
|
"user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// webhookLeftFinishLeave is the tear-down stage of webhookLeftCleanupClient,
|
|
// reached once the client's voice fields matched this join instance and were
|
|
// cleared: drop the voice subscription, clear the DB row, move the E2EE key
|
|
// holder on, and broadcast the leave.
|
|
func (h *Hub) webhookLeftFinishLeave(ctx context.Context, c *Client, userID, channelID int64, joinToken string) {
|
|
h.pubsub.Unsubscribe(c, VoiceTopic(channelID))
|
|
|
|
if h.db != nil {
|
|
if err := leaveVoiceChannelWithRetry(ctx, h, userID, channelID, joinToken); err != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("livekit webhook: LeaveVoiceChannel exhausted retries",
|
|
"error", err, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// This participant is out of voice, so the E2EE key holder may
|
|
// need to move. Without this the map keeps naming the departed
|
|
// user and the real lowest-uid participant's rekey offers are
|
|
// rejected with NOT_KEY_HOLDER. Safe here: no locks are held.
|
|
h.updateKeyHolder(channelID)
|
|
|
|
// The leaver's own client state was just cleared above, so
|
|
// broadcastVoiceEvent's still-in-the-room union can no longer see
|
|
// them — without broadcastVoiceEventWithLeaver's extra term, a
|
|
// participant without READ_MESSAGES on this channel (voice
|
|
// membership needs only CONNECT_VOICE) never learns the server
|
|
// already tore down their call. Mirrors finishVoiceLeave and
|
|
// CleanupVoiceForChannel, which add the leaver for the same reason.
|
|
h.broadcastVoiceEventWithLeaver(ctx, channelID, buildVoiceLeave(channelID, userID), userID)
|
|
slog.Info("livekit webhook: cleaned up stale voice state",
|
|
"user_id", userID,
|
|
"channel_id", channelID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MountWebhookRoute is a helper for the router to mount the webhook endpoint.
|
|
func MountWebhookRoute(h *Hub, apiKey, apiSecret string) http.HandlerFunc {
|
|
return h.NewLiveKitWebhookHandler(apiKey, apiSecret)
|
|
}
|