J3vbandClaude Opus 4.8 ef1aca8a67 fix(e2ee): pin the verified identity key on re-pin, rekey on keyed-peer leave ...

Multi-agent F3 security review surfaced two voice-E2EE defects:

- Re-pin TOCTOU (voice-E2EE MITM): the identity-mismatch modal showed a
  fingerprint from one membersStore read, but rePinPeerIdentity re-read the
  server-writable store to decide what to pin. A malicious server (F3's threat
  model) could swap in an attacker key via a user_update during the human
  out-of-band verification window and have it pinned, silently defeating the
  mismatch prompt. rePinPeerIdentity now takes the exact verified key as a
  parameter; ChannelSidebar passes the bytes whose fingerprint it displayed.

- Membership forward secrecy: the key holder rotated the room key only when the
  holder ROLE transferred, so a departed non-key-holder kept a valid room key
  until the next periodic (<=5 min) rotation. The holder now also rotates when a
  peer that held the key leaves (reusing rotateKeyPeriodically), gated on the
  leaver having actually held a key.

Client gates green: typecheck, lint (0 errors), prettier, vitest (3361).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-07-24 08:55:07 +02:00

..

tauri-client

fix(e2ee): pin the verified identity key on re-pin, rekey on keyed-peer leave

2026-07-24 08:55:07 +02:00